In most liberal democratic societies there is a recurring public debate about top wages in the public sector. The remuneration of top officials such as legislators, ministers, senior civil servants and senior judges is, indeed, a topic that can be discussed with great passion in the public debate. The reason that this issue attracts public attention is not only the fact that these groups are paid by public funds, but also that the salaries of high public officials are under political control. The latter definitely addresses ethical issues, such as: What can be considered a fair salary? Is there – or what would be – a tenable argument for a specific salary level for these top officials? In the research literature it has been concluded that the amount of rewards offered to high public officials, the manner in which the benefits are awarded, and the differences in rewards among officials within the same political system tell a great deal about how governments function. Hence, the remuneration of top officials can be seen as an important element of public governance (Brans and Peters, 2012). That said, very few academic commentators have in a systematic and comprehensive manner analyzed the validity and consistency of the arguments of this rather disorganized debate. However, in a recently published book titled Paying Our High Public Officials by Teun J. Dekker, the author sets out to fill this research gap. The purpose of the book is to illuminate the debate concerning the proper remuneration of high public officials by applying philosophical methods to political discourse.
This article discusses the effects of standard corruption measurement, as used in comparativeresearch, for its accuracy in estimating and understanding corruption. Implicitly, standard measurementstreat corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon (measured by a single score) that can varyin incidence between countries (or other geographical entities), but not in form. Such measurementsalso tend to equate corruption with bribery. This article argues that the degree to which onedimensionalbribery-focused measurements constitute a suitable proxy for corruption differs acrosscountries (i.e., the measurement discrepancy is not random across countries). In particular, thesemeasurements are ill-suited to capture corruption in established democracies with highly developedeconomies, where corruption is expected to center on gaining access to and influence within strongstate institutions rather than on bribery. Sweden, a “least-corrupt” case, is used to illustrate theeffects of relying on such measurements in such a setting, and to show that whereas bribery mightbe a relatively rare event, undue influence and interest conflicts can be a frequent occurrence.
This article provides a conceptual framework for studies of areas of politics and public policy in which political corruption is most likely to emerge (danger zones). The use of principal-agent theory in qualitative case studies is recommended. This approach gives attention to context, to the specifics of institutional design, and to individual choice as found in the "least corrupt" countries of the world.
Political parties are indispensable actors in representative democracy. However, trust in parties has declined in many democracies. Ethics management is a potential mechanism for parties to keep or strengthen public trust. Previous research about how parties have developed internal ethics mechanisms to promote organisational integrity is scant. This article explores how Swedish parliamentary parties use ethical strategies to uphold standards of conduct for their members. Sweden is a high trust society, but its citizens perceive risks of corrupt influence as relevant. Amongst representative institutions, parties score the lowest levels of trust. Therefore, Swedish parties are interesting to study in order to understand how they uphold integrity standards and assure voters that they are ethical organisations. We show that parties increasingly use formal ethics guidelines to set integrity standards within their organisations and integrity pledges for candidates. Parties also use relatively well-developed monitoring instruments but reactively rather than proactively. Tools to enforce integrity are few and often concentrated on formal expulsion procedures, which are rarely used. Swedish parties have during the last 15 years incrementally developed their ethics management processes. It remains to be seen to what extent these changes will transcend formal rules and strengthen integrity in the long run.
The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.