The Impact of Social Movements:
A study of Brazil's 2013 Protests

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ABSTRACT

In June 2013, Brazil saw a resurgence of its nationwide social movement, the size of which had not been seen for little over 20 years, since the fall of its military dictatorship. The mobilizations began by demanding a R$0.20 decrease in transportation fare costs, but soon its demands evolved into better public policy and anti-corruption measures. This paper explores the degree of success obtained by both branches of the movement, as well as what factors influenced their impact on policy making, therefore answering the question of “How successful were Brazil’s 2013 social movements, and what factors influenced such outcome?”. The study relies heavily on the media’s coverage of the events as its source of data, and uses Political Process Theory, Stages of Policy Responsiveness and Process Tracing to analyse the social movements’ impact on legislation. The results show that both branches achieved success, with transportation costs being reduced and anti-corruption policies being implemented. Such outcome can be attributed to the influence of both social movement internal organizational structures and positive public opinion, while absent of political alliances. The study hopes to entice future research regarding Brazil’s nation-wide rise in social movements, which have sprung as a result of recent corruption scandals discussed in this thesis.

Keywords: social movements, Brazil, political process theory, Movimento Passe Livre
I am sincerely grateful for my mother's inexhaustible patience, my father's everlasting inspiration, my partner's ongoing support, my friends' endless companionship, and my supervisor's bottomless wealth of knowledge. And beer, lots of it.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BRAZIL IN CONTEXT

Brazil has recently become a subject of interest in many academic fields, due to its increasing international influence in both political and economic affairs. Brazil has been put in the spotlight, highlighted by the creation of the economic association BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the hosting of its 6th summit. This has led to it becoming a serious topic of discussion amongst economists and political scientists alike. However, it seems that much of its internal political landscape goes vastly ignored by such commentators.

Glamorous international sports events such as the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games have increased Brazil’s international profile, but the recent corruption claims, fiscal mismanagement evidence1 and unfinished public projects2 related to these events have received increasingly less attention by the international community.

The same, however, cannot be said regarding Brazil’s domestic spectators. These incidents are merely the tip of the iceberg. Several corruption and inadequate public policy implementations scandals have come to light after 20143 and each embarrassment only adds to the extensive list that existed before them.

In June 2013, for the first time in a little over two decades, Brazilian citizens mobilized in order to protest this wave of poor governance, signalling a revival of Brazil’s nation wide social movements.4 These protests filled a civic demonstration vacuum that existed since the period of 1983 to 1992 where Brazil had a vivid activist culture. This period began in 1983 with the Diretas Já (“Direct Elections Now”) movement, which sought to end the military dictatorship and implement a direct electoral system. The movement saw a partial victory in 1985 when President Tancredo Neves was voted in by the electoral college5, and a complete victory in 1990 when President Fernando Collor was voted in through direct elections. In 1992, the Fora Collor! (“Collor, Out!”) movement successfully caused his impeachment.6

The 2013 revival of Brazil’s social movement culture can be attributed to the actions of the Movimento Passe Livre (“Free Pass Movement” [MPL]), a São Paulo based organization which sought to lower the recently increased transportation fare prices. Its claims quickly

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1 Mattos 2013  
2 Souza 2015  
3 Folha de São Paulo 2015  
4 Veja 2013  
5 Globo 2014  
6 Estadão 1992
gained momentum, and soon its public demonstrations did not only consist of MPL activists, but ordinary citizens voicing their concerns over better provision of public policy and against massive government corruption. These demonstrations received mass support and attendance as they spread across all of Brazil’s 26 states.

Social movements in Brazil has suffered a resurgence. The events of 2013 through to the pinnacle of its political crisis in 2015 have served as its catalyst, which has led to the creation of many other protest organizations and mass mobilizations. This study, however, focuses on the events concerning the protest activities surrounding the events of 2013.

While the protesting citizens were in no way as homogenous in their requests as those of the Diretas Já and Fora Collor!, due to their vast list of demands, this study will focus on two sup-portions of the 2013 protesters, being the MPL, which advocated for cheaper transportation fares, and the anti-corruption portion. The study will analyse what factors led these portions successfully or not enticing a response from the government bodies they targeted, specifically legislation implementation by the state and federal governments.

1.2 AIM

The aim of this study is to investigate what political impact Brazil’s 2013 popular protests had on government decision making, and which factors influenced the success of such social movement.

The theoretical frame, developed by Political Process Theory, argues that there are three main influential factors which effect social movement’s outcomes: the social movement internal organizational structures, political opportunity structures and public opinion. Therefore, this study examines which of these factors influenced the social movements’ success, by which means it did so, and to which degree.

A comparative approach is taken in order to paint a holistic picture of the events, and clearly show the influence of these factors. By analysing two simultaneous social movement branches, one might observe what factors were existent or absent within one and not the other, and better illustrate what helped or hindered the pursue of certain outcomes, and therefore its success.

More so, by taking a comparative frame within two branches of an overall movement, certain aspects can be held constant throughout the study, such as political and social environment, as well as the time frame of events; further isolating and shedding light on which
factors better influenced outcomes, and which did not, as the separate branches were operating within the same exact socio-political environment.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION

Brazil’s 2013 social movement had complex characteristics. The initial protests began with the MPL and quickly spread country wide, with a growing body of demands. This array of voiced concerns poses a challenge when studying this particular social movement, since it is in no way homogenous.

Across the whole country people demanded lower transportation fares, better provision of public services and anti-corruption policies, and often held opposing claims. One of the slogans which became a strong symbol for the movement at large was “Não São Só Vinte Centavos”! (Its Not Only Twenty Cents!)\(^7\), implying their manifestations were beyond the twenty cent increase in transportation fares, but extended to better governance.

In contrast, the slogan “É os vinte centavos!” (It is the twenty cents!)\(^8\) signalled a socio-economic and political divide amongst the masses, since for many the cause for their attendance in the demonstrations were the support of the MPL, and not a wider, more grandiose statement against poor governance.

Several other contrasting claims were voiced by protesters, going as far as advocating for a ban on the “gay cure”\(^9\) to the return of military rule.\(^10\) This internal heterogeneous characteristic was so strong that media outlets and academia alike had issues naming the social movement, highlighted by the variety of names to which the 2013 events are referred to in the two fields alike, such as Primavera Brasileira (Brazilian Spring), V de Vinagre (V for Vinegar), Movimento Passe Livre and others.

Since the social movement in question is not of a homogenous nature, in both its objectives and organization, neither can this study. In order to fully understand its power to influence legislative outcome, this study will focus on two separate portions of the social movement at large: the A – Movimento Passe Livre and B – anti corruption faction.

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\(^7\) Holston 2014, p898
\(^8\) Ibid
\(^9\) The “gay cure”, labelled as such by those protesting it, was a legislative project that saw the definition of “homosexuality” to be changed from a “natural variation in human sexuality” to that of a “disease”, and therefore able to be treated by mental-health professionals; Ramos 2013
\(^10\) Holston 2014, p898
The MPL had a clear objective, organization structure, leadership and support. Alternatively, the anti-corruption portion had a complete lack of the above. Whilst it gained mass support, it was absent of all other characteristics.

These two sub-case studies are used in order to illustrate and make evident, empirically, whether portions A and B achieved their objectives, and what influential factors were necessary to effect government decision making. Therefore, the question this paper will investigate and answer is:

“How successful were Brazil’s 2013 social movements, and what factors influenced such outcome?”

1.4 STUDY DESIGN

In order to analyze the social movement’s influential factors, as well as its political impact on government decision making, one must establish what are the dependent and independent variables of the study.

Social movement organizational structures, political opportunity structures and public opinion are to be understood as the independent variables. Legislation implementation, change or annulment driven by the social movement’s actions are to be seen as the dependent variable. The relationship between these variables establishes a causal link between action (by the social movement) and reaction (by the government) in relation to the goals pursued.

The mechanisms through which the discussed factors exert influence will be developed by Political Process Theory, whilst how influential they are over legislative outcome will fall within Schumaker’s Scale of Political Responsiveness\textsuperscript{11}, setting up a theoretical frame which encompasses both the action and reaction discussed above.

The study is of a qualitative nature, and will make use of Process Tracing methodology in order to analyse official government documents, media coverage and social movement’s available information, and what this means when it comes to actions and reactions.

The methodology chosen fits the study design as it provides a means of in-depth qualitative analysis of the contrasting social movement portions (A and B) within this particular case study, its progress along the theoretical frame which analyses its influence (Political

\textsuperscript{11} Schumaker 1975, p505
Process Theory), and the typology which accesses its impact (Scale of Policy Responsiveness) chronologically as the events of 2013 unfolded.

1.5 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION

The study seeks to understand which aspect, if not all, of both internal (organization structures) and external (political opportunity and public opinion) factors of Brazil’s social movement generated more effective mechanisms for influencing political outcome.

The way in which this study is designed is unique, therefore the results it will produce are highly relevant to this body of literature. Political Process theorists have called for academics to produce research which moves away from extensive single case studies (which they claim has been over done and provide little comparative benefit), and more towards social movement comparative analysis (so that results can be contrasted under the same systematic conditions).¹²

It can be seen, then, that this study is innovative in its analytical approach, since it is a qualitative in-depth case study of Brazilian social movements, but in a unique comparative set up, where two drastically different sub-portions of the social movement are studied under identical political and social context, as well as the same time-frame of events, which should provide an excellent case in which to test Political Process Theory.

In sum, the study is designed as to make two contributions within academia. Firstly, an empirical investigation of social movement outcomes within the Brazilian context. Secondly, the application of both Political Process Theory and Process Tracing methodology in order to shed light over how social movement’s can influence legislation.

1.6 OUTLINE

The thesis will begin with the development of the theoretical frame, in section 2. Firstly, it will clarify a number of key terms and concepts, including the concept of success/failure (highlighting the importance of the Scale of Political Responsiveness).

¹² Giugni 2004, p2; Bosi, Giugni and Uba 2015, p20; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999, pp xiv - xvi; Olzak and Soule 2009, p202
Secondly, a discussion of Political Process Theory, its importance to this study, how the two theories used are linked and used in conjunction, and its contextual application regarding the study. It will be followed by a summary of Brazil’s legislative process, as well as what has been lacking in the field of social movement research and the motivations behind the theoretical frame built for this study. At its end, it will develop the hypothesis to be tested by the empirical evidence presented in Analysis section.

In section 3, the choice of methodology, Process Tracing, will be justified, while in section 4., the data related to the phenomenon in question, regarding each sub-case study, will be presented. It will begin by presenting a status quo prior to the events of June of 2013 and make evident data that shows how social movement organization, political allies and public opinion effected the stages of the legislative process.

Section 5 will be dedicated to the analysis of the data presented in the previous section and which hypothesis it most strongly supports. The final section, 6., will be dedicated to the concluding thoughts regarding the study.
2. THEORY

2.1 RE-DEFINING SOCIAL MOVEMENT’S SUCCESS

Social movements can be understood as informal state challengers by politically threatened and/or disadvantaged groups, “engaged in sustained collective action to secure their claims”\(^{13}\) through pressure processes.\(^{14}\) Importantly, they differ from interest groups by lack of regular access to authority\(^{15}\) and action through noninstitutional means.\(^{16}\)

Academic have concerned themselves with the question of how (or if) social movements matter. This discussion has been centered around the outcome they may produce. The field has moved away from the classical view of success by benefit and/or acceptance,\(^{17}\) and have found that more precise, political indicators, better illustrate causal mechanisms and provide better measurability.\(^{18}\)

More so, the analysis of social movement’s outcome has often been centered around the state, and its response. This is due to the nature of social movement’s goals, which heavily relies on the willingness (or capability) of the state to concede to these requests, in order for them to materialize. Additionally, movements that target other societal actors have often relied on the state as a leverage tool to influence their outcomes.\(^{19}\) This relationship has been the main proponent of why social movement research has recently paid close attention to state’s response in order to measure its outcomes.

The choice of observing change in legislation as the dependent variable in social movement studies fits this criteria, as it is a measure of the state’s response and enables direct causality between social movement’s actions and the state’s reactions to be seen.

Legislative change as a dependent variable also highlights an important communication tool between the public (the electorate) and the state, and a mechanism for social movements to influence legislative outcomes. According to Democratic Representation Theory, elected officials have the primary goal to be re-elected. Therefore, one can assume legislators will

\(^{13}\) Amenta and Young 1999, p153
\(^{14}\) Schumaker 1975, p490
\(^{15}\) Ibid
\(^{16}\) Giugni 2004, p147
\(^{17}\) Gamson 1990
\(^{18}\) Amenta, Caren, Chiarello and Su 2010, p288; Bernstein 2003, p357
\(^{19}\) Amenta and Young 1999, p153
propose policies which will grant them more votes in the future (although this is not solely the reason why such propositions would be made).

This indicator of political outcome, however, has also been re-defined in recent times. Scholars have often defined social movement’s success in an oversimplified manner, being that it is only so if the state adopts the legislation advocated for by the social movement. Perhaps this approach has been undertaken due to the data and methodological difficulties in dissecting the influence of social movements towards the legislation process, but by doing so, it neglects various factors that might have helped or hindered the implementation of such legislation.

The solution to this oversimplification, therefore the redefinition of social movement’s success, is found in the “stages of policy responsiveness”. This concept addresses all the entire legislative process, and defines success as a matter of degree, rather than a dichotomous view of “success/fail” regarding solely the final implementation stage.

The concept of stages of policy responsiveness was first developed by Schumaker and later elaborated by Burstein, and defines the six stages as found below:

1. “Access: the ‘permeability’ of the political system and the state authority towards social movements and their claims;
2. Agenda: the adding of an issue into governmental or public agenda;
3. Policy: the adoption of desired legislation;
4. Output: the enforcement and implementation of desired legislation;
5. Impact: the substantial improvement of existing situation; and
6. Structural Outcomes: the transformation of the social or political arrangements.”

The six stages of policy responsiveness represent increasing levels of success. Each stage has a very intuitive definition, and closely mimics most legislative processes. Structural outcome, the sixth stage, is purposefully left out of the study, as it concerns long-term, unintended spill over effects of legislation, and therefore fall outside the scope of this paper.

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20 Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999, p5
21 Burnstein and Linton 2002, p400
22 Soule and King 2006, p1872
23 Ibid; See more in section 2.3 regarding Brazil’s Legislative Power.
24 Schumaker 1975; Giugni 2004, p7; Soule and King 2006, p1872; Burnstein, Einsenhower and Hollander 1995, p284
25 Giugni 2004, p7
26 Burnstein, Einsenhower and Hollander 1995, p284
As the social movement’s degree of success is seen to increase as it progresses through each stage, it is also seen to have more stringent rules and become more consequential. In other words, in order to progress to the next stage, the social movement faces greater difficulties (stringent rules), but in doing so, it causes more consequences.\textsuperscript{27}

For example: it is relatively easy for a bill to be introduced in the government’s agenda by a particular legislator. However, for it to be instituted, it requires a majority’s vote, therefore, it has more stringent rules.\textsuperscript{28} In contrast, each stage leads for it to become more consequential, as it is one step closer to becoming a law and addressing the issue at hand.\textsuperscript{29}

There is a plethora of factors that effect to which degree, if any, the social movement in question is successful, and why it may have failed to progress towards the following stage. In this study, three particular spheres of influence will be analysed, being that the social movement’s own resources, political opportunities and public opinion, which are further discussed by Political Process Theory, and will be further explored in section 2.2

This being so, one must admit that there might be hidden, undiscussed or disconnected factors that have effected this particular case study. However, there is good reason, backed by the theoretical framework as well as prior research, to strongly believe that the influential factors under scrutiny explain most, if not all, of why these particular social movement branches achieved its levels of success.

\section*{2.2 POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY}

This section will develop the analytical frame for the purpose of understanding what factors, both internal and external, effected the social movement’s degree of success\textsuperscript{30}

It will make use of Political Process Theory to analyse three influential spheres:

1. Social movement organizational structures,
2. Political opportunity structures,
3. Public opinion.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Soule and King 2006, p1872
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid, p1879
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p1873
\item \textsuperscript{30} Amenta, Caren and Ozlasky 2005, p519
\end{itemize}
These spheres were developed for the purpose of comprehensively analysing all impacting factors influencing social movement’s success, through all stages of policy responsiveness, since they not only take into consideration the internal factors of the social movement, but also its political and social environment.

Resource Mobilization Theory, the predecessor of Political Process Theory, also theorized movement’s outcomes, but concerned itself mainly with the internal characteristics of the social movement organization. One can see how such theory ignores various massively influential factors that might a movement’s success, such as the political landscape in which such organization operates within, and the public which it aims to mobilize.\textsuperscript{31}

Political Process Theory proves to be a more holistic theoretical approach to social movement research, as it encompasses all these factors, and produces a more thorough analysis of the events surrounding the actions by the social movement.

This approach has often been used in conjunction with the Stages of Policy Responsiveness typology, with research indicating that these three spheres have varying degrees of influence, depending on which legislative stage the movement finds itself aiming to effect, but are equally important in tracing influential mechanism.

This section will analyse the effecting factors these distinct spheres have on social movement success, and at which stage of political responsiveness they are more influential.

\textit{Social Movement Organization Structures:}

This sphere of influence draws much of its analysis from Resource Mobilization Theory, since it concerns itself mostly with the internal factors of social movements: its power to mobilize people, organize its operations, tactics to be used and resources to do so.\textsuperscript{32}

The importance of organizational structures begins with concept of collective action. Isolated individuals are seen to be unable to produce political change, since they have little direct access and say in political matters in order to pursue their interests. Therefore, individuals aggregate their efforts in order to achieve their overlapping personal interests, creating collective action.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{31} Ayres 1997, p50 \\
\textsuperscript{32} Giugni 2004, p21 \\
\textsuperscript{33} Olson 1967
\end{flushright}
Collective actions benefit from social ties and networks, social capital and collective identity, which creates a common bond regarding their interests and demands, which evolves to the creation both informal and formal forms of organizational structures.34

Interestingly, collective action heavily relies on pre-existing mobilizing structures as a source of unity regarding new movements, which in this particular study, may have been absent or dormant for some time.35

In order to effectively communicate their demands, and attempt to pressure government bodies, these individuals must organize themselves and balance the costs and benefits of their actions in order to do so.36

A number of internal social movement factors have been found to correlate with higher success rates, such as: single objectives over multi-objectives, use of violence and radical tactics, absence of violent oppression, and most importantly, high unity and organization over factionalism and/or lack of central leadership.37

This study is more concerned with the latter, since research points that movements (especially formal ones) tend to have higher success rates in influencing political outcomes through formal institutional channels, using litigation and lobbying, as well as public pressure.38

Social movement objectives are an important aspect regarding its success in influencing legislative outcome. Characteristics such as implementation difficulty and costs (both political and economic) can shape the way in which government officials view these objectives, and consequentially, how they will respond to it.

The same can be said regarding low profile versus high profile objectives. The former has very little political cost, since there is little attention paid to the issue by the electorate, and legislators do not risk losing votes by approving such bill.39

High profile objectives, on the other hand, have the opposite attributes. Its high profile status is most likely due to it being controversial, consequential and opposite to state’s interest. Its implementation incurs high political cost as government officials risk shifting electorates and losing voter’s support.40 This cost approach has been extensively developed as a theoretical

34 Soule and King 2006, p1878
35 Refer to page section 1.1 regarding Brazil’s social movement history; Giugni 2004, p150
36 Giugni 2004, p149
37 Gamson 1990
38 Soule and King 2006, p1878; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello and Su 2010, p296
39 Giugni 2004, p8
40 Ibid
frame of its own, using disruption and concession costs as key concepts regarding social movement’s success.\textsuperscript{41}

It has been argued that the introduction of legislation can serve as a symbolic, political gesture to satisfy constituents.\textsuperscript{42} That is, the bill has no real impact, but is aimed to appease those who advocate for it, projecting a false sense of accomplishment. Developing this rationale, this paper will also explore an interesting relationship between simultaneous intra-movement objectives, and government attempts to dampen the movement as whole by conceding to less-costly objectives and drawing attention from the others.

This being said, these other factors are not to be ignored. While violence, single objectives and absence of violent oppression have been found to increase social movement’s success, this thesis challenges these findings, in perhaps what may be case specific.

The use of violence may hinder the public’s perception (and therefore support), and erode the movement’s legitimacy. Contrastingly, the use of violence might positively influence public support, since it may incentivise activist behaviour against oppressive behaviour (this will be further discussed in the Public Opinion discussion within this section).

In summary, social movement organizational structures deal with the internal attributes of the movement, its tactics, leadership, objectives, financial resources and how these attributes influence their socio-political environment. It concludes, ultimately, that higher degrees of organization infrastructure and resourcefulness correlate with higher degrees of success.\textsuperscript{43}

However, when does this structure matter most? At which stage of policy responsiveness does it exert most influence? Social movement research has indicated that this sphere is most influential at the early stages of the legislative process.

The making of demands as well as agenda setting can be influenced by the movement’s own internal efforts, such as drawing attention to certain issues, drafting bills and creating leverage through mass mobilization. However, as the demanded legislation(s) progresses through political channels, it requires external political alliances and public support in order to be fully implemented.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} Luders 2015
\textsuperscript{42} Soule and King 2006, p1879
\textsuperscript{43} Soule and King 2006, p1879
\textsuperscript{44} Soule and King 2006, p1879; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello and Su 2010, p296
**Political Opportunity Structures**

This sphere of influence concerns itself with the analysis of the political environment in which the social movement operates within. This is a crucial theoretical evolution from Resource Mobilization Theory towards Political Process Theory, as it analyses the external political factors that aid and respond to social movement’s actions, and can either encourage or discourage them significantly.  

There are two central premises within political opportunity structures literature that are relevant to this study:

1. State structure,
2. Political alliances.

State structure refers to the degree of openness of the political system in place, which grants opportunity for social movement to mobilize and voice their concerns. For example, states with totalitarian regimes provide little political opportunity for social movements to operate within them, as they have limited rights to protest and mobilize against the state, and by doing so risk radical political oppression.

This particular case study deals with a democratic state, which grants its citizens freedom of speech and movement, and therefore makes possible for social movements to spring freely, and openly protest, make demands and challenge state actions.

Although this is held true by constitutional law, signs of political oppression may arise during the analysis of the events here presented, indication the existence of a lingering military dictatorship legacy.

At a macro-level of analysis, however, this study will consider Brazil a politically free country, with ample access to social movement and civil society actors. This fulfils the pre-requisite for social movement’s success within the typology, Access.

Political alliances and oppositions refers to the importance of such actors regarding the success of social movements. This concept, often referred to the Political Mediation Model, argues that social movements can only effect so much of the legislative process without the mediation of other political actors, and by seeking the support of mediators, they improve their

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45 Giugni 2004, p27, p168
46 Bloom 2014; Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan 1992, p309; Amenta, Caren and Ozlasky 2005, p520
47 Soule and King 2006, pp1881 – 1882
chances of success.⁴⁸ These actors, often considered to be political parties and elites, have institutionalized political power, and can represent the social movement’s demands within institutional arenas.⁴⁹

Political parties with large numbers of seats in the parliament, for example, which hold a stance regarding the social movement’s objectives, can significantly influence the chances of such legislation to be passed.⁵⁰ Interestingly, the media and its portrayal has also been seen to effect the political environment in favour or against social movement depending on its issue framing.⁵¹ The same can be said regarding lobbying corporations or interest groups with political leverage within relevant institutions.⁵²

In summary, this model can be seen as the support/opposition of external political actors, mediators, which hold greater power within political institutions in which social movements aim to influence.

When, however, do they matter? There are two stances held by academic regarding the importance of political mediators, particularly at the policy adoption stage in the typology. The first is that social movements benefit from positive political mediators, as their efforts are amplified, while there is space for different influential mechanisms to better influence outcome. The second, more radical stance, is that movements have no power when absent of mediators, since they have no direct institutional representation.⁵³

Interestingly, in a more cynical and perhaps less-naïve analysis of modern political environments, social movement theorists have argued that mediators are highly relevant in elite-dominated democracies. In a scenario where public policy and legislation often reflects the interest of political elites, social movements are powerless without the support of these actors. Alliances must be made in order to “infiltrate” political institutions and gain support to their objectives, as they face strong political opposition, and hold no influence over political outcome without them.⁵⁴

This presupposes a top-down, not so democratic view of the legislation implementation process, as opposed to a bottom-up, utopian view of democratic systems where government institutions solely reflect the interests of its citizens. This view more accurately reflects the

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⁴⁸ Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan 1992, p312
⁴⁹ Giugni 2004, p170
⁵⁰ Ibid
⁵¹ King 2008, p402
⁵² Bloom 2014
⁵³ Soule and King 2006, p1882
⁵⁴ Giugni 2004, p170
current state of affairs in Brazil’s political landscape, as much of its citizen’s discontent reflect their concern over actual representation and quality of governance. However, regardless of this observation, this study adopts the stance that social movements benefit, but not necessarily rely on allies, as it holds that other influential mechanisms can bypass the need for political mediators. This will be further explained in contrast to the influence of public opinion regarding legislative outcomes.

Public Opinion

This third and final sphere within the Political Process Model deals with the influence of public opinion on social movement success. Public opinion is defined as an “expressed view of a given group about certain issues of common interest or concern”\(^{55}\), composed of an aggregate of peoples values (stable, established beliefs), attitudes (less-stable, behaviour predispositions) and opinions (volatile, issue specific manifestations of both values and attitudes).\(^{56}\)

As it has been previously discussed, Democratic Representation Theory indicates that, conceptually, the actions of government officials and legislations should reflect the interest of its electorate, as to ensure citizenry satisfaction and therefore improve chances of re-election.\(^{57}\)

The mechanism of public opinion effect on legislation implementation is simple: citizens voice their support or discontent towards an issue, and officials respond by granting these requests in order to secure re-elections.\(^{58}\) However, does this premise hold true? How influential can public opinion be? When does it begin to matter?\(^{59}\) These are important questions to be answered before one gauges the effect of public opinion on movement’s success.

A growing body of research has indicated that public opinion does have a significant impact on political outcome, therefore showing that government institutions do respond to shifts in public opinion.\(^ {60}\)

The degree of responsiveness is often juxtaposed to the degree of importance, or salience, the issue has to the wider public. As citizens view an issue to be important, and

\(^{55}\) Giugni 2004, p190

\(^{56}\) Ibid

\(^{57}\) Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999, p5

\(^{58}\) Soule and King 2006, p1880

\(^{59}\) Burnstein 2003, p29

\(^{60}\) Giugni 2004, p192
therefore demand for it to be acted upon, the more likely they are to ensure their future elected officials will supply a solution for it, creating greater electoral pressure towards these same officials, and increasing the level of responsiveness.61

Interestingly, academics have pointed to a “crowding out” effect, where the high salience of one or few issues may draw attention from low salience issues, and whilst it will increase government responsiveness towards the former, it will dampen responsiveness towards the latter. Contrastingly, and perhaps even more interestingly, long-term responsiveness to public opinion might be heightened as legislators will tend to respond to public demands before they become high salience issues.62

There is an inherent, exponentially growing, mediating effect between social movements support, public opinion and political elites (decision makers) responses. Drawing once again from Democratic Representation Theory, social movements with specific interests and supported by minority groups will be the target of little attention, and will not benefit from shifts in public opinion. This is consistent with democratic concepts, as the interests of the many are more represented in comparison to the wishes of the few.63

Once social movements grow in support, public opinion plays a greater role in effecting policy outcome, as it becomes more relevant to decision makers, as they aim to please a higher percentage of their existent and potential electorate.64

At which legislative stage, however, does public opinion seem to be most influential? It is logical to conclude, from the discussion above, that social movements will benefit from favourable public opinion at the Policy (adoption) stage, since this is when public preference may shift decision maker’s support towards a particular legislation.65

Legislation does not necessarily need the public support at early stages of its implementation, as bills can be drafter and proposed by single legislators representing very specific interest groups.66

Public opinion is also seen to diminish the role of other influential political factors (e.g. political alliances) during the policy adoption stage.67 It can reduce social movement’s reliance on political allies as they shift the influential factor targeting legislative outcome. In other

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61 Burnstein 2003, p29
62 Ibid
63 Giugni 2004, p193
64 Soule and Olzak 2004
65 Soule and King 2006, p1880
66 Ibid
67 Ibid
words, rather than social movement seeking alliances (e.g. political parties) in order to effect policy adoption; social movements can seek to shift public opinion, which in turn pressures political parties and lead to policy adoption.

2.3 BRAZIL’S LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

In order to understand how social movements can influence political outcome in Brazil’s case, one must understand the legislative process and its connection to the theoretical frame of this study.

Brazil is a Republic, organized as a federal union, so that all states are linked, recognized and governed by its constitution. Its political model closely mimics that of the United States, Russia and India68

Its political organization is divided into three branches: Executive Power, Judiciary Power and Legislative Power. These are held to be independent regarding each other, capable of self organization, self governance and self administration.69 For the purpose of this study, only the latter Power will be explored further.

The Legislative Power concerns itself with the legislative process, that is, the implementation, change or abolishment of laws. Its representation is divided to correspond with Brazil’s three levels of government.

The National Congress (Congresso Nacional) oversees such processes at the Union (Federal) level, whilst the Legislative Assembly (Assembléia Legislativa) is responsible at the State level, and the Municipal Council (Câmara Municipal) at Municipal level. At the Federal level, the National Congress is further divided into two sub-sections, the Federal Senate (Senado Federal) and the House of Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados).70

The House of Representatives is seen as a direct link regarding the Member-States in the National Congress, while the Federal Senate is seen to represent the interests of the Union. The Legislative Assembly is seen to represent the citizens of a particular State, while the Municipal Council does so at the local level.

Theoretically, it would be possible for an opposing system to be created between the State and Municipal Level, as it occurs between Federal and State, but this system would render

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68 Mascarenhas 2010, p121
69 Ibid, p122
70 Ibid, p141
itself useless, since for every legislation proposed (regardless of how small), members of both houses would have to deliberate, which would prove severely impractical, due to Brazil’s limited number of states and its large quantity of municipalities.

Besides these three Powers, there is also what is considered to be Brazil’s “fourth Power”\(^\text{71}\), the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público).\(^\text{72}\) Such office is an independent branch of government, responsible for the defence of the rule of law, the democratic regime and the social and individual interests of the nation’s citizens.\(^\text{73}\) In sum, its task is to uphold justice.

The Public Prosecutor’s Office is organized in both Federal and State levels, and is responsible for the prosecution of criminal acts. In cases of major relevance, often regarding organised crime, police forces or public office, the Public Prosecutor’s Office also conducts the investigative tasks regarding these criminal allegations; through the use of its external control over federal and civil police forces.

The process of legislation development and implementation at the Federal level is often described as having five distinct stages. At both State and Municipal level, the process remains in principal the same, but in a simplified manner, without the inter-house deliberations.

1. Initiative: the process begins when either house (Federal Senate or House of Representatives) proposes a new legislation.

2. Discussion: after the proposition, the legislation is debated within private in-house commissions, where it might be amended. After, the proposal as a whole is revised by the contrasting house (if it was proposed by the Federal Senate, it is the House of Representatives that oversees its revision, and vice versa). After its revision, it is once again discussed by commissions, now formed by members of both houses, and subject to amendments once again.\(^\text{74}\)

3. Voting: the legislation is then put forward to a vote in a plenary session, closely resembling a parliamentary session. If the bill wins a majority of votes without any proposed amendments, it is put forward so that the President (Executive Power) can either sanction or veto it. If the bill passes, but has a proposed amendment to it, then it is taken back to its proponent, amended, subject for

\(^{71}\) Associação do Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios 2010

\(^{72}\) The direct translation of the Portuguese term is “Public Ministry”.

\(^{73}\) Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1998 2015

\(^{74}\) Mendes, Coelho and Branco 2009, p918
vote at the plenary session once again, and if voted for, subject of the President’s approval.\textsuperscript{75}

4. Sanction or Veto: The President holds the last say regarding a proposed legislation. As the chief of the Executive Power as well as the third branch of the National Congress\textsuperscript{76}, it can sanction it (either by actively doing so or by letting the deadline expire) or veto it (under either constitutional or political grounds). The veto is not absolute, however, as the National Congress can dispute it and annul it if an absolute majority (within a private voting session) is acquired.\textsuperscript{77}

5. Publication: the legislation is only implemented after it has been sanctioned by the President or its veto has been annulled by the National Congress.\textsuperscript{78}

It can be seen, then, that Brazil’s legislation development process progresses closely with Schumaker’s typology used in this study, which is therefore applicable as a measurement tool for Brazil’s social movement’s success.

\section*{2.4 FILLING THE GAPS}

Regarding the study of social movements in general, whilst applying Political Process Theory in particular, academics have been calling for a new way in which to conduct these studies, so that the findings truly reflect all factors influencing the phenomenon being studied. Three criticisms, and therefore their solutions, are the drivers for the theoretical base developed above.

Firstly, studies concerning social movements have been criticized for often being one-dimensional, failing to simultaneously analyse various influential factors, such as party influence, public opinion and protest activity. This is problematic, since by doing so one might ignore or hyper-inflate variables that hold explanatory power over the degree of social movement’s influence.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{75} Ibid, p919
\bibitem{76} Moraes 2009, p62
\bibitem{77} (Mendes, Coelho and Branco 2009, p921
\bibitem{78} Ibid
\bibitem{79} Olzak and Soule 2009, p202
\end{thebibliography}
This study proposes a multi-dimensional analytical frame, taking into consideration the three influential spheres developed by Political Process Theory. These internal and external factors are crucial for painting a holistic picture of social movement’s effects over a certain political outcome, as the lack of either might hide or distort their influence over the final results.

Secondly, the outcome of research itself has been criticized for being over simplified. This has been particular to studies concerning social movement’s influence over the legislation process, which have been criticized for overly paying attention to the final legislative outcome, often ignoring the movement’s influence over different stages of the legislative process.80

Schumaker’s typology provides a solution to the oversimplification of outcomes. The concept of Stages of Political Responsiveness gauges social movement’s success in relation to the legislative process it attempts to influence, creating degrees of success, rather than a binary interpretation of it.

Finally, social movement scholars have called for the field to move towards a more comparative approach to research, as to produce research that is not only comparable between countries, but also between the movements themselves and time periods.81 This study addresses the issue and compromises by analysing the effectiveness of two separate yet simultaneous branches of the social movement at large, so that the particular aspects of both are scrutinized under equal cultural and political context, as well as time frame.

2.5 HYPOTHESIS

The aim of this study is to understand which factors, and the mechanisms inherent within them, effected the success level of Brazil’s 2013 movement.

The use of two branches within one social movement at large serves two purposes. Firstly, to undertake a thorough analysis in order to abstain from generalizations regarding the entire mobilization, and make more thorough, pin-pointed statements regarding which factors effected its objectives.

Secondly, as discussed in section 2.2, Political Process Theory states that social movements often need internal organizational structures and either political opportunities or public opinion to succeed. By comparing and contrasting the influence of such factors within

80 Ibid
81 Bosi, Giugni and Uba 2015, p20
both cases, the author aims to confirm the need for such combination of factors, or prove that social movements can be successful with less existing factors than discussed.

This study has the expectation that both sub-cases will reach the Output level of success within the typology, and not yielding any impact (therefore not reaching the fifth and final level of success). Regarding what factors impacted its success, the author expects that the Movimento Passe Livre was influenced by both social movement organizational structures as well as public opinion, while the anti-corruption branch was influenced only by public opinion.

In order to better illustrate the plethora of combinations between influential factors and success levels, and develop the various hypothesis this study will chose from, two tables are presented bellow.

Table 1.1 will illustrate the success level reached by each social movement branch. Once again, if a certain stage is reached, its corresponding box receives a √, if not, an ×.

Table 1.2 will illustrate if the discussed factors were found to exert significant influence over the social movement’s success, regarding each branch, during the data analysis. If a certain factor is found to be influential, the corresponding box receives a √, if not, an ×.

### Degree of Success (Table 1.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Output</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MPL Branch</strong></td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti Corruption</strong></td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Influential Factors Present (Table 1.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><em>Movimento Passe Livre</em> branch</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption branch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Movement Organizational Structures</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opportunity Structures</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
<td>√ or ×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The hypothesis then, are simple:

Table 1.1 answers the “how successful were Brazil’s 2013 social movements[?]” portion of the research question, as it clearly illustrates which success stage was reached by each social movement branch.

Table 1.2 answers the “[...] what factors influenced such outcome?” portion of the research question, as it clearly illustrates what influential factors were found to influence the movement’s degree of success.
3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 PROCESS TRACING

Process tracing is a methodological tool often used in qualitative studies. It consists of the systematic examination of relevant and diagnostic evidence, in order to draw descriptive and causal inferences, as to answer a particular research question, and prove certain hypothesis. It is used in order to better study a particular phenomenon and its “temporal sequence of events”82, as well as analysing and evaluating its possible causal mechanisms.83

Central to process tracing methodology are the concepts of description and sequence. The former evolves around the accurate description of the events surrounding the phenomenon being studied, so that causal mechanisms as well as its direction of change can be accurately analysed.84 The latter concerns the sequence of impacting events taking place, and the variables affecting it.85

The aim of this methodology is to find relevant information, or evidence, that may lead to descriptive as well as causal inferences. However, what type of information serves as evidence?

Academics concerned with the proper use of process tracing methodology stress that such evidence must be found based on prior research, which in turn is divided into three main categories:

- Theoretical framework: theory directs research about which concepts must be explored and investigated for the purpose of finding causal links and mechanisms, in order to explain a certain phenomenon. These concepts often indicate which type of data needs analytical attention.86

- Recurring empirical regularities: just as theory directs which type of data is needed in order to unravel a research problem, prior research often provides established patterns that have been found, repeatedly, to ground causal mechanisms; and therefore should be used for future research.87

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82 Collier 2011, p823
83 Ibid
84 Mahoney 2010, pp125 - 131
85 Collier 2011, p823
86 Ibid, p824
87 Waltz 1979, p1
• Explanatory models: explores why these recurring empirical regularities occur, and what explains these empirical connections.\textsuperscript{88}

As prior knowledge directs which data should be used in a study, they serve the purpose of creating two types of inferences.

Descriptive inference is centered around the “judgment about what is important, substantively speaking, and how to describe it. To describe something is to assert its ultimate value.”\textsuperscript{89} One must observe and describe how, when, who and what\textsuperscript{90} is seen to be relevant, in order to learn about what is unobservable. A key aspect of description within process tracing is not the observation of changes, but rather of series of static situations or events at particular points in time. Process is created through a series of relevant steps, or static observations, which enables the accurate analysis of what is changing.\textsuperscript{91}

Causal inference is centered around causal relationships, where at least one variable, or causal factor (X), can be said to increase the probability of an effect on another variable (Y).\textsuperscript{92} Such inference serves the purpose of accepting or rejecting the study’s hypothesis, on the basis of sufficient evidence analysis which support (or not) significant causal links.

The combination of these two types of inference, based on prior knowledge in the research area, provide a platform for the accurate measurement of causal links within a particular phenomenon.

Resource Mobilization Theory, Democratic Representation Theory as well as Political Process Theory are the basis for explaining why the three spheres discussed in the section 2. effect social movements. Such theories provide an explanation of why these empirical regularities have been consistently found within the field of social movement research, as well as a wealth of prior knowledge regarding the subject, ultimately showcasing what type of data is needed to prove the influence of the factors discussed in social movement outcomes.

Where Political Process Theory guides this study in which type of evidence is needed in order to properly answer the research questions, Stages of Policy Responsiveness indicate where the process tracing “snapshots”, static observations, or event description must take place in order to infer causality: at each step in the typology.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, p5
\textsuperscript{89} Gerring 2012, p740
\textsuperscript{90} Gerring 2007, p228
\textsuperscript{91} Collier 2011, p824
\textsuperscript{92} Gerring 2007, p151
The application of process tracing will be done per case and per stage, followed by separate analysis and concluding with comparative comments; So that the presentation of data, and its analysis, can occur thoroughly and systematically, in order to support one the hypothesis shown.

3.2 DATA SELECTION

In order to create a body of data that is both truthful to the events studied and unbiased of opinion, the evidence it consists of should be as close to the original source as possible.

A small amount of primary sources, consisting mostly of photographs, is presented in the data section, found in various media outlets and academic papers alike.

The bulk of the data concerning the re-account of the events, however, are from secondary sources, again found mostly in media outlets, which provided extensive and detailed coverage during the event’s occurrence. In order to free the body of data of inherent bias and filter false and opinionated information, the author used a cross-checking approach, often comparing various sources of the same information in order to come as close to a truthful account as possible.

Veja magazine, Globo news and G1, albeit prominent sources of data, often showed visibly biased (pro-government, anti-mobilization) re-accounts of the events. Forum magazine, Estadão news and other media outlets provided less biased forms of data.

Several statistics are used to show the size of the mobilizations, support towards the social movement and shift in satisfaction regarding the government. Such data was sourced from established statistical institutes, such as the IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Publica e Estatistica [Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics]), IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics]), Instituto Datafolha (Datafolha Institute), the Military Police and several major media outlets, such as Globo news, Veja, Estadão and Folha de São Paulo.

Significant data discrepancies presented itself, mostly regarding the size and attendance of mobilizations, often between the estimates of the Military Police and media outlets. In cases where no reliable statistic was repeatedly found throughout the empirical investigation as to filter bias, all sets of estimates were presented so that the reader could use its own judgement regarding the true size of the mobilizations.
Official government documents, statements and speeches were sourced either directly from government online-databases or indirectly through media coverage.

3.3 KEY TERMS, DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION

- **Social Movement Success**: as success is understood by institutional access and government response within the typology, it must be measured as such. Therefore, the data described and analysed will consist of occurrence of protests, government official’ speeches, issued documents, statements and legislation concerning the social movement’s goals.

- **Social Movement Organizational Structures**: it concerns the internal aspects of the organization, such as the existence of a clear structure, leadership, membership and objective setting. The data reflecting the influence of this sphere will consist of statements issued by such organization and its leaders, membership numbers, as well as official and unofficial objectives voiced by both the organization and free-standing citizens.

- **Political Opportunity Structures**: this concept is understood by both institutional access (being able to protest) and political alliances. However, the latter is the focus of the analysis, as institutional access is seen as a given, since (1) Brazil is a democratic country with freedom of assembly and (2) protests occurred. Therefore, these structures should be understood as the existence of political alliances. The data presented will investigate the existence and strength of political alliances. Statements and documents by both social movements organizations and political parties will be used in measuring the existence and impact of such structure.

- **Public opinion**: as this sphere concerns the degree of public support towards the social movement’s objectives, the data used will consist both of political polls measuring the degree of support, provided by the IBOPE, IBGE, as well as crow numbers supporting the social movement’s mobilizations, provided by the IBGE, Federal Police, Media and estimates by independent observers (mainly online bloggers and reporters).
4. DATA

4.1 MOVIMENTO PASSE LIVRE BRANCH

0) SETTING THE SCENE

2003 - The origins of the Movimento Passe Livre organization can be traced as far back as August 2003, in Salvador, Bahia, on what would be known as Revolta do Buzú (“The Bus Revolution”). Local citizens organized themselves in order to protest against an increase in bus fares from R$1.30 to 1.50. The protests lasted three weeks, in aggressive fashion, but failed to yield a reduction in fare prices.94

2004 - In June, inspired by the events of the Revolta do Buzú, citizens of Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, took the streets to promote the Campanha pelo Passe Livre (“Campaign for Free Fares”), which opposed, successfully, the recent bus fare increase of 15.6%. These events would later be known as Revolta da Catraca (“The Turnstile Revolt”), and the genesis for the Movimento Passe Livre, derived from the campaign name mentioned above.95

2005 - Local leaders from Florianópolis recognize the need to communicate with other groups seeking the same objectives. An idea sprung: to create a formal social movement organization, with urban characteristics which sought to tackle matters of public transportation, not only in Florianópolis, but across the country. During the 2005 World Social Forum96 meeting in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, various small groups came together and formed the Movimento Passe Livre, with official representation in 11 capital cities.97

The MPL defined its organization as autonomous, independent, horizontal, non-partisan and of unified front. Autonomous and independent in its management, operation and specially financing, from NGOs, religious organizations, political parties and private donations; Horizontal as in all members were in the position of leadership, with a decentralized nature of internal organization; Non-partisan meaning that its organization did not support or

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93 “Buzú” is a colloquial term for “bus” in Portuguese.
94 Falcón, Rizério and Querino 2013
95 Tarifa Zero 2009
96 The World Social Forum is an independent organization that holds annual meetings in various capital cities across the globe, hosting several civil society and social movement organizations for the purpose of creating alternatives to “neoliberal ways of thinking”; World Social Forum n.d.
97 Pomar 2013
endorse any political parties; And unified front being that all independent cells worked under the same charter and pursue the same goals.\(^{98}\)

2012/2013 – As Brazil’s inflation faced increasing pressures, various companies across the country implemented fare increases in order to make up for their losses in profits. These increases generated violent manifestations in various cities:\(^{99}\)

- Rio de Janeiro\(^{100}\) (January to February 2012 and May 2013),
- Natal (August 2012 and May 2013)
- Porto Alegre (January 2013)
- Belo Horizonte (May 2013)
- Goiânia (May 2013)

2013, May – President Dilma Rousseff issues a Provisory Measure (MP nº 582/2012) implementing various tax reliefs for transportation companies across the country, in an attempt to dampen inflationary pressures and indirectly subsidize fare prices for the population, so that companies could reverse the fare increases put forward earlier in the year.\(^{101}\) Companies failed to pass over their tax reliefs in form of reduced fares.

2013, 2\(^{nd}\) of June- São Paulo’s State government had held its transportation fares constant under Geraldo Alckmins’ administration, at R$3.00. However, São Paulo’s Mayor Fernando Haddad declared, in the beginning of 2013, that fares would be readjusted, despite the Federal Government’s tax reliefs, issuing a fare increase to R$3.20 in the 2\(^{nd}\) of June.\(^{102}\)

1) ACCESS

6\(^{th}\) of June – Protesters gathered in front of São Paulo’s Teatro Municipal (“Municipal Theater”), under MPL leadership, to protest the fare increase. The military police confronted the manifestation, 15 people are arrested, with approximately 50 injured, including members of the media. Property depredation occurs.\(^{103}\)

\(^{98}\) Movimento Passe Livre n.d.
\(^{99}\) Watts 2014
\(^{100}\) The city of Rio de Janeiro has the same name as the state in which it is located, similarly to the city of São Paulo.
\(^{101}\) IG 2013; Ministerio Da Fazenda 2015
\(^{102}\) G1 2013
\(^{103}\) Pires 2013; Revista Forum 2013
Estimates regarding the number of protesters varies. Official military police statements place the numbers between 500 – 2'000, whilst most media outlets place the figures between 2'000 – 4'000, and the MPL claiming attendance of 5'000 people.

7th of June – Protesters close off one of São Paulo’s main highways, Marginal Pinheiros, causing mass disturbance in urban traffic - 226 kilometres of gridlock. A banner read Se A Tarifa Não Baixar, São Paulo Vai Parar! (“If the fare doesn’t drop, São Paulo will stop!”). Estimated numbers vary between 2’000 and 4’000 from media outlets, and 5’000 from police estimates.

Clashes between protesters and the military police occurred once again. Riot police was called, with rubber bullets and tear gas being shot towards the crowd. Many sought refuge in commercial establishments. Arrests and property depredation occurred once again.

11th of June – Protesters marched for six hours through Avenida Paulista (São Paulo’s main commercial avenue) and the city center, causing mass disturbance. Violence levels escalate, with both civilians and police officers being injured, as well as higher levels of property depredation. Again riot police is summoned, shooting rubber bullets and tear gas. Nineteen people are arrested in total, 10 of which are charged with “gang formation” and extensive property damage.

The MPL had previously issued instructions through social media (its main instrument of mobilization), for those attending to record whatever acts of vandalism one may witness in an attempt to separate MPL supporters and the small number of unaffiliated violent agents. This occurred as response to the overweeningly negative media portrayal following the manifestations of the 7th.

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104 Veja 2013
105 Esquerda.Net 2013; Pires 2013
106 Pires 2013; Revista Forum 2013; Ribeiro and Zanchetta 2013
107 Compania de Ingenharia de Tráfego 2013
108 Revista Forum 2013
109 Ibid
110 Veja 2013
111 Pires 2013
112 Ribeiro and Zanchetta 2013
113 Pires 2013
114 Veja 2013
115 Ribeiro and Zanchetta 2013
Estimates regarding protest attendance drastically vary. Media outlets issue estimates around 3’000\textsuperscript{116}, 4’000\textsuperscript{117}, 5’000\textsuperscript{118}, while police issues figures ranging from 10’000 to 12’000\textsuperscript{119}.

12\textsuperscript{th} of June – Whilst no manifestations occurred, it was a day of indirect communication between authorities and the MPL. São Paulo’s Governor Geraldo Alckmin and Mayor Fernando Haddad both issue statements from Paris claiming that the government would not negotiate with violent groups, that fares would not be decreased, and that they would not back down from their decisions.\textsuperscript{120} MPL leaders stated that protests would occur until fares were decreased.\textsuperscript{121}

13\textsuperscript{th} of June – Protests occurred not only in São Paulo, but many cities across the country: Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Maceió, Sorocaba, Natal and Teresina. São Paulo, however, was the city with the largest attendance and tension. Police estimated an attendance of 5’000, whilst media outlets estimated 20’000.\textsuperscript{122}

The date marks the culmination of the clash between protesters and the military police. Protesters ruptured a police blockade, going outside the negotiated protest route. Police Major Lidio Costa Junior declared: “we will not be responsible for what happens next”\textsuperscript{123}. Media outlets estimated that between 130 and 234 people were arrested. The police fired rubber bullets, tear gas and pepper spray freely into the crowds; 105 are injured, including severely injured media reporters, protesters and non-involved citizens, residents and bystanders.\textsuperscript{124}

Severe criticism of police actions immediately followed. Military police ex-commanders accused troops of unlawful conduct.\textsuperscript{125} São Paulo’s Secretary of Defence Fernando Grella Vieira launches an investigation regarding the police’ excessive and irresponsible use of force, alluding to the fact that such actions were attributed to the dictatorship’s legacy inherent in the military police’ doctrine.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{116} Esquerda.Net 2013
\textsuperscript{117} Veja 2013
\textsuperscript{118} Revista Forum 2013
\textsuperscript{119} Pires 2013
\textsuperscript{120} Rocha 2013
\textsuperscript{121} Veja 2013
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid
\textsuperscript{123} Estadão 2013
\textsuperscript{124} Pires 2013; Veja 2013
\textsuperscript{125} Godoy 2013
\textsuperscript{126} Veja 2013)
Various state governments choose to keep their police forces absent from local protests fearing the same behaviour would occur outside of São Paulo.\textsuperscript{127}

Mayor Haddad stated that “it did not look good for the police”. Governor Alckmin blamed violence on protesters “who did not keep up route agreement”\textsuperscript{128}. Despite such statements, Alckmin and Haddad maintained the stance that despite the abusive police actions: fares would not be decreased.\textsuperscript{129}

17\textsuperscript{th} of June – Protests took nation wide proportions. Demands evolved beyond fare increases, but towards better governance, provision of public services and abolishment of certain legislative propositions.\textsuperscript{130}

[This is where the second, anti-corruption, branch of protests arises, which will be further analysed in section 4.2.]

Protesters in Rio de Janeiro violently clashed with riot police. Across the country protests occurred relatively peacefully, while police forces were still present in the vicinity of the mobilizations in great numbers. Sympathy towards the MPL drastically increased, as well as public discontent, which is reflected by the great presence of citizens in the streets of numerous capital cities.

- São Paulo: 100’000 protesters by the MPL and media estimates, while the police forces estimate 65’000.
- Rio de Janeiro: 100’000 by both media and police.
- Belo Horizonte: 20’000.
- Brasilia: 10’000.
- Curitiba: 10’000.
- Protests also occured in Porto Alegre and numerous other cities without estimates.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{127} Veja 2013
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid
\textsuperscript{129} Estadão 2013
\textsuperscript{130} Holston 2014
\textsuperscript{131} Revista Forum 2013; Veja 2013
2) AGENDA

18th of June – São Paulo mayor, Fernando Haddad, summoned a meeting between the Conselho da Cidade\textsuperscript{132}, himself and the MPL representatives.\textsuperscript{133}

A MPL spokesperson argued that the people’s presence in the streets should serve as motivation for better negotiation between the mayor’s office and transportation companies. More so, that if public funds were being used to finance prestigious events (a nod to the World Cup infrastructure expenditures) for private enterprises, they should also be used to public good.\textsuperscript{134} The majority of the Conselho da Cidade’s consultants agreed that the fare prices should be lowered.\textsuperscript{135}

Haddad threatened that if prices are lowered, at a cost of approximately R$300’000 for the municipality,\textsuperscript{136} cuts would be made in both health and education expenditures as well as increase in fuel taxes, to make up for such deficit.\textsuperscript{137} It is further mentioned that the decision to reduce fares is not of a technical nature, but indeed political. The meeting is concluded with Haddad explaining that a reduction in such fares would have to be subject of deliberation within the Municipal Council before it could be implemented.\textsuperscript{138}

After the meeting’s end, Haddad met with President Dilma Rousseff and ex-president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, in order to discuss tax reliefs as to facilitate the fare reduction.\textsuperscript{139}

24th of June – Dilma summoned a meeting with São Paulo’s MPL leaders in order to discuss a national transportation programme, with the possibility of zero tariffs.

\textsuperscript{132} Direct translation: “City’s Council”. A forum for discussion and advisement, not deliberation, constituted of 136 consultants (journalists, social movement leaders, labour union leaders, business owners etc.) which monitor and advise the city’s management.
\textsuperscript{133} UOL 2013
\textsuperscript{134} Bulla 2013
\textsuperscript{135} UOL 2013
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid
\textsuperscript{137} IG São Paulo 2013
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid
\textsuperscript{139} Bergamo 2013
3) POLICY

19th of June – Haddad announced, during a press conference, that fares would be reduced to its original cost of R$3.00,\textsuperscript{140} by municipal decree n°54.016.\textsuperscript{141} Little information was published in relation to the proceedings within the Municipal Council.

It was further announced that the reduced fares would be valid from the 24th of June onwards, and that such lag in price change was due to logistical matters.\textsuperscript{142}

São Paulo’s governor, Alckmin, declared once again that such reduction comes at public cost, since money would have to be found somewhere else in the city and state budgets to cover the transportation expenses. Haddad repeated what was said by Alckmin in later statements.\textsuperscript{143}

Various other cities follow São Paulo’s government decision to lower fare prices, including Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Aracajú, Curitiba and dozens of satellite cities surrounding São Paulo city.\textsuperscript{144}

Prior to this date, however, several cities across the country had already reduced prices, including: Manaus, Goiânia, Cuiabá, Pelotas, Morte Carlos, Foz do Iguacú, Porto Alegre, Recife and João Pessoa.\textsuperscript{145}

The MPL supporters celebrate in the streets, while the broader protests were still ongoing. Protests occurred on the 19th, 20th and 21st.

MPL representatives discussed the need to move on to other targets, such as zero fares for public transport, but the rhetoric indicated such claim were for long-term propositions.\textsuperscript{146}

The Instituto Datafolha later announced that 77% of São Paulo’s residents approved the protests\textsuperscript{147} whilst also announcing that a poll taken after the MPL protests had shown that mayor Haddad’s approval rate had fallen from 34% to 18%.\textsuperscript{148}

4) OUTPUT

24th of June – The reduced fares were implemented at 00:00 of the 24th.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{140} Farias and Balza 2013
\textsuperscript{141} IG - São Paulo 2013
\textsuperscript{142} Bom Dia Brasil 2013
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid
\textsuperscript{144} Rolling Stone 2013
\textsuperscript{145} EBC 2013; Rolling Stone 2013
\textsuperscript{146} ViaMundo 2013
\textsuperscript{147} IG - São Paulo 2013
\textsuperscript{148} G1 2013
\textsuperscript{149} IG - São Paulo 201
5) IMPACT

26th of December, 2014 – Prices stayed at the corrected price of R$3.00 for the remainder of 2013 and 2014. São Paulo’s state governor Alckmin announced that fares would be readjusted to R$3.50, and would be implemented on the 6th of January of 2015.

9th – 29th of January – Protests occur in São Paulo’s centre, organized by the MPL. The first event, on the 9th, gathered an estimated 5’000, whilst the last had no reliable estimates. Clashes between the riot police and civilians occurred throughout the series of protests. In Rio de Janeiro where fares increased from R$3.00 to R$3.40, protests occurred at a smaller scale.

7th of December – As of this date, the cost of a single fare is of R$3.50. The MPL was unsuccessful in its efforts to hold the price at R$3.00.

4.2 ANTI-CORRUPTION BRANCH

0) SETTING THE SCENE

2013, 6th – 13th of June – The anti-corruption branch is derived from the Movimento Passe Livre events discussed in section 4.1. Therefore, the mobilizations that occurred between these dates served as the genesis for this wider, bigger protest group. Protests had a gradual growth of protest size, as well as mainstream media attention.

13th of June – This date’s mobilization saw violent clashes between police and protesters, civilians and media members. São Paulo’s governor and mayor, ex police commanders and mainstream media severely criticized the excessive use of violence by the police, which targeted not only protesters, but innocent bystanders and members of the press.

1) ACCESS

16th of June – At the opening ceremony of the FIFA Confederations Cup, FIFA’s president Joseph Blatter was booed during his speech, which was amplified by his

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150 Toledo 2014
151 Tomaz 2014
152 Estadão Ao Vivo 2015
153 SPTrans 2015
announcement of President Rousseff to the podium. Blatter addressed the crowd, showing his discontent: “Friends of Brazilian football, where is the respect and the fair play, please?” The crowd proceeded to boo during President Rousseff’s address. Such discontent was a result of the large expenditures and embezzlement claims of public funds related to the FIFA World Cup, which Brazil was set to host in 2014.

An estimated 500 people gathered outside the stadium hosting the opening ceremony in the nation’s capital, Brasilia, in order to protest the expenditure and embezzlement claims. In São Paulo, 50 members of the media protested against the police actions that injured several reporters, photographers and crewmen and arrested two press members.

Pamphlets and posters were independently distributed around São Paulo which read: “não é por centavos, é por direitos” (its not about cents, its about rights).

17th of June – As it was described in section 4.1, the events on this date saw much larger numbers than its predecessors, with numerous other claims besides that of the MPL. Protests occurred peacefully, for the exception of Rio de Janeiro, where violent clashes occurred between the riot police and protesters.

The event’s attendance in various cities across Brazil is found below:

- São Paulo: 100’000 protesters by the MPL and media estimates, while the police forces estimate 65’000.
- Rio de Janeiro: 100’000 by both media and police.
- Brasilia: 10’000.
- Curitiba: 10’000.
- Fortaleza: 5’000.
- Belo Horizonte: 20’000.
- Protests also occurred in Porto Alegre and numerous other cities without estimates.

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154 Lepiani 2013
155 BBC News 2014
156 Veja 2013
157 Esquerda.Net 2013
158 Ibid
159 Revista Forum 2013; Veja 2013
The demands went beyond the transportation fare reductions, and included: an end to police violence, better teacher’s salary, better public funds for health and education, better housing, public infrastructure, women/gay/indigenous/black rights, freedom of expression, renewable energy, environmental care and the abolishment of the PEC37\textsuperscript{160} and “gay cure” legislation projects.\textsuperscript{161}

PEC37 was a legislative project being put to vote at the House of Representatives, which sought to emend the constitution and abolish the investigational rights of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, transferring its ability to both federal and civil police, which it oversees.\textsuperscript{162}

Such legislation was dubbed the “impunity PEC”, as the new investigative body, the federal police (which has incurred heavy criticism for its inefficiency), would no longer be independent in relation to the three powers and could, in theory, be easily manipulated.

The phrase “Não São Só Vinte Centavos”! (Its Not Only Twenty Cents!) became the most widely used slogan in mobilizations and social media alike, signifying the change in the nature of the mobilizations, beyond that of the twenty cents increase towards other, more critical matters.

The phrase “Vem Pra Rua!” (Come to the streets!), also a widely used slogan, served the purpose of enticing citizens to participate in the mobilizations and show they discontent with the current government. Another popular slogan, “O Gigante Acordou!” (The Giant Has Awaken), indicated the masses had stood quietly for too long, and had finally risen to show its discontent with the current government – in large, gargantuan, proportions.

The crowds, however, were not homogenous as that of purely regarding the MPL claims. Within its wide body of claims, there were also opposing ones. Many advocated for civil liberties whilst others pleaded for the return of military rule. Whilst many alluded to the claims beyond the twenty cents increase, many voiced that such protests were indeed about the fare increase (“É os vinte centavos!” [It is the twenty cents!])\textsuperscript{163}, highlighting the socio-economic divide within Brazil’s demographics.

\textsuperscript{160} PEC stands for Proposta de Emenda á Constituição ("Proposal for Constitutional Amendment")
\textsuperscript{161} Holston 2014
\textsuperscript{162} Rodrigues 2013
\textsuperscript{163} Holston 2014
In Brasilia, Brazil’s capital city, thousands of protesters invaded the National Congress building and stood in its flat rooftops and extensive lawns, with relatively small intervention by the police.\textsuperscript{164}

The president of the House of Representatives, Henrique Eduardo Alves, declared during his visit to Moscow: “[I] Don’t know the motivation of these people, what claim they have, [I] don’t know the objectives. This way it is difficult to begin a negotiation”.\textsuperscript{165}

The commander of São Paulo’s military police, Benedito Roberto Beira, announced that he believed the riot police squads would be used during the protests.\textsuperscript{166}

By this date, an estimated 79 million people had been exposed to information regarding the mobilizations through social media channels, such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Youtube and others.\textsuperscript{167}

18\textsuperscript{th} of June – Protests near São Paulo’s Municipal Council gathered an estimated 50’000 people. Florianopolis gathers between 25’000 to 50’000. In Brazil’s northern city of Juazeiro do Norte, 10’000 surrounded the city’s mayor while he attended an ATM (automated teller machine). The mayor was surrounded for approximately 6 hours. Protests occur in 9 other cities.\textsuperscript{168}

Protests also occurred in numerous capital cities across the globe: New York, San Francisco, London, Sydney, New Mexico, Lisbon and many others. 69 cities across 25 countries participated.\textsuperscript{169}

President Rousseff, during an official broadcasted speech, told its citizens “Brazil had awakened, that morning, stronger”, and addressed the protests in a positive and uplifting manner. It included praise to the “democratic energy” of Brazil, as well as the civil involvement of its citizens, specially the youth. The speech included topics of protest encouragement, understanding and national pride, while its tone conveyed the government was sided with the protests in “creating a better Brazil”, while highlighting its achievements and its future policies.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{164} Bom Dia Brasil 2013
\textsuperscript{165} Jardim 2013
\textsuperscript{166} Veja 2013
\textsuperscript{167} Joia 2015, p7
\textsuperscript{168} Revista Forum 2013
\textsuperscript{169} Vitorino 2013
\textsuperscript{170} Borges 2013
The cyber-group Anonymous Brasil, affiliated with the world-renowned Anonymous, published a video (As Cinco Causas [The Five Causes]) outlining the five objectives that should be voiced by the protesters.

During the video, the speaker stated that the video was issued in order to make the movement’s objectives clearer, as it was labelled as having no goals by media outlets and government officials. The speaker stressed that the nature of the protests should be maintained as one of no religious, ideological or party affiliation.\(^\text{171}\)

The speaker also asked for viewers to share and replicate the video as to be widely publicized and not taken down or banned by public authorities. The video had more then 1 millions views within days (1’829’000 as of 13\(^\text{th}\) of December 2015).\(^\text{172}\) Anonymous Brazil was also responsible for several media-outlet Twitter hacks as well as shutting down multiple government and party website.

The Five Causes outlined the demanded:

1. The abolishment of PEC37 legislation proposal.
2. The exit of Renan Calheiros from the presidency of the National Congress.
3. The investigation of illegal activity surrounding the FIFA World Cup expenditures by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and federal police.
4. The implementation of a legislation that established government corruption as a heinous crime.
5. An end to judiciary privilege. A legislation that establishes that members of government had the right to be judged by a different tribunal than those who judge the average criminal.\(^\text{173}\)

The protests from this date forward were widely regarded as being one of no political affiliation or preference, as the public was discontent with current government and existent party options.\(^\text{174}\)

Between the period from the 6\(^\text{th}\) to the 18\(^\text{th}\) of June, the top six slogans regarding the protests had a combined 1’694’000 re-Tweets on the corresponding social media platform.\(^\text{175}\)

\(^{171}\) O Tempo 2013
\(^{172}\) R7 Notícias 2013
\(^{173}\) O Tempo 2013
\(^{174}\) Mische 2013
\(^{175}\) Joia 2015, p7
19th of June – 30’000 protesters gathered outside Arena Castelão, in Fortaleza, during a confederations cup game to protest against the world cup expenditures. Heavy intervention by military police and national guard was needed in order to subdue the masses. Protests occurred in other 15 cities with attendance ranging from one to twenty thousand each.

20th of June – Protests occurred in 388 cities across Brazil, including 22 capital cities. The protests size increase dramatically. The top 5 higher attendance estimates bellow are provided by the military police (which many observes deem underestimated), besides São Paulo’s which are provided by the Instituto Datafolha:

- Rio de Janeiro: 300’000.
- São Paulo: 110’000.
- Manaus: 60’000.
- Vitória: 60’000.
- Recife: 52’000.

The total estimate of all cities combined ranged between 1’000’000 and 1’500’000. Mild clashes occur in Rio De Janeiro and Brasilia, with 62 and 127 people severely injured, respectively. Evidence was later presented that authorities infiltrated the protests in order to instigate violent behaviour and erode the legitimacy of the mobilizations.

President Rousseff cancelled an international trip to Japan in order to deal with the occurring manifestations.

21st of June – Protests occurred in numerous cities across Brazil, albeit in significantly less locations and size, whilst the MPL announced it will no longer organize protests.

22nd of June – 60’000 people protested in Belo Horizonte, where 62 people were arrested. São Paulo has an attendance of 35’000. 2’500 mobilized in Salvador during a Confederations Cup game, where clashes with the police occurred. Protests happened in several other cities, albeit in much lesser numbers.

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176 Revista Forum 2013
177 UOL Notícias 2013
178 UOL Notícias 2013
179 Ibid
180 Magalhães 2013
181 Esquerda.Net 2013; Veja 2013
182 Esquerda.Net 2013
183 Veja 2013
23rd – 27th of June – Between these dates, protest size decreased dramatically, from tens of thousands to hundreds, in diminishing locations, with the exception of the 26th of June events in Belo Horizonte, which gathered 50’000 people.\textsuperscript{184}

The Instituto Datafolha would later publish that 85% of those attending the protests found out about the events through Facebook, 84% had no party affiliation, and that corruption was the number one reason why people attended the manifestations.\textsuperscript{185} An IBOPE poll showed 84% of the population supported the manifestations.\textsuperscript{186}

2) AGENDA

21st of June – President Rousseff addresseed the nation in a televised speech. She assured new measures would be put in place in order to ensure better governance and lessen corruption; as well as the guarantee that no federal funds were being diverged in order to finance the FIFA World Cup.\textsuperscript{187}

Rousseff also pleaded for citizens to provide appropriate hospitality for incoming tourists, in an effort to dampen the current (and possible future) protests, which were happening at the time of the FIFA Confederations Cup.\textsuperscript{188}

Three policies were proposed, targeting health, education and transportation. Foreign doctors would be imported in order to improve the public health system; 100% of federal petrol royalties would be converted into funds for public schooling; and the implementation of a national urban transportation programme.\textsuperscript{189}

24th of June – Rousseff sent a proposal to the National Congress that saw the issuing of a referendum, where citizens would decide the central themes of a political reform, including the possibility of constitutional changes. The possibility of constitutional changes were immediately dismissed by both houses in Congress.\textsuperscript{190}

The president also assembled two meetings, the first composed of various governors and mayors, and the second being attended by the MPL leaders. The purpose was to discuss

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Revista Forum 2013
\item \textsuperscript{185} Veja 2013
\item \textsuperscript{186} R1 2013
\item \textsuperscript{187} Calgaro and Motomura 2013
\item \textsuperscript{188} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{189} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{190} Castro 2013
\end{itemize}
the pressing matters advocated by the protesting citizens, such as corruption, transportation, health and education.\textsuperscript{191}

25\textsuperscript{th} of June – Both the Senate’s and the House of Representative’s presidents, Renan Calheiros and Henrique Eduarco Alves, respectively, announced the \textit{Agenda Positiva} (Positive Agenda). The main legislations amongst the 32 proposed included:

- Removal of the PEC37 as a legislative project.
- Establishing corruption as a heinous crime.
- The need for a clean criminal record for public servants.
- Clear definition of “organised crime” in the penal code
- Financial penalties for private companies guilty of corruption.
- End of the “gay cure” legislative project.
- The use of 100\% of federal petrol royalties in education and health budgets.\textsuperscript{192}

These legislations would put for vote in Congress in the close future, pending on the urgency of its legislative approval and implementation.

3) POLICY

26\textsuperscript{th} – 28\textsuperscript{th} of June – In congress, PEC37 was retracted and corruption was established as a heinous crime. The distribution of federal petrol royalties towards education and health budgets was voted through the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{193}

1\textsuperscript{st} – 5\textsuperscript{th} of July – The “gay cure” legislative project was retracted. The senate approved that public servants require a clean criminal record, distribution of petrol royalties towards public budgets, and financial penalties towards corrupt private companies.\textsuperscript{194}

8\textsuperscript{th} – 12\textsuperscript{th} of July – Senate approved the redefinition of what consisted a “criminal organisation” in the penal code.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{191} Redaçao Época 2013
\textsuperscript{192} G1 2013
\textsuperscript{193} G1 2013
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid
A summarised list of approved legislation follows below:

- Removal of the PEC37 as a legislative project - APPROVED.
- Establishing corruption as a heinous crime - APPROVED.
- The need for a clean criminal record for public servants - APPROVED.
- Clear definition of “organised crime” in the penal code - APPROVED.
- Financial penalties for private companies guilty of corruption - APPROVED.
- End of the “gay cure” legislative project - APPROVED.
- The use of 100% of federal petrol royalties in education and health budgets - APPROVED.\(^{196}\)

After the 12\(^{th}\), there was a dramatically lower number of legislations put to a vote, leaving 19 of the 32 proposals of the *Agenda Positiva* ignored.\(^{197}\)

4) OUTPUT

26\(^{th}\) of June – 12\(^{th}\) of July – As some of the items in the *Agenda Positiva* were the removal of certain non-implemented legislation, as well as penal code corrections, its approval can be considered as an immediate implementation. This was the case for the PEC37, “gay cure”, corruption as a heinous crime, financial penalties for corrupt companies and re-definition of organized crime. The need for a clean criminal record for the application towards civil servant positions was also instated immediately.\(^{198}\)

The allocation of federal petrol royalties towards health and education budgets was approved but not implemented.\(^{199}\)

5) IMPACT

2014 – 2015 – Several corruption scandals came to light in Brazil during this period, many of which are still unresolved as of December 2015. In 2014, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in conjunction with the Federal Police, began investigating and prosecuting many government officials and private companies involved in a multi-million-dollar embezzlement
case involving the FIFA World Cup constructions,\textsuperscript{200} as well as the running of the competition itself.\textsuperscript{201} The case was so large, in 2015 the FBI launched an investigation of its own regarding match-fixing during the competition.

In 2015, the Public Prosecutor’s Office together with the Federal police, began investigating and prosecuting those involved in a multi-billion-dollar embezzlement case involving Petrobras, a majority-state owned Brazilian oil company.

The Petrobras corruption scandal (widely considered to be Brazil’s biggest embezzlement and corruption case), which evolved into \textit{Operação Lava Jato} (Operation Car Wash),\textsuperscript{202} targeted many of Petrobras former upper-management, involving numerous former senators, ministers, former president “Lula” da Silva and current President Rousseff.\textsuperscript{203}

Several other investigations, some of which involved senior government officials, were launched during this period, led by the Public Prosecutor’s Office.\textsuperscript{204}

Data regarding the change in prosecution numbers regarding corruption charges, the number of public servant applicants denied due to criminal records, the ramifications of a clearer definition of “organized crime” and the number and value of fines payed by private companies found guilty of corruption were unavailable.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{200} JusBrasil 2014  \\
\textsuperscript{201} Araújo 2015  \\
\textsuperscript{202} Casado 2015  \\
\textsuperscript{203} Procuradoria da República no Paraná 2015  \\
\textsuperscript{204} Neto 2015
\end{flushright}
5. ANALYSIS

5.1 MOVIMENTO PASSE LIVRE BRANCH

0) SETTING THE SCENE

As it can be seen, the Movimento Passe Livre organization was created as a result of small protest occurrences, and due to a need to coordinate bigger, more influential mobilizations. Its charter highlights aspects that are significant to the theoretical discussion, particularly the Autonomous/Independent and Non-Partisan characteristics, meaning they do not need nor seek political affiliation in order to better reach its objectives.

Its origins and ongoing management signify a strong social movement internal organization structure, whilst its political position and lack of alliances shows little intent to seek influence through political opportunity structures.

The events pre-2nd of June technically reach the first step in the success typology, Access, since the MPL organized several protests against fare increases before this date. However, this study sees the fare increase in São Paulo, in the 2nd of June as the catalyst for the protests at large (a view that has been maintained throughout the media and academia’s recount of the events), and discusses these previous events as a means of showing growing pressures within Brazil regarding this particular issue, ultimately leading to a social movement “blow out” in São Paulo.

1) ACCESS

The MPL reaches the first stage within the success typology, since protests occurred. As it can be seen, between the 6th and the 17th of June, the size of mobilization drastically increases. While police violence and the negative media portrayal of the protests served the purpose of dampening the mobilizations, the MPL took measures to separate itself from the violent behaviour of few citizens, as well as providing a true, unbiased recount of the events through genuine footage spread through alternative types of media, since mainstream media outlets payed an exaggerated focus on property damage and protester’s violence rather than the movement itself.

The extreme violent behaviour by the military police in São Paulo served as a means of creating sympathy towards the MPL, and caused a massive shift in public opinion, since from the events on the 13th to the 17th, São Paulo’s estimates increased 500%, with numerous other cities organizing protests themselves.
With the engagement of the wider public, the number of demands also increased. Protests also occurred on the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st, but since the focus had been severely shifted from the MPL’s demands, the events of the 17th can be considered the last protest in which the MPL served as a catalyst agent.

The mainstream media’s framing of the protests was heavily criticized by independent media outlets due to severe bias. Scenes of violence and property depredation, involving small numbers of people, were aired and published repeatedly and given great focus, but scenes of peaceful mobilizations in great numbers were seldom aired. This negative framing was arguably an attempt to delegitimize the MPL’s actions and label it as an extremist group. Such framing changed on the 17th, when protests sized increased dramatically, and the true nature of both protests and military police had been exposed.

In sum, the occurrence of the protests can be attributed to the workings of the internal social movement organization, while its growing presence relied on the acquisition of positive public opinion. Political opportunity structures were thin. While protests occurred, repressive actions by the police, together with the dampening efforts of the media, suggest that Brazil’s political landscape was not so open as a full democratic status might imply, alluding to the fact that political legacies from the dictatorship period (1964 – 1985) still remained.

2) AGENDA

The MPL reaches the second stage of success within the typology, since government officials began to discuss their demands with other officials in power and within government institutions.

From the 12th of to the 18th of June, Haddad changed its seemingly strong stance, that fares would not suffer a decrease, to one of negotiation, introducing the MPL’s demands to the Municipal Council, for approval, and to the federal government (President Rousseff), for fiscal incentives.

This change in stance can be attributed to the ongoing protests organized by the MPL, and the shift in public opinion caused by them. Police violence was a strong aggravating factor, which tinted the government’s image in relation to the protests and generated public sympathy towards the MPL’s demands, as well increasing the scope of demands and creating a second, broader social movement [subject of the analysis in section 5.2].

Public opinion, expressed as public presence in protests, served as a constant pressure tool towards government officials. On the 18th of June, whilst Haddad met with the MPL and later President Rousseff, protests still occurred, and in growing numbers. Such protests would
occur, continuously, growing exponentially, until the 21st, further pressuring government officials.

One can see, then, that at the Agenda stage, social movement organizational structures and public opinion were once again influential factors in the success rate of the movement.

3) POLICY

The MPL reached the third stage of success within the typology by having its objective passed through legislative channels. The speed and hurry in which the reduction in fares is mentioned as a point of negotiation (18th) to when it is actually granted (19th) was an indication of the urgency of the matter at hand.

From the 17th to the 21st, protests drastically increased in size and in demands, exerting pressure through public opinion. One may assume those joining the mobilizations were in favour of them, since little citizen’s opposition was documented. The decision to lower fares was perhaps a more official attempt (in contrast to police oppression) to dampen the MPL and disperse the masses.

Seeing that the protests began under the MPL’s leadership, perhaps government officials rationalized that granting its objectives would appease its organization and disperse the masses in its support. The need for such dispersion was even more critical after the social movement mutation which occurred on the 17th onwards, seeing that some of the objectives were even more costly (anti-corruption laws, better provision of education, health etc.).

This approach proved insufficient to calm the masses, seeing that the people would continue mobilizing despite the MPL’s objectives being satisfied, indicating the influence of internal organizational structures.

4) OUTPUT

The government’s decision to lower fares was implemented. A five-day delay seemed expected and reasonable, taking in consideration the logistics of changing the whole pricing mechanism within the public transportation system, together with the difficulty of doing so during the São Paulo’s biggest protests in twenty years. The MPL reached the fourth stage within the success typology as its objective was implemented.
5) IMPACT

The analysis of the fifth stage within the success typology, impact, is done two-fold, short-term and long-term.

In a short term perspective, it can be said that the MPL was successful in causing impact, as the fare prices were held constant for the duration of 18 months (July 2013 to December 2014).

In a long-term perspective the MPL was not, as prices were increased at a higher rate (R$0.50 in 2015 in comparison to the 0.20 in 2013). However, this long-term perspective is more complex, as more factors were at play.

It is only natural, in economic terms, that some industry sectors suffer price readjust prices due to inflationary pressures. Which bares the questions: how long must the prices stay reduced in order to the MPL to be deemed as successful?

Since 2013, Brazil has faced growing inflationary pressures, while São Paulo’s state and municipal government incurred heavy costs in subsidizing the fare price of R$3.00 which was held constant for 4 years. The fare reduction of 2013 can be said to have decreased the chances of success of any further mobilization as the government had already made budgetary cuts to accommodate the strains caused by inflation and no further fare-increase. The 2015 increase can then be said to be a natural adjustment according to market forces.

Despite the economics related argument, the MPL’s inability to hold the prices constant through another fare increase highlights the importance of public opinion, public pressure and mobilization attendance. Inflation and budgetary strains were present in 2013, but public opinion was significantly less present in the events of 2015, whilst the internal organizational structures were at play in reacting to the government’s decision.

This study will hold the stance that the MPL, through the use of internal organizational structures and public opinion, while absent of political alliances (political opportunity structures), was successful in achieving the fifth stage of success, Impact, as fare prices were held at its desired price for a duration of one year and a half following the 2013 events; Future implications of the MPL and government actions targeting transportation fares were outside the scope of this paper.
5.2 ANTI-CORRUPTION BRANCH

0) SETTING THE SCENE

The growing size of the MPL protests, and the mainstream media attention it drew, led to the general awareness of populace that mobilizations were occurring. Regardless of the media framing in place, which was negative, the people became aware that a social movement was acting in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and other cities in the country.

This awareness, whilst seemingly unimportant, is a crucial factor in the creation of the anti-corruption branch of Brazil’s social movement at large. As people were aware that a specific organization was voicing their concerns over a particular issue, it created a possible venue (perhaps previously forgotten and/or seemingly out of reach) for citizens to voice their own concerns, disconnected with the MPL objectives, in future mobilizations.

The occurrence of extreme police violence and abuse of power during the MPL protests, particularly on the 13th of June, created sympathy towards the protesters and a sentiment of oppression by the government towards citizens, since many bystanders and press members were targeted.

The backlash of such police actions forced a shift in media framing, now against the abusive police forces and in favour of the MPL. The public, aware of the ongoing protests as well as the police violence, which now felt its civil liberties in jeopardy, would show its discontent not only with the police, but the government as well, in the form of mass mobilization.

These sentiments can perhaps be attributed to such actions being reminiscent of those during the military dictatorship period and tapping into the nation’s collective memory. Several political commentators criticized the current military police mentality as being a legacy of that regime. More so, Brazil’s last nation wide social movement was in relation to the dictatorship, its demise, and what government would follow.205 Therefore, the similar nature of the protests and police reprisals of the June MPL mobilizations with that of the 1983 military regime and Diretas Já protests may have led to a similar reaction by the populace.

In sum, public knowledge of already ongoing mobilizations, as well as the repressive actions by the military police and collective memory of previous social movement mobilizations, served as the spark which would ignite a broader social movement against corruption.

205 See section 1.1 for a brief overview of such protests.
The anti-corruption movement achieved the first stage in the success typology, as protests occurred. The evolution from the MPL towards a wider movement, with such aggressive character and massive public support, indicated two things.

Firstly, that the backlash over the use of police violence during the 13th of June served as a catalyst for the change in the movement’s character, as it increased awareness and sympathy towards the MPL mobilizations. It also tapped into the collective memory of the populace and sprung forgotten sentiments of oppression, regarding the military dictatorship period, and created a similar response to the Diretas Já! movement.

Secondly, the criticism towards police actions proved so dire, that such oppressive activity was discarded as a means of protest dissipation. Judging by the size of the manifestations, the amount of clashes between protesters and police forces were not so significant, which further incentivized people to attend the events, as there were diminished chances of police oppression.

The staggering statistics regarding the number of people distributing and receiving information through social media channels creates an interesting interpretation of social movement organisational structures.

The nature of social media platforms is one of autonomy, chaos, interpersonal, viral and unstructured characteristics. This clashes with the definition of what a social movement organization consists of, as defined by this paper, albeit it bears mentioning.

Although the anti-corruption mobilizations would not have occurred if not for the initial organization and inspiring efforts of the MPL, the presence of such numbers can be attributed to extremely effective actions of the common citizen, using modern communicative tools (social media), in order to reach and mobilize as many people possible.

This paper, however, holds the stance that such organisational structures were absent, as there was no representation, structure or leadership as to clearly communicate the protests’ objectives and negotiate with authorities. This is highlighted by the Anonymous Brasil’s response to Henrique Eduardo Alves’s statement, regarding no objectives or representation. It was an independent, anarchical, self-branded anonymous entity that signalled the state what objectives were being asked by the populace.

The crowds proved clearly non-partisan, which signalled political alliances (political opportunity structures) were non-existent.
Although many of the objectives asked for by both the populace and Anonymous Brasil were related to anti-corruption and better governance matters, PEC37 became the flagship legislation regarding the movement. This is highlighted by the fact that protests dramatically lost momentum once it was rejected by Congress.

The most important characteristic of these mobilizations, however, is its sheer size, spread across the entire territory. Such a massive, growing presence in the streets, made so that its claims could not be ignored and that crowds could not be oppressed. Therefore, one may conclude that although the Access stage of the anti-corruption movement was both lacking in social movement organizational structures as well as political opportunity structures, it made up for it with huge public opinion support, expressed both by opinion polls and public attendance.

2) AGENDA

President’s Rousseff speech, together with the Congress development of the Agenda Popular, can be considered a direct response to the massive, constant mobilizations; therefore, the anti-corruption movement reached the second level of success within the typology.

The need to appease the populace was further increased by the upcoming 2014 presidential elections, and Rousseff’s decreasing popularity. Government authorities were so desperate to find what causes the people were supporting, it took two of Anonymous Brazil’s legislative objectives into its agenda, one of which was not advocated by protesters (establishing corruption as a heinous crime – which meant sentencing was more severe).

Once again, the movement was not represented in Congress by political allies, nor was the agenda developed through negotiations through established social movement organizations and members of office. The government response to the mobilizations was the result of a chaotic communication process, involving members of both cyber-anarchic groups, the population and the urgent need appease the masses, which once again pressured the government through its sheer presence in the streets (indicating massive positive public opinion).

3) POLICY

The Agenda Positiva was composed of both high and low profile legislations. Within a short period of its issuing, most of its high profile topics, correlated with the demands coming from the protests, were approved by Congress.
After the 12\textsuperscript{th} of July, however, when protests occurrence had stopped, Congress activity regarding the agenda also stopped, leaving 19 of its items without an answer.

It is safe to conclude, then, that the massive presence in the streets, and the pressure it created towards the government, was responsible for the quick approval of the most significant legislative projects. Public opinion was the driving force behind such approvals, making up for the absence of organizational and political structures.

4) OUTPUT

The immediate legislative implementation of most of the mentioned projects are mostly attributed to the nature of the legislation. PEC37 and the “gay cure” were rejections, so the objectives were met by not implementing them. Similarly, changes in the penal code are implemented emended immediately. One can then conclude that the anti-corruption movement reached the fourth stage within the success typology.

5) IMPACT

Due to the lack of data, the only legislative impact that can be analysed is that of PEC37, the flagship legislation of the anti-corruption movement. PEC37 saw that the Public Prosecutor’s Office would no longer be able to undertake independent investigations, or control the Federal Police in order to do so.

The FIFA World Cup and Petrobras corruption prosecutions were both results of efforts undertaken by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, due to the severity of such criminal charges, together with the extremely high profile of those accused. Therefore, one may assume that without such an independent government body, these allegations might never have surfaced. One may then conclude that the abolishment of the PEC37 had an impact as an anti-corruption measure, reaching the 5\textsuperscript{th} stage within the success typology.
5.3 RESULTS AND COMPARISONS

A summary of both branches’ level of success, as well as influential factors found throughout the data analysis is presented below:

Degree of Success (Table 1.3)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Impact</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti Corruption</strong></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Influential Factors Present (Table 1.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Movimento Passe Livre branch</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption branch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Movement Organizational Structures</strong></td>
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<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Opportunity Structures</strong></td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Opinion</strong></td>
<td>√</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The *Movimento Passe Livre* branch reached the maximum degree of success, Impact, and was found to be influenced by both social movement organizational structures and public opinion.

The anti-corruption branch also reached the maximum degree of success, and was found to be influenced only by public opinion.

Firstly, one can conclude that public opinion proved to be extremely influential over the anti-corruption branch, as to equal the effect of both social movement organizational structures and public opinion which influenced the *Movimento Passe Livre*.

Secondly, it can be seen that Brazil’s social movement as a whole was influenced by both public opinion and social movement organizational structures, but lacked that of political opportunity structures (political alliances). Therefore, one can conclude that social movements can achieve their objectives while absent of such influential sphere.
This is consistent with the discussion in Political Process Theory which argues that at the later stages of the legislation process, either public opinion or political alliances are crucial for the movement to obtain success. In both these cases, public opinion was present, proving success can be achieved while absent of political alliances.

Political Process Theory also argues that social movements rely on its internal organizational structures to effect the early stages of the legislative process. Interestingly, while the anti-corruption branch did not have a clear organization, it relied on the efforts of another simultaneously acting group to achieve its beginning levels of success.

In sum, Brazil’s social movements were extremely successful in reaching its objectives, both of reducing transportation fares and anti-corruption. More so, they were both successful while absent of political alliances, relying solely on the influence of social movement internal organizational structures, and the massive effect of positive public opinion.
6. CONCLUSION

6.1 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The purpose of this study is two-fold. Firstly, to apply Political Process Theory in an innovative way, heavily based upon the criticism and recommendation of previous theoretical works. Secondly, to shed light into Brazil’s rich and complex political and social movement landscape, in order to understand what factors most influences it.

By separating Brazil’s 2013 movement between its two main branches, a comparative setup was possible, whilst holding several socio-political variables constant. This was beneficial for the study as it painted a holistic picture of the overall movement, and made possible the analysis of its degrees of success regarding different objectives, as well as what factors most influenced each legislative outcome.

This paper posed the research question of “How successful was Brazil’s 2013 social movement, and what factors influenced such outcome?”. Summarizing its results, the Movimento Passe Livre branch, which targeted transportation fare prices, reached the maximum degree of success within Schumaker’s typology, Impact, and had the transportation fares reduced to its original R$3.00. It was shown to be significantly influenced by both social movement organizational structures as well as public opinion. Evidence of political alliances (within political opportunity structures) was not found; which proved surprising for a social movement with such high degree of organization to lack allies.

The anti-corruption branch, which targeted PEC37 as well as several other legislation projects, also reached the final degree of success within the typology. It was found to be significantly influenced by public opinion, but absent of both political alliances as well as social movement organizational structures.

The results indicated that although Brazil’s 2013 social movement was very primitive regarding political alliances, and lacked organization at its largest form, the impact of public opinion through sheer mobilization size, with millions of protesters, compensated for the lack of other influential spheres, seeing that both social movement branches reached the maximum level of success.

Prior research, particularly in Political Process Theory, advocates that the three influential spheres discussed throughout this study encompasses all factors effecting social movement’s success. However, every study has its limitations.

Perhaps there were overlooked, underestimated or ignored variables that were responsible for the movement’s degree of success. A more detailed analysis of Brazil’s media
sector, regarding political alliances and political opportunity structures, could have defined it as either an ally or an enemy; however, this study focused on finding evidence of alliances regarding political parties. A more thorough analysis of the impact of social media on public opinion could also have proven beneficial, as to unravel through which mechanisms, and which degree, platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Youtube effected mobilization numbers and public pressure.

Other theoretical approaches may also have provided more fitting alternatives in order to isolate and measure such causal relationships. The Disruption Vs Concession Model, which argues that movements succeed when the cost of its disruption overtake the concession cost of its objectives, could have provided a viable theoretical frame. The author, however, believes that the use of Political Process Theory, in conjunction with Schumaker’s Scale of Political Responsiveness, provided a holistic approach to the study of social movement outcomes, and compromises and encompasses aspects discussed in many other social movement theoretical works.

6.2 FUTURE RESEARCH PROSPECTS

With the events of June 2013 serving as a resurgence in nation wide social movements in Brazil, 2014 and 2015 saw many more protests, with larger numbers, occurring throughout its territory, many of which targeted topics discussed in this thesis, such as the Petrobras and FIFA World Cup uncovered corruption scandals.

The impact of these events is the next step regarding Brazil’s social movement research, as these mobilizations are occurring more often, and perhaps with higher degrees of organization, political alliances, public opinion and crowd support, which should prove a rich and complex topic for academic and observers alike.
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY


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