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  • 301.
    Nyberg, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Viotti, Staffan
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    The Policy Conflict between Internal and External Balance under Fixed Exchange Rates: An Optimizing Approach1973Report (Other academic)
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  • 302.
    Olovsson, Conny
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Social Security and the Equity Premium Puzzle2004Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper shows that social security may be an important factor in explaining the equity premium puzzle. In the absence of shortselling constraints, the young shortsell bonds to the middle-aged and buy equity. Social security reduces the bond demand of the middle-aged, thereby restricting the possibilities of the young to finance their equity purchases. Their equity demand increases as does the average return to equity. Social security also increases the covariance between future consumption and the equity income of the young. The effect on the equity premium is substantial. In fact, a model with social security and borrowing constraints can generate a fairly realistic equity premium.

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  • 303.
    Olovsson, Conny
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Welfare Gains of Improving Risk Sharing in Social Security2004Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper shows that improved intergenerational risk sharing in social security may imply very large welfare gains, amounting to up to 15 percent of the per-period consumption relative to the current U.S. consumption. Improved risk sharing raises welfare through a direct effect, i.e., by correcting an initially inefficient allocation of risk, and through a general equilibrium (GE) effect. The GE effect is due to the fact that the allocation of risk in the pay-as-you-go system influences the demand for capital. As a result, with an efficient risk sharing arrangement, the crowding out effect associated with an unfunded system can actually be completely eliminated. Efficient risk sharing in social security implies highly volatile and pro-cyclical benefits, i.e., that retirees’ exposure to productivity risk is increased. Consequently, a policy involving completely safe benefits will unambiguously be welfare reducing.

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  • 304.
    Olovsson, Conny
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Why do Europeans Work so Little?2004Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Market work per person is roughly 10 percent higher in the U.S. than in Sweden. However, if we include the work carried out in home production, the total amount of work only differs by 1 percent. I set up a model with home production, and show that differences in policy – mainly taxes – can account for the discrepancy in labor supply between Sweden and the U.S. Moreover, even though the elasticity of labor supply is rather low for individual households, labor taxes are estimated to be associated with considerable output losses. I also show that policy can account for the falling trend in market work in Sweden since 1960. The largest reduction occurs from 1960 until around d1980. both in the model and the data. After the early 1980s, the trends for both taxes and actual hours worked are basically flat. This is also true for hours worked in the model.

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  • 305.
    Ortega, Javier
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    How (Good) Immigration is: A Matching Analysis1996Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We present a dynamic two-country labour matching economy. Workers decide whether to search in their native country (paying a small cost) or to look for a job abroad (bearing an additional cost). Firms choose the number of vacancies they post in each country according to the average workers' characteristics inside it. Wages are determined in an individual Nash bargaining. We show the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria: a no-migration equilibrium and two migration equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria comes from a self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon linking labour demand and incentives to migration. The equilibria are Pareto-ranked, with migration-equilibria dominating no-migration.

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  • 306.
    Palmqvist, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling1998Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the use of announcements of objectives or intentions, announcements which are common in implementation of monetary policy. To analyze such announcements, this paper uses a model in which there is assymetric information over the central bank's objectives. This informational asymmetry is represented by a scholastic inflation target, upon which only the central bank can condition its actions. Thus, the scope is set for signalling, and the use of announcements can be seen as a way for a central bank to signal its type. This paper assumes that a central bank can signal at its own discretion and shows that while central banks with high inflation targets never use announcements, central banks with low inflation targets occasionally, but not always, will choose to reveal their private iformation through an announcement. A first finding is that, contrary to what a cheap-talk equilibrium suggests, the announcements may be more precise the larger the central bank's equilibrium suggests, the announcements may be more precise the larger the central bank's news. Moreover, this paper shows that the frequency of announcements is unambiguously increasing in the magnitude of the central bank's news, something that goes well in line with what is typically found in actual implementation of monetary policy.

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  • 307.
    Peregrim Marion, Nancy
    et al.
    Dartmouth College.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Structural Differences and Macroeconomic Adjustment to Oil-Price Changes: A Three-Country Approach1983Report (Other academic)
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  • 308.
    Persson, Joakim
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Convergence in Per Capita Income and Migration Across the Swedish Counties 1906-19901995Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper finds strong and robust evidence of convergence in per capita income across the twenty-four Swedish counties 1906-1990. It is found that migration has a positive effect, albeit small, on the speed of convergence. Holding net migration constant, the estimated speed of convergence is around 3 percent per year, which is higher than etimates obtained by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) for other regional data sets. One likely explanation of this finding is that the current study, as opposed to previous studies, adjusts incomes to account for regional differences in cost of living.

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  • 309.
    Persson, Joakim
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Malmberg, Bo
    Institute for Building Research (Gävle, Sweden).
    Human Capital, Demographics and Growth Across the US States 1920-19901996Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper finds robust evidence that age structure matters for subsequent growth in per capita income across the US states 1920-1990. The age groups 25-65 year are positively related to subsequent per capita income growth. Another conclusion is that the average years of schooling affects subsequent per capita income growth positively when age structure is controlled for. Moreover, the estimated speed of convergence (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) increases substantially when schoolingand age structure are held constant in the income growth regressions.

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  • 310.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Distortive Taxation can Increase Welfare: If Relative Consumption Matters1993Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Contrary to what is assumed in traditional microeconomic theory, social rank seems to play a large role in actual human interaction. In the present paper I analyze the implications of a relative consumption, or relative income, externality (i.e., relative consumption ci/cj, and not only absolute consumption ci, enters into the utility function of agent i). This means that people will tend to work too much. In an optimal taxation framework, i show that a fairly high marginal tax rate can be Pareto efficient.

     

     

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  • 311.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Five Fallacies in the Social Security Debate2000Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper discusses five examples of the conventional wisdom that has often been expressed in the social security debate, even among academic economists. These are: 1. The major problem in most social security systems is that of demography: people simply live too long. 2. Disregarding the issue of demography, a Pay-As-You-Go system is inferior to a fully funded system since the former usually has a lower rate of return. 3. Disregarding the porfolio aspect (which might favor a PAYG system), a funded system dominates a PAYG system in a world of certainty. 4. The social security system is a suitable isntrument for intergenerational risk-sharing. 5. The government is a safe and reliable provider of insurance.

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  • 312.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Voting over the Size of Government1985Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the provision of a public good from three points of view: (i) The maximum level of production of the public good consistent with a Pareto optimum, (ii) The level of production of the good maximizing a social welfare function, and (iii) The level of production of the public good that will be the result of a democratic system with majority voting. The paper analyzes how these three levels of production differ from each other.

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  • 313.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example1996Report (Other academic)
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  • 314.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy1985Report (Other academic)
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  • 315.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy – the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment – can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying policies with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our resuklts with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).

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  • 316.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sandmo, Agnar
    Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
    Taxation and Tournaments2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labour supply and income distribution in the context of the rank-order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non-zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society’s welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.

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  • 317.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Siven, Claes-Henric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    An intertemporal general equilibrium model of criminal behavior is used to analyze the effect on crime of changing policy parameters. The policy parameters are the length of the prison term, the severity of punishment, and the amount of police resources. The number of crimes in society can be decomposed into an incentive part, an incarceration part, and a crime competition part. The magnitudes of these three components are studied by means of empirical data from England and the US.

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  • 318.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Siven, Claes-Henric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in Becker’s (1986) model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and sometimes quite low. In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical observations.

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  • 319.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Alternative Transactions Variables in Money Demand Equations: A Note on the Baumol-Tobin Theory1979Report (Other academic)
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  • 320.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Credibility of Macroeconomic Policy: An Introduction and a Broad Survey1987Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a broad survey of the work on credibility of macroeconomic policy since the early 80's. I critically evaluate a first generation of work dealing with the basic credibility problem that arises when policy cannot be precommited and when a desireable policy fails to be ex post optimal. Then, the desireable policy is not credible to the private sector. The work I discuss, deals with credibility problems in three different areas of macroeconomics (i) "anti-inflationary monetary policy", (ii) "macroeconomic public finance", and (iii) "policy coordination". The first generation of work leaves several issues unresolved, however, and a second generation of work dealing with these unresolved issues is currently developing. I also discuss this very recent work and make some suggestions for future research.

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  • 321.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Deficits and Intergenerational Welfare in Open Economies1984Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with public debt in open economies, extending Diamond's overlapping generations model to a small open economy as well as an international equilibrium of two large economies. It focuses on the intergenerational welfare redistributions caused by an increase in public debt triggered by a temporary government budget deficit, and shows how these redistributions differ in open and closed economies. The interplay between the deficits in the government budget and the current account is also analyzed. It is shown how a single period with a government deficit can be followed by a sequence of periods with a deficit in the current account.

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  • 322.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Politics and Economic Policy1992Report (Other academic)
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  • 323.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Real Transfers in Fixed Exchange Rate Systems and the International Adjustment Mechanism1983Report (Other academic)
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  • 324.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Roland, Gerard
    ECARE, University of Brussels (Belgium).
    Tabellini, Guido
    IGIER, Bocconi University (Milan, Italy).
    Comparative Politics and Public Finance1997Report (Other academic)
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  • 325.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Roland, Gerard
    Université Libre de Bruxelles.
    Tabellini, Guido
    Bocconi University.
    Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics1996Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the apponted policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters, in two distinct ways. First, it can elicit information held by the appointed officials and not otherwise available to the voters. Second, by playing one body against the other and by aligning the interest of the weaker body with their own, the voters can induce the two bodies to discipline each other. Separation of power only works to the voters' advantage if it is appropriately designed, however, and it can be detrimental if it creates a "common pool" problem. These advantages of separation of powers are present both in Presidential and in Parliamentary democracies. Government appointed rules in Parliamentary democracies must be appropriately designed, however, to prevent collisuon.

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  • 326.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Checks and Balances on the Government Budget1987Report (Other academic)
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  • 327.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Current Account Dynamics and the Terms of Trade: Harberger-Laursen-Metzler Two Generations Later1984Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a study of the current account dynamics resulting from the savings and investment dynamics in a small open economy which is subject to exogenous changes in its terms of trade and in world interest rates.

    Anticipated and unanticipated, as well as temporary and permanent, terms of trade changes have very different effects. There is, however, a general tendency towards cycles in both savings and investment, which gives rise to cycles in the current account.

    It is shown that the classic Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect on saving of a terms of trade deterioration can have any sign for plausible parameter values, both for temporary and permanent disturbances.

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  • 328.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Exchange Rate Variability and Asset Trade1987Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In popular discussion about the merits of different international monetary arrangements it is often maintained that increased exchange rate variability has a negative influence on international trade and foreign investment. This paper addresses a specific, but also a very basic, aspect of this general issue, namely the effect of exchange rate variability on capital flows and international portfolio diversification. More precisely, we examine how different monetary policies - and among those, policies that aim at stabilizing exchange rate - determine the risk characteristics of nominal assets, and how these risk characteristics in turn affect international portfolio composition and trade in assets, when international asset markets are incomplete.

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  • 329.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    International Borrowing and Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy1984Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We discuss optimal fiscal policy in open economies, using an open-economy version of a model used in the recent work by Lucas and Stokey. An optimal allocation  smooths out the tax distortions associated with financing a given sequence of government consumption, and it also smooths out private consumption of goods and leisure by borrowing (lending) on the international capital market in periods with high (low) government consumption. The main question we ask is how the optimal policy can be made time-consistent, when usccessive governments reoptimize with respect to current and future tax rates, but most honor the government debt obligations. We show that this requires government debt of sufficiently rich maturity to be issued.

    First we treat a case with capital controls, where only the government can borrow and lend abroad. The there is a unique restructuring scheme for the domestic debt that is necessary to give succeeding governments incentives to continue following the optimal policy (here we interpret and extend Lucas and Stokey's results). For a small economy, this scheme is also sufficient for time-consistency, but in an economy large enough to affect its terms of trade, it is also necessary to follow a unique restructuring scheme for the government's (and the country's) foreign debt.

    When there are no capital controls, time-consistency is no longer a problem in a small economy. In a large economy, what matters is total government debt and total foreign debt (but not their composition), and again there are unique maturity structures necessary and sufficient for time-consistency. An interesting observation is that in the distorted world we consider, relaxing the capital controls actually deteriorates welfare.

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  • 330.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Is Optimism Good in a Keynesian Economy?1982Report (Other academic)
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  • 331.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Misperceptions and Welfare1982Report (Other academic)
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  • 332.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tabellini, Guido
    University of Brescia.
    Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Part 1: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard1992Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Inspired by the current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a "federation" of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, while federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a moral hazard problem: federal risk-sharing can induce the local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We investigate this incentive problem under alternative fiscal constitutions. In particular, we contrast a vertically ordered system like the EC with a horizontally ordered federal system like the US. These alternative arrangements are not neutral, in the sense that they create different incentives for policymakers and voters, and give rise to different political equilibria. A general conclusion is that, centralization of functions and power can be welfare improving under appropriate institutions. However, this conclusion only applies to the moral hazard problem and a federation where the countries are not too dissimilar.

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  • 333.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tabellini, Guido
    Università di Brescia.
    Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?1993Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. In a society where distributional conflict is important, political decisions produce economic policies that tax investment and growth promoting activities in order to redistribute income. The paper formulates a theoretical model that captures this idea. The model implications are supported by the evidence. Both historical panel data and post-war cross sectionc indicate a significant and large negative relation between inequality and growth. This relation is only present in democracies.

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  • 334.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tabellini, Guido
    IGIER, Bocconi University (Milan, Italy).
    Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy1997Report (Other academic)
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  • 335.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tabellini, Guido
    University of California.
    The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration1990Report (Other academic)
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  • 336.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tabellini, Guido
    Bocconi University.
    The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians1998Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian - as opposed to proportional - elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential - as opposed to parliamentary - regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, less redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods.

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  • 337.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    van Wijnbergen, Sweder
    World Bank.
    Signalling, Wage Controls and Monetary Disinflation Policy1988Report (Other academic)
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  • 338.
    Prado, Jr., Jose Mauricio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper quantitatively investigates, in general equilibrium, the interaction between the firms’ choice to operate in the formal or the informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement, given a level of regulation. A static version of Ghironi and Melitz’s (2005) industry model is used to show that firms with lower productivity endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector. I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of regulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc) to back out how high the enforcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data. Welfare gains from policy reforms can be fairly large. I find also that welfare gains from reducing regulation are almost twice those computed for the policy reform. Finally, distortions associated with informality account for a factor of 1.5 of the output per capita difference between the richest and the poorest countries.

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  • 339.
    Queijo, Virginia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    How Important are Financial Frictions in the U.S. and the Euro Area?2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper aims to evaluate the importance of frictions in credit markets for business cycles in the U.S. and the Euro area. For this purpose, I modify the DSGE financial accelerator model developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and estimate it using Bayesian methods. The model is augmented with frictions such as price indexation to past inflation, sticky wages, consumption habits and variable capital utilization. My results indicate that financial frictions are relevant in both areas. Using the Bayes factor as criterion, the data favors the model with financial frictions both in the U.S. and the Euro area in five different specifications of the model. Moreover, the size of the financial frictions is larger in the Euro area.

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  • 340.
    Radetzki, Marian
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Aid and Development: Part I: Principles and Methods1972Report (Other academic)
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  • 341.
    Radetzki, Marian
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Aid and Development: Part II: Problems of Application1972Report (Other academic)
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  • 342.
    Radetzki, Marian
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Role of State Owned Enterprises in the International Metal Mining Industry1988Report (Other academic)
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    FULLTEXT01
  • 343.
    Radetzki, Marian
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Swedish Grain Storage Venture in Tanzania: A Micro Evaluation1971Report (Other academic)
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  • 344.
    Radetzki, Marian
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Van Duyne, Carl
    Williams Colleg.
    The Demand for Scrap and Primary Metal Ores After a Decline in Secular Growth1983Report (Other academic)
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    FULLTEXT01
  • 345.
    Razin, Assaf
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University.
    Svensson, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Current Account and the Optimal Government Debt1982Report (Other academic)
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    FULLTEXT01
  • 346.
    Razin, Assaf
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    An Asymmetry between Import and Export Taxes1982Report (Other academic)
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    FULLTEXT01
  • 347.
    Reinikka, Ritva
    et al.
    World Bank.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Working for God?: Evidence from a Change in Financing of Not-for-Profit Health Care Providers in Uganda2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    What motivates religious not-for-profit health care providers? This paper uses a change in financing of not-for-profit health care providers in Uganda to test two theories of organizational behavior. We show that financial aid leads to more laboratory testing, lower user charges, and increased utilization. These findings are consistent with the view that religious not-for-profit providers are intrinsically motivated to serve (poor) people and that these preferences matter quantitatively.

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  • 348.
    Risager, Ole
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Devaluation, Profitability and Investment1984Report (Other academic)
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  • 349.
    Risager, Ole
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Devaluation, Profitability and Investment: A Model with Anticipated Future Wage Adjustment1984Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the role of devaluation in stimulating profitability, investment and economic activity in a rational expectations model with wage contracts which inject an element of short-term nominal wage rigidity.

    It is shown that when real wages are expected to be restored through post-devaluation negotiations then devaluation sets off a cyclical path in the optimal investment rate. The effect on the trade balance in the short term is uncertain, because devaluation increases both saving and investment. Devaluation is in this case neutral with regard to all real variables in the long run.

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  • 350.
    Rose, Andrew K.
    et al.
    Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    European Exchange Rate Credibility Before the Fall1993Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Realignment expectations which measure exchange rate credibility are analyzed for European exchange rates, using daily financial data since the inception of the EMS. It is difficult to find economically meaningful relationships between realignment expectations and macroeconomic variables, although there are signs that lower inflation improves credibility. Statistically, many movements to realignment expectations are common to ERM participants. There were few indications of poor ERM credibility before late August 1992; the dimensions of the currency crisis in September 1992 appear to have been taken both policy-makers and private agents largely by surprise.

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