The Sweden Democrats ideational development

A study of the party programs over time

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Abstract

Sweden was left confused and chocked when the Sweden Democrats more than doubled their electoral support in the 2014 parliamentary election (Dahlkvist, 2014). However, Cas Mudde (2010) argues that the attitudes of these types of parties are a radicalizations of mainstream views, therefore to understand their success, research need to focus on the parties themselves (2010). Thus, the purpose of this study is to study the ideational development of the Sweden Democrats to increase the understanding of the party and thus answer the following questions; what are the distinctive features of SD's ideational development within three prominent ideologies in the SD's Party Programs and how do the analytical categories of these ideologies relate to one another? A content analysis will be performed of five party programs using Marie Demkers (1993) concept of ideology as the analytical framework; the postulates i.e. the party’s value-based fundamental views and the doctrine i.e. the operative level of the ideology. The study shows that the Sweden Democratic programs consists of both ideational continuances and changes, though the changes are mainly found in the doctrine, raising the question of whether the changes are strictly rhetorical and tactical.

Keywords: Ideational development, Sweden Democrats, postulates, doctrine, world view, solutions, utopia
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1. Introduction

The shock was a fact when it became clear that the populist radical right party\(^1\), the Sweden Democrats (SD), more than doubled its electoral support in the 2014 parliamentary election (Dahlkvist, 2014), and gained 12.9 per cent of the votes (val.se 2014). The Green Party’s Party secretary, Anders Wallner, argued at the night of the election that all other parties had a responsibility to make sure that the SD did not gain political influence. In a similar state of distress, the current Prime Minister, the Social Democrat Stefan Löfven, made the following promise: “We will make sure that they will not get the role of balance of power in the Parliament” (Aftonbladet a. 2014). The Prime Minister, as well as the current Minister of Finance, went as far as calling the SD a neo-fascist party (Aftonbladet. b. 2014, svt-nyheter. a. 2014). The so called “December agreement” made by the mainstream political parties was thus a reaction to SD’s success, and intended to stop the SD’s political influence (Gudmunson 2014). The reaction from the media has been equally strong. For example, the campaign “we are 87 percent” signalizing that a majority of the electorates did not vote for the SD and should take a stand against racism – was started by the newspaper Expressen, making their view on the SD as a racist party clear (Expressen, a. 2014).

Similar arguments are common in the current debate surrounding the SD. In Swedish media, as well as among established politicians, the SD is regularly portrayed as an outright racist, (e.g. Arnstad, a. 2014, Naeselius svt-nyheter, 2014, Hellström and Nilsson 2010: 64), sometimes fascist or neo-fascists party (Arnstad, 2012, Arnstad b. 2014). Thus, such buzzwords, as well as more toned down signifiers such as xenophobic and anti-immigration are commonly used to brand the party in the public debate. Accordingly, the mainstream view is that the SD represents ideas that are seen as abnormal in the open and tolerant Swedish society (Hellström, Nilsson, Stoltz 2012: 202). This stands in sharp contrast to the SD’s own view, calling themselves a social-conservative party (Jomshof, 2015).

However, the dominant public debate about the SD leaves us with a paradox. If Sweden is seen as such a tolerant country, how could a stigmatized party like the SD be capable of securing over 800 000 votes in the first place?

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\(^1\) Radical right populist party is the commonly used terminology within political science to describe parties such as the SD in Europe. These parties are a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007: 22, 23, 63).
The fact that the SD’s success strikes many commentators as a paradox might be related to the lack of reflection of actual research on the ideological foundation of radical right parties (RRP) and how their electoral strategies relate to widespread opinions within the electorate. This neglect is problematic if one wants to understand why the SD exerts a growing appeal on the electorate. After all, it seems unlikely that the number of racists or fascists in Sweden have more than doubled in four years. Additionally, while commentators in the public debate largely are preoccupied with analyzing the fact that segments of the electorate appear to agree with the SD, the renowned expert on the radical right, political scientist Cas Mudde has another view (2010: 1181). He argues that “widespread demand is a given, rather than the main puzzle, in contemporary Western democracies”. According to Mudde, the focus of the research should be on how the radical right party itself manages to attract a growing number of votes. Has the party changed its ideological, and thus ideational ground, to meet the electoral demand?

In reference to Mudde, I argue that a crucial key to understand the SD’s recent success is to map out their ideational development over time. Thus, the main focus of this essay is to find the distinctive features of the SD’s ideational development.

1.1 Disposition
In the first section previous research and the theoretical preliminaries of the essay will be presented. This is followed by chapter 3 explaining the methods used to examine the data as well as the necessary delimitations. The presentation and analysis of the result in chapter 4, will then be followed by a discussion of the results in chapter 5.

2. Previous research and theoretical preliminaries
In this chapter I will start by presenting previous research and then move on to the theoretical framework of the essay to improve the understanding of my choice of approach.

2.1 Previous research
Multiple studies of the SD has been made, but is mainly focused on their immigration policies or the party’s past. In addition, early research sought to explain the rise of the radical right with references to displeased segments of the electorate. According to Mudde (2010: 1169-1181), many contemporary studies continued on this path. In these studies the ideology of the radical right is understood as a deviation, something abnormal in a liberal democracy which only gets support
from the public during crises. A widely argued view is thus that the electoral breakthrough of populist radical right parties (PRRP) is explained by socioeconomic changes, underlying insecurities and fears of the population. From this approach the SD is seen as a party sharing concerns and disappointments with small, deviant parts of the population (e.g. Broström 2014, Norris 2005: 11-12, Integrationsverkets skriftserie VI, 2006: 46-48).

The emergence of protest voters (Norris 2005: 163) is therefore often portrayed as a primary explanation for the PRRP’s success. However, the political scientist Pippa Norris (2005: 163), argues that this only covers a small part of the phenomena. Agreeing with Norris, political scientist Marie Demker (2014: 185), argues that the media is partly responsible for the sometimes inaccurate picture of PRRP, in this case the SD, that many hold. She explains that the view of the typical voter of the SD has traditionally been young, uneducated men working in the industrial sector. This is now less accurate as the SD attracts voters from all across the political spectrum in Sweden (Integrationsverkets skriftserie VI, 2006: 46, 48, 53).

Frequently reported as well, is the fact that the Swedish population has a more positive attitude towards immigration today than in previous decades. Granted, this is confirmed by statistics from the SOM-institute at the University of Gothenburg. It is reported that in 1990, 61 per cent of the Swedish population supported the acceptance of fewer refugees and by 2010 these numbers had been reduced to 42 percent. Even so, statistics from the SOM-institute clearly indicate that almost half of the population wanted less immigration in 2010 (Demker 2013: 13, 40).

Mudde (2010: 1178) therefore argues, in difference to many contemporary studies, that the attitudes of PRRP's should be seen as a pathological normalcy — that is, such attitudes are in fact radicalizations of mainstream views. They are not marginal under normal conditions, but are in fact widespread within the population, although more moderate than those held by PRRP’s. Therefore, he argues, the focus on contemporary research should not be on the demand-side i.e. the electorates, but on the supply side, i.e. the ideas and policies supplied by the PRRP’s themselves (Mudde 2010: 1179). Thus, the main focus in the Swedish debate, which currently is on the demand of the voters, is wrongly prioritized. Instead, the success of the SD is more likely shaped by how the supply of this party is formed to meet the demand that actually exists in the electorate (Norris 2005: 15, 174). That said, Mudde (2010: 1179) points out that the demand-side explanations are not irrelevant. However, since demand for anti-immigrant policies are stable and widespread, demand-side factors do not help us explain the huge variation in electoral success of PRRP’s across Europe (Mudde 2010: 1179).
Demker (1993: 53) argues that a party’s fundamental conceptions of the world shapes their political tactics and policies. To be able to provide an answer to the problematization posed in the introduction, I will follow the reasoning of Mudde and leave the exclusive focus on demand-side factors. I will instead examine the ideational supply of the SD over time in an attempt to try to map out the distinctive changes and continuances in their fundamental conceptions of the world, i.e., their ideology.

### 2.2 Theoretical approach: the ideological supply of the SD

To be able to research the ideational development of the SD, I need to clarify the definitions of ideas and political ideology in this essay. There is no absolute agreed scientific definition of the term ideology (Heywood 2012: 4) and multiple definitions are present (Hamilton 1987: 18), many of them contradicting each other (Gerring 1997: 957). Despite this, there is according to John Gerring (1997: 980), professor in political science, some level of agreement in the field. He states: “Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that belong to one another in a non-random fashion. On what principles they intercorrelate, and to what degree, remain matters of dispute (and discussed), but the notion of coherence is difficult to gainsay”.

The sociologist Malcolm B. Hamilton (1987: 38) has a more specific definition and explains that an ideology can be seen as “a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationship and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue or maintain”. Hamilton (1987: 26), in line with Ball and Dagger (2004: 4), further adds that ideologies are explanatory and tries to explain why circumstances are the way they are. Furthermore, Hamilton (1987: 26) explains that ideologies try to explain why certain things are desirable, right, good and moral.

Additionally, every ideology, according to Ball and Dagger (2004: 9-10), claim to promote freedom. The American philosopher, Gerald MacCallum (1967: 314), argues that freedom for an agent is always freedom from something that cannot be reached due to an obstacle e.g., problems in society. In this case the agent is the electorates in Sweden, an agent that the political parties aim to represent. The political parties and the agent i.e. the electorates, are seen to share the same goals and to identify the same obstacles.

Building on Hamilton’s (1987: 38, 26) explanation, ideologies are in this paper seen as the actors’ views of reality - that is, what problems the actor see in the world, what the cause of
these problems are, the best way to deal with them as well as what society should look like. To clarify how I define the crucial concept of ideology, I will in addition refer to Demker.

Demker (1993: 63) explains that ideologies can be seen as either pervading a whole society or to be linked to a specific actor. In this essay ideologies will be seen as linked to a specific actor, namely a political party. Demker (1993:65-66) argues that party ideologies consist of mainly two levels that she calls the postulate and the doctrine. The postulates are the party’s value-based fundamental views e.g. the basic and fundamental traits and rights of the individual or the utopian society. The doctrine is, according to Demker, the operative level of the ideology. That is; the postulates related to the surrounding political and general reality (Demker 1993: 66). The postulates are thereby seen to direct and legitimize the doctrine (Demker 1993: 67). Although the operative part of the ideology might seem unitary, Demker (1993: 66) argues that this do not necessarily mean that the party’s value-based fundamental views are, as the postulate includes different postulates.

When studying party ideologies, Demker (1993: 68) breaks the concept of ideology down into three categories; world view, strategic solutions and utopia. The world view is an actor’s stated beliefs on central causes and effects that explain perceived political and/or economic problems and current situations. Strategic solutions are the means and solutions to the problems identified in the world view. In addition, strategic solutions are understood to identify ways of reaching the utopian society i.e. the ultimate society. Furthermore, Demker (1993: 68) relates the above mentioned categories to three additional analytical levels; the individual, the society and the international.

The concept of ideology is illustrated in table 2.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World view (WV)</td>
<td>The view on the individuals current situation and basic attributes</td>
<td>The existing conditions within the nations society</td>
<td>The existing conditions in the international sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic solutions (SS)</td>
<td>Solutions for how to reach the utopia of the individual</td>
<td>Solutions for how to reach the utopian society</td>
<td>Solutions and strategies for reaching the utopian relations in the international sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia (U)</td>
<td>The utopian conditions for the individuals</td>
<td>The utopian society</td>
<td>The utopian international order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Drawing on Table 1, the WV is thereby seen as the actor’s views of the individual’s current situation and basic attributes. Additionally it is seen as an explanation of the existing conditions within society and the international sphere as well as general attributes (Demker 1993: 68). SS are seen as the proposed solutions for how the individual, society and the international sphere will reach the ideal society for the individual i.e. the utopian society (Demker 1993: 68).

In this essay, I will employ Demkers (1993: 68) concept of ideology. However, due to limitations in the range of this essay and thus necessary demarcations, a somewhat modified concept with all the analytical levels morphed into one, will be used. In addition, only the *utopia* from the *postulates* and WV and SS from the *doctrine* will be used, with reference to Hamilton’s (1987: 38, 26) theory, I believe this is fruitful. Following Mudde (2007: 39), I argue that it is reasonable to expect that most parties in practice have more than one ideology as they want to attract a broad audience. Likewise, PRRP’s, such as the SD, generally combine the different ideologies of *nativism, authoritarianism and populism* (Mudde 2007: 26).

### 2.2.1 The ideological core of the populist radical right family

*Nativism* has been defined in varying ways, but is here defined as a combination of nationalism\(^2\) and xenophobia\(^3\) i.e. “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007: 19). Thus, the basic world view in the nativist ideology is that society is threatened by non-natives and foreign ideas, both of which should be treated with hostility. Thus, external exclusiveness is advocated (Mudde 2007: 138-139) to reach the *utopia*, i.e. the monocultural homogenous nation-state\(^4\) (Mudde 2007: 138). The *solutions* proposed by nativists include limited immigration, closed borders and deportation. Additionally, for immigrants granted entry to the nation, assimilation is promoted (Kateberg 1995: 495-4966). The “natives” are thus the priority based on their majority (Fry 2007: 5).

Likewise, *Populism* can be defined in various ways (Paul Taggart 2000: 10). It is an ideology that is hard to define due to the lack of demarcation of what should be inside versus outside the definition (Westlind 1996: 3). A widely argued view (see. Rooduijn Matthijs & Pauwels

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\(^2\) “A desire by a large group of people (such as people who share the same culture, history, language, etc.) to form a separate and independent nation of their own” (Mariam-webster, Nationalism, 2015)

\(^3\) “Xenophobia can be defined as the attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity” (UNESCO 2015).

\(^4\) Nation-state is a political organization in which a group of people are aware of a common identity and share the same history, traditions, language, descent and culture (Unesco 2015, Merriam-webster 2015 and Oxford dictionaries 2015).
Teun 2011, Kaltwasser 2014) is one by Mudde (2007: 23), where populism is seen as a thin-centered ideology with a chameleonic attribute. The definition that has been quoted plentiful, and will be used in this essay, reads as follows: ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte’ générale (general will) of the people’. The enemy in this world view is seen as the elite (Taggart 2000: 96), and exclusion of deviating individuals is preferred as a strategic solution (Taggart 2000: 94). Taggart (2000: 75) argues in agreement with Mudde (2010: 1175 and Cannon (2004: 242), that populist parties look upon themselves as being the voice of the common sense of the people. The people are in this world view seen as a “homogenous moral entity” (Taggart 2000: 12, 92) and institutional constrains e.g. constitutional protections of minorities, are seen as undemocratic as they do not prioritize the people (Mudde 2010: 1175).

Furthermore, authoritarianism may be defined in several different ways. Here however, authoritarianism is defined as a quest for a strict hierarchic social order as well as a society with severe punishments for deviancy and criminal acts (Mudde 2007: 23). Compliance and submissiveness to authority, as well as order and respect is crucial and the state should, in this world view, install these values in the population. Order is here seen as “freedom” (Mudde 2007: 22, 145-146) and the problems of the contemporary society is in this world view seen as being the result of moral decay and lenient laws (Mudde 2007: 23). Hostility towards “out-groups” and opponents are thus common strategic solutions (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992: 115).

2.3 Analytical framework

In the creation of the ideal types that will be used in this essay, Muddes (Mudde 2007: 26) aforementioned argumentation that PRRP’s, such as the SD, generally combine the ideologies nativism, authoritarianism and populism has been used as a base. Deriving from the definitions of the ideologies presented above, and using a modified version of Demkers (1993:65-71,77-79) concept of ideologies presented under 1.3, I have created the ideal types illustrated in tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below.

Table 2.2 Nativist ideal type

| World view | • Main threat; non-natives and foreign ideas  
|            | • Disloyal non-natives            |
| Strategic solutions | • Laws that will protect the own people  
|                    | • Limited immigration, deportation and assimilation, external exclusiveness |
| Utopia | • A homogenous nation-state with strong internal cohesion  
|         | • Monocultural homogenous nation-state |
The ideal type *nativism* is hereby seen as an ideology which *utopia* is a monocultural homogenous nation-state with strong internal cohesion among its citizens (Mudde 2007: 138). Its *world view* identifies the main threats as non-natives and foreign ideas (Mudde 2007: 138-139). The fears additionally include internal minorities and their effect on the internal cohesion and majority culture (Mudde 2007: 19). Their *strategic solutions* include limited immigration, deportation, assimilation and external exclusiveness (Mudde 2007: 138-139). The majority people, i.e., the people with ethnic roots in a country are seen as the main priority because they have the right to “their” country (Fry 2007: 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.3 Populist ideal type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Homogenous moral entity i.e not individualistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “The pure moral people” against the “self-serving corrupt elite”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Antiestablishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social mobilization around the populist party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “The common sense of the people” get priority, i.e direct democracy (majority rule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• External exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural homogenous population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A homogeneous nation-state ruled by the general will of the people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ideal type *populism* is here defined as striving for a homogeneous nation-state ruled by the general will of the people (Mudde 2010: 1175). The struggle between “the people” and “the corrupt elite” is identified as the main issue in society. Direct democracy, were the common sense of the people rules (Mudde 2007: 23) is called for. The people are seen as a unit, and individualism is rejected (Taggart 2000: 12, 92).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.4 Authoritarian ideal type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World View</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incapable masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not individualistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Main threats: moral decay within population, lenient laws, other parties and countries interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The State install crucial values in the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Severe punishments for deviance and criminal acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hostility towards outgroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Order is freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Same morality throughout the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Obedient and submissive population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A strict hierarchic social order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ideal type *authoritarianism* is seen to strive for a nation with a strict hierarchic social order with an obedient and submissive population. It identifies moral decay within the population, lenient laws (Mudde 2007: 23) and political opponents (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992: 115) as the main
obstacles to the utopia. The population in this world view is seen as incapable masse and the utopia is seen to be a nation-state with a strict hierarchic social order. The state shall install crucial values in the population (Mudde 2007: 22, 145-146) and strategic solutions include severe punishment for deviance and criminal acts (Mudde 2007: 23).

### 2.3.1 Analyzing ideological continuity and change

To find the SD’s ideational development over time, there is a need to clarify the changes and where these can be found. Demker argues that changes within the postulate i.e. the party’s fundamental values and beliefs of reality, need to be shown for an ideological change to have occurred (Demker 1993: 79). The motivation is that these values and believes lay the ground for the party’s interpretation of the current political situation and is used as a ground for legitimacy (Demker 1993: 67). However, noteworthy is that according to Demker (Demker 1993: 66), the postulate includes several postulates, which do not have to be consistent with one another.

I will not exclusively be looking at ideological changes, but ideational changes within the SD’s party program over time. Demker’s view can be used to decipher changes within ideologies as well. She argues that ideational changes can occur within different areas of the political party’s ideology without a change of the ideological ground of the party. The doctrine is more agile as it reacts to the political environment and changes thereafter. Thus the doctrine might partly change, creating a strain between the doctrine and the postulate but without an ideological change as a result. In addition, changes within the world view might affect the ideological ground of the party to a greater extent, and thus create a greater strain between the doctrine and the postulate than changes within the strategic solutions. This, as the value-based perceptions are seen to be of more significance to the ideology than that of specific issues. Moreover, the ideological ground per se might be constant, but the ideological nuances might differ over time. However, if the strain becomes insurmountable, the party either has to change the postulate or the doctrine (Demker 1993: 79).

Summarizing, if an ideological change shall be deemed to have occurred, the basic principles, e.i. the postulates must have been altered (Demker 1993: 79). However, as the postulate consists of multiple postulates within different areas of the ideology, a change in one of these postulates might not alter the ideology as a whole (Demker 1993:66).

Following the reasoning of Demker, the premise in this essay is that small changes in one or two of these three categories (WW, SS,U) will not affect the party’s ideational ground
extensionally, but that a combined change of these categories possibly will. Ideational changes can thus occur without the following of an ideological change.

2.3.2 Theories
I will in this essay assume Muddes (2010: 1178) theory of pathological normalcy, that is, that the attitudes of the SD in fact are radicalizations of mainstream views. This does by no means mean that policies suggested by the SD, or the core of the party’s ideology per se is mainstream, but that the key aspects of the SD’s ideological ground could be (Mudde 2010: 1178). Seen from this perspective, the SD does not need to change the public opinions, only mobilize the electorate and put the party’s main issues of immigration and security, on the political agenda (Mudde 2010: 1179). This essay will additionally use Hamilton’s (1987: 26,38) aforementioned definition in 2.2 regarding ideologies. Thus, ideologies are seen to guide the SD’s behavior, inspire political activism and to help set goals. Additionally, ideologies are seen as the SD’s view of reality i.e., the problems they see in the world, the causes of these problems, the best way to deal with them as well as the ultimate society. In addition, a modified version of Demkers theory of ideational and ideological changes will be used as a possible way of finding SD’s ideational development. The postulate in this essay thus consist of the party’s value based ideas i.e. the utopia. The doctrine consists of the world view and the strategic solutions. Thus, by empirically examining the ideologies that lay the ground for the SD’s political activity and ideas (Heywood 2012: 3), I hope to produce an important piece in the puzzle that is needed to understand the party’s resent success.

2.3.3 Questions of issue
The key questions are as follows;

1. What are the distinctive features of SD’s ideational development within three prominent ideologies in the SD's party programs?
2. How do the analytical categories (WW, SS,U) of these ideologies relate to one another?

3. Data and methods

In this section I will present the data collection and the methods that will be used in this essay. In addition I will explain why these methods were chosen, the advantages and disadvantages as well as demarcations made.
3.1 Collection of data

The empirical material used in this study will be collected from primarily manifestos. The essential information will be collected from different online sources, including the SD’s official webpage, where the political party program from 2014 is available. Additionally, from sdarkivet.se where earlier political party programs and principle programs are available. These programs are from the years of 1989, 1996, 1999 and 2005.

3.2 Methods and operationalization

To answer the questions of issue, I will use a qualitative method, performing a content analysis. Content analysis was chosen due to its general strength in its ability to create an overview of major materials in order to provide a basis for comparison (Bergström & Boréus 2012: 87). It is also a method that is well suited for finding patterns and nuances in an extensive material (Bergström & Boréus 2012: 51).

Qualitative methods, compared to quantitative methods, do not treat the different text parts equally. When employing the qualitative content analysis it enables me to, through careful reading of the texts, obtain the essential information (Esaiasson et al., 2012: 211). The content analysis will be carried out in three stages. First, I will apply the three ideal types, illustrated in table 2, 3 and 4, on the material. Ideal types are a type of constructed analytical instruments to help organize, simplify and generalize the texts. They are useful analytical instruments when the aim is to identify changes and progress over time (Demker 1993:71). It is important to point out that ideal types are not found in the empirical world. They are extremes (Esaiasson, et al., 2012: 140) that will be used as a type of grid to place over the texts (Bergström & Boréus 2012: 157). This in an attempt to find out to what extent the ideal types and the texts coincide, alternatively deviates from one another (Demker 1993: 60). This will be done by deciphering the world view, strategic solutions and utopia from each party program by asking the text a series of questions; What does the world look like and what are the threats, what should it look like and how do we get there? (Demker 1993: 68). Additionally, if the answers matches the ideal types. This will help me to analyze whether these three specific ideologies in the party programs are constant or not over time.

To identify the stated world view in the texts I will look for parts that describe conditions that exist or existed. This includes parts that identify threats and problems that the nation and society face. These parts will not only include descriptive parts, but evaluative statements of the general characteristics of the individual, society and the world (Demker 1993: 68). In order to exemplify how I later will analyze the ideational supply of the SD, an example of the world view is here presented from one SD party program; “This has obviously lead to what could be expected
and what will only become worse: unsolvable immigration problems, increased violence and increased criminality. It goes without saying that this suicide politics must be reversed and that a new type of immigration politics for health and survival needs to be implemented (PP1989: Background). They thereby clarifies how the party perceives the current society, as well as identifies the main problems of the biggest threats.

The proposed strategic solutions as well as the utopia expressed in the programs, will additionally be identified. The strategic solutions can be concrete or of a more general nature. An example of strategic solutions can be such as the following proposals: “The Sweden Democrats finds that the immigration in Sweden needs to be heavily restricted and that there needs to be a resettlement of immigrants of non-European descent” (PP1989: Immigration). In addition, the utopia can be exemplified by the following quote: “We believe that the conditions for a peaceful and democratic development is an ethnic and cultural homogenous nation, rather than a multicultural heterogenic state” (PP1989: Introduction).

The second stage of the analysis will try to decipher the interrelation between the three analytical categories world view, strategic solutions and utopia within each of the ideologies mentioned, to see if they are all linked together in a similar manner or if they depart from one another. The results will then be illustrated in additional tables and will be exemplified by quotes from the programs. It is however important to point out that a conceptual analysis will not be carried out. The texts will be examined in detail as well as a whole. The quotes will only be used to exemplify the result to ensure highest possible transparency. Furthermore, only the major features of the ideational development throughout the programs will be presented in the result due to necessary demarcations.

In the third stage of the analysis I will look at the interrelations between the three ideologies to see how the unified world view, strategic solutions and utopia have developed.

Certain parts of the programs might consist of paragraphs that include two or three of the ideal types rather than one exclusively. I will then, when possible, break these parts into smaller units in order for one ideal type to dominate, and then classify the paragraph as such. When two or three ideal types are equally dominant, the paragraph will be assigned to each one of the ideal types.

Ideal types do however lessen the empirical face and I therefore need to be careful interpreting the data. This relates to the hermeneutics, as pointed out by Gilje and Grimen (2007: 179), who argues that the scientist has his or her own understanding of the world. In other words, the researcher is never completely objective. This means that I have to be distinct in my motivation for my ideal types to ensure the optimal reliability and intersubjectivity (ibid).
Additionally, it is important to note that some paragraphs might not be classifiable with the help of the ideal types. If so, it is interesting since it indicates that other ideologies outside of Mudde's suggestion (2007: 26) might be important to PRRP’s. If many paragraphs are unclassifiable, the study will however be less reliable as it will be able to say less about the party programs as a whole.

The reason for not using a quantitative method which counts specific words is due to the complexity of party programs and the time table. The terms used to describe similar situations might change over time and I could therefore miss the actual meaning of the text. Reading between the lines and interpret what the text is trying to communicate is therefore necessary (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 210-211). As pointed out by Peter Esaiasson (2012: 210-211), the importance and significant of a text might not always be in how many times something is said, but how it is presented. This method could therefore affect the reliability of my study.

3.3 Demarcations
In order to carry out this study in accordance to instructions regarding size and scope, demarcations are necessary.

The original though was to use more ideal types, such as fascist and conservative nativism, fascist and conservative authoritarianism etcetera, in order to capture nuances within the ideologies. However, in order to execute this study according to the instructions, this is not possible. Likewise, the ideal types in this study were made slim for the same reason. This relates to the unclassifiable paragraphs mentioned in 3.3, as these demarcations increases the risk for extensive parts of the programs not being covered by the study. Therefore it needs to be pointed out that the result will not be representable for all material in the programs.

The journalist and author Anna-Lena Lodenius (2009), argues that to fully understand the SD’s history, it is necessary to go as far back as the 1970s and the founding of Keep Sweden Swedish (BSS) as some of the founders of the SD previously were members of BSS. However, this is not part of the SD’s official party literature, thus will not be done in this study. This with references to Mudde (2007: 38) who argues that a political party is not circumscribed to its members or those who lead the party, but that “it is an actor in its own right” (Mudde 2007: 38). Thus he argues that the official party literature, is the only thing that can represent the party. He does however call for both external and internal literature (Mudde 2007: 38).

External literature such as the SD’s newspaper might have given me a broader picture as well as the actual proposals put forward by the SD in the Parliament, as they might differ from the printed material distributed. However, that would make the data collection too extensive in this
limited research. Thus I will focus on internal literature. My adoption of Muddes definition on official party literature also means the exclusion of blogs and statements made in debates.

Using party programs that has been edited to make it presentable to the public might seem like an unreliable source. However, this is one of the reasons as to why it was chosen. The party program has been agreed upon by the party members. Thus it could possibly be less affected by personal rhetorics and ideas, although this is debatable as well.

A limited numbers of party programs were chosen in order to not make the data too extensive. The party programs selected were chosen partly with consideration to the duration of time between the programs as well as were major changes were seen after reviewing all of the party programs.

With references to the reasoning in this chapter, I believe that the combination of the different methods and analysis, will able me to map out ideational developments in the SD´s party programs over time and thus hopefully get a better understanding of the party.

4. SD´s ideational development

Below an analysis of five Sweden Democrats party programs (PP) will be presented, using the aforementioned theories and ideal types of three main ideologies said to influence parties such as the Sweden Democrats (Mudde 2007: 26). I will start by presenting the nativistic world view and its ideational development, followed by the nativistic strategic solutions and utopia. Additionally, a table of the interrelations of these analytical categories will follow. Likewise, the populist and authoritarian ideational development will be presented in the same way. Finally, a presentation of how the components of these ideologies relate to one another.

4.1 Nativism

Table 4.1 present the Nativist ideal type as the basis for my analysis of the nativist content of the party programs.

4.1 Nativist ideal type

| World view       | • Main threat; non-natives and foreign ideas  
|                  | • Disloyal non-natives                        
| Strategic solutions | • Laws that will protect the own people  
|                  | • Limited immigration, deportation and assimilation, external exclusiveness   
| Utopia           | • A homogenous nation-state with strong internal cohesion  
|                  | • Monocultural homogenous nation-state        |
4.1.1 World view (WV)

The changes in the nativist WV are not linear and the WV in the earlier programs is penetrated with xenophobia and numerous threats, increasing till 1999. In the later programs, the nationalism heavily overweighs, the threats are expressed more generally and the rhetoric is less direct. Still, many of the threats are the same in 1989 as in 2005; immigration, supranationalism and alien influences. Examples of earlier increased threats is the decrease of the "safe" group. In 1989, individuals from neighboring areas were perceived as a lesser threat than non-European individuals as they "ethnically and culturally easier blend into the Swedish society" (PP1989: Immigration). In 1996, Europe is divided into two separate culture spheres where only people from the Western culture sphere is described to ethnically and culturally blend in (PP1996: 5-6).

A possible ideational change in the WV is here exemplified with quotes. The first quote is representable for the three earliest programs in the study. The second quote shows the view of Sweden and the Western cultural hemisphere as superior. The third and fourth quotes show the identified possible ideational change. The country is still glorified, but the focus is on the nationalistic principle and not on Swedish superiority. Noteworthy is also the lack of the direct mentioning of ethnicity in the later programs WV.

"Sweden was an idyllic place, something of a model country for other countries to look up to... Our country was homogenous not only racially, but in many other aspects... The political demands of 'international solidarity' and the 'open society', has led to an immigration process that has opened our borders to a motley stream of immigrants and political refugees. They then evoke 'democracy and equality' to be able to demand their rights as citizens and to 'keep their culture', including their customs and conflicts. Naturally this has as expected led to, which will get worse; unsolvable immigration problems, violent and increased criminality. Naturally, this suicide politics needs to stop and a new immigration politics for survival and health need to be implemented, if Sweden is not going to dissolve and perish" (PP1989: Background).

"A typical Western phenomenon is the Enlightenment thoughts with the ideas of human rights and freedoms, which has no equivalent in the rest of the world" (PP1996: 6).

“The Sweden Democrats do not mean that Swedes are better than others, but that Sweden is the only place on earth where we have an absolute right to work and develop our own uniqueness and identity” (PP2005: 6)

"... A country with a strong cohesion and solidarity, built on a common identity" (PP2014: 3)

There are however ideational continuances such as the importance of culture, internal cohesion and common identity in a homogenous nation-state, here exemplified with the first quote that is representable for all the examined programs. The last quote above and the quotes below show the continued view of cohesion and cultural importance, tied to history and time.

---

5 "A desire by a large group of people (such as people who share the same culture, history, language, etc.) to form a separate and independent nation of their own" (Mariam-Webster, Nationalism, 2015)
"People and land are closely interrelated. These ties get stronger the longer a people live in their country. In time, trait grows from the people and the country, which is the peoples’ most precious inheritance” (PP1996: Background).

"We are in addition aware of the fact that Sweden are unique in many ways and that we have our own unique culture and history. We are very proud of that” (PP2014: 3).

In conclusion it is noteworthy that the WV of 2014 lacks the aforementioned international threats. It raises questions weather Sweden is seen as less threatened on the international arena, or if threats on the national arena are perceived as more urgent. The absence of concepts such as ethnicity and race in 2014 can be interpreted in multiple ways and it is hard to determine whether the concepts are considered as part of the ”common identity”.

Other previously mentioned problems, such as immigration, supranationalism and alien influences, are in 2014 either absent or described in a vague way (PP2014: 3). However, although described less forcefully in 2014, the base of the problems in the doctrine i.e. the operative level of the ideology (Demker 1993: 65), could still be interpreted to be similar to that of the earlier programs. Thus questions whether the doctrine paints a less threatening picture of the world because the SD no longer sees the world as threatening, or if the changes are strictly rhetorical is raised. The possible ideational change i.e. the view on the superiority of Sweden (PP1996: 6, PP2014: 3) is however clear.

4.1.2 Strategic Solutions (SS)

Although expressed differently in the later programs, the nativist solutions all take their stand in the following belief;

"...nationally oriented policies are the solution to many of the problems that Sweden faces today” (PP1989: Background).

The proposed solutions have however gone through some changes similar to those of the WV. The following quote regarding deportation, is representable for the first three programs examined in this study;

"The Sweden Democrats want to stop all immigration of people with origins from outside the Western culture sphere ... Substantial resources will be needed to create the conditions needed for the ethnic aliens who has immigrated to our country after 1970, to be able to return to their home countries ... Marriage to a Swedish citizen entails no exception from the repatriation” (PP1996: 12).

A major change in later programs is the move towards a more nationalistic rather than xenophobic approach, leaving earlier concepts like ethnicity behind. In the earlier programs, origin was
proposed to affect the distribution of Swedish citizenship; ten years for non-Nordic citizens, and three years for Nordic (PP1996: 5). The focus in 2014 is to a larger extent on how to limit general immigration and how to deal with groups already inside of the Swedish boarders (PP2014: 7).

"... limiting newly arrived migrants, with no need of protections, access to the benefit system during the first years in the country... a return to the assimilation policies that was in place until the mid-1970s, and that means that it is the immigrants who shall adapt to Sweden and not vice versa...the abolition of all government integration policies with the exception of Swedish classes, mandatory social studies and validation of courses and working experiences from their home country” (PP2014: 7) "... the abolition of the in reality free medical and dental care for illegal immigrants” (PP2014: 11)

There are however similarities in the earlier and later programs showing some ideational continuances. It is here exemplified by the proposal in the second quote above (PP1996: 12), and a later proposal of revoked Swedish citizenship for individuals with dual citizenships participating in terror training (PP2014: 5). Although different in motivation, these solutions clarify the view of being Swedish, which is not the citizenship itself. To be Swedish and part of the nation is considered to take generations and requires a common language, religion, loyalty, history and origins (PP2005: 5). Thus, assimilation is advocated. The constant view of Islam as a threat shows the continued idea of alien influences as a danger;

"No mosques are allowed on Swedish soil. International experiences show that Mosques can be a breeding ground for terrorism and religious interference in the political life” (PP1996: 6)

"... A clearer discouragement of Islamism and other totalitarian ideologies that are destabilizing the world” (PP2014: 21)

Concluding, a change can be seen in the view of discrimination and complete exclusion as a solution. The solution regarding eviction of individuals arriving in Sweden after 1970 (PP1996: 12), demonstrates a change, as the later programs do not mention deportation based on ethnicity or origin. The program of 2014 focuses to a greater deal on not facilitating additional support to immigrants already in Sweden (PP2014: 7), making it harder for the newly arrived to establish themselves. Hence, it could be interpreted as another way to reach the utopia (doctrine) (Demker 1993: 66), i.e. a tactical change by adapting to the surrounding society, hoping to attract more votes. Likewise, it could be an adaptation to a changed utopia i.e. an ideational change. Thus the utopia needs to be examined.
4.1.3 Utopia

In the five programs analyzed, the changes of the nativist utopia appear to be mainly rhetorical. The following quotes exemplify the utopia throughout all programs where the homogenous nation-state is a constant idea.

“We believe that an ethnically and culturally homogenous nation has a greater chance of a peaceful and democratic development than a multicultural heterogenic statehood. Experience suggests that common roots strengthen national integrity and contribute to stability and justice” (PP1989: Introduction).

"The most important factor in a safe, harmonic and solidaristic society is the common identity, which in turn requires a high degree of ethnic and cultural similarity among the population. Thereof, is the nationalistic principle - the principle of one state, one nation - the basis of the Sweden Democrats politics ” (PP2005: 4)

"The Sweden Democrats strives for a Sweden where the society is pervaded by a historically rooted, shared Swedish culture that creates unity and solidarity in-between the citizens” (PP2014: 18).

The most extensive change is seen in the utopia of 2014’s, where "ethnicity” is mentioned differently, describing a utopia that includes a Sweden with no discrimination due to ethnicity;

"The Sweden Democrats work for a society where men and women have the same value and rights. A Sweden where no one is discriminated based on their sex, ethnical background, agenda, sexual orientation or disability” (PP2014: 17).

However, the following quote shows the continued view of the prioritization of the population defined as Swedish;

"... A country where the law binding Swedish population is not discriminated within the health sector in relations to foreigners that are in the country illegally... A Sweden with lots of work and where the Swedish workers interests are put first” (PP2014: 8, 11).

Concluding, a possible interpretation is that shared roots and history refers to a shared ethnicity, as explained earlier and in 2005 (PP2005: 4). Although disapproving of discrimination based on ethnicity in 2014, the rest of the program shows an underlying tone that could be interpreted as if the Swedish natives are discriminated. Hence, it is hard to determine an ideational change. One might believe that the utopia i.e. the postulate, is close to constant, as the party uses similar language in 2014 as in 2005 when discussing the basis for a functioning homogenous nation-state. It does not necessarily mean that the postulates are not unified, which according to Demker (1993: 66) is possible, but could mean that ethnicity in relation to discrimination and a homogeneous nation-state is seen as different issues.
4.1.4 Interrelations

Table 4.2 presents the nativist ideology’s ideational development within the programs.

Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World view</td>
<td>• Sweden superior</td>
<td>• Constant*</td>
<td>• Increased threats</td>
<td>• General threats</td>
<td>• Decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Danger of loosing control of</td>
<td>• Increased threats</td>
<td>• Nationalistic principle</td>
<td>threats</td>
<td>threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>country</td>
<td>• Rhetorics toned down**</td>
<td>• Sweden not superior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>• Exclusion of non-natives</td>
<td>• Increased discrimination</td>
<td>• Almost absent</td>
<td>• Rhetorics toned down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution</td>
<td>• Nationally oriented policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>due to the lack of strategic</td>
<td>• Less discriminatory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ethnicity and origin</td>
<td></td>
<td>proposals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assimilation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia</td>
<td>• Monocultural and ethnically</td>
<td>• Constant</td>
<td>• Rhetorics toned down**</td>
<td>• Similar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>homogenous nation-state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• &quot;ethnicity&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common roots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Constant refers to mainly unchanged core
** Rhetorics toned down refers to less harsh and direct language

As shown in table 4.2 common continuances and changes in the nativist ideology can be identified. The later programs include possible ideational changes both in the WV and the SS following a similar pattern thus, the doctrine appears to be what Demker (1993: 66) calls unified. The utopia however, though rhetorically changed, appears close to constant through the programs, which could indicate a possible strain between the postulate and the doctrine.

4.2 Populism

Table 4.3 present the Populist ideal type as the basis for the analysis of the populist content of the programs.

Table 4.3 Populist ideal type

| World view | • Homogenous moral entity i.e not individualistic |
|           | • “The pure moral people” against the “self-serving corrupt elite” |
|           | • Antiestablishment |

| Strategic solutions | • Social mobilization around the populist party |
|                     | • “The common sense of the people” get priority, i.e direct democracy (majority rule) |
|                     | • External exclusion |

| Utopia | • Cultural homogenous population |
|        | • A homogeneous nation-state ruled by the general will of the people |
4.2.1 World view (WV)

Between 1989 and 2014, the populist WV is seen to go through major rhetorical changes and some possible ideational changes. The first quote exemplifies the harsh and direct rhetoric, and the party’s typical populist view (Mudde 2007: 23) of “the pure moral people” standing against the “self-serving and corrupt elite” (1989, 1996, 1999). The second quote exemplifies the continued idea of a people suppressed by an incapable elite that are not focusing on the majority of the people;

"Undemocratic elements have been violating groups or individuals who express divergent opinions or criticized the current policy. The lack of democracy has shown itself most clearly through the politicians and the medias’ intolerant hate campaigns against all the parties, organizations and individuals who dared to challenge the current immigration policy. These campaigns have gone so far that the freedom of expression is in grave danger” (PP1989: Background).

"The legislation has constantly been reinforced by the authorities to discriminate against the Swedish people” (PP1996: 11)

The early programs describe a corrupt elite engaging in favoritism and nepotism. The elite is described as incapable of leading the country, thus damaging the population by political brainwashing and smear campaigns through the media, thereby responsible for the decay of the country. In the 2014, the political failure is described differently and the politicians are no longer accused of being corrupt and undemocratic;

"Unfortunately we believe that the politicians in power, through their dividing politics and inadequate priorities, have made Sweden a little less nice and a little less fantastic each year in the past decenniums” (PP2014: 1).

Concluding, this part of the doctrine (Demker 1993: 79) describes a less urgent and less dangerous picture in 2014. Still, many of the former threats and issues (PP2014:3) are, although expressed differently, the same throughout the programs. However, a possible ideational change can be seen in 2005 and 2014 since the elite is no longer accused of purposely endangering the society. It could be interpreted as a strategic change, or a reaction to a perceived less dangerous world. Thus, the rest of the doctrine and the postulate need to be examined.

4.2.2 Strategic Solutions (SS)

In the three earlier programs, the populist proposals are relatively constant. The need to empower the people through direct-democracy is exemplified by the first quote. The oppression through media is expressed in the second quote.
"Before major policy decisions are made, they should be subject to a comprehensive and open debate. In the case of major changes in the policy stance a referendum should be resorted to in order to ascertain whether the decision has support among the citizens... both advisory and decision-making" (PP1989: Introduction).

"The Swedish population shall not be subjected to political brainwashing or one-sided propaganda. There is a need for alternative views. Individual citizens and organizations need to gain better protection against defamation and slanderous reportages. The media with national coverage, as TV and radio, has a particular responsibility and needs to be obliged to publish a response from the defamed party" (PP1999: Mass media).

In 2014, direct-democracy is still advocated;

"A new referendum of Swedish membership of the EU, with the objective that Sweden as soon as possible will leave the supranational union and return to an intergovernmental European cooperation" (PP2014: 20).

Concluding, due to the lack of populist solutions in the later programs, it is hard to determine whether an ideational change of the populist doctrine has occurred or not. Proposals regarding the media and the corrupt elite are absent. This could be interpreted in numerous ways; there is no need to react to these particular issues as they no longer are seen to exist, the elements are no longer included in the utopia and therefore do not need to be mentioned in the doctrine, or other issues are perceived to be more important.

4.2.3 Utopia

The populist utopia has gone through major rhetorical changes and its quantity is drastically decreased in 2014.

The idea that the SD is on the people’s side is constant. Although clearly expressed in the first quote, the second quote could, in its context, be interpreted as an ideational continuance;

"The Sweden democrats want to, in different ways, be the interpreter of the public interest. We believe that the public interest must guide the political decisions." (PP1996: 5).

"When we, the Sweden Democrats, say that we choose welfare, we mean in for real… When we, the Sweden Democrats, say that we love Sweden, we mean it. For real… Because we love Sweden and the people that live here. For real" (PP2014: 3)

Another ideational continuance is that the power shall stem from the people;

"The people’s participation needs to be increased by an improved direct-democracy" (PP1989: Introduction)

"The Sweden Democrats advocates a classical democracy model, with elements of user- and direct democracy ... All power emanates from the people" (PP2005: 9)
Furthermore, any mentioning of a society free of political brainwashing is absent in the later programs.

Concluding, the populist utopia appears close to constant. However, as in the aforementioned doctrine, the lack of references of impartial media and corrupt elite in the later programs, could be interpreted as an ideational or tactical change. The distinct features of the ideational continuances are however clear. The SD continuously express that the power shall stem from the people and that (e.g. PP1989: Introduction, PP2005: 9) the SD, in a typical populist fashion (Taggart 2000: 75, Mudde 2010: 1175), are on the people's side (PP2014: 3, PP1989: 5). The populist part of the postulate is thus interpreted to include mainly ideational continuances.

4.2.4 Interrelations

Table 4.4 presents the populist ideology’s ideational development within the programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World view</td>
<td>Population suppressed and politically brainwashed by elite and media</td>
<td>Constant*</td>
<td>Increased threats</td>
<td>Decreased threats</td>
<td>Rhetorics toned down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corrupt, self-serving and incapable elite</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rhetorics toned down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Solutions</td>
<td>Protect the people from oppression</td>
<td>No major changes</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Almost absent due to the lack of SS</td>
<td>Few populist Ss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appears constant</td>
<td>Appears constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia</td>
<td>Parliamentary direct democracy</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Almost constant</td>
<td>Less quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public interest guides political decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rhetorics toned down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Media not mentioned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant refers to mainly unchanged core ** Rhetorics toned down refers to less harsh and direct language

As seen in Table 4.4, the populist doctrine, and postulate remains to a large extent unchanged. Noteworthy is the reduction of populism in the later programs. This raises the question whether the populist view is seen as decreasingly important. Common changes can however be seen in both the doctrine and the postulate of the ideology thus, a strain is not recorded.
4.3 Authoritarianism

Table 4.5 present the authoritarian ideal type as the basis for my analysis of the authoritarian content of the party programs.

Table 4.5 Authoritarian ideal type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World View</th>
<th>Strategic Solutions</th>
<th>Utopia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Incapable masses</td>
<td>• The State instill crucial values in the population</td>
<td>• Order is freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not individualistic</td>
<td>• Severe punishments for deviance and criminal acts</td>
<td>• Same morality throughout the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Main threats: moral decay within population, lenient laws, other parties and countries interference</td>
<td>• Hostility towards outgroups</td>
<td>• Obedient and submissive population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• A strict hierarchic social order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.1 World view (WV)

The authoritarian WV changes over time, mainly due to a decrease of authoritarian parts. In the earlier programs, the WV is constant, mainly focusing on lenient laws, moral decay and political incapability. The following quote is thus representative for 1989, 1996 and 1999;

"The crime rate has increased alarmingly, especially serious crimes, which is a sign of failed politics, and no effective measures have been taken to rectify the situation. Due to the moral resolution, unrestrained immigration and mild punishment for criminal activities, Sweden has become a playground for international gangs and criminals...The fact that murderers and other serious criminals have been able to be free after a few years, sometimes after even less time, is proof enough of the permissiveness that has characterized - and still characterize - the politics regarding criminality" (PP1989: Background, PP1996: 3-4, PP1999: Background).

A constant view is that of the state as a protector of its citizens;

"To prevent crime and protect the citizens from crime and abuse is the duty of every democratic State" (PP1989: Criminality)

"As Swedish politicians and trustees of the Swedish population’s tax money, we never doubt that our primary responsibility is to guarantee the citizens of Sweden good living standards, safety and welfare” (PP2014:3)

The continued WV is nearly absent in 2014. However, the following statement could be interpreted as that Sweden is unsafe;

"We are happy that Sweden during a long time was a country where one could feel safe in once home and on the streets and the squares...A country with a strong internal cohesion and solidarity, built on a common identity" (PP2014: 3)
Concluding, the authoritarian WV is close to constant until 2005, and almost absent in 2014. One ideational continuity is however the view of the unsafe society which can be interpreted as problems with criminality and lenient laws, although not directly expressed. However, due to the lack of authoritarian parts, direct changes and continuances within the authoritarian *doctrine* is hard to determine. Thus, the SS’s needs to be examined.

### 4.3.2 Strategic solutions (SS)

A distinct feature of the ideational changes in the authoritarian parts of the programs is the view of the state as a guardian and thus the interpreter of morals. The earlier programs advocates moral rearmament (PP1989: Abortions) and a lot of the focus is on teaching the children the correct moral and culture (PP1996: 9,10). Both quotes shows the state as a moral incorporator e.g. the states right to define "family", all of which is absent in 2014.

"In addition to the tax on consumer goods, the taxes on luxury goods, some abundant goods and such that creates an unhealthy life patterns, are unhealthy or harmful to humans or the environment, should be stricter. Base food however should be untaxed" (PP1989: Tax politics)

"Registered partnerships for homosexuals should not be allowed. The specific inheritance rules that apply to heterosexual and monogamous families shall only relates to these, i.e., does not apply to other forms of union such as gay couples, polygamy etcetera. Gay couples and polygamous families shall not be allowed to adopt children” (PP1996: 9)

The continuances in the authoritarian *solutions*, is the belief in severe punishments. The following quote is representable for all programs examined except for 2014’s.

"When a man despite the help and assistance from the society, constantly relapses and commits serious crimes, it is time for the society to act forcefully… A person who has received three chances to re-adapt to a law-abiding life, but still relapses and commits serious crimes, should be incarcerated for the rest of his life. Certain extremely serious crimes shall in certain cases lead to the death penalty” (PP1996: 14)

Although different in severity, the advocacy for harsher punishments is still present in 2014;

"A major increase in the severity of the penalties for serious and repeated violations of the law by, among other things, the introduction of real life sentence without the possibility of time limitation or parole for the most dangerous criminals, mandatory deportation of all foreign nationals who commit serious crimes" (PP2014: 5)

---

6 Death penalty only advocated 1989 and 1996
Concluding, possible ideational changes in this part of the authoritarian doctrine are seen to be minimal up until 2014, where ideas of the state as a moral guardian (PP1989: Abortion, PP1996: 9,10) is absent. This raises the question if the SD has more faith in the citizens in 2014 than earlier. An additional explanation could be that the importance and urgency of such solutions decreased due to changes in the surrounding world, however harsh punishments are continually advocated, indicating a general distrust in people.

4.3.3 Utopia (U)

The Authoritarian utopia appears relatively stable over time, with the exception of 2014. Throughout the other four programs examined, a striving for a society where the state through school and severe punishments, disciplines the citizens is presented. Substantial is that the youth should learn the important and shared norms and rules that the society is built upon and that should penetrate the society;

"Abortions, criminality and moral decay can be counteracted by guiding actions in the home and in the school. The school shall create the feeling of homeliness and freedom" (PP1989: Introduction).

"The respect for the constitutional state increases if the families and the societies and organizations, for example the schools, moral and ethical perceptions are the same. The society has to function as a family where the experienced and adults are responsible to give the youth guidance, norms and rules" (PP1989: Criminality, PP1996: 14).

"The main goal of the Sweden Democratic politics is to create a healthy society - a welfare state - characterized by safety, harmony and solidarity" (PP2005:3).

A possible change in the utopia can be seen in 2014 where the state no longer is perceived as the only moral guardian;

"A Sweden where the state does not try to control men and women's sexual identity and life choices, but instead tries to support citizens in their choices and the situation they are situated in" (PP2014: Equality politics for the real people).

Another possible ideational change can be seen in the program from 2014 where the need for harsher punishments is not directly expressed. Instead, the punishment should be in proportion to the committed crime;

"The Sweden Democrats are working towards a Sweden where everyone can feel safe everywhere in the country, around the clock... A Sweden where the victims get support and justice they deserve. A Sweden where the punishments are in proportion to the committed crime and are in unison to the popular conception of the law. A Sweden characterized by consideration and safety" (PP2014: 5).

A constant belief and strive is a strong military defense;
"...This demands a defense with a severely deterrent effect on eventual attackers. The whole of Sweden shall be able to be defended" (PP1996: 12, PP1999: Defense and safety).

"The Sweden Democrats are working towards a Sweden with a strong and flexible defense. A Sweden where the whole kingdom can be defended. A Sweden with a defense force that creates trust and respect in the world. A Sweden with sustained domestic defense industry where we can feel safe and proud of a well-equipped, modern and effective defense" (PP2014: 13).

Concluding, the authoritarian utopia, the postulate, is not seen to go through any major ideational changes in the earlier programs (1989-1999). In 2005, some possible changes are noted, mainly by the lack of references to the state as a moral guardian. This change could possibly be interpenetrated as an increased trust in the population’s capability. Likewise, other problems could be more urgent. Additionally, a possible ideational change in 2014 is the lack of the direct expressed longing for harsh punishments. However, how the proportion of the punishments to the committed crime will be determined is not expressed, thus need to be looked at in relations to the SS’s. Noteworthy is the decrease of the authoritarian utopia in the program from 2014, and thus the questioning of the SD’s view on the importance of the authoritarian views in the later years.

4.3.4. Interrelations

*Table 4.6 presents the authoritarian ideology’s ideational development within the programs.*

**Table 4.6**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>World View</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political failure</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Close to absent</td>
<td>Close to absent</td>
<td>Serious issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lenient laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Moral decay</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Solutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Harsh punishments</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Almost constant</td>
<td>Almost absent due to the lack of strategic proposals</td>
<td>Restriction of participation in terrorism training</td>
<td>Less Paternalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strong State</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• State moral guardian</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Expulsion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Utopia</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• State moral guardian (Paternalism)</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Constant in most cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Harsh punishments</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disciplined and morally aware citizens</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strong military defense</td>
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</table>

* Constant refers to mainly unchanged core ** Rhetorics toned down refers to less harsh and direct language
As seen in table 4.6, the authoritarian doctrine and postulate follows a similar pattern up until 2005. In 2014, the doctrine can be seen to no longer be what Demker (1993: 66) calls unified as the WV is close to absent. The other part of the authoritarian *doctrine*, the *solutions*, are however present and are dealing with many, but not all, of the issues the WV brought up in earlier programs. Thus, SD could possible still see similar problems in the world as previously. However, aforementioned possible changes, as well as the lack of the WV in 2014, make it difficult to determine the *doctrine* to be constant in 2014. However, as the *utopian* society is similar in 2014 and 1989, a possible strain between the postulate and the doctrine need to be examined.
4.4 The SD’s party programs ideational changes and continuances

In this section I will summarize the ideational changes of the SD’s party programs, deriving from Demker’s view on ideologies as shown in table 4.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.7</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Postulate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World view</td>
<td>Strategic solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the three ideologies used in the analysis, common possible ideational changes and continuances between the analytical categories can be seen. The WV and the solutions follow, as presented in 4.1-4.3, a similar patterns up till 1999. In addition, the utopia stays constant during this period. However, as this pattern do not include any major changes, a strain between the operative level and the value based level of the ideologies is here not indicated. Thus, based solely in the three ideologies used in this study, during the years of 1989 and 1999, the programs seem to be advocating what Hamilton (1987:26) calls the same patterns of conduct, social relations and arrangements.

The programs can however be seen to change in 2005 as the threats expressed decreases and continue to decrease in 2014. As seen in 4.1-4.3, the authoritarian WV is close to absent in 2014, which indicates a changed WV, pointing to possible ideational changes in the operative part of the ideology. This as the previously continued ideas of e.g. the dangerous moral resolution (PP1989: Background, PP1996: 3-4, PP1999: Background) is no longer present. Although there are aforementioned ideational continuances within the WV and the SS, there is an extensive list presented in 4.1-4.3 of changes indicating ideational changes. Examples of such include the changed view on the state as a moral incorporator (PP2014), and a changed view on discriminatory proposal (PP2005, PP2014).

Furthermore, populist solutions are decreasing in the later programs which can be interpreted as a loss of belief in the populist solutions, thus a possible change in the doctrine. With the aforementioned arguments in mind, I would argue that there is a possibility that the doctrine, based solely in these three ideologies, has changed from 1989 till 2014.

The utopia, i.e., the postulate (Demker 1993:66), has as presented in 4.1-4.3, been almost constant throughout the examined programs, although with major rhetorical changes and some possible minor ideational changes. As the doctrine possibly has changed, it leads to the question if there are frictions between the doctrine and the postulate.
One example of this possible friction, what Demkers (1993: 79) calls a strain between the postulate and the doctrine, is the SDs’ view on being Swedish. The aforementioned solution to send immigrants back (PP1996: 12) and to revoke citizenships (PP2014: 5) exemplifies the main problem of this strain. Citizenship does not mean that the individual has become part of the nation since this is considered to take generations and requires a common language, religion, loyalty and history (PP2005: National freedom). As the revoking of citizenships is only applicable to citizens with dual citizenship (PP2014: 5), it means that in reality, there are no equal citizenship rights for all. The postulate is said to strive for society with no discrimination (PP2014:17), but this part of the doctrine is advocating discrimination, creating a possible strain between the two. As argued by Hamilton (1987: 26), ideologies are meant to justify and explain why and how certain traits and arrangements are desirable. Due to this friction, the ideology in the program in 2014 can be seen to be divided, thus giving different answers to why and how certain traits and arrangements are desirable.
5. Discussion and conclusions

I have examined the SD’s party programs to follow their ideational development to get a better understanding of the party’s success. As presented in 4.1, I have found possible ideational changes and continuances, presented and discussed below.

Continuances
As presented, the postulates (U) include mainly ideational continuances. Additionally, there are ideational continuances found in the doctrine (SS, WV), many seen to stem from the unchanged postulate. As ideologies are meant to justify a certain pattern of conduct (Hamilton 1987:26) this, I would argue, is not surprising as it avoids a so called strain (Demker 1993: 79) between the doctrine and the postulates.

Homogenous nation-state and alien influences
One of the major ideational continuances can be seen to stem from the SD utopia; the longing for, and belief in, a homogenous nation-state (PP1989: Introduction, PP2014:18). This is also seen in the WV where a previously homogenous Sweden is presented, facing dangers due to alien influences (PP1996:6, PP2014:21). Likewise, a similar pattern can be observed in the strategic solutions where external exclusion and assimilation is continuously advocated (Result 4.1, 4.3).

The homogenous society is penetrating all of the programs examined and are thus seen to be one of the basic views of the programs. Therefore, an ideational change in this part of the postulate would with Demkers (1993:79) reasoning, possibly have led to an ideological change. Put differently, ideologies are used as justifications of certain conducts (Hamilton 1987:26), in this case the solutions (doctrine). Hence, a change within this area of the doctrine would lead to the postulate no longer supporting the doctrine. This could be one of many reasons to why this view has not changed as it might have altered the ideology of the program too extensively for e.g. party members.

Incappable elite, lenient laws and the main purpose of the state
Another constant idea found in the doctrine is the incapability of the leading politicians (e.g. PP1989, PP2014: 1). One such example is their inability to protect their citizens, which, according to another constant idea, is the main purpose of the state (PP1989: Criminality, PP2014:3). A recurrent explanation presented to this failure, is lenient laws, met with strategic solutions for harsher punishments, a belief penetrating all analytical levels (WV, SS, U) throughout the programs.
One possible explanation for the mistrust of the elite is that the SD indeed believes that the current politicians are destroying the country. Additionally, it could be a strategy aiming to create distrust of the SD’s political opponents among the electorates. Supporting this theory is another constant idea; that the SD, unlike the elite, is on the side of the people (e.g. PP1999:Sweden Democrats, PP2014:3). These continuous parts of the doctrine are as presented supported by the postulates, thus Demker’s (1993:79) strain is not recorded. Additionally, the solutions (the conduct) are thus justified (Hamilton 1987:26) by the unchanged ideology.

Changes

Sweden’s superiority
Possible ideational changes can, based on the ideal types, be seen over time in the programs. One such change is the idea presented in the WV of Sweden being superior (PP1996: 6), as the later programs express the opposite (PP2005:17). If this change is tactical i.e. solely rhetorical, or a genuine ideational change is hard to determine. What can be seen however, is that there is nothing in the earlier utopia to justify (Hamilton 1987:26) the previous idea of superiority. Thus, this change in the doctrine does not create a strain with the unchanged postulate. However, this could indicate that a strain existed prior to this change.

Discrimination
Another possible ideational change that regards all the analytical categories (WV, SS, U) regards discrimination. The presented WV changes from 1989 and in 2014 a nation threatened by other ethnicities, deviant sexual orientations etcetera (PP1996: 9, PP2005:5) is not directly described. One explanation to the expressed acceptance of e.g. homosexuals, could be due to the ideational change in the view of the state as a moral incorporator. The solutions (PP1996: 5, 9, 12) change in a similar manner as the WV, however, the revoking of citizenships (PP2014:5) mentioned in 4.4 is a deviation.

The desire for a society without discrimination based on ethnicity, sexual orientation etcetera (PP2014:17), is one of few changes found in the utopia in 2014. One possible explanation is an adaption to what is believed to be an increasing public acceptance within these areas, in order to gain more votes. As discussed in 4.4, discriminative proposals remain. Thus creating a strain between the doctrine and the postulate (Demker 1993: 79), created by the doctrine, is present. This makes me question whether the change in the postulate is genuine as they there describe a longing for a world (PP2014:17) that they themselves counteracts (PP2014: 5). I would however argue that there are not enough discriminating proposals left in the examined parts of the program from 2014.
to create what Demker (1993:79) calls an insurmountable strain between the postulate or the doctrine that would lead to the party having to change one of the two.

Corrupt elite and media
Another major change regards the view of the corrupt and suppressive elite and media, a view removed from all three analytical categories. One possible explanation is that the world around the party changed, hence no reason to react to this threat or mentioning it in the utopia. However, to interpret this as an ideational change in the utopia does not seem logical as it would imply that we assume that the party now wants a corrupt and suppressive elite. Therefore a possible explanation could be that other problems appear more urgent, or a tactical maneuver to attract the electorates. However, as this view is removed from all analytical categories, a strain between the postulate and doctrine (Demker 1993: 79) is not noted.

5.1 Final conclusions
To conclude, the program rhetoric is gradually toned down, possibly interpreted as an attempt to become increasingly "politically correct" in an effort to gain votes. Furthermore, the potential ideational changes have been recorded within areas which in the Swedish society could be seen as sensitive, such as ethnicity, discrimination, countries superiority and corruption. The question is why these changes have occurred and what it means. As many of the changes can be seen in the doctrine, it could be interpreted as a strategy, a way of increasing the number of votes, thereby reaching close to the same utopian society. As explained by Demker (1993: 79), changes can occur in the doctrine without the corresponding ideas changing in the postulates and thus without an ideological change. Despite the limitations of this study, with Mudde's (2010:1181) theory of widespread demand as my base, I would argue that this limited research shows possible tactical ideational changes within the SD’s party programs. One explanation could be the pathological normalcy (Mudde 2010:1178). Even though many ideational continuances exists within the programs, the overall language and approach to issues gets, as mentioned, decreasingly harsh and less direct in the later programs. This could be seen as a strategy to lessen what Mudde (2010:1178) calls the radicalization of the populations views, and thus seem more appealing to the electorates.

The fact that parts of the party programs were not covered by the three ideal types created can be explained in various ways. It could indicate that the SD is not a PRRP or that Mudde’s (2007:26) theory is incorrect and that the excluded parts of the program consists of completely different ideologies. However, it is more likely that broader and more ideal types to catch the nuances within the ideologies, would have captured more of the programs.
Furthermore, there could be parts in the programs that were not covered by the study that could modify the conclusions reached. With the slim ideal types used, excluded parts varied over time, but landed on approximately 30 percent in general. The results and conclusions found in this study is just a small part in the puzzle towards understanding the SD’s development, and probably not the whole truth. Thus, further research is needed.

5.2 Analytical framework and further research

Among numerous obstacles and issues faced during the progress of this essay, the main problems manifested themselves in the limitations of the three ideal types. Thus, as mentioned in 3.3, an increase of ideal types in the study would have been desirable to be able to cover more of the programs, as well as different nuances within the ideologies as nuances has been hard to pinpoint. Furthermore, using the three additional analytical levels presented by Demker (1993:69) would have been suitable, as they would have given me a deeper analysis and is thus recommended for further research.

To complement the study in the future, and get a better understanding of the SD´s ideological and ideational base and development, a comparison with the SD’s actual proposals in the Parliament would be interesting. A comparison with the public opinion of issues covered by the three ideologies could in addition be fruitful to find out if the changes recorded in this study are mainly tactical or ideational changes.

Although this study was an ideational study, not solely ideological, I would argue that the study in itself, although with clear limitations, gives us an important piece in the puzzle of SD´s ideational development and gives us an idea of the programs evolution.
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