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  • 151.
    Hamilton, Carl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Economic Aspects of "Voluntary" Export Restraints1984Report (Other academic)
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  • 152.
    Hamilton, Carl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Import Penetration and Import Price Elasticities with Special Reference to Dynamic LDC Export Commodities: The Case of Sweden 1960-751979Report (Other academic)
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  • 153.
    Hamilton, Carl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Public Subsidies to Industry: The Case of Sweden and its Shipbuilding Industry1981Report (Other academic)
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  • 154.
    Hamilton, Carl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Restrictiveness and International Transmission of the "New" Protectionism1986Report (Other academic)
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  • 155.
    Hamilton, Carl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Upgrading Effect of Voluntary Export Restraints1984Report (Other academic)
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  • 156.
    Hamilton, Carl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Voluntary Export Restraints, Trade Diverson and Retaliation1983Report (Other academic)
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  • 157.
    Hamilton, Carl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Voluntary Export Restreints on Asia: Tariff Equivalents, Rents and Trade Barrier Formation1984Report (Other academic)
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  • 158.
    Hamilton, Carl B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    European Community External Protection and 1992: Voluntary Export Restraints Applied to Pacific Asia1990Report (Other academic)
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  • 159.
    Hamilton, Carl B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The New Silk Road to Europe1990Report (Other academic)
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  • 160.
    Hamilton, Carl B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Nordic EFTA Countries and the European Community: Options for the 1990's1990Report (Other academic)
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  • 161.
    Hamilton, Carl B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Transient Nature of "New" Protectionism1988Report (Other academic)
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  • 162.
    Hamilton, Carl B.
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Winters, L. Alan
    University of Birmingham.
    Opening Up International Trade in Eastern Europe1992Report (Other academic)
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  • 163.
    Hamilton, Carl
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Revealed Comparative Advantage: The Case of Sweden1982Report (Other academic)
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  • 164.
    Hamilton, Carl
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Should Direct or Total Factor Intensities be used in Tests of the Factor Proportions Hypothesis in International Trade Theory?1982Report (Other academic)
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  • 165.
    Hamilton, Carl
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Testing Theories of Trade Among Many Countries1982Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The objective with this paper is to test the factor proportions of trade applying the framework of Ronald jones (1974) and Anne Krueger (1977). Krueger, unsatisfied with the standard way of interpreting Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model in empirical testing, concludes "that a meaningful interpretation of the HOS model must lie within the manufacturing sector in a world of many countries. Once focus is so shifted, it becomes immediately apparent that the HOS predictions are more likely to be borne out in patterns of specialization within manufacturing [production] than in comparison of factor proportions in the exporting and importing-competing industries" (p. 43).

    What distinguishes this paper particularly from other empirical studies is that we use production and consumption data in addition to trade data. This enables us to test some additional hypotheses about international trade production and consumption.

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  • 166.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Are they Swinging Together?: A Measure of Linear Comovement with an Application to Swedish and Foreign Business Cycles1993Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A frequency band specific measure of the degree of linear comovement that does not need any assumptions about the structure of the dependence except linearity is defined. The distribution of the measure is simulated using Monte Carlo methods. The sensitivity of the distributions to the characteristics of the underlying processes is substantially reduced if low frequencies, for example the Hodrick-Prescott filter, may be dominated by the behavior at low frequencies. Explicit treatment of different frequency bands may then be preferable. The measure of linear comovement is applied to Swedish and foreign macro time series spanning the period 1861 to 1988. A substantial degree of comovement between Swedish consumption related variables and foreign GDP is found while Swedish GDP and manufacturing production is clearly less covariant with foreign GDP.

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  • 167.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Regime Shifts and Volatility Spillovers in Internationel Stock Markets1995Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A standard capital asset pricing model is extended to allow for stochastic shifts in the volatility of the news process. This model is then estimated on bivariate stock market data to separate two exogenous news processes - a world and a domestic. The results indicate that the influence of the world news process on the Swedish stock market has increased significantly over the period 1970-1995. I also find that the foreign influence is much stronger when the volatility of the world news process is high. Furthermore, when the world state shifts to high risk, the Swedish stock market immediately reacts by a large fall, estimated to 7.0%. The bivariate model is also  estimated on a set of other national stock markets.

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  • 168.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Variations in Risk: A Cause of Fluctuations in Demand?1993Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is a common belief, both among economists and non-economists, that consumers' perception of the riskiness of their future real income is important for economic activity. Studies of the effects of risk on demand have generally assumed away transaction costs. This is critical assumption. Risk in conjunction with transaction costs will give rise to irreversibility effect that are likely to be quantatively important explanations for fluctuations in the demand for duarbles. I will show that the sensitivity for demand to variations in income risk is likely to be much higher for durables than for non-durables. Consumers' perception about the risk facing them presumable varies systematically over the business cycle. Irreversibility effects can then be an important business cycles mechanism. I will present a model in which agents know that the risk of income shocks varies stochastically as opposed to the standard procedure of doing comparative statistics. For durables that are renewed every five years, a temporary increase in the unemployment risk from one to ten percent per year causes  the demand for duarbles to vanish for 3,5 months. The demand then stabilizes at a level 5% lower than before the increase in risk. Furthermore, I show that in contrast to the demand for non-durables, the fall in the demand for durables is larger the shorter the expected duration of the high risk period.

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  • 169.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Variations in Risk as a Cause of Fluctuations in Demand: The Empirics1993Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In a previous paper (Hassler, 1993) I have extended a standard irreversible investment model to the case when risk if known to stochastically fluctuate between two levels. The model is able to generate substantial fluctuations in durables demand if the level of risk is volatile enough. In this paper I estimate a model where risk, defined as the volatility of wealth, fluctuates between two levels. The risk levels and the transition probabilities are estimated using a maximum likelihood method and US aggregate data. Thereafter the likelihood that the U.S. economy is in the high risk state is estimated for each month from 1959 and 1992. These likelihoods are then used to predict the relative level of durables demand. Durables demand is found to be sensitive to the level of financial volatility. A shift to the high level of financial volatility cause an immediate fall in durables purchases of approximately 3%. Car purchases fall by around 7%. The dynamic response to shifts in risk, is not found to be in line with an irreversibility model with only two levels of risk.

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  • 170.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Stability and Optimality of Alternative Pension Systems1997Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In an analysis of the risk-sharing properties of different types of pension systems, we show that only a fixed-fee pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems can provide intergenerational risk sharing for living individuals. Under some circumstances, however, other PAYG pensions systems can enhance the expected welfare of all generations by reducing intergenerational income variability. We derive conditions for this to occur. We also analyze the stability of actuarially far PAYG pensions systems. It is shown that if an actuarially fair pension with a non-balanced budget system is dynamically stable, its accumulated surpluses will converge to the same fund as in a fully funded system. We also show that the welfare loss due to labor market distortions will, surprisingly, increase if the implicit marginal return in a compulsory system raised above the average return.

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  • 171.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Optimal Actuarial Fairness in Pension Systems1996Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A rationale for a compulsory pension system is that the government wants to correct supposedly myopic behavior by the individuals. Given such a system, we calculate the optimal relation between marginal contributions and benefits, i.e., the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness, for the individuals or for the government. We show that the optimal degree of marginal actuarial fairness increases in the rate of return in the social security system and also decreases in the government's rate of time preference. It is also shown that labor supple always increases when the link between marginal contributions and benefits is strengthened.

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  • 172.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rodríguez Mora, José V.
    Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain).
    IQ, Social Mobility and Growth1998Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Intelligent agents may contribute to higher technological growth, if assigned appropriate positions in the economy. These positive effects on growth are unlikely to be internalized ona competitive labor market. The allocation of talent depends on the relative award the market assigns to intelligence versus other individual merits, which will alos influence intergenerational social mobility. To illustrate this, we present an endogenous growth model where each agent can choose to be a worker or an entrepeneur. The reward to entrepeneurs is an endogenous function of the abilities they have been endowed by nature as well as of the amount of knowledge and other social assets they inherit from their parents. When growth is low, the equilibrium in the labor market implies that the reward to entrepeneurs, which will cause low intergenerational social mobility and an inefficient allocation of human resources and, consequently, low growth. On the other hand, there is also a stable equilibrium with high growth  which mitigates the inefficiencies generated by the labor market and implies high intergenerational social mobility.

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  • 173.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rodríguez Mora, José V.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance1999Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism which may generate multiple stady-state equillibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

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  • 174.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente
    Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    A Positive Theory of Geographic Mobility and Social Insurance2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    this paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility, unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote over unemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects of insurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration. Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their current location, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent's attachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UI reduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The main result is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiple steady-states - one "European" steady-state featuring high unemployment, low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one "American" steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility and low unemployment insurance.

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  • 175.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente
    Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Survival of the Welfare State2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides an analytical chracterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a politico-economic model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary incom redistribution. The key feature of the theory is that the future constituency of redistributive policies depends positively on the current level of redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. Agents vote rationally and fully anticipate the effects of their political choice on both private incentives and future voting outcomes. The model features multiple equilibria. In "pro-welfare" equilibria, both welfare state policies and their effects on distribution persist forever. In "anti-welfare equilibria", eben a majority of beneficiaries of redistributive policies vote strategically so as to induce formation of a future majority that will vote for zero redistribution.

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  • 176.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Vicente Rodríguez Mora, José
    Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain).
    Employment Turnover and Unemployment Insurance1997Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Two features distinguish European and US labor markets. First, most European countries have substantially more generous unemployment insurance. Second, the duration of unemployment and employment spells are substantially higher in Europe - employment turnover is lower. We show that self-insruance, i.e., saving and borrowing, is a good substitute for unemployment insurance when turnover is high as in US. If the insurance system is less than perfectly actuarilly fair, the employed median voter he will then prefer to self-insure instead of having unemployment insurance if turnover is high. We also show high unemployment insurance make unemployed more willing to wait for a job with low separation rates. This could make both high turnover/low insurance (US) and low turnover/high insurance (Europe) stable equilibria. Low turnover also leads to a strong divergence between the long and short run interest of the employed.- In absence of devices such that the median voter can bind future voters to some level of insurance, the voting cycle must thus be long in order to support a high level of insurance.

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  • 177.
    Healey, Derek T.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Development Policy: A New Assessment1971Report (Other academic)
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  • 178.
    Healey, Derek T.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Industrialization in the Developing Countries: With Special Reference to Africa1971Report (Other academic)
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  • 179.
    Healey, Derek T.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Planning and Development: The End of an Era1971Report (Other academic)
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  • 180.
    Healey, Derek T.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sweden: Problem and Opportunity1971Report (Other academic)
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  • 181.
    Healey, Derek T.
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    McFarlane, Bruce
    Department of Economics, University of Newcastle.
    The Economic Development of Papua/New Guinea1971Report (Other academic)
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  • 182.
    Henrekson, Magnus
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In order to get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism and not just on contracted hours should be taken into account. In particular, the effects on absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. In this paper we examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using time-series data for Sweden spanning a long period (1955-99) with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects of the expected sign. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permament increases in total sick leave per person employed and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983-91 period.

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  • 183.
    Horn, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Product Diversity, Trade, and Welfare1982Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A two-sector general equilibrium model, where one sector features monopolistic competition, is employed to show that the opening up of international trade migh decrease the likelihood that a market economy exhibits excessive brand proliferation, relative to a first best optimum. The paper also considers the welfare improving potential of the second-best regulatory policies. One is a behavioral regulation that controls each firm's output, but leaves entry and exit free; the other is a structural regulation that determines the number of firms active on the market, but leaves to each firm to determine its output level. It is shown that the opening up of international trade tends to make structural regulation relatively more welfare improving than behavioral regulation.

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  • 184.
    Horn, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Trade Union Determined Wages, Unemployment and the Size of the Public Sector1984Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    the interrelation between the size of the public sector and trade union wage claims is frequently emphasized in the policy debate in smaller developed economies - yet it has attracted very little theoretical analysis. A model comprising a private and a public sector with a wage-setting private sector union is employed in order to focus on possible consequences of the divergence in interests between employed and unemployed workers. It is shown that a reduction in the size of the public sector might cause long-term and even "permanent" unemployment and that a commonly conducted employment stabilization policy might also have structural consequences.

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  • 185.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lang, Harald
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lundgren, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Competition, Long Run Contracts, and Internal Inefficiencies in Firms1991Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Internal reward structures in firms are often integral parts of their "culture", and are changed infrequently in comparision to decisions about e.g., output prices. This paper investigates how this feature of firm organization provides a mechanism through which product market competition affects firm's internal efficiency. The design of firms' internal organization is modeled as a choice of an incentive structure between a principal and an agent, with strategic implications for firm's competitive positions on the product market. It is shown that - contrary to popular beliefs - there is a negative relation between the competitiveness of the product market and effort incentives.

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  • 186.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lang, Harald
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lundgren, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Managerial Effort Incentives, X-Inefficiency and International Trade1991Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper investigates formally the old idea that competition brought about by international trade yields welfare gains by reducing internal slack - "X-inefficiency" - in firms. The paper employs a contract-theoretic based, general equilibrium, trade model to demonstrate how international trade affects the contractual relationship in firms so as to induce more managerial effort supply. This increased effort supply is shown to be beneficial from a welfare perspective, partly because firms are X-inefficient. But, while these results partly confirm the economic "folklore", the folklore can be questioned on other grounds.

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  • 187.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lang, Harald
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lundgren, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    "X"-Inefficiency and International Competition1990Report (Other academic)
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  • 188.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Exchange Rate Policy, Wage Formation, and Credibility1985Report (Other academic)
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  • 189.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Trade Unions and Optimal Labor Contracts1984Report (Other academic)
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  • 190.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wolinsky, Asher
    Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
    Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger1988Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. It combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input prices and profits are affected by the structures of the upstream and the downstream industries, by the demand relations among the final products, and by the nature of the bargaining between the suppliers and firms. The implications for the incentives for merger turn out to be significantly different from what they would be in an alternative environment where prices are not determined in bargaining.

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  • 191.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wolinsky, Asher
    Hebrew University.
    Wages, Employment, and the Structure of Bargaining1985Report (Other academic)
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  • 192.
    Jacobson, Tor
    et al.
    Department of Statistics, Uppsala University.
    Vredin, Anders
    Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Warne, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Are Real Wages and Unemployment Related?1993Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we propose an alternative method for investigating the sources behind the behavior of real wages and unemployment. The statistical model we study is a certain structural error correction model, a so called common trends model, which has become popular in the empirical growth/business cycle literature. The system consists of real output, employment, unemployment and the product real wage and two exogenous stochastic variables, a tax wedge and a currency basket index. Based on quarterly Swedish data (1965-90) we find evidence supporting a short run but not a medium or long run relation.

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  • 193.
    Jacobson, Tor
    et al.
    Department of Statistics, Uppsala University.
    Vredin, Anders
    Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Warne, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Common Trends and Hysteresis in Unemployment1994Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We examine the sources of labor market fluctuations in the Scandinavian countries using VAR models with common trends. Our primary concerns are the sources of hysteresis in unemployment and possible differences between the economies. A simple economic model is presented to motivate our identifying assumptions. We show how estimates of the theoretical parameters may be obtained from the estimated common trends coefficients. The empirical results suggest that (i) the only common source of hysteresis in the Scandinavian labor markets is shocks to wage setting (or, equivalently, equilibrium unemployment); (ii) transitory labor demand shocks, which are emphasized in the theoretical literature on hysteresis, do not seem to be empirically important.

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  • 194.
    Johansson, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the interaction between time inconsistency problems in labor market policy and monetary policy. When both policies are discretionary, there is a positive inflation bias, whereas the bias market programs may be either positive or negative. A commitment of labor market programs to zero increases inflation, as compared to the case when both labor market policy and monetary policy are discretionary. Delegation of labor market policy to a liberal labor market board may improve the discretionary outcome, even if labor market programs crowd out regular employment. A conservative central bank always reduces the social loss, even when monetary policy interacts with labor market policy.

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  • 195.
    Jonsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Monetary Politics and Unemployment Persistence1995Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a simple positive model of monetary policy that allows for persistent unemployment. Monetary policy incentives are thus studied in a dynamic context, rather than in the more common repeated game setting. The main results are as follows: When unemployment is persistent, the credibility problem implies both a more severe inflation bias as well as stabilization bias. However, a simple state contingent performance contract eliminates both biases. Moreover, if policymakers with different preferences alternate in office following general elections, monetary policy becomes subject to various strategic political considerations. Monetary policy is used to influence future policymaking by affecting future government's incentive constraints, but it is also used to increase the incumbent's probability of re-election. The resulting political business cycle in monetary policy is fundamentally different for left-wing and right-wing oriented governments.

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  • 196.
    Jonsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Klein, Paul
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Stochastic Fiscal Policy and the Swedish Business Cycle1995Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we show that fluctuations in distortive taxes account for some of the key features of the Swedish post-war business cycle. The empirical fit of a simple stochastic growth model is dramatically improved when it is amended to include imperfectly predictable fluctuations in payroll taxes, consumption taxes and the degree of progressivity of income taxes. Indeed, using the simulated method of moments, SMM, we find that for large sets of conventional moments the tax-model cannot be statistically rejected, whereas a no-tax-model is always strongly rejected. In particular, allowing for stochastic fiscal policy brings the model's predicted correlation between labor input and the real wage, as well as the standard deviation of labor input and consumption relative to that of output, much more in line with the empirical evidence.

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  • 197.
    Kleiman, Ephraim
    et al.
    Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
    Michaely, Michael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Measurement of Welfare Loss from Tariffs: Some Further Explorations1973Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Wide currency has been gained in recent years by the so-called "triangles method" for estimating the welfare impact of the imposition of a tariff or its removal. While this approach faces a few well-knnown conceptual problems, it seems that no better substitute has yet been devised for this purpose. In the present paper we shall adopt this method, overlooking its difficulties, and attempt to widen its scope by applying it to issues which seem to have hitherto been subject to only little exposition. Three topics will be dealt with. The first, that of the welfare impact of a customs union, relates the measurement of the resultant gains or losses to the theoretical concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. The second, that of the welfare impact of tariffs imposed on the import of a capital good, incorporates into the analysis the treatment of the dynamic process of adjustment: it will be shown that though protection of a capital good does not affect the eventual size of the capital stock, it causes a welfare loss through its effect in the adjustment path. Finally, we analyze the welfare loss in an industry where protection results in a negative value added, so that the estimated effective rate of protection is negative. It will be shown that while the effective rate itself does not appear in the loss measure, all the components of which it consists participate in determining the size of the loss. First, however, to provide a suitable framework, we shall briefly reconstruct the basic skeleton of the method under consideration.

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  • 198.
    Korkman, Sixten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Foreign Exchange Reserves and the Adjustment Mechanism1973Report (Other academic)
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  • 199.
    Kotlikoff, Laurence J.
    et al.
    Boston University.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem1987Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The solution involves formulating a social contract, institution, or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy. The social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations, who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes. Both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract. For the old generation, breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless, and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it. For the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract.

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  • 200.
    Krugman, Paul R.
    et al.
    Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Inflation, Monetary Velocity and Welfare1982Report (Other academic)
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1234567 151 - 200 of 455
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