A central claim of the NPM doctrine is that public sector organizations will deliver better quality and improve efficiency if managers are given more autonomy in managerial and operational decisions. At the same time the idea is to keep managers under close control, which has led to the introduction of result-control instruments. This balancing strategy is referred to as the paradox of autonomization. There is, however, still scarce knowledge on whether and how the proposed balancing techniques work. Using a unique database on Swedish government agencies this article aims to mitigate this deficiency (N=1752). A balancing strategy is mainly confirmed, since higher managerial and structural autonomy are balanced with more external results control by government. We show that governments’ attempts at more managerial approaches to public service provision in reality add new ex post controls without reducing the old ones. However, policy and financial autonomy are not balanced by increased results control—these dimensions diminish when controlling for budget size. This study is an answer to a general call for more objective measures for evaluating bureaucratic autonomy

The post-NPM debate on government control of state authorities is un-decisive in both problem description and in terms of suggested remedies. ‘Wicked problems’ are said to call for re-integration of state executives, and for enhanced government control in order to increase coordination between public organizations. At the same time, excessive (performance) control is accused of posing a threat to professionalism in the public sector and to its problem solving capacity. In this paper we build upon Verhoest et al’s (2004) suggestion that we need to treat autonomy as a multi-dimensional phenomenon and argue the importance of adopting a nuanced analytical perspective on issues of too much or too little control. Using a unique data set containing information on nearly 20 years of governmental steering as this is expressed in yearly appropriation direction documents (N=1330) issued by the Swedish government, we a) map out how the government’s demand for performance information has developed over time, and b) as we treat performance information demands as one out of many policy instruments in a government’s toolbox we also look for specific and stable combinations of different policy instruments (represented by autonomy dimensions). Our findings show that the number of performance information indicators requested from governments in appropriation direction-documents have on a general level decreased over time. From our bivariate and multivariate analyses we have shown that any government’s inclination to e.g. demand less performance information from its state agencies in general comes with a less autonomous management model for the state agency.

This chapter addresses the degree of autonomy, politicization and coordination capacity in the Nordic countries looking at variations across Nordic countries as well as between Nordic countries and other European models. The importance of the East Nordic model is addressed, and also the ministry-agency divide. In terms of autonomy, a distinction is made between managerial autonomy and autonomy in policy-making, and policy implementation respectively. The chapter looks at the question of increased politicization, that is, the degree to which politicians accept the professional expertise of senior civil servants. The chapter also looks at coordination capacity, addressing hierarchy and network arrangements as well as the quality of coordinating along the vertical and horizontal dimension.

The data in this database has been collected mainly from appropriation directives issued by the Swedish government to 188 central government agencies 1993 to 2017. It contains variables that describe the formal steering tools applied by governments, such as choice of management model, financial steering, organizational steering, performance information demands, etc. It also contains information about agency characteristics and the governments in office.

The purpose of the project is to describe and explain the introduction and the consequences of the current management model of the public sector (management by results) from a democratic theory perspective. Firstly, our aim is to disclose the norms and values that the present model is bearer of. A first step will be to unfold what kind of values that are rewarded in the present model, and thereby also calling the attention to what values that are neglected. A point of reference for this is Elster's "three-cornered dilemma" of constitutionalism, democracy, and efficiency. This analysis of conflicting values will be made on different administrative levels, since the implications are different depending on whether we focus on government steering or the conditions of the service deliverers on the local level. Secondly, we aim to answer the question on why the model was introduced in the first place, and if this process poses any democratic challenges. Our perspective is that the introduction of this model has had far reaching effects for the work of the executive branch, and thereby has had greater constitutional implications than is generally acknowledged. Yet, we also know from earlier research that the introduction of the model was not of great political interest, but is rather the product of a limited number of top civil servants. Simply put, how come that this one particular management model is adopted, and is allowed to dominate, although it has been so highly criticized?

Recurring themes relating to the central constitutional principles of the public sector and the courts can be summarized as administrative dualism and institutional autonomy. The scope of the dual Swedish administrative model, as well as how much institutional autonomy government agencies and the courts are granted by the Constitution, has been strongly debated. These debates exemplify what we refer to as “the Swedish Constitution as a story of unresolved issues.” Paradoxically, substantial constitutional reforms in this area rarely come about due to regular constitutional reform making in Sweden. Instead, they are often the result of formally less demanding political decision making.

This article presents data from a study in which national bureaucrats working in the fieldsof taxation and food law in Sweden and Denmark are asked which legal sources and methods ofinterpretation they use when implementing EU law. The purpose is to contribute to the discussion about European legal method by using social science methodology. National agencies and authorities in the fields of taxation and food law face a multilayered' or multiprincipal' reality in which there is room for policy choices. The answers given by the interviewees speak of a plurality of legalsources, a situation where bureaucrats are becoming reluctant lawmakers instructing others on howEU law is to be applied and where bureaucrats find it necessary to found their decisions on what colleagues within the authority or from other Member States have said about how EU law should be applied.

Rapporten utgör slutredovisningen av en studie av riksdagens roll i planering och uppföljning av beslut som rör vägar och järnvägar.

Studien visar att systemet för planering och uppföljning på området inte fungerar i enlighet med av riksdagen beslutade riktlinjer. Det formella och faktiska styrelseskicket är olika saker. Ansvaret för planering och strategiska analyser

har delegerats till expertmyndigheter, men deras rationella planeringslogik får ibland stå tillbaka för politiska överväganden av annan art.

I rapporten föreslår författaren att riksdagen förbättrar sin uppföljning av den beslutskompetens som delegerats till regeringen och myndigheterna. Den bristande uppföljningen utgör ett demokratiskt underskott i den parlamentariska styrningskedjan.

Studien har genomförts på uppdrag av sveriges riksdag.

The aim of the thesis is to describe and critically examine the parliamentary debate on the role of administrative agencies in Sweden during the period 1975–2000. What views on delegation, administrative discretion and steering tools are advocated by the Swedish political parties? Which is the proper role of administrative agencies in a democracy? The author suggests that agencies might be perceived as obedient tools or as counter powers. The categories can be related to a list of legitimate demands on agencies, such as the demands of the people, the politicians and the law. The Swedish model of administration, formally prescribing “autonomous agencies”, gives an theoretically interesting edge to the fundamental problem of combining political sovereignty with administrative discretion.

The Swedish political parties perceive administrative autonomy to be a practical solution to a practical problem, rather than a question of power distribution. The overall conclusion must be that Swedish parties want agencies to obey rather than to obstruct. But the manifest idea of obedience is somewhat blurred when we consider the parties’ views on control mechanisms more generally. Since the hierarchy of different steering tools is not outlined in any detail, the risk of confusion is evident. Further, despite the fact that rhetoric of non-reform has dominated the Swedish parliament over time, the Swedish model of administration may not be as stable as it would appear. Rather than initiating bold reforms, the parties may opt for incremental change by adjusting the interpretation of the model, including some of its core principles.

I uppsatsen formuleras hypoteser om varför departementsindelningen ändras. Civildepartementets (1982) och miljö- och energidepartementets (1987) inrättande studeras närmare.

The aim of this paper is to describe the real government of Swedish transport politics of today. Several empirical studies of Sweden in the alleged post-corporativistic era are compared and re-analyzed. In what seems to be a more pluralistic setting of ac

The aim of this article is to test two hypotheses regarding bureaucratic role perceptions and the implementation of EU policies at the Member State level. A comparison of national agencies in two different executive settings, the Danish and the Swedish, yields the conclusion that established theories on bureaucratic role perceptions explain differences in policy-making in the late stage of the EU policy process. Interview data supports the first hypothesis: that the main difference between Danish and Swedish national-level bureaucrats is that between perceiving oneself as a national servant (Denmark) and as an independent expert (Sweden). The second hypothesis tested here is that national-level bureaucrats under certain circumstances will perceive themselves as EU servants, and make implementation choices accordingly. Convincing evidence supporting this hypothesis is not found — not even in the case of the food-policy agencies, which are regarded here as the most likely to foster EU servants.

This research contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between agency autonomy and organizational interaction. A comparative design that includes agency managers in Norway and Sweden describing organizational interaction, the measures used and their perceived quality, is applied. Based on observed significant country-related effects, a main conclusion is that strong formal and organizational safeguards of agency autonomy appear to produce positive views on organizational interaction. The unusually strong and clear boundaries that underpin the autonomy of Swedish central government agencies lowers the risks of interacting with others, protecting both turf and mandate.

Here we study how the choice of top management model is related to ex post control of state agencies in the context of Swedish governments and state agencies 2003 to 2016. The empirical question in focus is whether agency top management models are systematically related to governments’ request for performance measurements from agencies. This relationship is studied for 184 Swedish state agencies across time, in a population that contains four different management models (N=1696). Our data enables comparisons between single head management models; collegial/professional organs, and collective/pluralistic management models respectively in this regard. Controlling for budget size, and taking agency task; policy area, and point in time into account, we find that agency top management models have independent effects on the number of performance information requests made by governments.

The overall aim of this paper is to study how governments’ demand for performance information changes over time and across policy sectors. On a more specific note we evaluate a management reform launched by the Swedish right-wing coalition government in 2009. The Swedish implementation of Management By Objectives and Results (MBOR) was heavily criticized in the late 2000s, and calls for a more realistic set of goals for state agencies were made. The number and quality of performance indicators demanded was also put to question. An important conclusion was that since agencies are very different, the government should abandon any thought on a one-size-fits-all management policy. Using large-N data on government steering of Swedish state agencies during the period of 1997 to 2013 we conclude that while the number of performance information demands made has decreased substantially after the reform, the qualitative changes we observe in part move in the opposite direction than intended since governments make more precise demands, and request more information on effects. We also conclude that policy sector specifics (tasks and budget size) to a smaller degree than expected appears to co-vary with the performance information demands made.

This research concludes that the Swedish institution of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) has changed as a result of a top-down reform. The aim of the reform,which was to reduce the number of requests for performance information that thegovernment makes to the central government agencies, has been successfully implemented. In analysing the national government’s requests for performance information from 182 central government agencies (N=1752), this study confirms earlier claims of MBOR de-escalation. De-escalation is explained by stakeholder learning andthe new policy that re-interprets performance management in terms that fit the ideals of New Public Governance. This research concludes that the size of an agency’s budget hasa positive effect on the total number of requests and the government’s interest inquantitative performance indicators. Agency tasks that are relatively easy to measure andcount have a significant positive effect on the number of government requests. Task ismore important than budget size when governments decide what mix of indicators torequest from a specific agency. In this respect, the Swedish government adjusts its requests for information to the agencies’ tasks. The results from this study contribute to the ongoing debate on the application of performance management in a post-New Public Management setting.

In Sweden the institutional setup of semi-autonomous state agencies and local self-government predates some of the objectives of new public management reforms. Nevertheless, from the 1990s Sweden has been a zealous follower of NPM reforms. At present, Swedish top managers identify two main reform trends that correspond with the government’s goals for the public sector. One trend relates to already established management ideas, focusing on transparency, efficiency and performance. Another trend reflects an increased focus on citizenship as a question of consumer satisfaction. Soft steering tools appear to be effective in creating an elite consensus on public management policies.