THE INDONESIAN MILITARY
AFTER THE NEW ORDER
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THE
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NEW ORDER

Sukardi Rinakit

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Sukardi Rinakit
Glossary

ABRI *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia,* Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
AKMIL *Akademi Militer,* Military Academy
ASRENUM *Asistant Perencanaan Umum-MABES ABRI,* Assistant for General Planning—ABRI Headquarters
BABINSA *Bintara Pembina Desa,* Village Guidance Non-Commissioned Officers
BAIS *Badan Intelejen Strategi,* Strategic Intelligence Agency
BAKIN *Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara,* National Intelligence Coordinating Body
BAKORSTANAS *Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional,* Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability
BIA *Badan Intilijen ABRI,* ABRI’s Intelligence Agency
BKR *Badan Keamanan Rakyat,* People’s Security Body
DANSESKOAB *Komandan Sekolah Staff dan Komando ABRI,* Commander ABRI Staff and Command College
DPR *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat,* House of Representatives
FOSKO-TNI *Forum Studi dan Komunikasi TNI,* Army Forum for Study and Communication
GAM *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,* Aceh Freedom Movement
GBHN *Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara,* Broad Outlines of State Policy
GOLKAR *Golongan Karya,* Functional Group
HANKAM *Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan,* Department of Defence and Security
HMI *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam,* Association of Islamic Students
ICMI *Ikatan Cendekiaan Muslim Indonesia,* Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association
KABAKIN *Kepala Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara,* Head, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
GLOSSARY

KAMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia; Indonesian Association of Student Action
KASAD Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat; Army Chief of Staff
KASSOSPOL Kepala Staf Sosial Politik; Chief of Staff for Social Political Affairs
KASTER Kepala Staf Teritorial; Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs
KASUM Kepala Staf Umum; Chief of General Staff
KEPPRES Keputusan Presiden; Presidential Decision
KISDI Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam; Indonesian Committee for Solidarity in the Islamic World
KKN Kolusi Korupsi Nepotisme; Corruption Collusion Nepotism
KNIL Konin Klijk Netherlands Indische Leger; Royal Netherlands Indies Army
KODAM Komando Daerah Militer; Military Area Command
KODIM Komando Distrik Militer; District Military Command
KODM Komando Orde Distrik Militer; Sub-District Military Command
KOPASSUS Komando Pasukan Khusus; Special Forces Command
KOPKAMTIB Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban; Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
KORAMIL Komando Rayon Militer; Sub-District Military Command
KOREM Komando Resort Militer; Sub Regional Military Command
KOSGORO Koperasi Serba Guna Gotong Royong; Multipurpose Cooperative for Mutual Assistance
KOSTRAD Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat; Army Strategic Command
KOWILHAN Komando Wilayah Pertahanan; Regional Defence Command
LEMHANAS Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional; National Resilience Institute
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia; Indonesian Institute of Sciences
MALARI Malapetaka 15 Januari; 15 January Tragedy
MPR Majelis Permasyaratan Rakyat; People's Consultative Assembly
MPRS Majelis Permasyaratan Rakyat Sementara; Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
NASAKOM Nasionalisme, Agama, dan Komunisme; Nationalism, Religion, and Communism
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
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NU Nahdlatul Ulama; Revival of Islamic Scholars
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional; National Mandate Party
PANGAB Panglima ABRI; Commander-in-Chief ABRI
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia; Indonesian Democratic Party
PETA Pembela Tanah Air; Volunteer Army for the Defence of the Fatherland
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist Party
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian National Party
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; United Development Party
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia; Republic of Indonesia Revolutionary Government
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian Socialist Party
RATIH Rakyat Terlatih; (Military) Trained Population
SARA Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar Golongan; Ethnicity, Race, Religion: Between Classes and Groups
SEKBER GOLKAR Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya; Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups
SESKO ABRI Sekolah Staf dan Komando ABRI; ABRI Staff and Command College
SESKOAD Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat; Army Staff and Command School
SOKSI Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia; Central Organisation of All Indonesian Workers
TKR Tentera Keamanan Rakyat; People’s Security Army
TNI Tentera Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian National Forces
UI Universitas Indonesia; University of Indonesia
WAKASAD Wakil Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat; Deputy Commander of the Army
THE INDOONESIAN MILITARY HAS ITS ORIGINS in the struggle for independence but its situation today was largely shaped by the decades of authoritarian rule under Soeharto’s New Order and the manner of its final end. The breakdown of this authoritarian regime started when the political situation became unpredictable following the early economic crisis in July 1997. When the economic crisis struck Thailand, few believed that it would also affect Indonesia (Pour, 1998: 176). People trusted the government’s statements that the fundamentals of the Indonesian economy were strong and that the crisis would not seriously affect the country. Therefore, the people did not take the decline of the rupiah from Rp. 2,400 to Rp. 4,000 against the US dollar seriously at that time (Habib, 1999: 34–35).

The situation dramatically changed when Soeharto suddenly became ill and took medical leave for ten days. Although the Secretary of State, Moerdiono, affirmed on 5 December 1997 that President Soeharto was in good health and just needed to take a break (Kompas, 6 December 1997), people distrusted his statement. This triggered the fall of the rupiah to Rp. 5,500 per US dollar. The recovery of Soeharto from his illness did not improve the situation. Furthermore, the nomination by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) of B.J. Habibie as vice-president to replace Try Sutrisno in January 1998 and the postponement of the second loan clearance (US$ 5 billion out of a total loan amount of US$ 143 billion) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) escalated the crisis (O’Rourke, 2002: 64). Soon after
Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) announced an unrealistic National Budget (Rencana Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, RAPBN), which fixed the rupiah at Rp. 5,000 against the US dollar; this rate later dropped drastically to Rp. 10,000, then 17,000 per US dollar (Widjojo, 1998: 157).

The fall of the rupiah followed by high inflation rates resulted in high unemployment and the shortage of basic goods. More than two million labourers, especially from the textile, garment and footwear industries, as well as from the manufacturing and construction sectors, were laid-off during March–April 1998 (Bisnis Indonesia, 6 May 1998). Meanwhile, the shortage of basic goods led to an escalation of their prices; e.g., the price of rice increased by 300 per cent per kilogram, cooking oil by 500 per cent per litre, and sugar by 100 per cent per kilogram at the same time (Harian Neraca, 3 May 1998). These factors drove the student and independent activists (NGO activists) out on to the streets to hold demonstrations demanding the reduction of prices in basic necessities (Djajadi, 1999: 44; Siegel, 2001: 90). When the economic policy implemented by the government failed either to bring down the prices of essential goods or to increase the value of the rupiah against foreign currencies, rioting and looting occurred in some cities, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Medan.

Meanwhile, the kidnapping of activists prior to the 1998 general assembly, Soeharto’s unpopular insistence in appointing his cronies as cabinet members, and the price increase in fuel oil and electricity on 4 May 1998 had the effect of making the student and independent activist movements more focused at the national level. They changed their common cause from demanding that the prices of basic goods be reduced to demanding the resignation of Soeharto. Their demonstrations intensified after four students from Trisakti University were shot by security officers on 12 May 1998. One week later, they finally succeeded in occupying the DPR/MPR building for five days, from 18–22 May 1998.

On 21 May 1998, Soeharto resigned after 32 years in power. However, it would be misleading to assume that his resignation was forced solely by the student demonstrations. Besides the student
movement, three other factors contributed to his resignation, namely, the external pressures, an elite conspiracy and the factional split within the military. Meanwhile, another factor triggered his decision to step down as President – the resignation of fourteen ministers from his cabinet.

The first factor contributing to Soeharto’s resignation besides the student movement was due to external pressures, especially from the United States of America (Mann, 1998; Hill, 1999). The postponement of the second loan clearance (US$ 5 billion) by the IMF was influenced by the US government. In raising issues such as the violation of human rights, the kidnapping of activists and the continuing military operations in East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua), the United States asked the IMF to postpone its second loan clearance to Indonesia. Consequently, the already bleak economic situation became even more depressing and the socio-political unrest escalated. Given that the legitimacy of the New Order hinged on its success in maintaining economic development (Mas’oed, 1989), the Soeharto regime’s inability to solve the crisis automatically led to a loss in its credibility.

The second factor was an elite conspiracy (Singh, 1999: 99–152). Leaders of the Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals Association (Ikatan Cendikiawan Moslem Indonesia, ICMI) were seen as the masterminds behind this conspiracy. Coordinated by Achmad Tirtosudiro and Adi Sasono, the chairman and the general secretary of ICMI respectively, they conducted political manoeuvres. Not only did they politely ask Soeharto to resign through their statement that an extraordinary MPR session needed to be held (Eklöf, 1999: 181); they also held regular meetings at the house of Malik Fadjar, the Director-General of Islamic Affairs at the Department of Religious Affairs. At one such meeting, manoeuvres to topple Soeharto, including organizing demonstrations, were discussed. Amien Rais, Akbar Tanjung, Emha Ainun Nadjib and Nurcholish Madjid, among others, often attended such meetings. Moreover, these ICMI leaders were also able to convince Harmoko and Syarwan Hamid, the chairman and the vice-chairman of the MPR respectively, to ask Soeharto to resign. Since Vice-President B.J. Habibie was the
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general chairman of ICMI, he was suspected to be the master-mind behind the ICMI political manoeuvres to unseat Soeharto.

The final factor contributing to Soeharto’s resignation was a factional split within the military, which occurred when tension in the political situation became critical (Aspinall, 1995: 21–43). These tensions, reflecting the conflict between ‘Political Islam’ and ‘Pancasila’ factions (the latter including non-Javanese and non-Moslem military officers), reached a flashpoint during May 1998 when the people demonstrated and riots followed.

One faction of the military elite championing the position of Pancasila — the five principles that Soekarno formulated in June 1945 and proposed as the basis for the Indonesian state — was known as the Pandawa Lima or the five Pandawas, after the victorious Pandawa clan of the Mahabarata epic (Kingsbury, 1998: 230). According to Kingsbury, its members included General Wiranto, Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar, Lieutenant General A.M. Hendropriyono and Major General Farid Zainuddin. The other faction, which was inclined towards making Islam the fundamental component in politics, was known as the Taliban, and its members included General Faisal Tanjung, General Hartono, Lieutenant General Prabowo Soebianto, Lieutenant General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, Lieutenant General Kivlan Zain and Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani. The rivalry between the two camps surfaced after the ‘de-Benny-isasi’ era. It seems that after General Benny Moerdani was ousted from his posts as Commander in Chief and Minister of Defence in 1988 and 1992 respectively, the struggle to form the new factions within the military took place. The factions were finally split into two camps: the former president’s adjutants (Wiranto’s camp) and the president’s son-in-law (Prabowo’s camp). The conflict between these two camps can be substantiated at least by three indicators, namely, the involvement of the military in the kidnapping of activists such as Pius Lustrilanang, Andi Arif and Desmond J. Mahesa (Suhartono and Situmorang, 1999: vii–xvii; Van Dijk, 2001: 247), the involvement of snipers during the Trisakti University tragedy and the laxity in pacification efforts during the riots on 13–15 May 1998.
Although many have argued that the split within the military was the determining factor in Soeharto’s downfall (Azca, 1998: 251–255; D&R, 23 May 1998; Tajuk, 28 May 1998), in fact, this was only one of the contributing factors. The most significant factor that made Soeharto step down was the resignation of fourteen ministers led by the Minister of State for Development Planning, Ginandjar Kartasasmita (Gatra, 23 May 1998). Sensing that the odds in the changing political situation at that time were increasingly stacked against Soeharto, these ministers decided to withdraw their allegiance to him. When Soeharto responded by offering them new positions in the reshuffled cabinet, they turned him down (Gatra, 23 May 1998). Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani pointed out that they had disappointed Soeharto (Forum, 2 June 1998) and this could be identified from the former president’s statement: ‘I had nurtured and promoted them since their early career but when I really needed their support, they rejected me.’

But Sa’adilah Mursjid, the State Secretary, reminded Soeharto of the sad reality that everybody had left him, prompting him to finally step down.

With the resignation of Soeharto on 21 May 1998, Indonesia moved from the New Order era to the Reform era. But this significant political transition did not make the students and independent activists stop their demonstrations. Instead they switched their common demand from the resignation of Soeharto to the removal of the Dwifungsi ABRI (the dual-function role of the military). They believed the military was complicit in the kidnapping of activists and shooting of students, as well as involvement in the mushrooming practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism. ‘So, go to hell with the Dwifungsi ABRI. Go to hell with the military.’ They were, then, disappointed when the independent leaders who were supposed to support them (such as Megawati, Gus Dur, Amien Rais, and Sultan of Yogyakarta) in fact preferred the military to withdraw gradually from its socio-political role.

Responding to student demands on the issue of the removal of the Dwifungsi, which basically reflected public demands, too (Suara Pembaruan, 12 June 1998), the Commander in Chief, General
Wiranto, asserted that the military would redefine (mendifisikan kembali) its socio-political role (Gatra, 10 October 1998). In agreement with him was the Chief of Staff of Territorial Command, Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who stated that the military needed to reposition (mereposisi) itself away from its traditional deep involvement in politics (Tempo, 22 December 1998). This meant that the military would significantly reduce its control over society, especially in social and political affairs. In Yudhoyono’s terms, the new role of the military was to be the so-called ‘influence role’.

Few could imagine that the military would change its attitude, especially when the generation of 1945 and the early military academy alumni (namely, the 1960s cadets) were in power. One can only conclude that strong internal and external factors caused the attitudinal change. According to Sundhaussen (1985: 273–283), the internal factors that can force a military to change its role are the officers’ cultural background and its perceptions of civilian supremacy, while Samego (1998: 70–71) notes that the political situation and international pressures constitute external factors that may also be responsible for the change.

It should be noted that, since the struggle for independence, the military has been involved in Indonesian politics (Sundhaussen, 1986; Notosusanto, 1984: 17–19; Sayidiman, 1996; Sumitro, 1997). The military’s perception of itself as a political force arose from the blurred distinction between its military and political functions during the revolutionary war against the Dutch. By its very nature, the struggle for independence was political as well as military (Crouch, 1978: 25). This was influenced by the various social backgrounds of the fighters during the struggle for independence, such as the Laskar or youth paramilitary troops (e.g., Hisbullah, Barisan Pelopor, Barisan Berani Mati, Barisan Pelajar); the ex-paramilitary troops trained by the Japanese (Volunteer Army for the Defence of the Fatherland, Tentara Pembela Tanah Air or PETA); and the former regular troops trained by the Dutch (Royal Netherlands Indies Army, Koninklijke Nederlands Indische Leger or KNIL). These fighters were successfully transformed into the
INTRODUCTION

People's Security Body (Badan Keamanan Rakyat, BKR) on 22 August 1945, the People's Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, TKR) on 5 October 1945 and then the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) on 3 June 1947. The name TNI was changed to ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces) in 1966 but reverted again to TNI on 1 April 1999. According to Salim (1991: 2–3), the TNI has unique characteristics because it had established itself and had not been shaped by the government or political parties: it is self-created and owes allegiance to no one except itself.

The military’s claim that it had established itself as a formidable institution seemed to justify its legitimate role in socio-political affairs (Jenkins, 1984). Although previously involved in some political affairs, such as the 17 October 1952 Incident, its involvement was given institutional expression only after it had forced President Soekarno and Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo to declare the effectiveness of martial law (Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg, SOB) in March 1957 (Lowry, 1998: 183). The military’s move to legitimize its non-military role, especially in political affairs, was also known as ‘the army’s political charter’ (Lev, 1966: 15–16). This move was the starting point for the military in changing its role from action (1945–1957) to participation (1958–1965) (Samego, 1998; Acza, 1998: 47–48). The speech of General A.H. Nasution in 1958 on the concept of the Middle Way (Jalan Tengah) (Nasution, 1985) basically constituted the military’s effort to further participate in socio-economic and political affairs.

On 12 November 1958, General Nasution said that the military was not just a security tool for civilian governments, as in western democracies, or a military regime that dominated state power in dictatorships; it was also a significant force in society that cooperated with other forces in working together for the people’s interests (Nasution, 1971). Implementing his Middle Way concept, General Nasution directed the senior military officers to assist senior civilian officers in controlling the nationalization of Dutch enterprises (Crouch, 1978: 275). This measure finally became the most important step towards the historical legitimacy of the social
and political role of ABRI. Meanwhile, the Middle Way concept – with some improvements in its conception – became commonly known as Dwifungsi.

The historical legitimacy of ABRI’s social and political role strengthened the justification for Dwifungsi’s implementation in much of the social and political life in Indonesia during the New Order period. To further strengthen the justification, the role was codified in the 1966 MPR(S) decisions (Act No. XXIV/MPRS/1966 on New Policy on Defense and Security) and subsequently in law (Act No. 20/MPR/1982 on Defense and Security Principles and Act No. 2/MPR/1988 on ABRI Servicemen). Dwifungsi, therefore, offered military officers the opportunity to occupy high positions in the bureaucracy. Military officers were able to hold positions as ministers, director-generals of important departments, general secretaries, ambassadors, governors, mayors, sub-district and village heads, as well as senior positions in public firms, state enterprises and private companies (Jenkins, 1984: 23–52). The dominant military control over society, however, culminated in 1985 when the government succeeded in forcing social organizations to make Pancasila its sole ideology. This meant that only those pro-government organizations could continue to exist and the remaining elements were marginalized. Hence, military control over society became almost absolute.

To effectively carry out its dominant role in society, the military needed huge sums of money to forge closer rapport with the people and to maintain officers’ loyalty, as well as for military operations in politically unstable areas such as East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua). Since the budget for military expenditure was very limited, i.e., around 1 per cent of the total national budget on average per annum, it made significant changes to foundations, which were initially set up to help soldiers financially, so that the foundations eventually became pure business enterprises. Such changes, of course, not only offered the military’s senior officers positions in the companies, but also strengthened their grip on society through business deals. Only people who had ties with the military (or the military officers’ own families) could have a role to
play in the military’s business ventures. Such a situation made the business environment, as well as the political realm in Indonesia, eventually become tainted with the rapid growth of practices involving corruption, collusion and nepotism.

Soeharto’s resignation, followed by the military’s decision to conduct internal reforms, automatically ended an era of military dominance. Public pressure to end their dominant role, moreover, became stronger after Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) was elected as the new president for the period 1999–2004, succeeding B.J. Habibie who was interim president in 1998 and 1999. It seems, however, that the military was not yet prepared to entirely withdraw to the barracks, although it agreed to end its presence in the DPR and MPR by 2004. This reluctant attitude of the military could be identified by the comments of the commander of the TNI, Admiral Widodo Adisoeipto, when he pointed out, ‘It should be noted that TNI members have equal political rights with those of other citizens, namely to vote and to be elected’ (The Strait Times, 26 February 2000). It was clear this meant that the military wished to maintain its socio-political role.

The fall of Gus Dur and rise of Megawati Soekarnoputri as president, moreover, gave new hope to the military that it might regain its traditional position, although it would not be as dominant as during the New Order period. In contrast to Gus Dur’s attitude of consistently trying to control the military, the conciliatory attitude towards the military of Megawati and her party, PDI-Struggle, was more reassuring and acceptable. Therefore, the military did not object to her appointment; it now had the opportunity to retrieve its traditional socio-political role.

NOTES
1 Such as the intervention of the central bank through the selling of its US dollars in the capital market and the closing of banks that have CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio) minus more than 25%. The government also tried to introduce the Currency Board System (CBS) but since the people responded negatively, this financial policy was cancelled (Bisnis Indonesia, 23 April 1998).
2 Out of 23 activists who were kidnapped, nine were released, such as Pius Lustrilanang and Andi Arief, while the fate of the rest remained unknown (Kompas, 21 April 1998).

3 His eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Indra Rukmana, for instance, was appointed as Minister of Social Affairs; while Bob Hassan, his golfing buddy, was made the Minister of Trade. Soeharto’s other favorites, such as Haryanto Danutirto, Abdul Latief and Subijakto Tjakrawerdaja, were appointed as Minister of Transportation, Minister of Manpower and Minister of Cooperation and Small Scale Industries respectively (Kompas, 5 May 1998).

4 The prices of gas and petrol increased by 66% (from Rp. 600 to Rp. 1,000 per litre), while kerosene increased by 40% (from Rp. 200 to Rp. 280 per litre) and electricity increased by 50%, depending on the application (Bisnis Indonesia, 6 May 1998).

5 The debate as to who shot the students remains unsolved to this day. The military said that the culprits were police officers. This was supported by the type of bullets found in the victims’ bodies. However, the police commander, General Dibyo Widodo, rejected the military’s conclusion. He refused to let the police be made scapegoats. Later, 18 police officers were arrested by the military police and General Widodo was suddenly replaced by General Roesmanhadi. It seems that General Widodo was angry and decided to resign. Meanwhile, the Jakarta police commander, Major General Hamami Nata, held responsible for the outbreak of riots in Jakarta, was replaced by General Noegroho Djajoesman (Forum Keadilan, 14 May 1998).

6 The terminology of ‘Pancasila’ and ‘Political Islam’ was proposed by Suryadinata (1998: 33) to replace the previous terminology, namely ‘red and white’ or the so-called ‘nationalist’ (ABRI Merah Putih) and ‘Islam’ or ‘green’ factions (ABRI Hijau) (Kingsbury, 1998: 230; Azca, 1998: 259). Since the Islamic faction within the military also had nationalist ideals, I agree with Suryadinata that the terms ‘Pancasila’ and ‘Political Islam’ are more appropriate.

7 The five principles were: 1) belief in one God; 2) a just and civilized humanity; 3) the unity of Indonesia; 4) the people’s sovereignty led by the wisdom and prudence found in deliberation among representatives; and 5) social justice for all of the Indonesian people (Eklöf, 2003: 30–31).

8 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

9 This refers to the dispute between the military and the MPR relating to A.H. Nasution’s proposal to modernize the Armed Forces. Since the
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proposal was rejected by the MPR, the military was angry and accused the civilian government of intervening in the internal affairs of the military. Nasution and Kawilarang then aimed a cannon at the presidential palace. Since there was no response from President Soekarno to the military’s complaint, Nasution resigned from his military post thereafter (Crouch, 1978; Nutosusanto, 1991).

10 The names of these foundations are Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (army), Yayasan Bhumyamca (navy), Yayasan Adi Upaya (air force) and Yayasan Bhayangkara (police).

11 Gus Dur was forced to vacate his presidential position before the end of his term when the Assembly moved to impeach him. The vice-president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, was finally sworn in to replace him as President of the Republic on 23 July 2001 and see out the rest of his term until 2004.
A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE MILITARY in Indonesia shows that its involvement in politics began since the struggle for independence in the country. Such a historical claim is used by the military as a cornerstone to justify its dual-function role, or Dwifungsi. One function includes all aspects of national defence and security while the other covers socio-political matters where the military deemed that it should have at least influence if not control. Regarding the latter, there are two opposing views among academics. The first school of thought argues that the military played a dominant role in socio-political affairs during the pre-reform period, especially during Soeharto’s era (Crouch, 1988; MacFarling, 1996; Sanit, 1999). In other words, the military was on a par with Soeharto in controlling the country. In contrast, the second school of thought asserts that the military was basically weak since it had been used by Soeharto as his political tool (Said, 1998, 1999; Bhakti, 1999a; Irsyam, 1999). The internal reforms being conducted within the military, therefore, are often seen as an effort to restore its position as the defender of the country, standing neutral and above all groups in society.

A study of the two schools of thought suggests that they consider the relationship between the military and the President to have been static. This chapter examines the dynamic relationship between the two parties in domestic political affairs since the early years of independence, especially the three roles that the military assumed vis-à-vis the president, namely as a spoiler, as a critical supporter and as a political tool. However, prior to discussing the
dynamic relationship between the two parties, the debates among the proponents and opponents of Dwifungsi and the re-categorization of its development are assessed here.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DWIFUNSGI: A RE-CATEGORIZATION

By and large, the discussion about military involvement in socio-political affairs follows the military's version of their historical legitimacy that 'the dual functions practices' were implemented far earlier than its formal conception (Crouch, 1978; Said, 1987; Singh, 1995). As pointed out by Crouch (1988: 25–26), the military was engaged in a struggle for independence in which politics and military action were inseparably intertwined. Along with the changing times, the involvement of the military in socio-political affairs became stronger, especially after A.H. Nasution introduced the Front Lebar (Broad Front) concept on 12 November 1958. This later became better known as the Middle Way (Jalan Tengah) concept, an embryonic form of Dwifungsi, after the term popularized by Professor Djoko Soetono of the University of Indonesia (Nasution, 1985: 234–235).

However, the existing studies on the development of Dwifungsi by Jenkins (1983) and Singh (1995) by and large only focus on its chronological sequence and ignore the theoretical framework as a cornerstone in categorizing its development. As a consequence, this category does not facilitate an understanding of the deep involvement of the military in socio-political affairs during certain periods. In general, they divided the development of Dwifungsi into five periods. These are: (a) the early formulation of the army’s role (1945–49); (b) the period of liberal democracy (1949–57); (c) the army in ascendancy (1957–59); (d) the expansion of the army role (1959–65); and (e) the New Order period (post-1965). It was up to Azca’s study (1998: 45–51) to come up with the only version using the ideological approach.

Applying Van Doorn’s typology on military ideology (1971), Azca divided the development of Dwifungsi into three categories, namely: (a) Dwifungsi as an operational ideology of the military (1945–49); (b) Dwifungsi as a corporate ideology of the military
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(1950–59); and (c) Dwifungsi as a political ideology of the military (post-1959). Unfortunately, his categorization was too broad in dividing the time-frame of the development of Dwifungsi. It thus became inaccurate in depicting the implementation of the military ideology under specific periods. Meanwhile, the former categorization, which excluded the characteristic of the military ideology as well as its time-based historical sequence, did not reflect the deep involvement of the military in socio-political affairs. Therefore, a re-categorization is needed to solve those problems.

Combining the chronological sequence and ideological approaches, the development of Dwifungsi could be re-categorized into five periods, namely: (a) no shared military doctrine period (1945–58); (b) Middle Way concept as a corporate ideology of the military (1958–65); (c) Middle Way concept as an operational ideology of the military (1965–66); (d) Dwifungsi as a political ideology of the military (1966–98); and (e) Dwifungsi as a corporate ideology of the military (post-1998). For the last period, the discussion is conducted in Chapter 5.

NO SHARED MILITARY IDEOLOGY (1945–1958)

It was widely known that the military’s involvement in socio-political affairs began since the struggle for independence. However, this did not mean that the military was ideologically aware of what it had done at that time. Since the military doctrine was only introduced a decade later, there was no shared ideology during the time of the struggle for independence. If there was indeed one, it was ‘the struggle’ itself (Rinakit, 1999). This means its involvement in socio-political affairs was only an integral part of the military’s struggle in achieving independence. In other words, such involvement could not be considered as the implementation of its ideological principles, since there was no shared ideology to begin with. Therefore, the claims by the military thinkers, such as Suryohadiprojo (1992: 171, 174), that Dwifungsi existed since the struggle for independence, could be seen as part of the military’s effort to strengthen its justification in controlling the country. Such claims are similar to the military’s justification that they are the people’s own flesh and blood. Sometimes they use another
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analogy, that they are fishes, while the society is water. Without water the fish will die. But in the end, their goal is power.

Following the chronological sequence, the first period of the development of Dwifungsi, which produced no shared military ideology, spans from the years of the actual revolution (1945–49), to the liberal democracy period (1949–57) and to the first year of the declaration of martial law (1957–58), i.e., before Nasution’s Middle Way conception was articulated.

The years of the actual revolution (1945–49) could be said to be the early formulation of the military’s role. This is due to the fact that, since Indonesia’s pre-war leaders spent most of their time on efforts to achieve independence, they neglected other important issues (such as political forms adopted after independence) and paid almost no attention to the military or to defence problems. Therefore, the leaders of the new republic, which proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945, did not create the military. There was disappointment among the military leaders towards the civilian leaders, such as that expressed by Oerip Soemohardjo, then a retired Major of KNIL, who asserted, ‘Aneh negara zonder tentara’ (‘It is strange that there is no army within the state’) (Notosusanto, 1991: 40). The situation led the military leaders to form their own body, to equip and arm themselves and to carry out their operations according to their own desires (Nasution, 1956: 12; Said, 1987: 16; Said, 1991: 22, 131). Such enthusiasm, which contained inherently the seeds of all manners of future conflicts between the civilian leaders and the military, was often referred to by the military as a cornerstone of its self-perceived awareness that predetermined its later socio-political role.

As already noted, the Indonesian military was composed of three groups within society who were the fighters during the struggle for independence. These were: (1) the Laskar, or youth paramilitary troops (i.e., Hisbullah, Barisan Pelopor, Barisan Berani Mati, dan Barisan Pelajar); (2) the ex-paramilitary troops trained by the Japanese, or the so-called Volunteer Army for the Defence of the Fatherland (Tentara Pembela Tanah Air, PETA); and (3) the ex-regular troops trained by the Dutch, or the so-called Royal
These fighters were successively transformed into the People’s Security Body (Badan Keamanan Rakyat, BKR) on 22 August 1945, the People’s Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, TKR) on 5 October 1945, and then the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) on 3 June 1947.

However, the inexperienced government of the newly proclaimed republic gave no policy guidelines to the military to control the recruitment and promotion of its officers who came originally from those various former fighting units. This frustrated most of the military leaders. On the other hand, it strengthened the military’s self-understanding that it was there prior to the republic. ‘We are the Republic. It is because we were there that these people can call themselves minister’ (Jenkins, 1983: 16). Such a claim indicated that it did not want to be controlled by the civilian government. The election of its own Commander in Chief, General Soedirman, followed by its pressure on the government to rubber-stamp its decision, for instance, was proof that the military was unhappy with the government. As noted by Lieutenant General Didi Kartasasmita, the situation during Soedirman’s election resembled gangsters choosing their leaders rather than the disciplined way in which military commanders were supposed to be appointed (Soemarsono, 1993: 140–143; Sophiaan, 1994: 79).

The military’s unhappiness with the government continued, as revealed by the difference between President Soekarno and General Soedirman in deciding the political measures to face the Dutch. This basically exposed the civilian–military gap in their different socio-economic backgrounds (Crouch, 1988: 28). Most civilian leaders came from the urban areas, had graduated from university and had had long political experience since 1920–30. In contrast, most military leaders came from the small cities, especially in Java, were less educated, and were still young. ‘With such weaknesses, what could they do? Conceptualize their doctrine? Argue with the civilian leaders who decided to implement the liberal democracy? What they could do, of course, was threaten the civilian leaders. It was the only way.’

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Indeed, there was no shared military ideology during the liberal democracy period (1949–57) either. What did spread among the military leaders at that time was the leadership of General Soedirman, who followed the teachings of a leader of Javanese religion, Sosrokartono, the brother of R.A. Kartini (the female national hero who became the symbol of women’s emancipation in Indonesia). Its philosophical guidelines stipulated that to be a good leader, somebody had to be able to ‘attack without soldier, without weapon…win without killing, without hurt…after winning then serve the country.’ Referring to the last phrase, *after winning then serve the country*, it was easy to understand the disappointment of the military when its role to serve the country was limited after what it had done in defending the fatherland during the struggle for independence. After the Dutch recognized the sovereignty of Indonesia in December 1949, the civilian leaders implemented the constitution of UUDS 1950. Based on liberal democratic values, it automatically placed the military under civilian control. The death of General Soedirman in January 1950, moreover, not only meant the loss of the military’s charismatic leader who had protected its interests, but also led to a tightening of civilian control over them (Said, 1991). It strengthened the military’s resentment towards the civilian politicians.

The 17 October 1952 Incident was the best evidence to show the military’s displeasure with the civilian politicians. The action of A.H. Nasution, then the army commander, who aimed a cannon at the presidential palace, symbolized the military’s protest against the opposition politicians in parliament. The military accused the politicians of intervening too much in its internal affairs when they disagreed with its plan to modernize the army. Since Soekarno did not succumb to the military pressure to dissolve parliament, Nasution resigned thereafter. According to Feith (1962: 58–77), this defeat reflected the weakness of the military in the political arena. Moreover, it did not mean, as asserted by Muhaimin (1987), that the affair marked the date when the military became formally involved in politics for the first time. His argument, therefore, was weak since there was no ideological consideration and political agenda.
that provided the basis for the military’s action. ‘Their action was more like cowboys with their arms on the hips in an arrogant way, than the military with its vision and ideological awareness.’

February 1954 is a more appropriate date for the military’s involvement in politics for the first time. Here, A.H. Nasution’s notes mention that he just started to think seriously about politics and the military doctrine during his non-active duty as an army commander in 1952–54 (Nasution, 1985: 356). Nasution realized that, to be able to influence the policy-making process, political measures must be adopted. Therefore, he sponsored the establishment of a political party in February 1954, namely the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (Ikatan Pejuang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, IPKI), as a political tool of the military to play an active role in politics. Although IPKI did not get popular support during the 1955 general election (Sundhaussen, 1982: 91; Sophiaan, 1994: 75), the date of its establishment is more appropriate as the first date of the military’s formal involvement in politics.

The last period which produced no shared military ideology was during 1957–58. The martial law proclaimed by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo on 14 March 1957 gave the military an opportunity to exercise more power. According to Said (1987: 23), there were two reasons why the government was forced to declare martial law. First, when senior military officers boycotted the government’s decision to appoint Colonel Bambang Utojo, a man of fairly low seniority, as Army Chief of Staff on 27 June 1955. The boycott, which later became known as the June Affair, reflected the split within the military that finally prompted the political offensive of the officers. Second, the emergence of regional rebellions, such as PRRI/Permesta, which broke out because of bad relations between the centre (Jakarta) and the regions. However, the deepening involvement of the military in politics at that time had yet to be guided by the military doctrine.

The Middle Way as a Corporate Ideology (1958-1965)

Martial law, which opened the way for the military to be involved in politics after the failure of IPKI to gain popular support during the general election two years earlier, became the training ground.
for the officer corps to exercise their leadership. Their success in calming the political situation at that time was used as evidence of its better leadership compared to the civilian one. ‘Although the civilian leaders were more educated, they did not have a firm attitude. Sometimes, we the military thought they were very slow in making decisions, too many needless debates, while the situation worsened.’

The military’s efforts to be active in politics since the establishment of IPKI and its opportunity to exercise more power during martial law made it realize that to be deeply involved in socio-political affairs, the military needed a doctrine. By having it, the military had justification to be involved in socio-political affairs with or without martial law (Crouch, 1978). The birth of the Middle Way concept on 12 November 1958 could therefore be seen as the answer to meet that purpose. In his speech during the celebration of the Military Academy, A.H. Nasution pointed out that

the Indonesian Armed Forces [are] not just the ‘civilian tool’ like in the Western countries, nor a military regime which dominates the state power, but as one of many forces in the society, the force for the struggle of the people (kekuatan perjuangan rakyat) which works together with other people’s forces (kekuatan rakyat lainnya). (1971: 103)

Making use of martial law, it was easier for Nasution to implement his Middle Way principle. In the first step, he exercised the doctrine through the appointment of more officers to occupy managerial positions in the Dutch companies after the government nationalized them in February 1959. By that time, in fact, some officers had already become company managers in Dutch companies following the proclamation of martial law. So what Nasution had done was to strengthen the military’s grip on society, particularly in the business sectors. Seven big Dutch companies, such as Pertamina, Krakatau Steel, the Netherlands Trading Bank and Hotel des Indes, were under military control (Palmier, 1962: 103). Such control allowed the military to have its own budget. It became easier for the military to intensify its scope of influence in the political arena, especially to block the widespread influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI).
In accordance with the characteristics of corporate ideology, which emphasize the formulation of a doctrine by the military itself and the usefulness of the doctrine for the sake of its unity and position within the state (Van Doorn, 1971: xx-xxi; Azca, 1998: 47), the Middle Way concept can thus be considered the military’s corporate ideology. It relates to the fact that the Middle Way was conceptualized by Nasution, a military man, and initially proposed to consider the position of the military within the state. This was clear from Nasution’s speech when he pointed out that the Indonesian Army did not and would not copy the situation existing in several Latin American states, where the army acted as a direct political force. Nor would the military emulate the Western European model, where armies were dead tools in the hands of their governments. The Indonesian army would not involve itself in political flashpoints, such as a coup d’état, but would not at the same time become an observer only. The Indonesian army had to be given the opportunity to participate in the government based on its expertise and individual merit (Nasution, 1971).

Another characteristic of corporate ideology is the lesser involvement of the military in politics, i.e., its involvement in political affairs is limited mainly to the policy making process. Although Colonel Mas Isman had already in 1958 been sent to New York to become the advisor to the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations and three officers from the generation of 1945 were appointed as ministers during the Karya cabinet (1957), this did not mean that the political influence of the military was strong. Their appointments were not tantamount to government acknowledgement of the capability of the officers, as argued by Soebijono (1993: 24–25). Rather, it was related to the politicians’ efforts to accommodate all groups within society. Nasution was aware of such a situation. Therefore, he used the appointment of more officers into Dutch-owned enterprises as an exercise in implementing the Middle Way principle. By that time, moreover, the military was also facing mounting cases of corruption and smuggling conducted by officers. The consolidation process within the military body thus became more crucial than the spread of its political influence.
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Such a situation confirmed the characteristics of the military’s corporate ideology.

Nasution’s second step in exercising his Middle Way principle involved the reorganization of the military body and the appointment of officers, including himself, to become members of the National Council and National Planning Council in 1958. The reorganization of seven Military Territories (Tentara dan Territorium, T&T) into 17 Regional Military Commands (Komando Daerah Militer, KODAM) increased the number of higher positions for the officers. In practice, it not only doubled the number of panglima (regional military commanders) and their associated staff organizations but also reduced the factional infighting among the officers prevalent during the T&T era. Meanwhile, the involvement of the military in decision making through its participation within the National Council prevented it from taking over the country. This contradicts other arguments which asserted the decision of the military in not staging a coup as either determined by its disunity or by Nasution not intending to do so (Sundhaussen, 1982: 124). All arguments are probably correct but they ignore the point, namely, the hesitancy of the officers out of concern for the people’s acceptance. The popularity of Soekarno and the strong support of the PKI for him undermined the military’s confidence in staging a coup.

Despite the fact that exercising the Middle Way principle extended the involvement of the military in a non-security role, its accommodation as a corporate ideology of the military occurred just when the period of parliamentary democracy had officially come to an end, i.e., when Soekarno promulgated the 1945 Constitution on 5 July 1959. Under this new political system, namely Guided Democracy, the role of the military in non-security affairs became constitutionally legitimate (Tiwon, et al. 2000: 59; Azca, 1998: 49). Moreover, according to Imron Rosjadi, a young Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) parliamentarian, it was impossible to leave the military outside the parameters of government (Sundaussen, 1982: 124). He further pointed out, ‘To separate them from politicians is a holy dream which may be realized by the next generation who have not participated in the revolution to free Indonesia from Dutch colonialism.’
Such acceptance made the military secure in implementing the Middle Way principle as its corporate ideology, especially after the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare (Doktrin Perang Wilayah) was formulated by the Army’s Command School (Sekolah Komando Angkatan Darat, SESKOAD) in March 1962. In implementing the doctrine, Nasution ordered the creation of the military commands from the provinces to the villages, paralleling the civilian bureaucracy (Figure 1). Its creation was not to control the political activity of the people or to intervene in the civilian government policy-making, but to contain the PKI’s influence. In the military’s perception, the PKI was seen as a threat to the nation since it not only opposed the state ideology, Pancasila, but also tended to divide the
nation (Soebijono, 1993: 27; Singh, 1995: 83). When the conflicting interests between the military and PKI intensified in 1965, the era of the Middle Way concept as a corporate ideology of the military came to an end.

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The conflicting interests between the PKI and the military, which became tense during the Guided Democracy period, motivated Soekarno to take a middle position or balancer between the two parties. In such triangular relations, Soekarno was needed by the PKI as its protector against the military (which aimed to demolish the PKI’s political influence) while for the military Soekarno was needed to legitimize its involvement in the political arena. Soekarno himself benefited from both of them since he used the military to check the widespread influence of the PKI, which threatened his charisma and political influence, while at the same time needing the PKI to mobilize the masses to listen to his speeches.

Despite the PKI’s anti-Pancasila stance and portrayal by others as being a traitor to the nation, the military’s resentment of the PKI was in response to the latter’s opposition to military involvement in politics. The PKI’s attitude contrasted with that of the other parties, who had agreed to military involvement, and made the military regard the PKI as its enemy. Their conflicting interests were clearly reflected in the establishment of their social organizations.

To contain the widespread influence of the PKI, the military created various bodies that paralleled various PKI organizations. The Central Organization of All Indonesian Workers (Sekretariat Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia, SOKSI), for instance, was formed by the military to limit the influence of the Centre of the All Indonesian Workers’ Unions (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, SOBSI) of the PKI. The other military organizations formed along the same lines were the Family Spirit Consultative Councils for Mutual Assistance (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong, MKGR), Multipurpose Cooperatives for Mutual Assistance (Koperasi Serba Guna Gotong Royong, KOSGORO) and the Movement of Indonesian Workers (Gerakan Karyawan Rakyat Indonesia,
Meanwhile, other efforts to limit the PKI’s influence were also conducted by the military within the National Front (Front Nasional). According to Singh (1995: 85), the establishment of the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, Sekber Golkar) on 20 October 1964 was done to prevent the National Front from being dominated by the PKI.

With such conflicting interests between the military and PKI on the one side and Soekarno’s manoeuvres using either the military or the PKI to achieve his political ambitions on the other, the country’s economic development was neglected. Describing the situation, Woo and Nasution (1989) noted:

> The budgetary pressures grew steadily worse, resulting in a period of even higher inflation in 1962–1965. Between 1962 and 1964 both money supply and the cost-of-living index roughly doubled every year… Economic growth slowed to 0.8 percent per year in this turbulent period. The evolution of the export/GDP ratio tells the story of economic decline very well; it fell from 8.7 percent (1951–57) to 6.8 percent (1958–61), and then to 1.1 percent (1962–65)…”

In such dismal economic conditions, the first five years of the 1960s can best be described as a period of economic chaos. To shift the people’s attention away from the real problems, Soekarno built monuments, expensive public buildings and coined catchy slogans. He believed that the people could live vicariously through the glory of physical manifestations and increasing prestige. In a bid to strengthen national unity, he implemented a diversionary strategy in making the people look for a foreign enemy. Confrontation with Malaysia and his rejection of United States aid by saying ‘go to hell with your aid’ were examples among others of his tactics to distract the people’s attention. However, none of the above filled the people’s hungry stomachs or eased the pain of galloping inflation and grinding poverty.

By 1965, Indonesia had become a dangerous country to live in because of the contending forces for power, influence and control. By that time, the characteristics of the Middle Way as the corporate ideology of the military shifted to its operational stage,
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which was characterized by violence and political uncertainty, as reflected in the abortive coup of 1 October 1965. Although the coup was caused by the internal power struggles within the military rather than by the PKI (Anderson, 1971: 1–2; Sophiaan, 1994: 77; Tiwon, 2000: 64), the actions taken by the troops led by Lieutenant General Soeharto to deal with the military personnel associated with the PKI were outrageous. He not only jailed some of them without trial but also killed others, especially those accused of masterminding the coup, such as Lieutenant Colonel Untung.

Accusing the PKI of murdering the generals and claiming that the military had a sacred duty to protect the country, Lieutenant General Soeharto – in his position as commander of KOPKAMTIB, the new command established on 2 October 1965 – ordered the military to liquidate all PKI members and sympathizers. Here, he led the mopping-up operations against the PKI and its supporters. An integral part of this unleashing of violence from the end of September 1965 until the Second Army Seminar in August 1966 was that around one million people are estimated to have been killed (Latif, 1999).


Following the aftermath of the abortive coup – later known as Peristiwa G30S/PKI – Soekarno’s political career came to an end. Through the Letter of Instruction (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret) of 11 March 1966, Soekarno handed over executive powers to Soeharto. One year later, in March 1967, Soekarno was removed from office. This introduced a new era in Indonesian politics, with the military in a supreme position. In such a position, the Middle Way concept – which stressed the middle position of the military (i.e., it was neither the ‘civilian tool’ nor a ‘military regime’) – had to be abandoned. In short, a new doctrine was needed by the military to legitimize its new position of leading from the front.

To fulfill such a demand, the military conducted the Second Army Seminar in Bandung, on 25–30 August 1966. The seminar, which proposed to revise the result of the First Army Seminar (2–9 April 1965), reaffirmed the adoption of the concept of Dwifunsgi as the
new ideology of the military. Meanwhile, the term *Dwifungsi* – introduced by Nasution during the National Police Officer Meeting in Porong (East Java) in 1960 (Nasution, 1985: 235; Suryohadiprojo, 1966: 14) – had yet to be used in the documents of either the First or Second Army Seminar. This fact refutes the argument asserted by Samego (1998a: 94), which stated that the term *Dwifungsi* was only just introduced during the Second Army Seminar in 1966. In fact, the first formal use of the term *Dwifungsi* was in two 1969 laws on elections and political parties (Laws No. 15 and 16), which included the statement:

> Remembering that *Dwifungsi* ABRI as a tool of the state and a social force must unite and become a unifying force that is capable of being the pioneer of a strong and peaceful Pancasila and UUD 1945. (Quoted from Noto Sosanto, 1991: 150)

Another legal document that used the term *Dwifungsi* was Law No. 2/1988 on ABRI Servicemen, which stated, ‘ABRI soldiers implement the ABRI dual function; that is, as a defence and security force and as a social-political force’ (*Lembaran Negara*, 1998: 21–35). Meanwhile, other legal documents such as the Broad Guidelines for State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) and Law No. 20/1982 on the Defence and Security did not mention the term but did refer to the concept. In general, it stated that ABRI not only had defence and security functions but also a social and political role.28

However, the Second Army Seminar must be noted as the cornerstone of the *nggarso sung tulodo* role of the military. It not only introduced a doctrine of ‘total people’s defence’ (*Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta, Hankamrata*) but also rewrote Tri Ubaya Cakti (the Three Sacred Vows)29 since its content was suspected of being influenced by communism and Soekarno neologisms (Maynard, 1976: 138). In the latter doctrine, moreover, there was a new document, entitled the ‘Ideal Foundation for the Struggle of the Indonesian National Army’, which constituted the manifestation of the non-military role of ABRI. It brought the military role into politics to the highest levels:

> In the beginning, the TNI had only a limited role in non-military activities, but then, pressed by several national crises, the TNI has
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gradually been forced to enlarge its role. At present, it is a fact that the Indonesian Armed Forces in general and the TNI in particular form a big and strategic social force in the national political constellation… . (Notosusanto, 1975: 129)

Meanwhile, the pain of inflation and poverty left by the Soekarno era forced the New Order government under Soeharto to put economic development as the primary national goal. According to Soeharto, the government was unable to concentrate on development unless national stability was reached. As he pointed out:

In whatever country it is impossible to carry out development without the preservation of national stability – stability in the political, economic, social, cultural, defence, and military field. Without development, there will be no growth, and without growth, there will be nothing to improve the people’s standard of living. (Quoted in Wilson, 1992: 34)

To achieve national stability, Soeharto implemented Dwifungsi. Relating to the security and defence functions, Soeharto ordered his military protégés to continue eliminating those suspected of being pro-PKI. Moreover, they also constantly reviewed the ‘threat theory’ in order to legitimate their violent behaviour. As noted by Honna (1999:78), the theory was continuously adjusted following global and domestic developments. Relating to the socio-political roles, meanwhile, Soeharto appointed army officers to hold high positions in the bureaucracy, the regime’s political organization (Golkar) and the state enterprises. These moves were not only to ensure that the strategy of economic and political development was implemented firmly but also to control society. Therefore, the regime claimed itself to be a ‘stabilizer’ (stabilisator) and ‘dynamizer’ (dinamisator) of development (Lane, 1991: 28). Whoever criticized the military’s involvement in economic and political affairs was seen by the military as an enemy of development. Since development was understood as an effort to bring prosperity to the people as mandated by the state ideology (Pancasila), whoever was anti-development was also anti-Pancasila (tidak Pancasilais).

As mentioned earlier, the military indeed continuously adjusted its threat theory following global and domestic developments. In the first decade of the New Order era, for instance, the term ‘extreme
left’ (ekstrim kiri, EKI) was commonly used by the military to control society. The term, which referred initially to the PKI and its sympathizers, had been extended in 1973 to political parties when the government regrouped the nine remaining parties into three political organizations, namely PPP, Golkar and PDI. Whoever disagreed with such government measures would be labelled as EKI and jailed without trial. Given such a line of thought it was thus understandable when the military accused Professor Sarbini Somawinata and Dr Sjahrir, for instance, as the masterminds of the 15 January Disaster in 1974 (Malapetaka Limabelas Januari, MALARI) since they were well known as socialists.

In 1978, the military again broadened the scope of its activities covering EKI. It was influenced by the emerging student movement during 1977–78, which opposed Soeharto’s presidential re-election. Accusing the movement of being mobilized by the ‘New Left’, which had taken over communist activities after the banning of the PKI in 1966, and suspecting that it also used labour and land disputes to attract supporters, the government tightened its control over society. Coordinated by the National Defence Institute (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, LEMHANAS) and Operational Command for the Restoration of Order and Security (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, KOPKAMTIB), the government established a programme in 1978, the so-called National Refresher Course (Penataran Kewaspadaan National, TARPADNAS), that enabled military officers and civil servants to better handle the ‘New Left’ threat. From that time, reference to the ‘latent communist threat’ (bahaya laten komunis, BALATKOM, as it was commonly called by the officers) became popular.

Meantime, in the early 1980s, the military adjusted its ‘threat theory’ by introducing the term ‘fundamentalist’ and raising concerns about the so-called extreme right (ekstrim kanan, EKA), i.e. fanatical and militant Islamic fundamentalism. The hijacking of an airplane in 1981 (the Wyola affair), bomb attacks on the Borobudur temple and Bank Central Asia, and the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident, said military officers, were evidence of the emerging EKA. Since then, they have monitored the Islamic movement closely.
The tight control of the government over society meant it did not face any serious restrictions in implementing policies. As a result, the New Order government compiled what can only be classified as an extraordinary record of economic rehabilitation, growth and transformation. National income increased six-fold in real terms. The growth rate was 7 per cent or more per year between 1967 and 1981, and after falling to just over 3 per cent in the 1980s due to declining oil prices and other structural problems, in the 1990s growth rates again approached and at times exceeded 7 per cent (Bresnan, 1993: 284–88; Schwarz, 1994: 57–59). Per capita income grew at some 4.5 per cent annually after 1965, and as of the mid-1990s it was four times greater in real terms than it had been in 1965. In US dollars, the average Indonesian’s annual income increased from around US$50 in 1965 to approximately US$1,000 in 1995 and nearly US$1,200 in 1996. Meanwhile, the number of people who lived below the poverty line fell from 60 per cent of the total population to a mere 19 per cent in the same period while population growth declined from approximately 2.6 per cent to 1.8 per cent. The same progress was also shown by other indicators such as education, health, non-oil exports and direct foreign investment. Among other success stories, the most incredible one was the success of the rice self-sufficiency programme in 1985.

Such success stories of national development made the military more confident that the implementation of Dwifungsi was on the right track. As stipulated in Law No. 20/1982 on Defence and Security, it therefore claimed itself to be the dinamisator (dynamic driving force) and stabilisator (stabilizing force) of national development. This strengthened the previous claim stated by Soeharto during the military leaders meeting on 3 March 1969:

The esprit de corps, the loyalty to duty, the discipline, the flexible organization, the clear procedure and work system, the clarity of the responsibility system, the full responsibility of the leader and the delegation of the power are the general principles and management practiced by ABRI. The officers who hold civilian positions have to spread its spirit and good organizational system. (Samego, et al., 1998a: 97)

In the same vein, Murtopo pointed out:
From the history of our country we can conclude that it is only because of the presence of ABRI that the disintegration heading towards the destruction of our country several times could be avoided. Historically speaking ABRI is the only group in society which was born together with the new institution, namely, the state based on Pancasia . . . . It is because ABRI has the ability and tradition to overcome groups’ ideologies and interests that make it the leader of the country. (Murtopo, 1974: 108–109)

The military’s confidence in its role and ethical values shown in the above statements indicated that Dwifungsi as a doctrine was compatible with the features of a political ideology. According to Van Doorn (1971), if the military claimed itself to be a nation builder, then its ethical values were promoted into society, and its working system (management) was presented as the best system, it meant a military doctrine was transformed into its political ideology. Looking at the indicators of a political ideology, therefore, it could be said that since its early birth Dwifungsi had become the political ideology of ABRI. The military’s efforts in maintaining its role through adjustments to the ‘threat theory’, moreover, affirmed the existence of Dwifungsi as its political ideology. This was unlike the operational and corporate ideologies, where scope for its political role was limited; in contrast, the political ideology gave the military an unlimited role in socio-economic and political affairs.

In the early years of the 1990s, the military extended its ‘threat theory’ following the rise of globalization and democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since this attracted the increasing attention of society, the military feared it would create political instability in the country. This was manifested in the emerging demand of political openness (keterbukaan) that was influenced by the process of democratization on the global level. Besides, the steady economic growth since 1967 had brought about changes in the social structure and values through rising levels of education and skills as well as greater exposure to and consciousness of differences within Indonesian society and between it and the outside world. In turn, this increased the political awareness of society, as evidenced by the establishment of new NGOs and the emergence of the demand for keterbukaan.
THE MILITARY DURING THE PRE-REFORM PERIOD

For the military, NGOs and other critical social organizations were seen as the real threat to development since they raised the issue of *keterbukaan* so strongly. Branding organizations such as FORDEM35 and FPKR36 as members of the *organisasi tanpa bentuk* (organization without organization) – and hence as part of the latent communist threat – was one way in which the military steadily tried to eliminate them. Ironically, among these organizations was Petisi 50, an organization established mainly by two traditional political *aliran* (streams) – namely nationalism (members including Abdul Madjid and Slamet Bratanata) and Islam (including Mohammad Natsir and Anwar Haryono) – as well as several former military officers (such as Admiral Ali Sadikin and General Hoegeng) (Lane, 1991: 42).

However, actually the movement demanding *keterbukaan* was not the sole preserve of NGOs and other critical organizations but also included the younger generation of politicians and the military. Figures such as Sarwono Kusumaatmadja and Rachmat Witoelar of Golkar were openly talking about the need for increased democratization. Moreover, such military members of the DPR as Lieutenant General Saiful Sulun, Major General Samsuddin and Brigadier General Rukmini tried to oppose their headquarter's policy by raising the issue of *keterbukaan* in parliament. This attracted the displeasure of the armed forces headquarter; according to General Try Sutrisno, they had gone too far and should be re-educated (Lane, 1992: 52).

Meanwhile, the emerging issue of *keterbukaan* was understood by the people as an opportunity to voice their grievances. On the labour front, *keterbukaan* meant they could strike in order to demand their rights. Therefore, the number of labour stoppages increased dramatically from year to year after 1991 and took a particularly dramatic turn, as evidenced by rioting, destruction of company property and the murder of businessmen. On the student front, *keterbukaan* translated into a protest against the national lottery (Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah, SDSB). According to the students, the SDSB made poor people even poorer. This protest was intended as a direct criticism of Soeharto with the students
renaming the SDSB as *Soeharto Dalang Semua Bencana* (Soeharto is the mastermind of the disasters).

Observe the development of demands for political openness that started to attack his leadership, Soeharto got angry in 1993 and made his *gebug* (clobber) statement. He said he would clobber whoever tried to topple him unconstitutionally. The statement was followed by General Faisal Tanjung, the commander-in-chief, who stated that whoever obstructed economic development would be wiped out (*dilibas*).

In accordance with the nature of *Dwifungsi* as a political ideology that positioned the military as the stabilizing agent (*dinamisator* and *stabilisator*) of development, the movement demanding political openness was seen by the military as a threat to its effort to bring about political stability in the country (i.e. to its *stabilisator* role). Therefore, the terms *gebug* and *libas* were translated immediately by the military officers into 'security' actions in order to maintain this role. A prominent member of *Petisi 50* was captured and banned from going overseas, while student activists who criticized Soeharto, such as Nuku Sulaiman, were arrested and jailed. Cultural performances such as drama, music and comedy were tightly controlled and many students, particularly from Gadjah Mada University, were jailed just because of their jokes. Certain magazines such as *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik* were banned on 14 June 1994 because they were critical of Soeharto's leadership, particularly in relation to his support for Habibie when the latter purchased 14 old ships from Germany.

Meanwhile, Marsinah, a woman labourer in Surabaya who had actively demanded the fulfillment of labour rights, was murdered. At the same time, the military intensified its operations in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya provinces. Accusing the GPK (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, the disturber of the peace movement) in the provinces of threatening national unity, the military took harsh measures against whoever was suspected of being a GPK member or sympathizer. As a result, kidnapping, torture, killing, rape, and the other violent actions were carried out by the military. Moreover, the military also attacked the office of the Indonesian Democratic
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Party (PDI) on 27 July 1996 and killed 23 people in order to topple Megawati Soekarnoputri from her position as PDI chairman. Besides, the military kidnapped and jailed pro-democracy activists such as Budiman Sudjatmiko of the Democratic People’s Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD) and accused them of being neo-communists who endangered the country.

The repressive and coercive actions taken by the military to maintain its dominant role revived the debate on Dwifungsi. In fact, it was not a new phenomenon since the first debate had taken place in 1968. Early critics of the implementation of Dwifungsi had come from student activists of 1966 (Angkatan ‘66) who earlier had supported the military in toppling the Old Order. Student leaders such as Nono Anwar Makarim, Dawam Rahardjo, Nurcholish Madjid and Soegeng Sarjadi criticized the ‘excessive practices’ of Dwifungsi. According to them, many military officers did not have the ability to hold civilian positions, particularly as village heads, sub-district heads (camat), mayors or governors. They often resorted to repressive or other military methods when dealing with the people rather than using modern bureaucratic principles (Mimbar Demokrasi, 1968). Therefore, student activists also used slogans such as ‘the military are stubborn’, ‘the military abuse power’ and ‘ABRI is the defender of the status quo’ in order to criticize how Dwifungsi was practiced (Notosusanto, 1991: 330).

Ironically, criticism also came from General Nasution, the father of the Middle Way, who from 1971 onwards steadily became one of the strongest opponents of Dwifungsi. According to Nasution, the implementation of Dwifungsi had to synchronize with the interpretation of Chapter 2 of the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945). This meant that the military as a part of the functional groups was only permitted to have representatives holding positions as MPR members; they should not participate in day-to-day politics. He added that the deep involvement of the military in government during times of martial law could not be continued in an era of political stability (Nasution, 1971: 327). Nasution’s intervention encouraged such other opponents of Dwifungsi as Marsilam Simanjuntak and Arbi Sanit to become more critical of the military.
ARGUING THAT INDONESIA DURING THE NEW ORDER ERA WAS NOT UNDER MARTIAL LAW, THEY STATED THAT THE DOMINANT ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SOCIO-POLITICAL AFFAIRS WAS INAPPROPRIATE. THE FOCUS OF THEIR CRITICISM WAS THE REPRESSIVE AND COERCIVE BEHAVIOUR OF THE MILITARY AS IT STEADILY ADJUSTED ITS 'THREAT THEORY'.

The criticism of Dwifungsi became the catalyst for discussion in public forums in the early years of the 1990s. Two scholars, Arbi Sanit and Miriam Budiardjo of the University of Indonesia, raised the issue of the number of ABRI representatives in parliament during a sitting of Commission 11 of the DPR. They suggested that the military needed to reduce its representatives in order to improve democracy (Kompas, 3 January 1992). From this moment, the long-standing taboo on questioning the military's dominant position was broken. Opponents of Dwifungsi began to speak up and demand a reduced role for the military. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, for instance, stated that since the military was only 0.3 per cent of the total population, it should not have been allocated 20 per cent of parliamentary seats.

By and large, criticism of Dwifungsi was related to the socio-economic and political distortions caused by the dominant role of the military. In socio-political affairs, this dominance hampered the careers of both civilian politicians and bureaucrats since the kekaryaan programme – assignment of serving members of the Armed Forces to a tour of duty involving non-military tasks – became ABRI’s central policy. Meanwhile, military dominance encouraged nepotism and corruption in the economic field (Dhakidae, 1999). During the New Order era, however, there was no critic who argued that the dominant role of the military in socio-political affairs was also a source of weakness. This situation not only caused inefficiency and negligence in the military’s defence and security roles, but also made it possible for civilians to exploit its dark side, giving rise to such evils as nepotism and corruption.

In contrast, after the collapse of the New Order, many critics stated that the dominant role of the military had boomeranged or backfired (Dhakidai, 1999; Bhakti, 1999a). Moreover, the military’s far-flung organizational structure – which reached from central
government down to village level and once was seen as the source of the military’s structural power—was now viewed by many, including military officers, as one of the military’s organizational weaknesses. According to them, this not only incurred hefty operational costs but also widened the distortions of command. Therefore, they shared the idea of abolishing those military sub-district commands like BABINSA, KORAMIL, and KODIM as had been proposed by Major General Wirahadikusumah. The idea was that this abolition would make the military’s territorial structure more efficient. Their arguments, of course, were debatable. In reality, the army’s existing territorial structure and the military’s financial independence from the government were seen as part of the military’s political resources (Liddle, 2001: x–xi). In other words, the current structure was still useful in providing structural power for the military.

It was an interesting phenomenon that many observers who previously were proponents of Dwifungsi, like Hasnan Habib, Salim Said and Sayidiman Suryahadiprojo, suddenly switched sides to become its opponents after the reform movement gathered pace. They shared the views of critics of Dwifungsi that the military’s organizational structure had become inefficient since it was unable to defend Soeharto or resolve such territorial problems as in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya (Papua). Therefore, they supported the proposal by Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah to close down the military sub-district commands (KORAMIL and KODIM) to make the military organization more efficient. Moreover, he also stated that, if the military could not prevent the country from sliding into political instability, it would be better to abandon the military sub-district commands.

During the New Order, the proponents of Dwifungsi used both the historical legitimacy of the military and its success in bringing about political stability to facilitate economic development as their main argument to silence their critics (Murtopo, 1974: 123–124; Yuwono, 1983: 54; Notosusanto, 1991: 149–153; Habib, 1996: 74–75; Sudarsono, 1997). In general, their arguments were rooted in Maynard’s visualization of the military elite’s perceptions of Dwif-
Table 1: The military’s perceptions of Dwifungsi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Function</th>
<th>Second Function</th>
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<tr>
<td>is called the</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Defence role</td>
<td>1. Socio-political role</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Professional role</td>
<td>2. Patriotic role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Primary role</td>
<td>3. Secondary role</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Role as protector</td>
<td>5. Role as struggler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Role as security apparatus</td>
<td>6. Role as social force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Role as instrument of state</td>
<td>7. Instrument of revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Role as security force</td>
<td>8. Role as freedom fighters</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>is concerned with</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Preventing disintegration</td>
<td>11. Seeking integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Protection</td>
<td>13. Development</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>can be described as</td>
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<td>15. War-oriented</td>
<td>15. Peace-oriented</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Stabilizing</td>
<td>17. Dynamizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Oriented toward law enforcement</td>
<td>18. Oriented toward law making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Intermittent role</td>
<td>22. Continuous role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Singular role</td>
<td>23. Multi-faceted role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Fighting role</td>
<td>24. Conciliatory role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. The will to resist</td>
<td>25. The will to grow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Universally accepted</td>
<td>26. Skeptically accepted</td>
</tr>
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</table>

fungsi (see Table 1). They claimed that the military’s awareness of its dual function role, as shown point by point by Maynard, made Dwifungsi an extremely ‘effective medicine’ to maintain national stability (Bhakti, 1999a: 53–54). Given such conditions, the government was able to implement its economic policies without any restrictions. As a result, sustained economic growth was notable during the New Order era. Therefore, the proponents of Dwifungsi called the successes – in stability and economic growth – a ‘dual success’ (Habib, 1998: 1).

Unlike the opponents of Dwifungsi who steadily received more support, particularly from the younger generation of academics, NGO activists and students, its proponents were dominated by the older generation. They referred to important events in the country such as the struggle for independence, the communist rebellion of 1948, the regional rebellions (DI/TII, PRRI/PERMESTA) and the failed communist coup of 1965 as evidence that the military’s presence in socio-political affairs was necessary. Besides, they also argued that the military’s presence was a prerequisite for political stability since the civilian politicians were divided and weak (Bhakti, 1999a: 51–52).

However, the collapse of the New Order regime indicated that the implementation of Dwifungsi, which had been able to sustain economic development at certain times, had negative effects in the long run (Dhakidae, 1999). Military intervention not only paralysed the socio-economic and political systems but also suppressed the emergence of civilian leaders. Moreover, since competition in the systems was unfair, corruption, collusion and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme, KKN) had become a common phenomenon. The fall of Soeharto, then, brought an end to Dwifungsi as the military’s political ideology as well. The military now needed a new ideology in order to adapt to the new political situation under civilian rule. Looking at the military’s ideas formulated in its new White Paper, ‘Paradigma Baru ABRI’ (The New Paradigm of ABRI), it seems that their ‘new paradigm’ parallels the concept of the Middle Way that Nasution formulated for application as the military’s corporate ideology in the period 1958–65. The vision is that the military
should continue to maintain its significant role in socio-political affairs, though to a much lesser extent than before. Therefore, the new paradigm of ABRI has been criticized by scholars as being only reposisi setengah hati (half-hearted reforms) of the military (Bhakti, 1999c).

In order to illustrate the deep involvement of the Indonesian armed forces in economic and political affairs during the pre-Reform era, Table 2 sums up the relationships between the types of military ideologies and their relative roles. In short, when ABRI implemented its doctrine as an operational ideology, it meant ABRI had a relatively medium role in political affairs and a relatively low role in economic affairs, while being deeply involved in the commission of violence. However, when ABRI implemented its doctrine as a political ideology, its role in economic and political affairs was relatively high. Moreover, it was also deeply involved in the commission of violence. Only when ABRI implemented its doctrine as a corporate ideology did its involvement in the commission of violence become relatively low.

**A SPOILER, CRITICAL SUPPORTER AND POLITICAL TOOL**

Besides the development of Dwifungsi, another problem to be clarified is the relationship between the military and the President (executive). Up till now, the relationship between the military and the President had been seen as a static relationship. The question has been if the military had a dominant role and was on a par with...
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Soeharto, both controlling the country together (e.g. Crouch, 1988; MacFarling, 1996; Sanit, 1999) or instead that the military was basically weak because it had been used as a political tool by Soeharto (e.g. Said, 1999; Bhakti, 1999a; Irsyam, 1999). In fact, as argued by Suryadinata in his study on Indonesia’s foreign policy (Suryadinata, 1996: 42–25), the relationship between the two parties was dynamic. In the domestic political context, the dynamism of their relationship can be seen in three roles that the military assumed vis-à-vis the President since the struggle for independence, namely as a spoiler, critical supporter and political tool of the president. This section assesses the three roles and their impact on society.

The Military as aSpoiler

By definition, a spoiler is a person who opposes the leader’s policies (Lake, 1983: 522; Rinakit, 1996: 9). In this respect, the military would oppose the president’s policy if it saw this as inimical to its interests. As a spoiler, the military used rejection and strong-arm tactics in order to influence presidential policy. However, once an understanding between the two parties was reached, the military as the guardian of the state would toe the presidential line. The military, then, showed that it was under executive control and its actions were only to implement government policy.

In their continuum model of the military’s involvement in socio-political affairs, Welch and Smith (1974: 1–2) focus on influence, intervention and control. Here, there are parallels between their influence role and the spoiler role of the Indonesian military. If there is a little distinction between the two concepts, it is that the spoiler role widens the scope of the military’s actions, including open opposition to the President in order to influence presidential policy. One can see the influence role in the formal efforts of the military as regulated by the constitution, i.e., the military has to use formal mechanisms such as an assembly meeting in order to influence policymaking to achieve its goals. However, the two roles have much in common. Both the spoiler and influence roles not only occur in situations where the military is formally subordinate to the civilian government but also receives few economic or political
benefits. In short, both concepts basically overlap. As a spoiler of the President, the military had a relatively high influence in policy making but received relatively low benefits in the economic and political fields (see Figure 2, page 53). The following events show clearly that the Indonesian military acted as a spoiler of the presidency.

First, when on 19 December 1948, a surprise Dutch attack was launched on Yogyakarta, most of the civilian leaders headed by President Soekarno vacillated over what to do and, in the event, allowed themselves to be captured. Following the release of these leaders half a year later on 6 July 1949, there was disagreement for the next month between General Soedirman and President Soekarno over the timing of the ceasefire. The former preferred negotiations with the Dutch to take place before declaring a ceasefire but the latter disagreed, saying that the delegation headed by Vice-President Mohammad Hatta was already on its way to the Roundtable Conference. On 2 August 1949, General Soedirman decided to resign as Commander-in-Chief of TNI because of President Soekarno’s refusal to back down from his decision. But Nasution successfully persuaded the general not to proceed with submitting his letter of resignation. Here, General Soedirman showed great pride in the military but utter disappointment with the executive:

It can be said that the only national possession of the Republic that remains intact and unchanged, even though it has had to face all types of problems and changes, are the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia (the Indonesian National Army). Truly then, it is an obligation on all who want to defend the Proclamation of 17 August 1945 to see to it that the only national possession of the Republic which remains intact is not changed by the situation, whatever that situation may be. If our leaders adhere consistently to their original opinions, then, God willing, our national armed forces will remain upright forever and will be able to guarantee the safety and security of our country and people. However, the world turns, history moves on, and sometimes the thinking of men shifts from the original course. Before me I see a change (a shift) in the road followed by our leaders. (Nasution, 1963: 50, quoted in Maynard, 1976: 177)

He also told the President that although he would no longer be Commander in Chief, he would continue to lead a guerrilla war
even though the civilian leaders were surrendering. Soekarno, of course, rejected his resignation by saying that should General Soedirman resign, he himself and Vice-President Hatta would also resign. Soedirman was touched by Soekarno’s response and there were tears in his eyes (Suryohadiprojo, 1996: 13). As a result, he withdrew his resignation but insisted on his troops conducting guerrilla warfare. Soekarno finally supported this decision.

Apart from the possibility that the surrender of Soekarno and other civilian leaders was due their disappointment in the ability of the military to protect to them (Kahin, 1995) or to other factors, the facts show that the military played a spoiler role at that time. Soedirman’s decision to resign but continue to lead guerrilla forces in fact influenced Soekarno’s policy. He finally took on the Dutch on both the diplomatic and military fronts. Not least, this was shown by his support for Soedirman’s move to wage guerrilla warfare.

Second, when Nasution and such protégés as Colonel Kawilarang aimed a cannon at the presidential palace, this caused the so-called 17 October 1952 Affair. In an attempt to stop the political opposition in parliament from discussing a topic regarded by the military as its internal problem – namely, its plan to modernize the army – the military asked the president to assume executive power and dissolve parliament. At the same time, the military organized a large civilian demonstration in front of the presidential palace demanding the dissolution of parliament. However, President Soekarno faced down the protesters, saying he refused to dissolve parliament as he was not a dictator. In a democratic state, he added, people have to vote and perfect their own parliament through general elections (Notosusanto, 1991: 69). Since Soekarno did not succumb to the military pressure to dissolve parliament, Nasution was forced to resign.

It is true that the 17 October 1952 affair reflected an internal conflict within the military. Nasution’s idea of military modernization was feared by Bambang Supeno’s camp. They suspected that Nasution’s idea was only to promote the officers who had a Dutch educational background and in the process to block other officers
THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AFTER THE NEW ORDER

who had lower qualifications. The latter group were ex-laskar (youth paramilitary troops) or ex-PETA. Since they were closer to Soekarno than those with a Dutch background, they reported their fears to him. Besides, Bambang Supeno also influenced members of parliament to raise the issue of modernization within the military. This was the root of the problem that finally led to the affair. The bravery of Nasution and his supporters, who could be considered as representative of the military since they dominated the headquarters and regional commands, led to the abortive attempt to suppress the President and became another example of the military adopting a spoiler role.

Lastly, senior military officers boycotted the government’s decision to appoint Colonel Bambang Utoyo, a man of fairly low seniority, as Army Chief of Staff on 27 June 1955. The event, better known as the 27 June 1955 Affair, was actually a continuation of the previous 17 October 1952 Affair. After Nasution’s resignation, Bambang Sugeng was promoted to the position of Army Chief of Staff. This intensified the internal conflict within the military. To resolve the problem, the officers finally held a meeting in Yogyakarta on 21–25 February 1955 that resulted in a conciliatory document, the so-called ‘Piagam Keutuhan Angkatan Darat’ [Charter of the Army’s Unity]. When soon after the Minister of Defence, Iwa Kusumasumantri, appointed Bambang Utoyo as Army Chief of Staff, senior military officers staged a boycott of the minister’s policies; to them, the appointment went against the main principles of the charter, which stipulated that the promotion of officers should be based on seniority (Notosusanto, 1991: 27–28). This boycott again showed the spoiler role of the military towards the government.

As mentioned earlier, the spoiler role has little to do with economic and political benefits gained by the military but it can have a relatively strong influence in policy making. This can be seen in the events described above. None of these events led to gains by the military in terms of economics and politics. The first proved the military’s commitment to defend the motherland, while the latter two reflected its disappointment with a government that tried to intervene in its internal problems. There are no records of
any officers during this era being involved in business or holding ministerial positions.

Since a spoiler role had relatively low economic or political benefits, only the military’s disappointment with civilian politicians during the early years of independence (Said, 1987: 20) could be identified as a decisive factor for the military assuming the spoiler role. The disappearance of this role overnight after Soeharto took power in 1966 proves that assumption. Besides, there was almost no negative impact directed at the people caused by the military’s spoiler role; the military did not involve itself in day-to-day politics and economics.

The Military as a Critical Supporter
Soon after Soekarno handed over executive powers to Soeharto, the military shifted its role from spoiler to critical supporter. As a critical supporter, the main task of the military was to provide input and propose policies to the president, as well as to offer criticism, albeit in a polite way. However, the military’s critical supporter role was only evident during the first two decades of the New Order government, since at that time most of the military elite were Soeharto’s friends or former staff members. They were thus understandably capable and confident enough to remind Soeharto about certain cases relating to the nefarious activities of family members and close friends. Besides, as a new president lacking in experience, Soeharto appeared willing to listen to any criticism, be it from those in his inner circle (such as Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Hoemardani, Sudomo and Yoga Sugama) or outer circle (such as Soemitro and Sutopo Yuwono). As such, the era of the military’s role as a critical supporter lasted from 1966 to 1988. In 1988, the last Soeharto confidant, General Benny Moerdani, then Commander-in-Chief, was sacked when he tried to warn the president about the nefarious activities of his children (Schwartz, 1999: 146). In Soeharto’s view, by meddling in his family affairs, Moerdani showed himself to be unacceptably arrogant. Thereafter, only former adjutants of the president, like General Try Sutrisno and General Faisal Tanjung, were promoted to high positions in the bureaucracy and military.
As a critical supporter of the president, the military’s role in socio-political affairs approximately paralleled the interventionist role found in Welch and Smith’s continuum model (influence-intervention-control) (Welch and Smith, 1974: 12) rather than the participatory role described by Bhakti (1996b: 195). Since martial law from 1957 till the first two decades of New Order government, the military’s involvement in socio-political affairs had been characterized by its interventionist rather than participatory role. The military’s deep involvement in socio-political affairs, backed by the use of power, was sufficient proof of this. The military’s involvement, however, did not reflect its voluntary attitude, which constituted the main characteristic of its participatory role.

As a critical supporter of the president, the military’s capacity to influence policy making was relatively moderate but it was able to derive high benefits in the economic and political fields (see Figure 2). Such military roles can also be called decomposition roles (Stepan, 1971), in that the military was at least on a par with Soeharto and the civilian bureaucrats (particularly the technocrats) in charting government policies. In the political field, the military supported Soeharto in developing the threat theory in order to control society. In the economic field, the technocrats, or so-called Berkeley Mafia,51 proposed the stabilization and rehabilitation of economic programmes. The military’s duty was to safeguard the implementation of these programmes, which among others included halting hyperinflation, rescheduling foreign debt, obtaining new credits and instituting an open-door policy towards foreign direct investment. With its creation of an open market economy, the new government reintegrated Indonesia into the world economy and domestically ushered in an open market economy (Thee, 2002: 204). Such a development enabled the military officers to benefit immensely since now they could establish their own businesses.

The domination of the military and bureaucrats in the policy-making processes meant that Indonesia was ruled via bureaucratic authoritarian practices from the early years of the Soeharto government. For Soeharto, choosing the military as his principal supporter was the safest measure since he was not comfortable
with the attitude of most civilian politicians, especially as their political motives were unpredictable. The bad relations between the military and civilian politicians during the Soekarno era were also a major reason why he preferred to be independent of the politicians.\textsuperscript{52} The number of military holding strategic positions during the first decade of his administration indicated his mistrust of politicians. In 1973, for instance, 34 per cent of cabinet ministers were from the military, while governors and ambassadors were 70 per cent and 44.4 per cent respectively. In 1977, the number rose to 42.5 per cent for ministers and 70.3 per cent for governors but fell slightly for ambassadors (41 per cent). Moreover, the military dominated local administration at the sub-district level. They also dominated Golkar and had 100 non-elected representatives in the DPR, who also became members of the MPR as part of functional groups.

According to Said (1999), however, Soeharto decided to choose the military as his supporter because he knew that to be able to control the country he had to control the military. Therefore, the steadily reduced number of military officers as cabinet ministers, governors and ambassadors in the 1980s and early years of the 1990s did not mean the same phenomenon was taking place in the other positions. Hence, their reduction to 24 per cent (minister), 40 per cent (governor) and 17 per cent (ambassador) on average did not correspond to the reduction of bureaucratic authoritarian practices compared to the previous decade. Until the late Soeharto era, there was no evidence that parliament or political parties, as well as independent interest groups, were able to check the power of the bureaucracy. This meant that government polices were still under bureaucratic control.

However, the domination of Soeharto over the military did not mean the military elite were his passive partners during the first two decades of his administration. They behaved as critical supporters with firm characteristics, such as advising and proposing policies, as well as offering criticism to the president. They were not a political tool that only ensured implementation of the policies decided by the president and his technocrats.
In its role as the critical supporter of Soeharto, the military had proposed some political policies in order to achieve political stability as a prerequisite for national development. Soeharto’s lack of experience in governing the country was offset by the military’s political measures. Its first effort was to support the president in consolidating his power through restructuring Sekber Golkar (the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) in 1967 so that it could be used as a powerful electoral machine that would guarantee military domination in politics. As noted by Suryadinata (1992: 28), however, pro-Soekarno officers still controlled Sekber Golkar at that time. Therefore, the military called for a meeting (Musyawarah Kerja Sekber Golkar) on 2–7 November 1967 in order to replace them. After two years, Soeharto’s supporters succeeded in consolidating 210 organizations to become seven federations (kino) within Sekber Golkar. Apart from one kino, which was led by civilians, the rest were occupied by the military. Sekber Golkar (later better known simply as Golkar) finally became an electoral machine not just for the regime but also for the military during the Soeharto era.

The military’s second effort was to support Soeharto in consolidating his power through its initiative to regroup the political parties in 1973. This plan had already been prepared in 1971, as can be seen in Ali Moertopo’s statement during his press conference in May that year announcing that political parties would be restructured after the 1971 general election (Suryadinata, 1992: 79). With Golkar’s landslide victory (62.8 per cent of votes) – among the other parties only NU received a significant share of the votes (18.7 per cent) – the government found it easier to consolidate the ten remaining parties into three political parties, namely PPP, Golkar and PDI. The role of Ali Moertopo could not be ignored in relation to Golkar’s victory. He was often said to be the architect of the floating mass concept, which attempted to depoliticize the Indonesian people (Suryadinata, 1987: 40). Moreover, he also led Special Operations (Operasi Khusus, OPSUS), an informal intelligence unit which was formed mainly to help Golkar win. The combination of both strategies (the floating mass and special operations) thus resulted in the landslide victory for Golkar.
The military's last effort was to support Soeharto through a series of policies that were mainly proposed in the first five years of the 1980s. After its claim to be the dinamisator and stabilisator of development was introduced to the people (Regulation No. 20/1982 on Security and Defence), in 1984 the military (as an integral part of the government) proposed five political bills in order to strengthen its grip on society. These were the bills on the political parties and Golkar amendment, the mass organization, a referendum bill, the amendment of the election and the DPR/MPR bill (Suryadinata, 1987: 46). Since the bills also regulated that Pancasila should be the sole ideology for all socio-political organizations, it faced strong rejection from radical Moslems. In their perception, the bill was a threat to their political survival. As a result, a clash between radical Moslems and the military occurred in Tanjung Priok.

In accordance with the characteristics of a critical supporter, however, the military gained relatively high benefits in the economic and political fields (Figure 4). These benefits continued despite power shifts at ministerial level and changes in the strategy of economic development (from comparative to competitive advantage). Therefore, the success of technologists (Habibies' camp) to replace technocrats (the Berkeley Mafia) had no impact on the military's privileges.

As mentioned earlier, however, the military actually could not be considered a passive partner during the first two decades of the Soeharto administration. While supporting Soeharto to consolidate his power, the military also criticized him. At least four instances to show its role as a critical supporter of the president can be identified.

First, when Soeharto asked Soemitro about his opinion of Ali Moertopo being appointed as chief of the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN, Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara), Soemitro disagreed with this idea. According to him, the appointment of Moertopo would conflict with the work of the intelligence institution, since it would be used by Moertopo to attain his personal goals. As noted by Jenkins (1984: 13), Soemitro pointed out:
After Malari Pak Harto asked me … ‘Well, what do you think about the idea of Ali (Moertopo) becoming Chief of Bakin?’ ‘No!’ I rejected it. I told pak Harto, ‘It is not because I don’t like Ali, Pak! It is because we have to create a very good impression with the whole intelligence effort’. Intelligence officers should not play games in the political processes.

The Soemitro–Moertopo rivalry aside, Soemitro’s objection to Soeharto’s plan showed that the military was not a mere ‘yes-man’ of the president but was willing to disagree with his plans should they be thought to risk inflicting severe damage to national interests.

The second instance was when Ali Moertopo reminded Soeharto about the economic policies, which he felt were too focused on monetary issues. In the 1970s, the economic policies in Indonesia were conceptualized by technocrats (led by Widjojo Nitisastro) and the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional). Their approach focused on the monetary policy and ignored the structural ones, i.e., the industrial policy (Soesastro, 1999). In order to strike a balance in economic policies, Moertopo and Soedjono tried to influence Soeharto. Although their effort to remind Soeharto finally failed, it could be considered as evidence of the critical supporter role of the military.

The third instance was when the Army’s Command School (SESKOAD, Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat) wrote a paper before the 1977 general election. Later known as the SESKOAD Paper, this stated that the armed forces had to refrain from taking sides in general elections in future and not to align with any political groups. For Soeharto, the SESKOAD paper was seen as a threat to his position, especially after the paper was enthusiastically endorsed by a group of retired army generals, the so-called Forum for Study and Communication. As noted by Said (1998: 538), in one of its most important documents, the Forum elaborated on the SESKOAD Paper along three lines, as follows.

First, they declared that, while the armed forces ‘dual function’ doctrine of fighting external enemies and participating in domestic politics in principle had been conceptually sound during
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a certain period in the national struggle, it should be reviewed continually. In the current period, its implementation needed immediate correction. Second, political life in Indonesia should be based on fundamental democratic principles, particularly equal opportunity for all groups to pursue their political ambitions. Finally, the Indonesian armed forces should be removed from involvement with political parties and groups. It should return to its original position, separate from any civilian political group, including Golkar. Moreover, it was hoped that, because of its moral values, the Indonesian armed forces would remain above all groups. (Said, 1998: 538)

In order to counter the military’s assertion of neutrality, Soeharto reiterated that ABRI should again support Golkar and not stand above all socio-political groups. The president delivered this rebuttal during a regular meeting of armed forces commanders held in Pekanbaru, Riau.

The final example of the military’s role as a critical supporter was shown by Benny Moerdani in his above-mentioned appeal to Soeharto concerning the involvement of his children in businesses that had made many businessmen unhappy. The unfair advantage they derived from their father’s reputation not only harmed the fair competition between businessmen, but also created more problems for the already ineffective bureaucracy. Moerdani, in his position as Commander in Chief, asked Soeharto to control his children’s business behaviour since it could affect his charisma as Bapak Pembangunan (leader of development). In Soeharto’s perception, however, Moerdani’s appeal was seen as interference in his family life.57

Besides, Soeharto also suspected that Moerdani had been brave in criticizing him not only because of the closeness of their relationship but also because – since he assumed the military was under his control – Moerdani had become too self-confident. As such, Soeharto regarded Moerdani’s lack of respect as a potential challenge to his leadership. Soon after this criticism, therefore, Moerdani was replaced by General Try Sutrisno, a former adjutant of Soeharto, on 27 February 1988.

Looking at the characteristics of the critical supporter role of the military, it seems that this role is consistent with the argument
that the military was on a par with Soeharto in controlling the country (Crouch, 1988; MacFarling, 1996; Said, 1991). That is, Soeharto’s military supporters mostly came from the same generation as him and shared the same experiences. Therefore, their support for Soeharto could not be seen as reflecting their inferior position towards him. Rather, their support reflected their equal position – although not exactly equal – since they not only proposed policies but also criticized him. This era, however, came to an end together with the appointment of Try Sutrisno as Commander in Chief.

**THE MILITARY AS A POLITICAL TOOL**

The appointment of Try Sutrisno as Commander in Chief marked the change of role of the military from being a critical supporter of the President to a political tool. It was an era where the military produced almost no single policy and had no bargaining position towards Soeharto. Regulation No. 2/1988 on the Military Servicemen, which was effective during the time when Try Sutrisno was Commander in Chief, had in fact been proposed by his predecessor (Benny Moerdani). Their status as former adjutants made them blind loyalists, since they realized that their military and political careers depended on Soeharto’s blessing. On the other hand, Soeharto used the military to control society and guard his personal interests (Said, 1998, 1999; Bhakti, 1999a, Irsyam, 1999). The tight control over society, which was almost absolute, indicated that as a political tool of the president, the military’s role paralleled the continuum model of Welch and Smith (influence–intervention–control) (Welch and Smith, 1974: 1–2). As a political tool of the president, meanwhile, it received relatively higher benefits in economic and political fields compared to its previous role as a critical supporter of the president (Figure 2).

There is a popular belief among the people involved in establishing the New Order government that Soeharto did not intend to become president in the beginning and that they had to convince him. Since Soeharto was not firm on the matter, they had criticized him for being indecisive. However, they were surprised at
his later resolve when their representatives, such as Amir Machmud and Harry Tjan Silalahi, appeared before Soeharto to remind him after his second appointment that he had to prepare his successor for the next presidential election (1982). But Soeharto just said that, as stated in the constitution, there was nothing wrong if he was re-elected after finishing his duty. Since then they realized that Soeharto was already enjoying his comfortable ‘chair’.

Perhaps, for the people involved in establishing the New Order, Soeharto’s answer surprised them because they paid little attention to him since he was in power. Looking at his statement in the early years of his administration, it seems that from the beginning he had planned to use the military as his political tool in order to realize his political ambitions. As noted by Maynard (1976: 188), Soeharto said:

We must put an end to the situation of instability in which one rebellion is succeeded by another, one disturbance followed by another, and where crisis is the order of the day … ABRI does not wish to be a mere fire-extinguisher. ABRI is able to wipe out the causes making possible the outbreak of that ‘fire’ (author’s italics).

Everything done by ABRI is in conformity with the rules of procedure and the rules of the game we have decided together. ABRI is represented in the people’s representative institutions, both in the Centre and in the Regions by virtue of the regulations in force. Members of ABRI have become civil servants with due observance of the requirement needed. Members of ABRI have become governors up to village heads based upon election. What is more, they accepted their assignment spurred by the idealism of struggle, not because they wished to occupy the post, not because they wanted to accumulate authority and power in the interest if ABRI.

However, it was impossible for him to realize his goal in his early administration because his friends and former staff members were not his blind supporters. Therefore, Soeharto could not use them as his political tool. Meanwhile, it seemed that Soeharto was not secure in his position till he was able to control the military. In order to hasten this process, he manipulated the management conflict by dividing his political supporters into two camps opposed to each other. Soeharto was therefore able to remove them
one by one and prevent the emergence of one dominant group threatening his position.

It was widely known that the conflicts between Ali Moertopo and Soemitro (1974), Soedarmono and Benny Moerdani (1984), Faisal Tanjung and Hendroprijono (1996) and Wiranto and Prabowo (1998) were engineered by Soeharto. The first two were mainly attempts to eliminate his critical supporters, while the last three were addressed to maintain the balance of power among the parties and to defend his position as the centre of power. Excluding the last conflict, which finally led to his downfall, Soeharto was able to control them firmly. However, the collision between the two camps always led to riots, such as the 15 January disaster of 1974 (Mali 1974), the Tanjung Priok affair (1984), the 27 July affair (1996) and the May riots (1998) respectively.

After Soeharto succeeded in eliminating those among his supporters who were considered to be of his generation, from the end of the 1980s he became the centre of political power. Since the new leaders of the military were his former adjutants, he had strong control of the military. Considering himself as the centre of power, Soeharto assumed the leadership of Senapati ing Ngalaga, the King of Mataram, in governing Indonesia. This meant Soeharto identified himself as a Javanese king (Kingsbury, 1998: 75). According to Lane, however, the era of Soeharto’s strong control of the military could be considered as the era of ‘militarist’ regime (Lane, 1991: 7). This meant Soeharto used the military for his own purposes and the military as a socio-political group was not his first concern. He was more preoccupied with protecting his economic and political interests.

As political tool, the main duty of the military was to protect the president’s interests even though this would harm the people. Therefore, it could be understood that the phenomena of violence and other human right violations became more serious after the former adjutants held strategic positions in the government. The military not only established Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya (Papua) as military operational areas (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM), it also kidnapped, tortured and jailed democratic activists.
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Figure 2: Indonesian military relations toward the presidency

Notes:
(∗) The early months of the Abdurrahman presidency (see Chapter 4).
(†) The later period of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (see Chapter 4).
(‡) The presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri (see Chapter 5).


and whoever criticized Soeharto and his family. In short, the military tightened its control over society, particularly after the demand for political openness increased.

The military’s blind loyalty paralysed the economic and political superstructures, particularly the bureaucracy, parliament and the people’s assembly. Its function was no more than a rubber stamp for Soeharto and his family interests as well as their Chinese business counterparts. This can be proved by the number of presidential decrees, like the decree on the tax facilities given to certain industries, which violated the law in pandering to Soeharto and his family interests, but which were still legal under the government.64 This situation worsened as the military, a political
tool of the president, became increasingly involved in business. Together with the Soeharto family and Chinese conglomerates, it accumulated much wealth (James, 1990: 15).

The shift of the military foundations to become pure business institutions, argued by the military officers as their attempt to increase the well-being of soldiers, in fact produced the opposite effects. Although they used their business profits outside their usual budgets for security and political operations in order to maintain political stability, they also used the profits to maintain their glamorous lifestyles. This was part of their reward for being a political tool of the president.

Based on the earlier discussion, Figure 2 sums up the relationship between the president and the military, where the latter assumed the role of a spoiler, critical supporter and political tool of the former.

NOTES
1 Discussion with Dr Kusnanto Anggoro of CSIS (Jakarta, 21 September 1999).
2 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).
3 Discussion with Rufinus Lahur of CSIS (Jakarta, 21 September 1999).
4 Nasution was reinstated as army commander on 7 November 1955 after the boycott action by senior officers protesting the appointment of Colonel Bambang Utojo, a man of fairly low seniority, as Army Chief of Staff.
5 Also, see the argument of the former assistant of the chief of social and political affairs of the military (Assospol Kassospol ABRI), Major General Suwarno Adiwijoyo, who stressed the function of IPKI as a political tool of the military, Republika, 29 April 1999. Meanwhile, General Gatot Subroto, Colonel Sutoko and Colonel Azis Saleh were among other prominent officers who were active in IPKI.
6 The period of State of Siege spanned from 14 March 1957 to 1 May 1963.
7 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).
8 For more discussions on their competition in the economic arena, see Robison (1988).
They were Colonel Soeprajogi as the Minister of State for Economic Stability, Colonel Mohammad Nazir as the Minister of Shipping and Colonel Azis Saleh as the Minister of Health.

Colonel Soeharto, then Diponegoro Division Commander, was reportedly involved with the smuggling. He illegally exported sugar and other stuffs to Singapore. Since the military was attempting to consolidate its cohesiveness at that time, General A.H. Nasution and Gatot Subroto sent him to SESKOAD (Cribb, 1991).

The National Council was established on 6 May 1957 (Regulation No. 7/1957), while the National Planning Council was set up on 23 October 1958 (Regulation No. 80/1958). The main duty of the former was to advise the president on the state and society affairs, while the latter was to formulate the broad policy guidelines for the country. Both institutions were the functional groups within society, including the military.

These seven T & T were: (1) T & T I/Bukit Barisan (Aceh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau), (2) T & T II/Sriwijaya (South Sumatra and Jambi), (3) T & T III/Siliwangi (West Java), (4) T & T IV/Diponegoro (Central Java), (5) T & T V/Brawijaya (East Java), (6) T & T VI/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan) and (7) T & T VII/Wirabuana (Sulawesi, Moluccas, West Irian, Bali and Nusatenggara). Meanwhile, the 16 KODAM were: (1) Kodam I/Iskandarmuda (Aceh), (2) Kodam II/Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra), (3) Kodam III/17 August (West Sumatra), (4) Kodam IV/Sriwijaya (South Sumatra and Jambi), (5) Kodam V/Jaya (Jakarta), (6) Kodam VI/Siliwangi (West Java), (7) Kodam VII/Diponegoro (Central Java), (8) Kodam VIII/Brawijaya (East Java), (9) Kodam IX/Mulawarman (East Kalimantan), (10) Kodam X/Lambung (South Kalimantan), (11) Kodam XI/Tambun Bungai (Central Kalimantan), (12) Kodam XII/Tanjungpura (West Kalimantan), (13) Kodam XIII/Merdeka (North and South Sulawesi), (14) Kodam IV/Hasanuddin (South Sulawesi and North-East Sulawesi), (15) Kodam XV/Pattimura (Moluccas), (16) Kodam XVI/Udayana (Nusatenggara) and (17) Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih (Irian Jaya). See, Bachtiar (1988: 31).

Interviews with former president Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999) and Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999). Both of them argued that the involvement of the military in the policy-making process during martial law, particularly in 1958, prevented them from taking over.
14 This relates to the fact that the PKI was included in the big four parties which got popular support during the 1955 election. It received 16.4% of votes (59 seats), while PNI received 22.3% of votes (57 seats), Masjumi received 20.9% of votes (45 seats), Nahdlatul Ulama received 18.4% of votes (45 seats), see, Sundhaussen (1982: 91). If PKI boycotted Soekarno’s policy or missed Soekarno’s speech, it would harm Soekarno’s charisma.

15 PKI was estimated to have 15 million members at that time, see, Azca (1998: 74).

16 This accusation relates to the PKI rebellion in 1948. In the military’s perception, the PKI was considered a traitor to the nation since it committed rebellion while the military was defending the fatherland from the Dutch attacks during the Dutch military aggression.

17 The organizations under PKI include the People’s Youth (Pemuda Rakyat), Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, GERWANI), Indonesian Peasant League (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI), the Centre of the All Indonesian Workers’ Unions (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, SOBSI).


19 These were the National Monument (Monas) and Peasant Statue (Patung Tani).

20 These were the Olympic Stadium in Solo, Central Java and Senayan Stadium, Jakarta.

21 These were Manipol USDEK, Nasakom and Panca Azimat Revolusi.

22 They were Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Colonel Latief, Colonel Suherman and Air Marshal Omad Dhani (Anderson, 1971: 2).

23 They were General Ahmad Yani, Major General S. Parman, Major General Suprapt, Major General Harjono, Brigadier General Pandjaitan and Brigadier General Sutojo, while General Nasution slipped away from the scene of the murder (Hughes, 1967: 28).

24 He was also the commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, KOSTRAD) at that time, see, for instance, Bachtiar (1989: 98).

25 The controversy on the number of murdered people emerged because Soekarno refused to announce the real number. Based on the data collected by the Fact Finding Team led by A. Latif, around one million people were dead. Listening to the figure, Soekarno was shocked and he refused to announce it. Later, he publicly announced
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that one hundred thousand people were killed during the short period of the annihilation of the PKI (Latief, 1999).


27 See also MacFarling (1996: 143).

28 Article No. 26 of Law No. 20/1982 mentioned, ‘Indonesian Armed Forces have functions as defence-security force and as a the social force.’ Meanwhile the 1973 GBHN stated, ‘The missions of ABRI [include] … to continue raising the capabilities of ABRI both as a defence and security force and as a social force’.

29 For further discussions on the doctrine of Tri Ubaya Cakti, see Notosusanto (1975); on Hankamrata, see Nasution (1971).

30 The United Development Party (PPP) included the Reawakened Moslem Scholars Party, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), the Moslem Party (Parmusi), the Islamic Confederation (PSII) and the Islamic Education Party (Perti). The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) included the Nationalist Party (PNI), the Catholic Party, the Christian Party, the Party in Support of Indonesia’s Independence (IPKI) and the People’s Party. The functional group of Golkar included different groups, such as civil servants, the Armed Forces, women’s organizations, farmers, students, etc.

31 For the prediction of the potency of the Islamic movement becoming the opposition to the government, see Crouch (1980: 665).


33 For more discussions on the self-sufficiency in rice, see Wilson (1992: 40–44).

34 By and large, the political ideology of the military originates not in military circles but in political movements and leaders. Since the Indonesian Armed Forces became involved in politics from the early time of their establishment, they however developed their own doctrine, namely, Dwifungsi. This case is similar with the French Army, which developed guerre revolutionnaire doctrine. See Van Doorn (1971: xvii).

35 Fordem (Forum Demokrasi, Democratic Forum) established in 1991 by Abdurrahman Wahid (at that time as the chairman of Nahdhatul Ulama) and other former student activists such as Marsilam...
Simandjuntak, Bondan Gunawan, Arief Budiman, Rahman Tolleng and T. Mulya Lubis.

36 FPKR (Forum Pemurnian Kedaulatan Rakyat, Forum for the Cleansing of the People’s Sovereignty) established in 1991 by Lieutenant General H.R. Dharsono, the former leader of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), namely, Abdul Madjid and the Islamic leader Deliar Noer.

37 For more details on the number of labour strikes and their analysis, see Rinakit (1999: 139).

38 In September 1989, returning home from a trip to New York and Moscow, Soeharto had already said the same statement, ‘I am willing to be replaced constitutionally, but I will gebuk anyone who tries to remove me unconstitutionally, including any generals’ (Kompas, 14 September 1989). The aim of his statement was to warn Petisi 50, who steadily criticized his leadership.

39 The number of victims of ‘Peduli’ (Peristiwa Duapuluh Tujuh Juli, 27 July Affair) was still controversial, until now. Minister of Security and Defence claimed that 5 people were killed during the affair, while the National Human Rights Commission claimed 23 people missing. However, there was a rumour spreading among the people that around 100 people were killed during that time.

40 In the same vein, see the comments of General Soemitro and M. Yusuf on Dwifungsi, as quoted by Notosusanto (1991: 321–322).

41 Among others, they are Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah and Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro. Discussions with the author (the specific place, date and the affiliation of the interviewees is similar as stated in another part of this book).

42 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).

43 According to Crouch (1988: 27), for instance, the contradiction between the civilian leaders and the military in deciding the political measures was determined by the gap in their different socio-economic background.

44 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 24 June 1999).

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48 Discussion with Rufinus Lahur of CSIS (Jakarta, 29 September 1999). Also, interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 24 June 1999). For further discussions on the inner and outer circles of Soeharto, see Jenkins (1984).

49 As noted by Professor Sadli, former Minister of Mines and Energy, Soeharto’s children, in fact, were involved in business since 1985 (D & R, 19 July 1999; Tempo, 16 June 2002). They treated Pertamina like a cash cow. In other words, the money to develop their business empire came from Pertamina.

50 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

51 They are Dr Widjojo Nitisastro, Dr Mohammad Sadli, Dr Ali Wardana, Dr Subroto, and Dr Emil Salim. Some names are noted as newcomers in this camp, namely Radius Prawiro, JB. Sumarlin and Adrianus Mooy. These people had been ministers in strategic departments. They were well known as the Berkeley Mafia since they had graduated from the University of California Berkeley (Thee, 2002: 196).

52 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 24 June 1999).

53 These included Brigadier General Djuhartono, Imam Pratignyo (NU) and J.K. Tumaka (PNI), see Bhakti (1999b: 128).

54 These seven federations were KOSGORO (Mas Isman), SORSI (Suhardiman), MKGR (Sugandhi), HANKAM (Gatot Suwignyo), Professional (Gondohutomo), GAKARI (Jamin Ginting) and Gerakan Pembangunan (Sumiskun, a civilian), see Bhakti (1999b: 131).

55 Discussion with Rufinus Lahur of CSIS (Jakarta, 21 September 1999). For comparison, see interview in D & R with Hadi Soesastro (DR, weekly magazine, 19–24 July 1999).

56 Interviews with Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani, Chief of Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Jakarta, 18 August 1999) and Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).

57 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 24 June 1999).

58 For more discussions on the conflict between Ali Moertopo and Soemitro, see Cahyono (1996).
For more discussions on the emergence of the state secretariat as a political power, see Pangaribuan (1996).

Interview with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces School of Command (Bandung, 23 August 1999). Also see Tapol Bulletin No. 152 (1999: 14).

Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999). Also see Tapol Bulletin, No. 152 (1999: 14).

The rivalry between Faisal Tanjung and Hendroprijono led to the raid on PDI headquarters on 27 July 1996. Tanjung supported Soerjadi, former PDI chairman, to take over the party from Megawati Soekarnoputri, who gained popular support and was elected as the new chairman on June 1996. In Tanjung’s view (of course in Soeharto’s view too), Megawati was seen as a threat to the continuation of the regime. Any movement supporting her therefore must be wiped out. In contrast, Hendroprijono was seen to be behind Megawati’s victory in seizing a top position in the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). He allowed the students and activists to give speeches at PDI headquarters. Tanjung was unhappy with such a situation. He sent preman to ransack PDI headquarters. By and large, the rivalry between Faisal Tanjung and Hendroprijono reflected the split between the militant Islam and Merah Putih. The former (Faisal Tanjung’s camp) had close associated with ICMI, while the latter (Hendropijono’s camp) did not. For more details about this subject, for instance, see Kingsbury (1998: 224–225), O’Rourke (2002: 9–11), Tapol Bulletin No. 152 (1999: 14).

Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 24 June 1999).

For more details on the decrees see Indonesian Corruption Watch (1998).

Interviews with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).

This refers to the President Abdurrahman Wahid era, discussed in Chapter 4.

This likewise refers to the early months of the Abdurrahman presidency and is discussed in Chapter 4.

This refers to the President Megawati era. This is discussed in Chapter 5.
Towards the New Paradigm

WITH ABRI A POLITICAL TOOL OF SOEHARTO from the late 1980s, its image depended greatly on his reputation. The loss of Soeharto’s legitimacy after the economic crisis hit Indonesia had an automatically negative effect on the military’s image. When the people, particularly the students and the activists, blamed Soeharto for the country’s ills, much of the blame also fell on the military. The dominant role of the military collapsed once Soeharto stepped down. This chapter discusses the factors contributing to the fall of Soeharto and the consequences faced by the military following his downfall, particularly in relation to the emerging demands of the people for reform of its dominant role in socio-political affairs. It also examines the anti-Habibie and anti-Dwifungsi movements, as well as the New Paradigm of ABRI.

Unlike other arguments which stress the role of the students (Bhakti, et al., 1999a) and the conspiracy theory (Singh, 2000) as the main factors determining Soeharto’s downfall, this chapter examines other factors that contributed to his fall. These are divided into two categories, namely, the contributing and triggering factors. The latter comprises only one factor, namely, the resignation of 14 ministers, led by Minister of State for Development Planning, Ginandjar Kartasasmita. Among the contributing factors were the international actors (particularly the IMF and United States), the student and opposition movements, the elite conspiracy and intra-military politics. The latter reflected the institutional crisis of the military and receives more attention in discussing the fall of Soeharto. Since the split within the military took place when
the crisis hit the country, it was seen as the root cause of the regime’s weakness. Together with the military’s financial mismanagement and its inability to control its rank-and-file soldiers, the split undermined the military’s capacity to defend itself against the anti-Dwifungsi movement. In order to cope with the people’s demand to abandon Dwifungsi, the military introduced a new paradigm that would reduce its dominant role in socio-political affairs, the so-called internal reforms of the military. Unfortunately, these reforms are often seen as half-hearted.

THE FALL OF SOEHARTO
In Soeharto’s view, his resignation was forced by two factors. First, he indicated that the IMF formula for economic reforms, which was renewed and signed by him on 15 January 1998, was part of a larger US agenda to unseat him. In his view, the IMF’s reform prescription, especially its suggestions to increase prices for fuel, electricity and rice, was only a trap. Such policies made the people suffer more and undermined his legitimacy in their eyes as the father of development. His conviction of their trap was supported by other facts, such as the appeal by Michael Camdessus’s (managing director of the IMF) for him to resign, the postponement of the loan clearance by IMF and the pressure exerted by every US official whom he met – Walter Mondale (former vice-president and ambassador to Japan), Lawrence H. Summers (deputy treasury secretary) and William S. Cohen (defence secretary) all asked him to resign. In order to counter their plan to victimize him, Soeharto hesitated to implement the IMF’s recommendations and considered adopting the policy of a currency board. His plan, however, was rejected by other countries. In telephone calls to Soeharto, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan, for instance, emphasized the importance of conforming to IMF norms. In addition, President Bill Clinton also telephoned him twice a week to dissuade him from committing to the currency board idea.

Second, he did not want to see more students die in demonstrations demanding his resignation. As supreme commander at
that time, Soeharto had the right to declare martial law and take whatever actions needed to defend his presidential position. In fact, he planned to declare it and re-establish KOPKAMTIB (Komando Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban, the Operations Command to Restore Order and Security). He offered Wiranto and Soebagio command of the KOPKAMTIB but. Both declined the offer (Tajuk, 4 March 1999; Jakarta Post, 5 March 1999; Republika, 22 January 2000). Meanwhile, since he saw himself as the one who had insisted on compulsory education for children under 15 years old in order to upgrade the quality of human resources in the country, he was very sad when the students criticized him severely. In his view, it was because his development policy was on the right track that more children could have higher education. The students, however, did not appreciate his efforts. This saddened Soeharto. To avoid further bloodshed, therefore, he decided to resign.

Soeharto’s statements that his resignation was determined by only foreign pressures (particularly the IMF and US) and his willingness to step down are too simplistic. Agreeing with his personal account of his resignation, therefore, will only lead us to ignore the complex factors that forced him to resign, such as the student and opposition movements, the elite conspiracy and intra-military politics. Moreover, his statement not to step down until 2003 and his proposal on 19 May 1998 to establish a Reform Council in order to prepare for a smooth transition of power showed that, in fact, he was not willing to step down.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
As mentioned by Soeharto earlier, it is true that external factors, particularly the role of the US and IMF, contributed to his downfall. Ignoring these international actors will lead us to obscure their significant role in accelerating the regime’s decay (Tajuk, 23 July 1998). However, it is debatable whether the IMF intentionally prescribed the wrong medicine in order to bring about a regime change, or rather that it chose the wrong prescription because of its lack of expertise on Indonesia (Bresnan, 1999: 88). In any case, ultimately the IMF formula hastened the fall of the
Soeharto regime not least because it bogged down the system in the country.

The situation was further aggravated by Washington's reluctance to act in containing the financial crisis despite its commitment to promoting democratization and encouraging a market-based economy in Indonesia. It appeared that the US was more keen to protect the interests of American companies operating in Indonesia. Washington wanted the proper functioning of an economic system in Indonesia based on transparency and efficiency principles. Such a system not only facilitated maximization of profits from the lowest operational costs, but also opened up opportunities to purchase the profitable state enterprises. In this instance, Soeharto was seen as an obstacle to the realization of their market-based economic agenda. His determination to protect his family and cronies who conducted their businesses through monopolies hampered the process of economic liberalization. Soeharto needed to be removed at all costs.

Foot-dragging by the US and IMF led to a worsening of the Indonesian condition. This was aggravated by other factors, such as the inherently unstable international financial market and a subdued regional economic environment. Japan, the dominant economy in East Asia and a very generous aid donor, was in big trouble. Several of its banks were teetering on the brink of insolvency. Such a situation, however, did not hamper Japan from supporting Indonesia provided its support was within the IMF framework. The IMF finally moved to assist the Republic by providing a big US$ 43 billion package whose clearance would be decided by the IMF based on its evaluation on the seriousness of government actions in implementing the IMF's recommendations. Unfortunately, its pre-crisis advice was not sufficiently focused on the core issues of financial and macroeconomic management, but was too generalized in its approach and addressed such non-core issues as trade reforms and state-sanctioned preferential trading and licensing privileges. As such, its assistance 'did not produce any immediate economic improvement' (Suryadinata, 1999: 113).
Until the third signing of the agreement between the IMF and the Indonesian government on 10 April 1998, a total of 117 policy commitments were endorsed (Hill, 1999: 80). These related to fiscal policy (17), monetary and banking policy (17), bank restructuring (24), foreign trade (16), investment and deregulation (15), privatization (13), the social safety net (2), environment (6) and others (7). The government, however, was not serious in implementing the IMF recommendations. Soeharto even reserved IMF funds for distribution to his cronies only. Mainly these were used to clear debts, part of such funds going to bail out the Andromeda Bank, owned by his son’s Bambang Trihatmojo. In short, ‘KKN’ – the rampant practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism continued unabated, bringing Indonesia to the brink of economic collapse. The government could thus no longer continue as usual.

THE STUDENTS AND OPPOSITION

_Hanya ada satu kata: lawan_, literally means ‘there is only one word: fight’. These famous words from a poem by Widji Thukul were borrowed by the students to arouse feelings of unity and courage among themselves when facing the troops during demonstrations. Thukul was a critical young poet and activist of the People’s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Democratic, PRD). His poem inspired the students not to give up until Soeharto stepped down. The action of borrowing from this poem led the government to accuse the student movement of being communist. In the military’s perception, whoever associated with the PRD was considered communist. This perception originally came from Soeharto, who mentioned that the student movement was influenced by two groups of socialists, namely PRD and PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party). In his view, they were using students in order to make a comeback in politics, as during the Soekarno era. Since, by nature, students tend to be open-minded and secular, they were easier to be influenced. Meanwhile, the government found it difficult to control academic activities within university campuses since there was privilege of academic freedom there.
There is no evidence that socialists used the student movement when it rocked Indonesia. The role of the PRD or other social groups within society was no more than a sharing of their frustration against the Soeharto government. In their view, the failure of the government to solve economic problems was not due to its inability in formulating solutions. Rather, it was caused by its reluctance to implement the economic recovery agenda. This government attitude increased the people’s disappointment, which had its origin before the reform movement occurred. What the people wished for most was a new political atmosphere in general and a new president in particular. The steep increase in prices for staple goods after the economic crisis reached Indonesia in July 1997 strengthened their perception that the country needed structural changes in its political system.

The regime, however, was too confident and ignored rising popular sentiments. This was confirmed by the re-election of Soeharto for his seventh term on 10 March 1998. Earlier, in December 1997, the results of a poll conducted by the students of Gadjah Mada University showed that 83 per cent of respondents did not want Soeharto to be re-elected. This poll was soon followed by those of other universities, all overwhelmingly rejecting Soeharto. However, the ruling elite ignored the message from the findings of the poll questioning Soeharto’s legitimacy as president. Rather, they insisted on his candidacy.

Realizing that the government had spurned their aspirations for political change through peaceful and democratic means, the students finally decided to take to the streets. The MPR session of 2–11 March 1998 was the moment used by the students to show their disappointment with the regime. Most of the big cities in Indonesia, such as Medan, Padang, Lampung, Ujung Pandang, Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Solo, Surahaya and Denpasar, were rocked by student protests. However, their demonstrations lacked nationwide coordination. Students from different universities formed umbrella organizations limited only to their own city or province. There was no central leadership.
Responding to the protest movement, General Wiranto, Commander in Chief cum Minister of Defence and Security, tried to persuade the students to give up holding demonstrations in the streets. In order to avoid unexpected situations such as riots, he said, the military would allow them to hold demonstrations, but only on campus. He also proposed a national dialogue with the students to discuss steps for an agenda of reform (Forum Keadilan, 20 April 1998). Unfortunately, the students were reluctant to accept his proposal. They suspected that the military would manipulate the meetings in order to fulfill their own interests. Besides, the students also realized that their lack of nationwide coordination would make them vulnerable to divide-and-rule tactics. Hence, Wiranto's proposal could be considered as part of the military’s efforts to weaken the student movement by preventing it from any possibility of unification.

Wiranto’s efforts failed as the students intensified their demonstrations soon after Soeharto unveiled his new cabinet on 14 March 1998, only four days after he was sworn in as President. The appointment of his cronies to ministerships increased the students’ disappointment with the regime. As noted by Liddle (1999:25), however, at 76 years of age, Soeharto had no choice but to depend on his family members and cronies, which was why he had appointed them as ministers.

Learning from previous demonstrations, which lacked nationwide coordination, the students tried to network at the national level. In order to intensify their pressure on the regime, they coordinated their moves and raised similar issues and grievances on a nationwide basis. By consensus, they finally agreed to put Turunkan Harga (interpreted literally to mean ‘lower prices’ or as an acronym for Turunkan Harto dan Keluarga, Bring Down Suharto and His Family) as their central demand followed by other sensitive issues, such as political reform and an end to ‘KKN’ (corruption, collusion and nepotism). The package was also known as Reformasi Total (Total Reform). This movement, particularly the demand for Soeharto’s resignation, became more strident after four students from Trisakti University – namely, Hery Hartanto, Elang
Mulyalesmana, Hafidin Royan and Hendriawan Lesmana, an Indonesian Chinese (peranakan) – were shot dead by security forces.\textsuperscript{11}

However, it was only in theory that the students were united. In practice, they were divided into three groups: radical, moderate and conservative (or status quo) (see Table 3). Each group had its own interpretation of \textit{Turunkan Harga}, an end to KKN and political reform issues. The strongly radical elements\textsuperscript{12} favoured confronting the security forces and mobilizing the non-student masses in order to intensify their struggle. In their view, \textit{Turunkan Harto dan Keluarga} meant not only overthrowing the existing socio-political system, but also installing a new system. Relating to the KKN issue, they demanded that whoever was involved in KKN must be put on trial and their businesses taken over by the state. For political reforms, their demand focused not only on changes to the five political regulations often seen as part of Soeharto’s political tool to control political activities of the people,\textsuperscript{13} but also the revision of the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945).

The other groups, the so-called moderate elements,\textsuperscript{14} stressed the need for the student movement to maintain its ‘purity’: the movement must be peaceful, less violent and have no popular mass gatherings. Like their counterparts from the radical camp, the moderate group also demanded \textit{Turunkan Harto dan Keluarga}. However, they preferred to improve or reform the present system and power structure rather than to overthrow the existing socio-political system and set up a new one. Relating to the KKN issue, meanwhile they demanded that whoever was involved in corruption, collusion and nepotism must be put on trial. Their companies however should be allowed to operate as usual. Hence, the government should not take over the companies involved in KKN, as demanded by the radical group, but only supervise them. Like the radical elements, the moderate group also demanded changes to the five political regulations and revision of the 1945 Constitution.

Besides these two groups, there was another one, namely, the conservative or the so-called status quo groups.\textsuperscript{15} For the conservatives, Soeharto and his cronies were not the primary concern. From the beginning, they had claimed that their movement was
Table 3: Divisions within the student movement, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radical Groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Kota (FORKOT, City Forum):</td>
<td>Institut Sains dan Teknik National (ISTN, National Technological and Sciences Institute, Jakarta), Universitas Kristen Indonesia (UKI, Indonesian Christian University, Jakarta), Sahid University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (FKSMJ, Jakarta Forum of Student Union Communication):</td>
<td>Dokter Mustopo Beragama University, Mercu Buana University, Tujuh Belas Agustus University, Pembangunan Nasional University (USNI), Satyanegara Indonesia University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Jakarta: (Jakarta Front):</td>
<td>Jakarta University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Bersama (FORBES, Union Forum):</td>
<td>National University, Trisakti University, Parahiyangan University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi (FAMRED, Student Forum for Democracy and Reform):</td>
<td>Pancasila University, Atma Jaya University, STF Driyarkara, Perguruan YAI, IAIN Ciputat, Gunadarma University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderate Groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Moslem Indonesia (KAMMI, The Action Forum of Indonesian Moslem Students)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Mahasiswa Indonesia (FORMA Indonesia, Indonesian Students Forum), Jakarta: University of Indonesia (UI), Sekolah Tinggi Akuntansi Negara (STAN), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Mahasiswa Indonesia (FORMA Indonesia, Indonesian Students Forum), Yogyakarta-Semarang: Gadjah Mada University, IKIP Yogyakarta, IKIP Semarang, Diponegoro University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Mahasiswa Indonesia (FORMA Indonesia, Indonesian Student Forum), outer Java: University of Sumatra Utara (USU- Medan), Sriwijaya University (UNSRI-Palembang), Syiah Kuala University Aceh.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM, Muhammadiyah Students Associations) consists of 27 universities under Muhammadiyah Foundation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
aimed at preventing any possibility of a revival of communism in Indonesia. Studying the issues they raised and the people they targeted, it seemed that this group could be linked to, if not used by, Soeharto and his cronies. Sofyan Wanandi and Arifin Panigoro, among others, became their targets. Both were known as government critics in the late Soeharto era (Tajuk, 1–23 July 1998). Accusing Wanandi of financing the PRD and Panigoro of financing the student movements to create a scenario to topple Soeharto, the conservaties wanted to show that the movement led by the radical and moderate student groups was not independent but rather infiltrated by the others, the so-called socialist elements. Such efforts, however, failed to convince people that the student movement was riddled with socialists. They also failed to undercut the radical and moderate groups’ movements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Groups</td>
<td>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Islamic Student Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forum Mahasiswa Rawamangun (FOMARA-Jakarta): IKIP Jakarta, Sekolah Tinggi Economii Indonesia (STEI), and STIE Labora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Groups</td>
<td>Himpunan Mahasiswa Moslem Antar Kampus (HAMMAS, Inter-Campus Moslem Students Association): Ibnun Chaldun University, Jakarta Islamic University (UIJ), Bekasi Islamic University, University of HAMKA, Indonesian Islamic University (UII-Jakarta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forum Umat Islam Penegak Keadilan dan Konstitusi (FURKON, Islamic Forum of Upholder Constitution and Peace): youth masjid elements, youth Islamic movements, Habaibs, and other youth Islamic movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Islamic Students): Islamic Senior High School, particularly Assyafiah and Al-Azhar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Observations by author during the 1998 student movement.
It was true that the student demonstrations were supported by the other groups within society, particularly academics, businessmen, NGOs, journalists, politicians and even retired military officers. However, it is hard to tell whether they were socialist, nationalist or Islamic. They simply opposed the Soeharto regime, whatever their beliefs. Bolstered by the 19 researchers from LIPI who stated their concern for the uncertain prospects of the nation on 20 January 1998, opposition elements began initiating their own manoeuvres. Soon after their statement, the alumni of Bandung Technological Institute, or the so-called ‘Kelompok 234’ (234 Group), held a demonstration at Taman Ismail Marzuki on 10 February 1998. It was followed by the Alumni Association of the University of Indonesia (ILUNI-UI), which held its meeting at Salemba campus on 25 February 1998. Meanwhile both alumni from Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta) and Airlangga University (Surabaya), also held separate but similar gatherings on 23 February 1998 and 28 February 1998 respectively (Bhakti, et al., 1999a: 90–91). In general, they demanded the resignation of Soeharto. Asserting that the national disaster being faced by the nation reflected the failure of national leadership, they argued that leadership change would be the only way to solve the problem. Besides, they also claimed that the economic policies of the Soeharto regime digressed from the national economic strategies as mandated by UUD 1945.

Meanwhile, the other opposition elements within society, particularly NGO activists, religious leaders, politicians and journalists established the People’s Mandate Council (Majelis Amanat Rakyat, MARA). Since its chairman, Amien Rais, was vocal in criticizing the regime and demanding total reform, MARA became popular among the students. Although Abdurrahman Wahid of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Megawati Soekarnoputri of PDI-Struggle refused to join MARA, this had little negative affect on MARA’s image. MARA was still highly accepted by the students because of its members, such as Rizal Ramli, Albert Hasibuan, Goenawan Mohamad, Toety Heraty Noerhadi, Daniel Sparingga and Arifin Panigoro, all of whom had consistently demanded Soeharto’s
resignation. Following MARA, two other opposition groups were also established, namely, Gema Madani led by Prof. Dr Emil Salim and Barisan Nasional (BERNAS, National Front) led by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Kemal Idris. In contrast to Gema Madani, whose membership was dominated by academics, BERNAS was dominated by retired military generals. Unlike MARA and Gema Madani, moreover, BERNAS in fact not only supported the students but also mobilized the people to join the student demonstrations. This action was believed to be supported by ALDERA (Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat, People’s Democratic Alliance) and AKRAB (Aksi Rakyat Bersatu, People’s Joint Action), the loyalist supporters of Megawati Sukarnoputri in PDI-Struggle.

The emergence of the opposition and students’ movement out of the so-called urban middle class in the late Soeharto era is interesting because they did almost nothing during New Order era; the government faced few significant challenges from them for much of the New Order period. Steady economic growth had anaesthetized them, making them withdraw from active political life. Moreover, as noted by Anderson (Tempo, 16 January 2000), the Indonesian middle class, particularly those living in Jakarta, had become a week group that had no spirit and no clear way of thinking. Since the Malari Affair of 1974 and NKK/BKK Affair of 1978,17 this week movement became just visible when three magazines, Tempo, Detik and Editor, were banned in 1994 and when Megawati Soekarnoputri was toppled as the chairman of PDI-Struggle in 1996. However, as these cases did not represent the whole urban middle class interest, middle class support for the movement was also limited. The contrary situation happened when the financial crisis assailed Indonesia in 1997. As it affected the lifestyles and aspirations of the whole urban middle class, they finally took to the streets to hold demonstrations.

In the beginning, it seemed that the student demonstrations did not solely represent the people’s grievances, but their own interests. This can be identified by one of the placards they held during a demonstration at Trisakti University. It demanded: Turunkan Harga Fotocopi dan Parfum! (Reduce the Price of Photocopying and Perfume!)
Towards the New Paradigm

When the situation became critical, however, the students played down their own interests to act as a catalyst of the people’s struggle. When people were suffering as the impact of the crisis deepened, they went to the streets to express public dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, the exposed cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism by the media and the abduction of the activists by the military made the students even more angry with the government.

The support of the media in particular and other opposition groups in general greatly encouraged the student movements, making it difficult for the regime to break them. Instead of breaking its opponents, the regime lost its own legitimacy as a successful body capable of maintaining political stability. For the military, meanwhile, the bravery of the students to hold demonstrations in the streets dented its image as the stabilizer of the nation. However, the opposition’s support for the students could not be considered as unreserved support, since they already had been hostile towards Soeharto. Barisan Nasional, Gema Madani, Majelis Amanat Rakyat and other opposition journalists and activists had been his economic and political victims. This was due to the economic and political policies of the New Order, which had principally benefited the Soeharto family, its cronies and loyalists. Generally the spread of economic and political surpluses had only been distributed among Soeharto’s inner circles.

In the business field, Soeharto’s family and cronies not only monopolized the prime sectors, such as cement, wheat flour and toll collections on highways, but also had seized the small- and medium-scale industries such as beauty parlors and cassava crackers. They also controlled the media sectors, especially television, radio and magazines (Aditjondro, 1999). Their business empire was nurtured with the help of foreign investors though its capital originally came from the government. There was an acronym taken from the nickname of Soeharto’s eldest daughter, Tutut: Tanda Usaha Tanpa Untung Terus (get profits without doing anything). In order to smoothen the bureaucratic process and the safety of their business operations, they brought bureaucrats and military officials into
their companies. Since their networking was deeply rooted within the government institutions, they became the government itself. Therefore, the New Order government was often seen as a complex alliance embracing foreign and Chinese bourgeoisie, the middle class (the urban technocrat/administrative/managerial class) and the politico-bureaucrats (Robison, 1986; 1990; Macintyre, 1990). They were not only a comprador class that became the extended hand of foreign investors, but also one which exploited national resources. Besides, they were also known as the rent-generating government.20 The government took effective measures to block the business operations of the critics of Soeharto, including cancelling their company licenses and having banks withdraw their lines of credit.

Meanwhile, promotion to high-ranking positions within the military and bureaucracy was solely dependent on Soeharto’s blessing. The same case also prevailed for the political parties and other major institutions. It was thus understandable that the opposition rejoiced at his fall since they were virtually excluded from the benefits of these economic and political decisions. Mobilizing the urban poor to join the student demonstrations was one of their moves in making the deteriorating political situation even worse for Soeharto. However, the key moment came after four students at Trisakti University were shot dead by security officers. This shooting ignited the students’ wrath that finally led them to occupy the DPR/MPR building. Many believed that the Pancasila faction within the military (Wiranto’s camp) was behind the occupation of the DPR/MPR building by the students. According to Wirahadikusumah, however, it was not Wiranto who made the decision to ‘allow’ the students to enter the DPR/MPR compound. Who decided it, among others, was Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah himself and Major General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. After they made the decision, they reported to Wiranto. Their goals to support the students were at least two-fold, namely, to intensify the pressure on Soeharto to resign and to create conflict between Prabowo and the president since he failed to prevent the students from entering the DPR/MPR building.21 In short, behind the victory of the students
TOWARDS THE NEW PARADIGM

to enter the DPR/MPR building, in fact, was the rivalry between
the Taliban and Pancasila camps.

Furthermore, the student shootings also triggered full-scale
rioting and looting in most cities in Indonesia, particularly Jakarta,
Solo, Surabaya and Medan on 13–14 May 1998. The prime targets
were Indonesian Chinese and their businesses, which to many were
the most obvious symbols of Soeharto’s cronyism and corruption.
The violence claimed 1,300 lives and more than 5,000 buildings
were torched during the two-day riots. One week after the chaos,
Soeharto finally resigned, despite a presidency supported by the
three political pillars, the bureaucracy, the dominant political party
(Golkar) and the military. It cannot be denied that the students and
other opposition forces played a significant role in toppling Soeharto;
they became one of the factors for his resignation.

THE ELITE CONSPIRACY

As mentioned earlier, the students and other opposition forces
were not the sole factors that influenced Soeharto’s downfall. This
can be identified by Soeharto’s comment, which stated, ‘Kalau
sekarang ini revolusi, Tirto ‘tak jedher dhisik!’ (If now is revolution, I
shoot Tirto first!). Such a comment indicated that there was
something wrong with the political elite at that time. Presumably,
they had conspired to unseat Soeharto. This has been confirmed
by Singh’s study (2000: 110–137), which argues that the political
elite conspiracy also played its contributing role in influencing
Soeharto’s resignation. This is related to the fact that Soeharto, in
the eyes of the people, became the symbol of KKN, the status quo
(since he has been too long in power), man-made disasters (since
the government had failed to solve the economic crisis) and
sinking loyalty of his supporters. This can be seen from the
unexpected demand for his resignation raised by his loyalists, such
as Harmoko and Abdul Gafur – something unimaginable before.
After the people, particularly the students and the opposition,
began considering Soeharto as their common enemy, it seems his
protégés started looking for their own safety and betrayed their
patron.
Moreover, Soeharto’s ‘last resort’, ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Moslem Indonesia, the Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals’ Association), also betrayed him. This had been established after he began doubting the military’s loyalty from 1990 onward. On 6 May, 1998, the ICMI executive chairman, Achmad Tirtosudiro, seconded by its secretary general, Adi Sasono, said that the cabinet needed to be reshuffled and the extraordinary session of the MPR should continue (Eklöf, 1999: 181). Besides, they also asserted that only a government free from KKN would have the commitment to implement political reforms. That is a polite Javanese euphemism. What they actually wanted to say was that Soeharto must resign. In Javanese political culture, what they had done was tantamount to an insult, which angered Soeharto, particularly concerning Achmad Tirtosudiro.

As noted by Eklöf (1999: 181), however, Vice-President B.J. Habibie, as the former chairman of ICMI, tried to distance himself from the political statements of ICMI leaders. He said that there was no need for a cabinet reshuffle or for an extraordinary MPR session. He also said, that ICMI should not involve itself with political matters (Kompas, 7 May 1999; Suara Pembaruan, 9 May 1999).

At a casual glance, the contradictory statements between Habibie and the ICMI leaders indicate that they were no longer in the same camp since their words against each other. However, on closer examination can be seen that this was actually a camouflage in order to conceal ICMI’s intention to seize power. Through such a well-orchestrated move they could reaffirm and consolidate their existing political power by identifying groups supporting the populist symbol (Achmad Tirtosudiro-Adi Sasono), the status quo (Habibie) or were against both of them. Such planning was not only useful in assessing their opponents’ power but also in recruiting new supporters, particularly from outside the ICMI, as well as in making political manoeuvres for seizing economic and political resources. Such a move enabled ICMI to maximize its resources in an attempt at widening its popular support base since, compared to the other political forces, such as the military, PDI Megawati (later PDI-Struggle) and the traditional Islamic group (Nahdlatul Ulama, NU), which had comparatively larger resources, ICMI was considered
small. In fact, its organization was not at all deeply rooted nationwide.

The idea that the right time had come for Indonesia to be governed by civilians attracted academics, politicians and activists in the late Soeharto era. It became the national political discourse. Since the idea attracted people, ICMI used it as part of its strategy to gain popular support, particularly from the academics and activists. They held some closed-door discussions on that issue. Meanwhile, former student leaders, such as Nurcholish Madjid and Fahmi Idris, who were feeling guilty for their unreserved support of Soeharto and complete trust in the military to control the Republic since 1966, also initiated intensive meetings, particularly at Malik Fadjar’s house in 14 Indramayu Street, Central Jakarta. One meeting was attended by the other leaders, such as Amien Rais, Akbar Tanjung, Utomo Danandjaja, Soegeng Sarjadi, Emha Ainun Nadjib and Adi Sasono. Though most of them were ICMI members, their presence at Malik Fajar’s house was in other capacities, for instance as members of KAHMI (Keluarga Alumni Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Alumni of the Indonesian Islamic Students Association). In other words, their colour was KAHMI rather than ICMI.

Meanwhile, to gauge the people’s reaction in demands for Soeharto to resign, they organized meetings and seminars. Their seminar at Wisata Hotel on 17 May 1998, attended by many NGOs, was the most important forum in that a memorandum calling on Soeharto to step down was drafted. Interestingly, Madjid handed a copy of this memorandum to the military when they invited him to discuss the current situation at its headquarters. It also asked Sa’adilah Mursyid, the state secretary, to hand another copy of the memorandum to Soeharto. In response to KAHMI’s manoeuvre, ICMI leaders, particularly Adi Sasono and his lieutenants, tried to take advantage of it by claiming that they were behind the political manoeuvres to oust Soeharto. They also claimed that the student demonstrations were mobilized by them.25

Benefiting from the uncertain situation at that time, many people believed their claim, including Harmoko and Syarwan Hamid, the
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of DPR/MPR respectively, as well as Soeharto. To frighten Harmoko and Hamid by telling them that they would be finished off by popular wrath if they did not help him bring Soeharto down, Sasono succeeded in influencing them to call a press conference calling for Soeharto’s resignation on 18 June 1998 (Singh, 1999b: 125). This movement, meanwhile, was interpreted by Soeharto as a result of the ICMI memorandum to topple him. In his view, however, it was not Sasono who drafted the ICMI memorandum but Achmad Tirtosudiro. Soeharto said only someone more powerful and experienced than Sasono would be able to convince Prabowo Soebianto and B.J. Habibie that the right time had come to cease being loyal to him. This person also plotted the conspiratorial role of Habibie and ICMI by contradicting their denial of there being any need to reshuffle the cabinet and call on extraordinary MPR session. Given such measures, it was easier to identify their friends and enemies.

It seems that Soeharto himself did not know that ICMI was no more than behaving opportunistically at that time. His absence from the country for a week, from 9 May 1998 when he was attending the Group of 15 Summit in Egypt, perhaps made him no longer as well informed on the current political situation. Soeharto did not suspect that the real powers behind such political manoeuvres were in fact some of the KAHMI members. Its members, especially those from the ‘66 generation, planned their moves from 14 Indramayu Street. Through its ‘activists’, such as Malik Fadjar, Amien Rais, Fahmi Idris, Akbar Tanjung and Nurcholish Madjid, among others, KAHMI convinced B.J. Habibie and the military that political reforms had to take place. Besides, they also persuaded Habibie to be ready to take over the presidency when the time came.

In order to increase their pressure on Soeharto, meanwhile, the 14 cabinet ministers led by Ginandjar Kartasasmita, most of whom were KAHMI members, resigned from their ministerial posts. (Interestingly, whether by accident or design, the number of ministers who resigned from their posts matched the street number of Malik Fadjar’s house — their command post — namely, number 14). The student movements successfully paved the way for them to carry out
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their manoeuvres unimpeded, including drafting the memorandum for Soeharto’s resignation. However, their efforts would have been unsuccessful without the support and bravery of Saa’dilah Mursyid, the state secretary, who handed the memorandum to Soeharto and suggested that he resign since there were only two persons (Soeharto and himself) left in the government.

Studying the KAHMI movement, which was coordinated by the ’66 generation, it seems that economic and political reasons motivated their action. Although Madjid mentioned many times that their movement owed a debt of responsibility to the people, since they had given a ‘blank cheque’ to Soeharto to govern Indonesia after they had toppled Soekarno in 1966, their movement had been used by Soeharto to assume dictatorial powers and to accumulate immense wealth for his family and cronies. Madjid himself, perhaps, had been motivated to seek revenge for Soeharto’s wrongdoing in the past. What he wanted was to take the ‘cheque’ back. For his friends, in contrast, their enthusiasm in toppling Soeharto was motivated by economic and political reasons. It was their only chance (if they wanted it) to seize power and gain economic benefits. Otherwise, other political powers, especially PDI Megawati (PDI Struggle) and the military (ABRI) would beat them to it. In the political culture perspective, the competition between them reflected the constant struggle between Pancasila and Political Islam in Indonesian politics. As former activists of an Islamic student association, which tended to represent political Islam, KAHMI did not want to lose out to the other streams (aliran). Therefore, in order to avoid being marginalized (as Islam had been) role during the New Order era, they had to pre-empt PDI-Struggle and ABRI in grabbing power, since both parties represented abangan or the so-called Pancasila aliran.

Intra-Military Politics

The last factor that contributed to the fall of Soeharto was intra-military politics, the so-called split within the military. Compared to the first two factors, intra-military politics probably contributed most in influencing his downfall. Could the students and other
opposition forces have occupied the DPR/MPR building without support from certain elements in the military? Would the conspiracy theory work have continued unimpeded if the military had been united? The answer is no. With regard to the students and opposition movements, for instance, they tried for a couple of days to penetrate the military barricade in order to enter the compound of the DPR/MPR building, but failed. Therefore, they were surprised when many soldiers, not wearing their uniforms, suddenly appeared in the lobby of the DPR/MPR building and sang patriotic songs on 18 May 1998. They also shouted *Turunkan Soeharto* (Down with Soeharto) and *'Gedung Ini Milik Rakyat'* (This building is owned by the people). Interestingly, the security officers who usually maintained tight security in guarding the building suddenly relaxed their guard and allowed the students to enter the building. This could only have occurred if the military had not been disunited. Evidence attesting to this was that no conspirators were arrested by the security officers although their manoeuvres, such as drafting the memorandum for Soeharto’s resignation, were open and blatant.

However, it would be misleading if a split within the military is seen as the dominating factor in determining Soeharto’s downfall. Like the others, it was only a contributing factor. Besides, the split was not a new phenomenon in Indonesian politics. It had happened previously, indeed right since the military organization was established. The rivalry between the former soldiers of KNIL and PETA complicated Indonesian politics during the Old Order era (1945–66). In terms of causation, however, there is a basic difference between the split within the military during the Old Order and New Order eras. In the Old Order era, the split was natural since it was related to the historical background of the soldiers (KNIL vs PETA). In contrast, during the New Order era it was engineered by Soeharto in order to maintain his power. He created at least four conflicts among the military elite during his presidential tenure, namely, the conflict of Soemitro versus Ali Moertopo (1970s), Soedarmono versus Benny Moerdani (1980s), Faisal Tanjung versus Hendroprijono (1990s) and Wiranto versus
Prabowo Soebianto in the twilight of his power. Unfortunately, each of these clashes was always marked by riots where the people suffered. These were Malari (1974), Tanjung Priok (1984), the 27 July Affair (1996) and 13–15 May riots (1998).

Although most politicians in the world in some circumstances implement divide-and-rule politics, Soeharto’s political behaviour of divide and rule appears to be unique. For Soeharto, divide and rule politics has been thoroughly inculcated in his blood. As a Javanese, he comprehends fully the Javanese philosophy that is based on the Javanese written characters, Hanacaraka. He mentioned many times that the young generation needed to learn the philosophy of the Javanese characters.31 The characters, which consist of 20 letters, have the meaning: ha na ca ra ka (there are two commanders), da ta sa wa la (they fight), pa dha ja ya nya (they are equally powerful), ma ga ba tha nga (they die together).

In Javanese belief, the Hanacaraka characters were created by a hermit, Aji Saka.32 When there was turmoil in the ancient kingdom he and his disciple, who both had supernatural powers, decided to travel to the capital of the kingdom. Before leaving, Aji Saka asked another disciple to guard and hide his dagger he knew that the king had announced that whoever would restore peace in the kingdom could succeed him as a king. Knowing this, he decided to participate in the ‘competition’. However, he suspected that his accompanying disciple also coveted the position. Therefore, he deliberately asked his companion to collect his dagger from the hermit’s abode. The other disciple who guarded the dagger, however, would not pass it to him since his master had instructed him that only he himself could take the dagger. Finally, in order to carry out their duty Aji Saka’s two disciples fought each other. Since they were equally powerful, they died together. Aji Saka finally succeeded in restoring the peace and became king without having to worry about a threat from below.

The moral of this story is that someone must create two balancing and powerful camps and plot to make them fight each other. The plotter will then emerge to pick up the spoils after they have destroyed each other. In Javanese political culture, there is no good
or evil way to seize power, whether based on legitimate or illegitimate sources, and it is without inherent moral implications as such (Anderson, 1990: 23). As a Javanese, Soeharto felt that it was perfectly legitimate to employ divide-and-rule politics in governing Indonesia.

However, divide-and-rule politics in the Hanacaraka style is not, in fact, the perfect tool in political strategy. This was demonstrated by Soeharto’s failure to maintaining the conflict structure he had created. Differences and poor intelligence then became the decisive factors of his failure. Soeharto’s fall was also determined by the absence of political generals with whom he could share his problems as in the past, since most of them had passed away. To overcome this complication, he constantly replaced ABRI’s Chief of Socio-Political Affairs of ABRI in order to find a smart young general. These were Harsudiono Hartas (6.5 months), Hariyoto PS (8 months), M. Ma’ruf (7 months), Hartono (13 months), Syarwan Hamid (11 months), Yunus Yosfiah (4 months) and Susilo Bam-bang Yudhoyono (6 months). In his view, however, none of them was good enough to be his partner because their political instincts were poorer compared to those of his generation.

In contrast to the first two decades of his presidency when he was supported by his political general friends, in the last decade of his government Soeharto was surrounded by politically inexperienced generals, the so-called technical generals. They were his former adjutants who spent most of their early military career based at Jalan Cendana (Soeharto’s longtime home). Such a promotion system, which ignored the meritocracy within the military since it depended highly on Soeharto’s blessing, made the split within the military more serious, especially during the last decade of his administration. The split that initially divided the former adjutant and non-adjutant camps (i.e., during the Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudrajat era) then spread into the Islamic and Pancasila camps when General Faisal Tanjung was promoted to be the Commander in Chief. This situation was triggered by Soeharto’s political manoeuvre when he started to court political Islam in 1990. His doubts concerning the capability and loyalty of the younger
military generation forced him into this move. In the past decades, in contrast, he was against political Islam. Even in the selection of cadets for the military academy, any religious fanaticism was stamped out. It meant that a candidate who was a religious fanatic, especially Moslem, would not be accepted.

The selection of Magelang as a training ground for the cadets was expected to influence their mind-set and behaviour to become Javanese aristocrats, since the place was considered the centre of Javanese culture (Britton, 1996: 203–207). Indeed, Soeharto did not introduce this anti-Islamic attitude. Military leaders from the past generation had done the same thing. They believed more in Wedatama, a Javanese spiritual book written by Mangkunegoro IV (1851–81), than the Islamic teaching practised by the pious Moslems or the so-called kaum, which they had been obliged to follow (Britton, 1996: 160). In Vlekke’s view, the anti-Islamic attitude of the elite was already evident from the seventeenth century, when King Amangkurat I ruled the Mataram kingdom of Yogyakarta (Vlekke, 1959: 175). At that time, there was a regulation that only non-Moslems were permitted to become the kingdom’s soldiers. From the aristocrats’s view, Islam was seen as a threat. They suspected its followers would rebel and seize power.

However, the banishment of Islam from power ended when Soeharto started looking for its support. This evoked an Islamic euphoria, particularly after ICMI was established in 1990. Since Soeharto was behind the establishment, many officers, especially those who had close relationships with the ICMI’s leaders, started to be smitten by the euphoria of Islamic revivalism. Suddenly, they preferred to be admitted as the ‘santri general’. As mentioned by Nasution (Gatra, 30 January 1999), the term ‘ABRI Hijau’ and ‘ABRI Merah Putih’ spread from that time. In general, the ‘ABRI Hijau’ or the so-called ‘Taliban’ was more powerful compared to the ‘ABRI Merah Putih’ or the so-called ‘Pancasila’, since Prabowo Soebianto, Soeharto’s son-in-law, showed his interest in the former. Included within the ‘Taliban’ were Faisal Tanjung, R. Hartono, Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, Kivlan Zain, Z.A. Maulani, Subagio HS, Fachrul Rozi, Zaki Anwar Makarim and Djoko Subroto. Meanwhile, Wiranto,
A.M. Hendropriyono, Agum Gumelar, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Farid Zainuddin were the patrons of ‘Pancasila’ (Kingsbury, 1998: 230–232). For Soeharto, from the end of the 1980s, when he became uncertain of the military’s support and loyalty, there was no choice for him but to depend more on his close kindred, such as Prabowo, and his Islamic general friends. Such a situation enabled their military careers to skyrocket, especially Prabowo. Within one year, for instance, he was promoted twice as Major General (as commander of KOPASSUS, the special forces command) and second to Lieutenant General (commander of KOSTRAD, the army strategic and reserve command).

The split between the ‘Taliban’ and ‘Pancasila’ camps intensified day by day (Tapol Bulletin, March 1999). This was understandable since both parties competed for top political positions and control of economic resources owned by the military. In order to win the competition, the two opposing factions expanded their networks and membership. They even recruited their new members as early as when they were in the military academy and other advanced military training institutions, such as the Army’s Command School (SESKOAD) and the Armed Forces’s Command School (SESKO ABRI). Their target, of course, was the cadet with the best-ranking results (the best ten cadets). In contrast to the past, the split within the military in the last year of Soeharto’s rule was very serious. The economic crisis followed by the political crisis intensified their rivalry. This rendered the system ineffective. As a result, Soeharto who first had lost his legitimacy as Bapak Pembangunan because he failed to resolve the economic crisis, now lost his power base and finally had to resign.

The factionalism within the military body weakened its structure since the organization was split right down the middle from the centre (military headquarters) to the district (district military command). This also made it more difficult for the military to control its rank-and-file soldiers. Any officer who was promoted to a new position would bring in his staff members to replace the old ones, who were suspected to be loyalists of the previous commander. When Faisal Tanjung was promoted to Commander in Chief, for
instance, officers who were suspected of being Moerdani’s men were removed (de-Benny-isasi) and replaced by his own loyalists. One of his loyalists was Soebagio HS, who was appointed as commander of Diponegoro regional military command. Soon after occupying his new post, he replaced most of the commanders at the sub-regional and the district military commands under his territory with his loyalists. The same measure would also be applied by commanders from the opposing camp when they were promoted to new posts.

Such a situation was influenced by the length of the commander’s tenure, which was, by and large, very short. This reflected that the military indeed was suffering an institutional crisis. It could not control its soldiers. For the regional military commanders, for instance, their mean tenure was 600 days (20 months) only. Meanwhile, the mean tenure for the district and sub-regional military commanders was 700 days (23 months) and 600 days (20 months) respectively (see Table 4). According to Kammen and Chandra (1999), the commanders’ short tenure was influenced by the number of AKABRI alumni. In the early years of the 1970s, the academy had an average of 397 cadets who graduated per year.

In their view, the large number of alumni forced the military headquarters to shorten the tenure period of the officers in order to give others a chance. Studying the process of promotion, which was very competitive (Figure 3), however, it seems that the patronage factor was more significant in determining the short tenure of the officers compared to the number of AKABRI alumni factor, as argued by Kammen and Chandra. It means that the alumni were aware from the beginning that it was difficult to reach the high-ranking posts since they numbered in the hundreds. Therefore, the patron-client relationship with their seniors became the determinant in their career prospects. In other words, the phenomenon of the officers’ short tenure in the last decade of the Soeharto government was determined more by the varied careers of their patrons than by the number of AKABRI alumni. This, again, reflected the institutional crisis within the military body since the promotion system was not applied in the right way.
Indeed, the short tenure of the officers weakened the military structure. This made the officers incapable of understanding comprehensively the real problems in the field. The situation, moreover, was worsened by their eagerness to eliminate their opponents from another military camp. As a consequence, they panicked when events such as the riots and the student movements occurred in their territory. At the same time, they hesitated to take firm action against the demonstrators since they suspected that another military camp was behind the movement. This was exactly what happened in the late Soeharto era.

### Table 4: Mean tenure for commanders, 1990–1998

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**Notes:**
(a) 9 Regional Military Commanders (Major General). After the re-establishment of Pattimura Military Command in 1999 the number of commanders became 10 persons.
(b) 39 Sub-District Military Commanders (Colonel).
(c) 280 (approximately) District Military Commanders (Lieutenant Colonel).
(d) 128 Battalion Commanders (Major and Lieutenant Colonel).

Meanwhile, Prabowo’s meteoric rise to the rank of lieutenant general displeased many officers, especially his former classmates of 1973–74, since most of them – except Major General Sjafriz Sjamsuddin and Lieutenant General Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Jakarta Military Commander and the Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs of ABRI respectively – were still ranked as lieutenant colonel or colonel at that time.36 Besides, his rapid promotion also went against the principle of promotion on merit within the military. This created the emergence of ‘heartbreak’ officers who finally banded together under Wiranto’s leadership. Fortunately, they also received moral support from their seniors, such as Rudini, Bambang Triantoro, Try Sutrisno, Edi Sudrajat and Benny Moerdani, who were all worried about the Islamization process occurring within the military body. For Wiranto, who was promoted to Commander in Chief on 16 February 1999, Prabowo was a real threat since he was the son-in-law of the Supreme Commander, Soeharto. According to Djojohadikusumo (Tempo, 14 May 2000), Wiranto’s fear could be understood since he was not only weak in character but also in intellectual capacity. In his view, therefore, what Wiranto had to do was to eliminate his rivals.

However, the rivalry between the two camps did not surface in public in the beginning, particularly because they always refused to confirm when asked about their split. When the critical situation happened, however, their rivalry became obvious since both of them manoeuvred to eliminate the opposing camp in order to seize the economic and political resources. The kidnapping of activists prior to the General Session of the Assembly (SU MPR, 1–11 March 1998), the Trisakti student shootings (12 May 1998) and the May riots (13–15 May 1998) constituted part of their manoeuvres.37 The confusion surrounding the story of the affairs indicated that both camps had set up traps to make scapegoats of their rival. Relating to the student demonstrations, meanwhile, Prabowo’s camp was suspected of being behind the troops who blocked the students from entering the DPR/MPR building. The anger of his sisters-in-law, Tutut and Mamik, at him as he failed to prevent the students from entering the DPR/MPR building
Figure 3: Assignment and Promotion patterns within the military. Source: Kammen and Chandra (1999: 59).
Notes: The figures under each rank indicate the total number of positions within the Army of that rank. Arrows indicate the most likely career moves from one rank and/or position to the next.
TOWARDS THE NEW PARADIGM

(Djojohadikusumo, 2000: 427), was proof of Prabowo’s involvement in igniting the student demonstrations.

In order to counter Prabowo’s movement, Wiranto’s camp applied the opposing strategy. Secretly, they placed soldiers within the DPR/MPR building. They not only sang patriotic songs within the DPR/MPR courtyard but also echoed the demand for Soeharto’s resignation. Moreover, they also opened the DPR/MPR gate in order to allow the students to enter. It seems that the Jakarta Garrison commander, Major General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, did nothing to block the students from entering the DPR/MPR compound. In line with this, he argued that he had to few troops to ‘save’ the DPR/MPR building since they had to be deployed in other strategic areas, like the government buildings and foreign embassies. In short, the split between the two camps enabled the students to occupy the DPR/MPR building. This moment was seen by Soeharto as the sign that the military was no longer behind him.

THE RESIGNATION OF MINISTERS

Considering the critical situation after the May riots and the occupation of the DPR/MPR building by the students, Soeharto called Nurcholish Madjid to his residence at Jalan Cendana on 18 May 1998 to discuss the reform movement. Madjid convinced him that what the students meant by reform was his resignation. In order to get a better picture of the situation, Madjid suggested to Soeharto that he call together a meeting of national figures. Soeharto agreed but under one condition, namely, that he himself would select them. On 19 May 1999, therefore, Soeharto met them in the palace. They were Abdurrahman Wahid, Ahmad Bagja, Ahmad Soemargono, KH Ali Yafie, Emha Ainun Nadjib, KH. Kholil Baidlawi, KH. Makruf Amin, Malik Fadjar, Nurcholish Madjid and Yusril Ihza Mahendra (Al Zastrow Ng, 1999: 36).

Except for Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the figures were all national Islamic leaders. The event, therefore, was known as the meeting between Soeharto and the nine saints or the so-called *walisongo*. In the political culture perspective, the meeting was important for him since he not only received the input from *walisongo* but he
could also look to manipulate the meeting to regain his legitimacy. His ability to call the Islamic leaders was expected to influence the popular perception that *Wahyu* (mandate/power) was still in his hand. However, since the *walisongos* rejected his offer to become members of the Reform Council being prepared by him – the same response also given by the other leaders, such as Megawati Soekarnoputri, Ichlasul Amal, Liliek Hendrajaya and Anas Urbaningrum – Soeharto finally realized that his time was over. His legitimacy had been shattered.

The rejection of the *walisongos* and the other leaders validated previous evidence and erased initial doubts about there being no security restrictions for the students to enter the DPR/MPR building and ICMI’s success in bringing Prabowo and Habibie on board. Habibie’s bravery in telling Soeharto on the afternoon of 19 May 1998 that people accepted him (Habibie) more had disappointed the latter. Therefore, when his 14 key ministers resigned and refused to be reappointed to the Reform Cabinet being prepared by him, Soeharto realized that he was left alone (Suryadinata, 1999: 115). This finally triggered his decision to resign. These 14 ministers were: Ginandjar Kartasasmita, A.M. Hendropriyono, Akbar Tanjung, Sumahadi, Rachmad Bambang Sumadhijo, Tanri Abeng, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Theo Sambuaga, Subiakto Tjakrawardaya, Justika Baharsjah, Giri Suseno, Haryanto Dhanutirta, Rahardi Ramelan and Sanyoto Sastrowardojo.

THE ANTI-HABIBIE MOVEMENT

After receiving the resignation letter from the ministers on 20 May 1998, Soeharto decided to become a Wise Man (*madeg pandhita*). The ministers’ press conference led by Ginandjar Kartasasmita and Akbar Tanjung, which was televised nationwide, placed his decision to resign on a solid footing. Together with his decision to step down, he prepared a decree authorizing Wiranto to implement the Assembly decision (*Keputusan MPR*) No. 5/MPR/1998 on Martial Law. It meant that Soeharto had chosen Wiranto as his successor. Wiranto, however, refused to declare martial law although many officers, including Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, supported...
him. In Soeharto’s eyes, Wiranto was a coward since he refused to use his authority. Therefore, there was no choice for Soeharto but to transfer the presidential position to Habibie on 21 May 1998. However, the appointment of Habibie as the new President and Wiranto’s statement on the military protection for the former president and his family, received a negative response from the students and activists. This ignited the demonstrations again, with Habibie and the military as their new targets.

The anti-Habibie movement emerged because the new president was considered to be one of Soeharto’s cronies. He stated proudly on some occasions that Soeharto was his political mentor. Besides, the transfer of power from Soeharto to him was seen as unconstitutional by the students and his political opponents since it was not conducted in the DPR/MPR building, and not with Soeharto’s accountability speech. The students, therefore, did not acknowledge Habibie as President and demanded that executive power pass to reformist leaders. The main duty of this transitional government would be to prepare for free and fair elections to elect a new government. The students also demanded an extraordinary session of the MPR (SI MPR) to ask the former President Soeharto to account for his actions.

When Habibie and his new government, as well as Golkar and the military, responded enthusiastically to the students’ demand for the extraordinary session, they realized that the session would not be used to ask for Soeharto’s accountability but to legitimize their new government. This could happen, since 75 per cent of the DPR/MPR members were Golkar representatives. Therefore, the students, particularly from FORKOT, FAMRED, FKSMJ and KM-ITB, shifted their demand to oppose an extraordinary session. To show their disagreement, they took to the streets again to demonstrate. Prior to the fall of Soeharto, these anti-Habibie demonstrations were also supported by other groups within society. They included Koalisi Nasional (National Coalition), Kelompok Pendukung Mega (The Group of Mega Supporters, kPM), Gerakan Rakyat Pro-Reformasi (Pro-Reform People’s Movement, GRPR), Komite Buruh Aksi Reformasi (Labour Committee for Reform Action,
THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AFTER THE NEW ORDER

KOBAR), Solideritas Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmers Solidarity, STI), Kaum Miskin Kota (Urban Poor People, KMK), Jaringan Kerja Keseniaan Rakyat (The Networking of People’s Arts, JAKKER), Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia (Centre of Indonesian Labour Struggle, PPBI), Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat (People’s Democratic Alliance, ALDERA), Serikat Tani Nelayan (Farmers and Fishermen Unions, STN), Institut Sosial Jakarta (Jakarta Social Institute, ISJ), Yayasan Geni Salatiga (Salatiga Geni Foundation), Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi Rakyat (Centre for Information and People’s Action Networking, PIJAR), Sekretariat Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia (Secretariat of Indonesian Forest Conservation, SKEPHI) and Pusat Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Centre of Indonesian Legal Aid, PBHI).

Since Habibie’s opponents, by and large, came from the nationalist camp, his supporters accused them of opposing Habibie because he was Moslem. This fact, again, reflected the constant struggle between the two streams in Indonesian politics, namely, Pancasila and political Islam. It was true that for his supporters, especially Furkon, HMI, KAMMI, HAMMAS and KISDI, Habibie was seen as the symbol of Islam (Ecip, 1999: 40). Soon after Soeharto transferred his power to Habibie, they tried to enter the DPR/MPR building with banners showing their support for Habibie. Their action, believed to be mobilized by ICMI, provoked the anger of the anti-Habibie camp. Fortunately, a clash between the two camps was prevented by the marines who were guarding the DPR/MPR building at that time. In fact, in terms of numbers, Habibie’s supporters were far fewer compared to the anti-Habibie camp, but they were prepared to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Islam (jihad) since they believed that Habibie was the symbol of Islam. Indeed, the small number of Habibie’s supporters who came to the DPR/MPR building (approximately 15,000 persons compared to more than 200,000 students from the anti-Habibie camp) refuted ICMI’s claim that it had mobilized the students’ demonstrations to topple Soeharto.

In order to change his opponents’ perception of him, Habibie implemented popular policies. In the economic field, the govern-
ment immediately named those businessmen who were accused of embezzling money from the state, like William Soerjadi and Hendra Rahardja of Summa Bank and BHS Bank respectively. The government also refunded the credit for farmers and small-scale industries (Kredit Usaha Kecil/Kredit Usaha Tani, KUK/KUT) that was stopped during the crisis. In the political field, he permitted the establishment of new political parties, the implementation of free and fair elections and the referendum for East Timor, the release of political prisoners and the dismissal of the DPR/MPR members who had gained their positions because of family ties (see Table 5).

In the field of law, he promised to bring to justice the actors and the mastermind behind the Trisakti student shootings and the kidnapping of the activists. Acceding to Soeharto’s request, Habibie had Prabowo discharged from his strategic position as PANGKOSTRAD (Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command). In the field of human rights, he established the National Committee for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and the Joint Team for Fact Finding (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta, TGPF) of the May riots. In order to place his popular policies on a solid footing, furthermore, he had 17 draft regulations submitted to the parliament.

Meanwhile, in order to get further support from the military, which was dominated by Wiranto’s camp after it succeeded in eliminating Prabowo’s camp, Habibie tried to take Wiranto’s side by discrediting Prabowo. Explaining to his guests present during the opening ceremony of the Second Asia-Germany Editors Forum on 15 February 1999, he accused Prabowo of threatening him at midnight on 22 May 1998, one day after Soeharto handed over power to him. This happened because he refused Prabowo’s demand to promote him to the position of Chief of Army Staff (KASAD) and appointing Lieutenant General Soebagio HS as the Commander in Chief.

Habibie’s efforts to win popular support turned out to be ineffective. His opponents still considered him an illegitimate president. Therefore, the wave of student demonstrations opposing his leadership never subsided. Moreover, on 10 November 1998, the students
### Table 5: Nepotism within the DPR/MPR, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Former position</th>
<th>Member of DPR/MPR and relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soeharto</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>MPR, Siti Hardiyanti R. (daughter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Bambang Trihatmodjo (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Halimah T. (daughter-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Siti Hediati H.P. (daughter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Hutomo Mandala Putra (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; H. Probosutedjo (step brother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Sudwikatmono (cousin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; H. Sukamdani G.S. (cousin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Wismoyo A. (nephew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
<td>MPR, Rugaiya Usman Wiranto (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Amalia Sianti (daughter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmoko</td>
<td>Minister of Information</td>
<td>MPR, Sri Romadhuyati H. (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Adi Sutrisno (brother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginandjar K</td>
<td>Coordinating Minister for Economics and Finance</td>
<td>DPR, Gunarijah K. (sister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Agus G.K. (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Sukanda K. (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MPR, Gumiwang K. (brother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alip Pandoyo</td>
<td>Chairman of Golkar (C. Java)</td>
<td>DPR, Liliek H. (daughter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogie S.M</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
<td>DPR, Anwar A. (brother-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Emmy Sariamah (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Enny Busyiri (sister-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Tuti Hayati A. (sister-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisal Tanjung</td>
<td>Coord’g Min. for Politics and Security</td>
<td>DPR, Masrowida Faisal T. (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try Sytrisno</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>MPR, Isfan Fajar Satryo (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soedarmono</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>MPR, Tantyo Adj S. (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan B.D.</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>MPR, Zuraida Hasan Basri D. (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syarwan H</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
<td>MPR, Endang Agustini (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Gafur</td>
<td>Minister of Youth and Sports</td>
<td>MPR, Kemala Gafur (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd. Sayoeti</td>
<td>Gov. of Jambi</td>
<td>DPR, Fach. Razy (brother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MPR, Lily Abdurrahman (wife)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Nepotism within the DPR/MPR, 1998 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Former position</th>
<th>Member of DPR/MPR and relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ary Mardjono</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>MPR Sri Fatimah Mardjono (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arief K.</td>
<td>Chief of Navy</td>
<td>MPR Sri Widyawati A.K. (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singgih</td>
<td>Attorney Gen.</td>
<td>MPR Rennie Singgih (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangindaan</td>
<td>Gov. of North Sulawesi</td>
<td>DPR Evert E.M. (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MPR Adelina Mangindaan (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Hartono</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
<td>MPR Oetari Hartono (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Sarwoko S. (nephew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartarto</td>
<td>Coord’g Min. for Supervision of Devpt</td>
<td>MPR Hartini Hartarto (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardans</td>
<td>Gov. of East Kalimantan</td>
<td>MPR Ayu Farida (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Aswin</td>
<td>Gov. of Riau</td>
<td>MPR Sri Kadarwati (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agum G</td>
<td>Gov. of the Institute of Nat. Defence</td>
<td>MPR Linda Agum Gumilar (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Baharsjah</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>MPR Justika Sjarifuddin B. (wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Moertopo</td>
<td>Minister of Information</td>
<td>MPR Ali Mursalam (brother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Harris Ali Moertö (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Iris Indira Murti (nephew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiyogo A.</td>
<td>Gov. of Jakarta</td>
<td>MPR Bambang Ananto W. (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mas Isman</td>
<td>Kosgoro Founding Father</td>
<td>MPR Hayani Isman (daughter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail H.M.</td>
<td>Vice-Chairman of DPR/MPR</td>
<td>MPR Nilman Jaya (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibnu Sutowo</td>
<td>Director of Pertamina</td>
<td>MPR Ponco Sutowo (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Adiguna Sutowo (son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erwan S.</td>
<td>Chairman Golkar</td>
<td>MPR Erie Sukardja (brother)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author.
brought together Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais and Sultan Hamengkuwono X of Yogyakarta at Ciganjur in order to show people that these leaders were more appropriate to be their leaders than Habibie. For the students, the four leaders were seen as the ‘real’ transitional government and not the Habibie government. These anti-Habibie student activities reached their peak during the extraordinary session of the MPR on 10–13 November 1998. To face this strong rejection, Habibie sought the help of the military and Islamic militias or the so-called Pam Swakarsa. This move led to a clash between the students and the military and Islamic militias.

During the two-hour clash between the two sides at Semanggi Bridge on 13 November 1998, the so-called First Semanggi affair, five students were shot dead by security forces. They were Bernadus Irmawan (of the Catholic University of Atmajaya), Teddy Mardani (Indonesian Institute of Technology), Sigit Prasetyo (Indonesian Administration Foundation, YAI), Muzamil Joko Purwanto (University of Indonesia) and Engkus (University of Jakarta). The decision of the extraordinary session of the MPR, which appointed Habibie as interim president, was received negatively by the students. They rejected the decision by continuing to demonstrate. During this early morning movement, Yap Yun Hap, a student of the University of Indonesia, was shot dead by the security forces. This affair was known as the Second Semanggi affair.

Indeed, the students’ deaths did not dampen the spirit of the anti-Habibie movement in the post-Semanggi affairs. In addition to the students, the academics also consistently criticized Habibie’s policies. By and large, they doubted his policies would work since he was one of Soeharto’s cronies (Noer, 1998). Regarding the investigation of the KKN cases, for instance, they were skeptical that Habibie would examine his former political mentor, Soeharto. Another group that also opposed Habibie strongly was the group of retired military officers who were banded together under the National Front. Represented by its five members, Kemal Idris, Ali Sadikin, Rudini, Hasan Habib and Bambang Triartoro, they met Wiranto in order to urge him to seize power from Habibie. How-
ever, in line with his refusal when Soeharto earlier authorized him to declare martial law, Wiranto also rejected their request (*The Straits Times*, February 11, 2000).

**ANTI-DWIFUNGSI MOVEMENT**

Wiranto’s refusal to declare martial law and stage a coup against Habibie was related to his awareness of popular opposition to the military. During the student protests, it seemed that people had shown that they were against the military. They not only criticized its moves severely, but also pelted military officers with stones and burnt their cars. This anti-military feeling had never happened in the past, contradicting the military’s long-held claim that they were the ‘sons of the people’. Besides, its motto – what is good is good for the military – was hardly credible. The burning of military symbols and cars by the people during the student demonstrations showed the strained relationship between the people and the military. In fact, what was good for the military was no longer good for the people. As a political tool of the government, the military had been obliged to follow any order given to it, inadvertently becoming the Trojan horse of the government. Where the military had originally subordinated its loyalty to P (Pancasila), U (UUD 1945, the 1945 Constitution, N (Negara Kesatuan, the Unitary State) and E (Eksekutif, President), it now became loyal to E (President) only. If Wiranto declared martial law and staged a coup, the assessment of many analysts was that civil war would break out, since a strong anti-military feeling was pervasive among the people. His careful attitude was believed to have been influenced by the views of reformist officers such as Susilo Bam-hang Yudhoyono, Agus Widjojo and Agus Wirahadikusumah, who banded under his *Merah Putih* camp.

In contrast to the army, the people welcomed the marines. In their view, the marines were not only professional but also understood their aspirations. They even protected the students when the latter were badly treated by the army and the police. According to Said (1999), the people’s acceptance of the marines related to the indirect relations between them and the people during the New Order government. The marines had never been involved in public
incidents, since Soeharto did not use them as his political tool. Also, unlike the army and police, the marines never hurt the people.

For the army and the police, it seemed their loyalty to E (President) was thoroughly inculcated. They assumed whoever opposed the government must be considered the enemy. Their treatment of the student demonstrations was similar to actions against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). The students were regarded as rebels; they were kicked, beaten and shot. To prevent students from entering the DPR/MPR building when the extraordinary session of the MPR was taking place on 10–13 November 1998, the police and military not only placed tanks around the building but also electrified the gates. Furthermore, they mobilized the pro-Habibie Islamic militias, Pam Swakarsa, to oppose the students. This effort shifted the conflict between the military versus the students to become one of militias versus students. In other words, the military created the horizontal conflicts between the students (anti-SI MPR camp) and militias (pro-SI MPR camp). Through this effort the military expected that the students would no longer focus their attention on its past wrongdoings.

However, the military’s efforts to shift the students’ attention failed. Together with the Koalisi National and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), the students, particularly from FORKOT, FAMRED, FKSMJ and KM-ITB, continued to criticize the military and demanded the abolition of Dwifungsi. The mobilization of Pam Swakarsa, which was planned to create the horizontal conflicts among the people, in fact had the opposite effect. It worsened the military’s image and criticism of it became stronger. Here, the critics intentionally revived the anti-Dwifungsi issue in order to generate anti-military sentiments.

At least three reasons were behind their critical attitude towards the military. First, they regarded the military as no longer an instrument of the state, but as a political tool of the government. Therefore, its behaviour led to the violence and crimes against humanity. Second, the military had restricted the right of speech for the people and controlled political parties and other institutions.
Third, the military had occupied most of the top civilian posts and divided the regional governments into three categories, namely, A (troubled areas), B (semi-troubled areas) and C (untroubled areas). These categorizations were useful to legitimize its role in occupying the strategic posts within the troubled and semi-troubled areas. Such a military attitude, however, finally led people to resent them. As noted by Wirahadikusumah, never before in the past had the military been labeled by the people as bandits. Therefore, it was understandable when Sundhaussen called such a development as the end of the dual function, or the so-called Sen-Dwyakalaning Dwifungsi (Forum Keadilan, 30 November 1998).

Indeed, the anti-Dwifungsi movement emerged along with the anti-Habibie movement. This was related to the fact that, after the fall of Soeharto, the students focused their demand on the three main issues: bring Soeharto to trial, reject Habibie and abolish Dwifungsi. Unfortunately, the three issues related directly to the military. Concerning Soeharto, for instance, Wiranto had promised that the military would protect the former President and his family. Where Habibie was concerned, the military had assumed that the transfer of power from Soeharto to Habibie was constitutional (Mabes ABRI, 1998: 1). Meanwhile the last issue, Dwifungsi, constituted the instrument of the military to gain socio-economic and political benefits. Therefore, it was difficult for the military to be objective in responding to the people’s demand for the abolition of Dwifungsi.

Interestingly, the military was placed in a tight spot in facing the anti-Dwifungsi movement. The socio-economic and political privileges received by it had influenced its lifestyle. As admitted by Wiranto (Media Indonesia, 9 February 1999), this made its senior military officers so comfortable that militarily neglected its main duty to safeguard the security of the country. When the anti-Dwifungsi movement attacked the military, it panicked. Soeharto’s strong control of the military had caused the latter to lack leadership. What the military could do finally was only to argue that if people really wanted the abolition of Dwifungsi as demanded by the anti-Dwifungsi movement, it had to be clear who they were
referring to (all Indonesian people or only the many students and politicians who claimed to represent the people). According to the military, there were still many people who wanted the continued practice of *Dwifungsi*.

**THE NEW PARADIGM OF THE MILITARY**

The military’s effort to twist the meaning of what they said was received passively by the students and other social groups within society. They constantly demanded the abolition of *Dwifungsi*, although the time frames they proposed were different. The first group, namely, the students, demanded the abolition of *Dwifungsi* immediately, while the second group, which consisted of political parties and interest groups within society, such as PDI-Struggle and Kelompok Ciganjur respectively, proposed a gradual abolition of *Dwifungsi*, namely, over six years. Although they contradicted each other in terms of time frames in the military’s eyes, these groups were considered to belong to the same camp since they had a similar demand, the abolition of *Dwifungsi*.

However, the split within the military in the early period of Habibie’s administrative government divided its attention in facing the anti-*Dwifungsi* movement. Although Prabowo had already been eliminated from the military, his loyalists were still powerful since they occupied strategic positions within the body of the military. Among them were Lieutenant General Soebagio HS (Chief of Army Staff), Lieutenant General Fachrul Rozy (Chief of General Staff of ABRI), Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani (Chief of National Intelligence Bureau) and Major General Zaky Anwar Makarim (Chief of Army Intelligence Bureau). Wiranto’s supporters moved to consolidate their power immediately in order to strengthen their grip within the military body. The first measure implemented by them was the formation of the Officer Honorary Council (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira, DKP) to investigate Prabowo’s involvement in kidnapping activists and igniting the May 1998 riots, as reported by the Joint Team for Fact Finding (TGPF). Ironically, the DKP was led by the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Soebagio HS, who was regarded as Prabowo’s close friend. It seemed
that the Merah Putih camp did it intentionally. This measure was
not only to test Soebagio’s loyalty to the commander in chief but more
importantly also to bring about a new conflict between Soebagio
and Prabowo. Another strategy of divide and rule within the military
was applied.

Soon after Prabowo’s testimony was heard and he was sacked
from the military, the Merah Putih camp transferred out the officers
suspected of being Prabowo’s men. They included 33 officers from
the Department of Security and Defence, 13 officers from Military
Headquarters, 25 officers from Army Headquarters, 10 officers from
Navy Headquarters, 4 officers from Air Force Headquarters and 12
officers from Police Headquarters (Kompas, 6 January 1999). Interest-
ingly, two officers close to Soeharto were appointed to strategic
positions during this reshuffle. They were Lieutenant General
Soegiono and Major General Tyasno Soedarto, who were promoted
from Vice-Chief of Army Staff (Wakasad) to Chief of General Staff
(Kasum) and from Diponegoro Territorial Commander to Chief of
Army Intelligence Bureau (BIA) respectively. This fact strengthened
the assumption that Soeharto’s influence within the military was
still strong. According to many observers, particularly Fatah and
Pabotinggi (Republika, 5 January 1999), the reshuffle not only reflected
Soeharto’s resilience but also the reaffirmation of ties between
Wiranto and Soeharto. Therefore, it was understandable when Time
magazine argued that although Habibie was president, the real force
behind the throne was actually the military (Time, 1 June 1998).

Following the consolidation of power by Wiranto’s supporters
and reshuffle that saw all senior military positions occupied by
Merah Putih members (Suara Pembaruan, 6 January 1999), the
military turned its attention to address the anti-Dwifungsi move-
ment. The military reformists, who conducted self-criticism and
promised to reform the military’s socio-political role after the fall
of Soeharto, took immediate measures to upgrade its public image.
They were aware that the implementation of Dwifungsi had over-
extended itself. In order to respond to the strong anti-Dwifungsi
demand, they introduced the new term Peran to replace Dwifungsi
and announced the new paradigm of the military’s socio-political
role on 5 October 1998. This new paradigm was explained in the military’s White Book, entitled *ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa*. According to Major General Djoko Besariman, Commander of the Army School Command (SESKOAD), however, the idea to reform ABRI had existed before the reform movement actually emerged. Since 1995, in fact, SESKOAD had studied the level of the people’s acceptance of *Dwifungsi*. The findings would be used to adjust the implementation of *Dwifungsi*. Since the reform movement took place, however, it was no longer relevant. They had no choice but to conduct the internal reforms as demanded by the people.

Studying the history of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) since their inception reveals that the military had changed the terms of its paradigm at least three times (Table 6). First was when Nasution proposed his Middle Way concept, which assigned the military not solely the security but also the socio-political role. This not only legitimized its intervention in civilian affairs but also replaced the previous term that was used by General Soedirman’s generation, namely, *People’s Army* paradigm. Second was when *Dwifungsi* shifted from the Middle Way paradigm during the Soeharto era. This enabled the military to intensify its control over society since it had a dominant role in socio-economic and political affairs. *Dwifungsi* replaced the interventionist role of the military with its control role. The final change was during the reform era when the Wiranto generation proposed the *New Paradigm of ABRI*, or so-called ‘internal reforms’ of the military. Since the military only changed the term, there was no substantial change to its self-perception. The military always considered itself as the people’s army, which had an inalienable right to maintain its dual-function role. This meant that whatever the name of its paradigm, the military would maintain its *Dwifungsi*, though its scope could not be as dominant when compared to the New Order era.

Since the security and defence role constitutes the main duty of the military, its internal reforms only covered the changes with regard to socio-political affairs. According to Widjojo and Maulani, at least three reasons had forced the Wiranto generation to
redefine its socio-political role. The first reason was related to the changing strategic environment on a global scale. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, democracy and human rights issues became the central issues of the global community. To cope with such changes, the military needed to redefine its socio-political role. Otherwise, Indonesia would be shut out of the global community and the international organizations would not support it if the country was faced with problems. Demilitarization was there-

### Table 6: Changing terms of the Military Paradigm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Self Perception</th>
<th>Basic Idea</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soedirman</td>
<td>TNI as revolutionary soldiers</td>
<td>TNI is the People’s Army</td>
<td>Territorial and fighter functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasution</td>
<td>TNI as revolutionary soldiers</td>
<td>Middle Way Concept</td>
<td>TNI has a social and security role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soeharto</td>
<td>ABRI as revolutionary soldiers</td>
<td>Dwi fungsi (based on Cadek II)</td>
<td>ABRI has a security and defence role and dominates socio-political affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>TNI as revolutionary soldiers</td>
<td>The New Paradigm</td>
<td>TNI has a security and defence role and has changed its socio-political role from: (a) control role to influence; (b) direct influence to indirect; (c) role sharing with civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
(a) *Prajurit dan Pejuang* (Notosusanto, 1991).
(c) *Catur Dharma Eka Karma II* (Second Army Seminar, 1966) *(Seskoad, 1967).*
(d) *TNI Abad XXI: Redefinis, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI* (Mabes, 1999).
The second reason was the keen rivalry between countries in the world along with the globalization process and free-market competition. Since the military organization could no longer cope with facing the new world development, it had no choice but to depend on the technical and managerial skills of civilian professionals. Therefore, it had to reposition its socio-political role.

The third reason was related to the increasing political awareness of the people. For the new generations, who were better educated and who never had experienced the historical events that legitimized Dwifungsi, the military’s involvement in socio-political affairs was considered to have exceeded its duty since it contravened democratic values. Therefore, people demanded that the socio-political role of the military be abolished.

Any sole focus on external pressures as factors that influenced the military to redefine its socio-political role ignores the complexity involving the repositioning of the military’s role. Internal factors within the military, particularly in relation to its institutional crisis, though fewer than the external factors, also significantly influenced Wiranto’s generation to redefine the military’s socio-political role. It seems that the institutional crisis handicapped the military’s ability to conduct its internal consolidation and to respond to the demand for a review of its role.

The first indicator of the military’s institutional crisis was the large number of 1970s military academy alumni. As mentioned earlier, the number of cadets graduating from the military academy averaged 397 cadets per annum in the 1970s. These numbers had become problematic for the Armed Forces Headquarters since the mid-1990s as the number of commander positions within the military was limited. As a consequence, the Headquarters faced difficulties in managing the promotion of officers. As a result, as shown in Table 4, every commander at KODAM, KOREM and KODIM only occupied his position for a short tenure.

The second indicator was the internal conflict within the military. The limitation of the commander posts and the large number of
military officers made the assignment and promotion patterns within the military much tighter (Figure 3). Not only did this situation mean that a commander might misunderstand the real problems in his territory, since his tenure was too short, but also it compounded the factionalism within the body of the military. The limited numbers of command positions fostered, if not created, factionalism among officers. Factions protected their interests but also they perpetuated patron–client relationships among them. Meanwhile, the splits within the military, though not new (as these had been there since the military’s inception) became the determining factor hindering the military in conducting its internal consolidation. The rivalry between the Prabowo and Wiranto camps made the military inept in responding to students and democratic activists’ grievances on the abolition of Dwifungsi.

The last indicator was the military’s financial mismanagement. The economic crisis that hit Indonesia from July 1997 harmed many financial resources of the military. This was not only because of the collapse of the Chinese-owned companies – these had underpinned the military’s finances based on an Ali–Baba (military–Chinese businessmen) relationship61 – but also the economic slowdown of its adversely affected the performance of the companies controlled by military foundations. As is widely known, the profit from these companies had been used by the military to cover 75 per cent of its total annual expenditure. Moreover, the financial management of these foundations was suspect. The case of the KOSTRAD foundation’s misused funds amounting to Rp. 173 billion (US$ 17.3 million), for instance, was one of the examples of mismanagement that contributed to the military’s financial mess.

As mentioned earlier, the combination of external and internal pressures forced the military to redefine its socio-political role. In line with this, they proposed the New Paradigm of ABRI. The concepts of this new paradigm are as follows (Mabes ABRI, 1999: 23–25):

1. Changing the method and position so as not to be in the forefront always. This meant that the pioneering and modeling role’s of the military in society, nation and state life, which were dominant in the past and objectively needed at
that time, were now given to the functional institutions. The role of these functional institutions would be defined by national agreement. As the revolution’s fighters, however, the military would always be prepared to do its duty within the continuum from peace to martial law.

(2) Changing the concept from its role of control to influence. This meant the socio-political role of the military, as part of its total role, was no longer to appoint the military personnel to civilian posts but rather to contribute to constructive thinking. This was evidence of the military’s responsibility to the nation.

(3) Changing the method from direct to indirect influence. Since the socio-political role of the military in the past had led to its involvement in day-to-day politics, the principle of indirect influence meant the military was to bestripped of its socio-political role in day-to-day politics. This needed to be implemented comprehensively by the components of the nation and the functional institutions.

(4) Role sharing with the other components of the nation. This meant that the socio-political role of the military should be integrated with the roles of all other parties in the integrated national system. Each component of the nation needed to be aware that, as a subsystem of the national structure, it had interdependent relationships.

On the conceptual level, it seems that all the officers agreed with the formulation of the military’s new paradigm as announced on the celebration of ABRI Day, 5 October 1998. In the implementation, however, when the reformist officers translated the paradigm into internal reforms of the military, friction among the officers occurred. These reforms included:

(a) separation of the police (POLRI) from the military body (ABRI);

(b) abolition of the Central Council of Socio-Political Affairs (WANSOSPOLSUS) and the Regional Council for Socio-Political Affairs (WANSOSPOLDA);
Towards the New Paradigm

(c) changing of the socio-political staff of ABRI into the territorial staff of the TNI;

(d) should be rewarded as follows; dissolution of ABRI’s non-military staff, namely of SYARWAN (the civilian staff), KAMTIBMAS (Peace and order in society), and BABINKAR (the civilian assignment council);

(e) abolition of the Social Political Staff of the Regional Military Command (KODAM), Sub-Regional Military Command (KOREM) and District Military Command (KODIM);

(f) abolition of the military officer’s secondment to civilian posts through retirement and change of status;

(g) reduction in the number of military representatives in parliament;

(h) non-involvement of the military in day-to-day politics;

(i) severance of the organizational relationship with Golkar and establishment of a proper distance with the other parties;

(j) neutrality of ABRI during elections;

(k) changing paradigm in ABRI and ABRI’s Big Family relationships; and

(l) revision of the military doctrines in order to adhere to the demand for reform and the new role of the military in the twenty-first century.

Studying the internal reforms of the military, it seems that certain points of the reforms had already been covered by the others. The dissolution of the civilian staff of ABRI (point d), for instance, in fact was only part of the abolition of the military’s assignment in civilian posts (point f). Therefore, the reforms could be compressed into seven points as follows:

(a) separation of the police (POLRI) from the military body (ABRI);

(b) abolition of the Central Council of Socio-Political Affairs (WANSOSPOLPUS) and the Regional Council for Socio-Political Affairs (WANSOSPOLDA);

(c) changing of the socio-political staff of ABRI into the territorial staff of the TNI (this covers the abolition of the
socio-political staff of the Regional Military Command (KODAM), the Sub-Regional Military Command (KOREM) and the District Military Command (KODIM);

(d) the abolition of the military’s assignment in civilian posts through retirement and change of status (this includes the dissolution of the non-military staff within ABRI, namely SYARWAN, KAMTIBMAS BABINKAR;

(e) reduction in the number of military representatives in parliament;

(f) non-involvement of the military in day-to-day politics (including severance of the organizational relationship with Golkar and establishing a proper distance with the other parties, the neutrality of ABRI within the election and the changing paradigm in ABRI and ABRI’s Big Family relationships;

(g) revision of the military doctrines in order to adhere to the demand for reform and the new role of the military in the twenty-first century.

The split between the officers became more serious once the interests of many senior officers were threatened by the implementation of the reforms. It seems that the variant theory of the iron law of oligarchy was applicable in this case. Hence, when all the officers became Merah Putih after Prabowo’s camp had been destroyed, the military returned to its natural condition of being split internally. The officers’ unity during the Taliban threat disappeared along with the destruction of their opponent.

In response to the implementation of the military’s new paradigm and its associated internal reforms, the military officers formed themselves into three groups, namely status quo, tactical and strategic groups. Since the tactical and strategic groups basically referred to the moderate and radical reformist officers respectively, this section employs these terms. As such, the Indonesian Armed Forces divided into three camps, namely, status quo (conservative), moderate reformist and radical reformist camps (Table 7).

The leading members of the status quo camp were those officers who were former Soeharto adjutants and who had close relation-
Table 7: Groups within the military and their leading members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Quo Group</th>
<th>Leading Members</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Wiranto</td>
<td>Former Commander in Chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Soegiono</td>
<td>Former Chief of General Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Tyasno Soedarto</td>
<td>Former Chief of Army Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman</td>
<td>Gov. of Military’s Command School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Djojoe Besariman</td>
<td>Wirabuana Military Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif</td>
<td>Governor of Military Academy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Sati Silalahi</td>
<td>Brawijaya Military Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Slamet Suprijadi</td>
<td>Former Silwangi Military Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Zainuri Hasyim</td>
<td>Siliwangi Military Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Sudrajat</td>
<td>Former Chief of Military Info. Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. S. Marasabessy</td>
<td>Former Chief of General Staff</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderates Group</th>
<th>Leading Members</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Widodo A.S.</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Susilo Bambang Y.</td>
<td>Former Chief of Staff, Territorial Cmd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Agus Widjojo</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of Territorial Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Djamari Chaniago</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Endriartono Sutarto</td>
<td>Chief of Army Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Arie J. Kuma’at</td>
<td>Chief of National Intelligence Bureau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Bibit Waluyo</td>
<td>Jakarta Military Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Kiki Syahnakri</td>
<td>Vice-Chief of Army Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Sumarsono</td>
<td>Diponegoro Military Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Slamet Kirbiantoro</td>
<td>Governor of Army’s Command School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Amirul Isnaeni</td>
<td>Commander of Military Special Forces</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radicals Group</th>
<th>Leading Members</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Agus WK</td>
<td>Former Cdr, Army Strategic Reserve Cmd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Ryamizard R.</td>
<td>Cdr, Army Strategic Reserve Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen. Ian Santosa P.</td>
<td>Former Air Force Chief of Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Saurip Kadi</td>
<td>‘Territorial Asst for Chief of Army Staff’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Graito Usodo</td>
<td>Chief of Military Information Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen. Djasri Marin</td>
<td>Former Military Police Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.Gen. Romulo R.S.</td>
<td>Former Chief of Staff, Jakarta Army Cmd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.Gen. Djoko Sumaryono</td>
<td>Assistant to Navy Chief of Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.Gen. Djoko Suyatno</td>
<td>Chief of Lanud Iswahyudi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.Gen. Herman Prayitno</td>
<td>Vice-Chief of Air Force School of Cmd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.Gen. Koesnadi Kardi</td>
<td>Director for Strategic and Operational Studies of the Military School Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Achmad Djmaiadi</td>
<td>Commander of Combat Training Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Agus Suyitno</td>
<td>Commander, 083 Subregion Military Cmd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ships with Cendana, such as Wiranto and Soegiono. In terms of their social background, they had no overseas university degrees or training and their family background was abangan, or weak Moslem, as Gaffir terms it (Gaffir 1992). They were also known as the pseudo-reformist camp since they considered the changing paradigm of the military as harmful to their interests. This means they paid only lip service to reform of the military at that time in order to undercut the anti-Dwifungsi movement.

The second was the moderate reformist camp, whose adherents included leading members like Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Agus Widjojo. By and large they had overseas degrees and training, they had enjoyed rapid military promotion although they were not former Soeharto adjutants and they, too, had an abangan (weak Moslem) family background. These officers agreed with the changing role of the military so long as reform was done in gradual stages. This camp was also known as the pragmatic group. This appellation was not only because their approach constituted a direct response to the people’s demand, but also because they often

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**Table 7: Groups within the military and their leading members (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Members</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col. Cornel Simbolon</td>
<td>Commander, 043 Subregion Military Cmd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Darmawan</td>
<td>Assistant for R&amp;D to Navy Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Lumban Sianipar</td>
<td>Military Attache, Hanoi, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Mulya Setiawan</td>
<td>Former staff, Dep of Security and Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Welly Soekatman</td>
<td>Chief of Logistics for the Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Yuktayana Tjitrwasita</td>
<td>Chief of R&amp;D for Socio-Political Affairs, Army School of Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Yussuf Solichien</td>
<td>Advisory staff for the Commander of West Combat Fleet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
(a) interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).
identified themselves with the formal policy of military headquarters. In short, the headquarters’ version on the implementation of the internal reforms of the military was formulated by them.

The last group was the radical reformist camp. The adherents of this camp included Agus Wirahadikusumah and Saurip Kadi. Since they comprised 20 officers, they were also known as the Group of 20. The first two camps, especially the status quo camp, considered the last camp as ill-bred officers. They not only wanted internal reforms implemented comprehensively and immediately but also criticized their colleagues who were not sincere in withdrawing from their dominant role in socio-political affairs. Therefore, they were also known as the ideal camp since they wanted the military to become professional and submit to civilian supremacy, as had been proposed so long ago by General Soedirman. In general, the social characteristics of this camp were that they had overseas degrees and training, their military career had progressed slowly (most of them were still at colonel rank) compared to the first two camps and, similar with the others, their family background was abangan or weak Moslem.

Comparing the three camps of officers, it seems that the split among them was not influenced by generational differences (class graduation from the military academy), the quality of AKABRI’s curriculum or their religious fidelity (all were abangan, or weak Moslem, after the Taliban camp had been eliminated). Rather, it was influenced by the social status of their family, their overseas training and education, and the speed of their military career. Except for Soegiono who was the son of the revolutionary hero Lieutenant General S. Parman, the rest of the patrons of the status quo camp, by and large, came from lower-middle income families. Soegiono’s conservative attitude, therefore, was most likely influenced by his position as a former adjutant to Soeharto. Given the background of the status quo camp (no overseas degree or training, close to the Soeharto family, skyrocketing career, lower-middle income family background), it could be understood that this camp tended to be close-minded compared with the last two camps. As high-ranking officers, moreover, they enjoyed privileges not accessible to
them in the past. In short, their hesitant attitude in the implementation of the reforms was determined by their fear of the loss of their privileges. Therefore, Simbolon has judged them as the generals who were weak in character.

In contrast to the first group, the last two groups, by and large, came from upper-middle income families. The patron of the moderate reformist camp, Agus Widjojo, for instance, was the son of the revolutionary hero Brigadier General Sutojo. Meanwhile, the patron of the radical reformist camp, Agus Wirahadikusumah, was the nephew of General Umar Wirahadikusumah, a former vice-president. Since their youth they had enjoyed a good life although they were not wealthy and perhaps had nothing to lose. Their top priority was no longer wealth but prestige. It could be understood, therefore, why their speedy promotion determined their radicalism. In other words, the better their career prospects, the lesser their reform attitude. This was because they wanted to maintain the prestige they had attained. Hence, it was understandable why the last camp tended to be radical. Since their military career prospects were not bright compared to the moderate camp, they sought upward mobility through other means, such as by giving support to any effort to uphold civilian supremacy, conducting self-criticisms and asking forgiveness from the people for the military’s wrongdoings in the past. These manoeuvres enabled them to get popular support from the people.

The status quo camp found the attitude of the moderate and radical camps, especially the last camp, irritating. The split among them started when the radical camp did not agree with the status quo’s attempt to include their own version of the military role into the white paper on ABRI. According to the radicals, the status quo officers reformulation of ABRI’s role was little more than a reiteration of Dwifungsi ABRI. Although they included their desire to support the democratization process in the country, it was no more than a cunning ruse to hide their real aim, that they wanted to maintain the military’s dominant role in socio-political affairs (Rakyat Merdeka, 29 July 1999). Their version of the role of ABRI was as follows (Mabes, 1999: 44):
(1) defending the state’s integrity and sovereignty from foreign threats;
(2) guarding against internal threat;
(3) supporting the development of the nation;
(4) supporting the process of democracy to ensure civilian rule as guided by Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution;
(5) participating in improving people’s prosperity;
(6) participating in peace-keeping forces in order to bring world peace into reality.

A study of these six points shows that they are consistent with the military’s perception of its Dwifungsi role as studied by Maynard (1976: 260). Referring to his study, it seems that points 1, 2 and 6 of ABRI’s new role fall in line with the military’s perception of its first role (security and defence). In other words, the three points were no more than the other formulations of the military’s perception of its security and defence role, which concerned military affairs, defending the nation, preventing disintegration, security, protection and discipline. Points 3, 4 and 5, meanwhile, are also compatible with his indicators on the socio-political role of ABRI that concerns civilian affairs, nation-building, seeking integration, prosperity, development and cooperation. This shows that this faction of the military was not serious in redefining its role (Suara Karya, 19 July 1999; Republika, 29 Juni 1999). Until a couple of months after the new paradigm was announced, the military only changed the name from its term of ABRI to TNI, and from Chief of Socio-Political Staff (KASOSPOL) to Chief of Territorial Staff (KASTER). This happened because most of the strategic positions within the military were held by the pro-status quo officers.

People who had listened to the military’s promise to change its dominant role, however, became impatient with its slowness in implementing internal reforms. This situation worsened as the military hesitated to support the investigations of several activities, the Trisakti student shootings and the May riots. It seemed that the military intentionally hid the true facts of the case from the public. This made it the subject of stronger critic-
ism from the people, particularly students, academics and activists. Interestingly, together with these incessant criticisms, many riots also took place, such as the shaman killings in Banyuwangi and the ethnic riots in Ambon. This situation became worse when the Habibie government stipulated many policies that were against military interests, such as the abolition of the military operation area (DOM) of Aceh, the referendum for East Timor and the agreement to investigate those military officers allegedly involved in crimes against humanity. These policies, which were aimed at winning over the civilians opposed to Habibie, in fact irritated the military. They aggravated the military’s already negative perception of Habibie since he had already interfered in the military’s affairs when he developed strategic industries opposed to its interests during the Soeharto era. As a consequence, not only did the riots escalate but the military also withdrew its support for Habibie.

Among Habibie’s policies that irritated the military, one of the most significant – and one that hardened the military’s determination to dump Habibie – was the referendum on East Timor. For the military, East Timor was everything, since it was part of the problem that could tarnish its image as a guardian of the nation. When the result of the ballot was ‘independence’ from the Republic, the military’s displeasure with Habibie was overwhelming. This is because for the first time in its history the military suffered a defeat; it had failed to defend the unity and integrity of the nation. The situation became even worse when many military officers, particularly those assigned to East Timor, were accused by the Human Rights Commission and other democratic activists of being involved in the commission of violence against humanity in the post-referendum period. When Habibie gave his accountability speech in the MPR Special Session in October 1999, the military and police representatives to the MPR (who tended to abstain from voting) followed most of their fellow MPR members in rejecting Habibie’s speech. In fact, the five retired generals, Ali Sadikin, Bambang Triantoro, Kemal Idris, Hasnan Habib and Rudini, had rejected Habibie far earlier. In order to show their resentment for him, they asked Wiranto to stage a coup against Habibie soon after
he was handed power from Soeharto. Such a fact became part of the evidence of the military’s resentment for Habibie.

Concerning the riots, most people believed that the military was responsible. Its aims were clear, namely, to remind the people that without the military’s presence there would be disorder. Moreover, the military also wished to maintain its socio-economic privileges. Given the chaotic situation, the military would have the excuse to maintain its dominant role. In order to understand fully its efforts, the military also proposed a draft on the regulation of Handling the Dangerous Situation (RUU PKB). By this regulation, the military not only had the power to control society but also the right to declare martial law. Given the military’s desire to maintain its dominant role, it could be understood why the military was hostile to people who demanded its return to the barracks. As mentioned by Lieutenant General Syamsir Siregar, there was no need for people to force the military to go back to its barracks, because, going by history, Indonesia would have disappeared without ABRI (Forum Keadilan, 1 October 2000).

NOTES
1 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).
2 So far, only Theo F. Toemion has stated clearly that the IMF intentionally wanted to topple the Soeharto government. For more detail about his comments on the IMF role in contributing to the government’s downfall, see Kompas (25 May 1998).
3 For more discussion on the causes of the crisis in Indonesia, see for instance Hill (1999: 47–83).
4 Most people, including academics, assume that the poem was written by W.S. Rendra, a prominent poet and performer, see, for instance, Singh (1999: 116).
5 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999). See also, Garda (15 February 1999).
6 Most of the restructuring programs conducted by the government excluded the companies of Soeharto’s family and cronies. The unexpected release of Andromeda Bank from the Banking Restructuring Programme, when the bank had already collapsed, for instance, constituted one such example.
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7 Following Wiranto’s statement that the student demonstrations were prohibited in the streets, the Jakarta Military Commander, Major General Syafrie Syamseddin, and the Jakarta Police Commander, Major General Hamami Nata, announced the same regulation for their territories (Bhakti, 1999a: 84).

8 The meeting was scheduled on 4 April 1998 but was cancelled since most of the invited students rejected the invitation. Finally, the dialogue took place on 18 April 1999. However, representatives of many of the leading universities were missing, among them the University of Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, Bandung Technological Institute and Indonesian Christian University, Bogor Institute of Agriculture and Airlangga University. The student activists who did not attend the meeting claimed that the participating delegates were not representative of the students and charged that many of them had been brought in from remote provinces.

9 Among the cronies who became ministers were Bob Hasan (Minister of Trade and Industry), his daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Minister of Social Affairs), General Hartono (Minister of Home Affairs), Theo Sambuaga (Minister of Labour), Agung Laksono (Minister of Youth and Sports), Fuad Bawazier (Minister of Finance), General Faisal Tanjung (Minister of Politics and Security) and General Wiranto (Minister of Defence and Security).

10 Most people assume that the students used the Internet or mobile-phones in coordinating their movement; in fact, they only used public telephones. One of the reasons behind using public phones was their suspicion that mobile-phones and the Internet were already tapped by the security forces.

11 For more details about the Trisakti Affair, see Forum Keadilan, 1 June 1998.

12 By and large, the radical groups were mainly comprised of the non-Moslem elements. They were either nationalist or socialist.

13 These political regulations are Regulation No.3/1975 on Political Parties and Golkar, Regulation No.2/1985 on the DPR/MPR Membership, Regulation No.3/1985 on Pancasila as the sole ideology, Regulation No.5 on Referendum, and Regulation No. 8/1985 on Election.

14 This group mainly came from the public universities. They consisted of Moslem and non-Moslem backgrounds.
15 This group consisted of the Moslem elements. They were often seen as *para demonstrator bayaran*, ‘they hold demonstration since somebody paid them to do so’.

16 For more details on these 19 researchers and their concerns, see *Kompas* (21 January 1998).

17 NKK/BKK (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/ Badan Koordinasi Kampus*) was a government measure to reduce student militancy, pro-posed by Minister of Education, Dr Daoed Joesoef. Since the students considered this policy as a government measure to curb their political rights, they finally held demonstrations nationwide.

18 However, at that time media reports were still very much circumspect. Fuller details were only published after the Soeharto regime collapsed, particularly in the Pertamina and Texmaco cases. For more details about the Pertamina case, see *Forum Keadilan* (25 Juli 1999) and *Detektif & Romantika* (*DR*, 24 July 1999); for the Texmaco case, see *Panji Masyarakat* (8 December 1999).


20 For more discussions on this issue from its neo-clasics perspective, see McLeod (2000: 16–26).

21 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999). Wirahadikusumah explained further that the troops that guarded the DPR/MPR compound at that time were KOPASSUS. They guarded it tightly. This was believed to be at Prabowo’s orders, though as the commander of KOSTRAD at that time he did not have authority to order KOPASSUS. Since he was its former commander (before being promoted to command at KOSTRAD) and he received an order from Cendana to prevent the students from entering the DPR/MPR building, the new KOPASSUS commander, Major General Muchdi, allowed Prabowo to use his soldiers. However, once the Armed Forces Headquarters (Wiranto’s camp) ‘approached’ him, he relaxed his troops. This led to the students entering the DPR/MPR building. Besides, Wiranto’s camp also placed soldiers within the DPR/MPR courtyard. They wore casual shirts like students in order to hide their original identity, sang patriotic songs and echoed the demand for Soeharto’s resignation.

22 Tirto is the nickname of Achmad Tirtosudiro. He was the chairman of the Indonesian Moslem Intelectual’s Association (*Ikatan Cendikiawan*)
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Moslem, ICMI) at that time. Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

In the past, the relations between Soeharto and Islam were not so smooth. There was no accommodation of political Islam by the government. In their view, political Islam was a threat to national harmony since it demanded the consistent implementation of Islamic law in the country. Therefore, Soeharto implemented the ‘carrot and stick’ policy. Through his foundations, namely, Amal Moslem Pancasila and Dakap, he supported the moderate Moslems to build their mosques. In contrast, he wiped out any radical Moslems who went against him or who were suspected of disturbing national stability. The Lampung, Tanjung Priok and Haur Koneng (West Java) affairs, among others, were examples of Soeharto’s policy on Islam. However, when he was not sure of the military’s loyalty, as evidenced by their disagreement over his decision to choose Soedarmono and Habibie as vice-president in 1983 and 1988 respectively, Soeharto began courting Islamic power as his new supporter. In 1990, he established ICMI in order to counteract the military’s power. About Soeharto’s policy on Islam, see, for instance, Soesastro (Tajuk, 19–24 July 1999).

Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

Actually Adi Sasono was a KAHMI member but it seems that his loyalty was to ICMI and not KAHMI. His position as general secretary of the organization perhaps influenced his consideration in taking sides since it gave him a power base from which to use the organization’s is resources freely for his own political agenda.

Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

Although Nurcholish Madjid disliked political Islam, as evidenced by his popular statement in the 1970s, ‘Islam Yes, Political Islam No’, he still wished for Islam to play an important political role in Indonesia. See, for instance, his view of Islam as National Wealth, Mimbar Demokrasi (1968).

For more details about Islam and Pancasila aliran, see Suryadinata (1992; 1998).

For more details on the split within the military during the Soekarno era, see Soemarsono (1993: 140–146); Notosusanto (1984: 72–73); Soemohardjo (1973).

See, for instance, Soeharto’s speech on the National Meeting of Puppeteers, Media Indonesia, 16 July 1991.
32 For the Aji Saka story, see, for instance, Olthos (1941).
33 In terms of age, the gap between Soeharto and his generals was very wide. It inhibited him from understanding them well. The rivalry among them, meanwhile, influenced the validity of the intelligence reports provided by the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) and the Army Intelligence Agency (BIA). This led to his failure in conflict management.
34 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).
35 This point was derived from the discussions with 8 junior military officers ranked between major and colonel. According to Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, moreover, such recruitment was not solely top-down but also bottom-up. For the top-down model, he cited the experience of M. Jusuf when he found Wiranto. As a junior military officer who did not have a connection to senior military officers, Wiranto was assigned to an isolated area in North Sulawesi. He even thought about giving up his military career to become head of the county (camat). General M. Jusuf, then Commander in Chief, who was travelling to inspect the military territorial command in that area, found him and was impressed by his appearance. General Jusuf then brought Wiranto to Jakarta and promoted him. According to Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, such a story encouraged senior officers to ‘recruit’ their juniors who qualified in terms of academic and military capabilities. The way used to recruit them was through the junior’s assignment in the sub-territorial command under the senior’s territory. There was also the bottom-up model. Since the promotion and assignment system in the military was tight, particularly because the number of military academy alumni increased from year to year, the younger officers were aware that they had to ‘approach’ their seniors who held the command posts. According to Wirahadikusumah, however, this recruitment model flowered at the end of the 1980s, when the embryo nil rivalry between ABRI Islam and ABRI Merah Putih (Pancasila) first began. Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999). For the complete story of M. Jusuf and Wiranto, also see O’Rourke (2002: 71). For an example of recruitment within the military, although it was not clearly explained, see Kingsbury (1998: 230).
36 Interviews with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999). It seems that his view was understandable since out of 397 cadets that graduated on average per year in the 1970s (Kammen and Chandra,
Prabowo was not only the first but also the fastest officer to reach the rank of lieutenant general. The remainder of his classmates, by and large, were left far behind although in terms of academic and military capabilities, they were perhaps no less capable than him. It is understandable therefore if they were jealous of him. Moreover, their inability to ride on his coattails, since they had no chance to do so, deepened their jealousy and hostility against Prabowo.

There was an assumption that, in fact, Prabowo fell into Wiranto’s trap. One piece of evidence relates to the kidnapping cases. When Prabowo kidnapped the activists, Wiranto did the same thing at the same time. This was to make Prabowo the scapegoat. The second piece of evidence was the Trisakti student shootings. The shootings were not only committed by Prabowo’s camp. The announcement by military headquarters that only ‘special forces’ could have been responsible was often seen as the latter’s effort to again make scapegoats of the Prabowo camp. Meanwhile, the two lost battles enraged Prabowo. In order to get back at Wiranto, he ignited the May riots of 1998. Prabowo had hoped that the riots would damage Wiranto’s image since as Commander in Chief he had failed to achieve political stability. Confidential interview (Jakarta, 2 July 1999).

Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).

Sjafrie Sjamsuddin’s attitude invited speculation that he had a close relationship with Wiranto. Until then, Sjamsuddin had been seen as a close friend of Prabowo and one of his loyalists. His decision not to block the students from entering the DPR/MPR compound, however, showed that he supported the Wiranto camp manoeuvre. According to O’Rourke (2002: 109), Sjamsuddin, in fact, was closer to Wiranto than to Prabowo. They were, in fact, in the same vein since both were former Presidential adjutants.

Interviews with former president Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999) and Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani, Chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency, BAKIN (Jakarta, 18 August 1999).

Walisongo were nine Islamic clerics who disseminated Islam in Java during the seventeenth century. They were Syech Abdul Malik Ibrahim, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Ampel, Sunan Kudus, Sunan Giri, Sunan Gunungjati, Sunan Muria, Sunan Drajad and Sunan Kalijaga. See, for instance, Muljono (1978).

Rector of Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
43 Rector of Padjadjaran University, Bandung.
44 Chairman of the Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI).
45 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. During his trip to Egypt, Soeharto announced publicly that, if the people no longer wanted him as their leader, he would be pleased to step down and become pandhita (Wise Man). However, he never did. Since he also considered implementing the fixed-rate policy and proposed the establishment of the Reform Council, it seems that he did not want to step down.
48 For more details on the list of businessmen, see Panji Masyarakat (21 April 1999).
49 His referendum policy for East Timor made many military officers disappointed, particularly those involved in Seroja Operation to annex East Timor in 1975 since it had resulted in the death of many soldiers. They accused Habibie of not knowing the history of the Republic.
50 They were Professor Dr Asep Suryaman, Colonel Abdul Latif, Sergeant first class Bungkus, Sergeant Major Marsudi of PKI; Budiman Sudjatmiko, Petrus Harianto, I Gusti Anom Astika, Yacobus Kurniawan, Wilson, Pranowo, Suroso, Ken Budha Kusmandaru, Dita Sari, Garda Sembiring, Coen Pontoh, Soleh and Andi Arief of PRD; Xanana Gusmao and Joao F. Camara of Timor Leste; Dr Ir. Sri Bintang Pamungkas (PUDI); Muchtar Pakpahan (SBSI); Andi Sahputra and Nico Demus Wandy Tuturong of AJI. See Sinar (2 June 1998) and Tapol Bulletin No. 152 (May 1999).
51 According to Soeharto, he himself asked Habibie and Wiranto to unseat Prabowo. He was disappointed with Prabowo since the latter had betrayed him by working together with ICMI’s leaders to topple him. Interview with former President Soeharto (19 June 1999). This fact reflected that, although Soeharto had resigned, in fact he was still powerful. Habibie and Wiranto were no more than his puppets. Discussion with Munir, Coordinator of Kontras (Jakarta, 28 September 1999).
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53 Prabowo denied Habibie’s version. According to Prabowo, the deployment of the soldiers at that time was not to stage a coup against Habibie but to ensure his safety. For more details on this issue, see Kompas (16 February 1999), Tempo (1 March 1999) and Asiaweek (3 March 2000).

54 The Deklarasi Ciganjur included: (1) appealing to the people to maintain national unity, (2) returning the people’s sovereignty and empowering of parliament, (3) placing the reform agenda in the new generation’s perspective, (4) conducting fair elections immediately in order to end the illegitimate government of Habibie, (5) abolishing the military’s dual function within 6 years, (7) investigating KKN cases, and (8) abolishing Pam Swakarsa.

55 Pam Swakarsa included Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Islamic Youth Movement, 300,000 members), Brigade Hizbullah (Hizbullah Brigade 120,000), Furkun (100,000), KISDI (5,000), Liga Moslem Bandung (Bandung Moslem League, 1,000), Mahasiswa Islam Bandung (Bandung Islamic Students, 700) and Remaja Al-Furqon (Al-Furqon Youth, 450).

56 See, for instance, Kristijadi’s comment on Habibie (Merdeka, 6 May 1999). The doubt of the academics on Habibie’s seriousness in investigating Soeharto was proved by the widespread distribution of the tape purportedly recording his conversation with the attorney general, Andi M. Ghalib. In this conversation, they agreed with each other to obstruct the investigation.

57 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).

58 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army’s Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

59 Crystallized from the interview with Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces School of Command (Bandung, 23 August 1999) and Z.A. Maulani, Chief of the National Intelligence Bureau (18 August 1999).

60 The conclusion that the military was not compatible with democracy is derived from the discussion with Marsilam Simanjuntak of Fordem (Jakarta, 8 August 1999).

TOWARDS THE NEW PARADIGM

62 KAMTIBMAS (Staff members of Peace and Order in Society) of ABRI who are from the police, naturally have to go following the separation of the police from the military body. Since this point is stated in the New Paradigm of the military, the author prefers to mention it rather than to omit it.

63 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999). Also, see Kadi (2000).

64 General Soedirman, in fact, was not a military professional; he was a former teacher. The military’s perception of itself during his era was as revolutionary soldiers. This meant the military was not a professional but a people’s army. Therefore, it is misleading to argue that General Soedirman was a professional soldier. He hoped that the military would become a professional army one day but it was not the case during his days of active duty as Commander in Chief. Discussion with Dr Kusnanto Anggoro of CSIS (Jakarta, 21 September 1999).

65 All the military respondents agree that the curriculum of the Military Academy does not contribute much in broadening the perspective of cadets. Widjojo and Maulani, moreover, spontaneously commented that it is ‘zero’ when the author asked them about the subject. Interview with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces School of Command (Bandung, 23 August 1999) and Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani, Chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Bakin) (Jakarta, 18 August 1999). According to Maulani, the curriculum of the Military Academy has almost never changed since 1960. It consists of 53% non-military subjects, 22% military subjects and 15% sport. For more details about the Academy, see Maulani (1997: 265–284).

66 For more details on the Banyuwangi case, see Al-Zastrow Ng (1999: 93–120). Gus Dur called the Banyuwangi case part of the Naga Hijau (Green Dragon) operations, which were conducted by the military. Besides, there were other operations, namely, Naga Merah (Red Dragon) whose goal was to eliminate Megawati and her supporters. The goal of these operations was to weaken the right threat (Islam, particularly Nahdlatul Ulama) and left threat (PDI Struggle of Megawati Soekarnoputri). For more details about the two operations, see, Tempo (20 February 2000).

67 As noted by O’Rourke (2002: 141), Habibie’s intervention hurt the financial interests of the generals. He noted further, Procuring weapons (at marked-up prices) had long been a lucrative field for Indonesia’s
generals. When the technology minister began making ambitious forays into defence contracting, they resented the fact that he was both cutting into their margins and burdening them with unwanted gadgetry.'

This regulation was finally rejected by the parliament in December 1999.
ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY HAD PROMISED that its new paradigm, which was announced on 5 October 1988, would be effective from 1 April 1999, not many of the promised internal reforms were in fact implemented by the end of Habibie's transitional government on 20 November 1999. This was because the military was kept busy conducting its own internal consolidation, and also because it was reluctant to implement its new paradigm. This attitude continued when the new democratic government under President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) was sworn in. The struggle between the new government and the military on its internal reforms – the so-called 'reduced privileges' in socio-economic and political affairs – dominated Indonesian political discourses in the post-New Order government. By and large, the whole picture of the military's internal reforms was reflected by its changed name, i.e. from ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian Armed Forces) to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army). In line with the new name, it was assumed that the military would change its dominant role following the completion of its internal reforms agenda.

This chapter examines the changing role of the military in the new democratic regime under President Gus Dur. It focuses on the struggle between the civilian government and the military on the implementation of its internal reforms. These reforms included:

(a) separation of the police (POLRI) from the military body (ABRI),
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(b) abolition of the Central Council of Socio-Political Affairs (Dewan Sosial Politik Pusat, WANSOSPOLPUS) and the Regional Council for Socio-Political Affairs (Dewan Sosial Politik Daerah, WANSOSPOLDA),

(c) turning the socio-political staff of ABRI into the territorial staff of TNI,

(d) abolition of military assignments in civilian posts through retirement and change of status,

(e) reduction in the number of military representatives in parliament,

(f) non-involvement of the military in day-to-day politics, and

(g) revision of military doctrines so they to adhered to the reform requirements and new role of the military in the twenty-first century.

This chapter also examines the economic contestations between the two parties.

THE RISE OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID

It was Habibie’s policy on the free formation of political parties that made possible Gus Dur’s ascent to become President of the Republic. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 3), in order to get popular support, Habibie implemented populist policies soon after he succeeded his predecessor, Soeharto. One such policy, which was expected to raise his image as a reformist leader, concerned his decision on the formation of political parties free from the numerous restrictions and conditions imposed during the Soeharto era. Soon after he announced that policy, 181 parties applied for registration. Out of these numbers, 141 parties were approved by the Department of Law since they fulfilled the set requirements. After further scrutiny by the General Election Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), finally 48 parties were given the green light to contest in the General Election on 7 June 1999. Meanwhile, in order to determine the number of DPR/MPR members, Habibie established the so-called Team of Seven led by Prof. Ryass Rasyid, the Minister of Regional Autonomy. This team fixed the composition of the DPR membership at 500, consisting of 463 elected
THE MILITARY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID

members and 38 military representatives. Meanwhile, the MPR would have 700 members consisting of the all DPR members (500 persons), plus 135 regional representatives and another 65 from the functional groups.

A study of the political parties that contested in the 1999 general election seems to indicate that political aliran (streams) last seen in the old order had re-emerged in Indonesia. During the New Order era, especially after the fusion of the political parties in 1973, the Indonesian political map had been divided into two streams only, namely Pancasila and Political Islam. However, during the reform era, a different and more complex situation arose. The categorization of the two streams applicable during the New Order era was thus no longer adequate to explain the phenomena of the political parties in the post-Soeharto era. A re-categorization of the streams is needed in order to take into account the ideological backgrounds of the newly established parties. According to Dhakidae’s study (1999), the parties that contested in the 1999 election could be divided into four main streams, namely, Nationalism (e.g. PDI-Struggle), Religion (e.g. PPP), Developmentalism (e.g. Golkar) and Socialism (e.g. PRD). There were also other political parties whose aims spanned two or more of these streams (for instance, Nationalism-Religion-Socialism), among them, PKB, PAN and PUDI.

Looking at the results of the 1999 general election, it seems that the old parties who had been restructured in the New Order era, such as PDI-Struggle, Golkar and PPP, got more popular support compared to the newly established parties. The results were as follows: PDI-Struggle received 34 per cent of the vote (153 seats), Golkar 26 per cent (120), PPP 12 per cent (58), PKB 11 per cent (51), PAN 7 per cent (34), PK 1.5 per cent (7), PDKB 1 per cent (5), PNU 1 per cent (5), PKP 0.8 per cent (4) while others gained 2.7 per cent (12).

Such results had surprised many people. The PKB’s Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), for instance, who had predicted that his party would gain at least 35 per cent of the votes, was humbled when PKB received only 11 per cent (Gatra, 21 October 2000). The same situation happened to Amien Rais of PAN. Performed under
expectations and only received 7 per cent of the vote. Meanwhile, PDI-Struggle emerged as the party with the highest number of votes; this made its chairman, Megawati Soekarnoputri, more confident. Although Gus Dur who had been Megawati’s political mentor for a decade, the result displeased him as he was afraid that now Megawati would part company from him politically. For Gus Dur, Megawati’s refusal of his request that she appoint four PKB members to her cabinet, if she became president, confirmed his fears. He was also unhappy that she did not offer him any position which would give him the leverage to bargain, but only the chairmanship of the Supreme Advisory Council DPA, Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, which was of little use to him politically.

To improve his bargaining position, Gus Dur devised political manoeuvres such as ‘posturing’ the Sultan of Yogyakarta (Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX) as an alternative candidate for president, since the Islamic parties rejected a woman as president. His manoeuvre, however, did not get popular support. Therefore, Gus Dur concluded that, in order to maintain his political influence, he had to fight to gain the presidential position for himself (Meitzner, 2000: 4). Indeed, according to Nurcholish Madjid, all this time Gus Dur in fact had harboured ambitions of becoming president (Gatra, 21 October 1999). Being a shrewd politician, Gus Dur had sensed Soeharto moving closer to the fundamentalist Moslems from 1990 onwards. He took the opportunity to visit Soeharto regularly, hoping to get the ex-leader and his cronies to support him in his political ambitions with their political resources (funding and manpower).

At the same time, the Islamic parties were also unhappy with PDI-Struggle because the latter had not approached them to discuss the composition of the future leadership. They felt that, on the basis of its 35 per cent of the vote, PDI-Struggle had become arrogant and too confident that, Megawati, would be the next president. The real political game now began when the MPR went into session and these Islamic parties sought to thwart the presumptuous ambitions of PDI-Struggle by joining forces to form the so-called ‘middle axis’ (poros tengah). They occupied a powerful bloc of 172 seats in the parliament, and their voice became signi-
significant in determining who would become president. Initially, the middle axis, especially PPP and PBB, had planned to give their votes to Habibie instead. In order to reinforce their move to stop Megawati, they also raised the issue that traditional Islamic teachings prohibit a woman from becoming leader (or president).

However, they reconsidered their support for Habibie after it became clear how strong the anti-Habibie movement was. They also realized that Golkar was split between A.A. Baramuli’s camp (green Golkar, Golkar hijau) and the white Golkar (Golkar putih) of Akbar Tanjung’s camp. The former supported Habibie while the latter gave its support to Megawati. Moreover, Golkar putih also had the support of the military, which had been unhappy with Habibie over his decision on the referendum for East Timor. Major General Zaky Anwar Makarim had asserted that, as a soldier and intelligence officer, he did not accept the loss of East Timor (Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 September 1999). These reasons led the middle axis to approach Gus Dur, who had initially doubted the middle axis’s manoeuver, but finally became convinced of their seriousness to canvass for him. This was especially so after Amien Rais, the leader of poros tengah, appeared before the kyais of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Buntet, Cirebon to ask their permission to canvass for Gus Dur. Not only did his candidature preempt the threat of clashes between the supporters of B.J. Habibie and Megawati Soekarnoputri, but also it allowed for the two biggest Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (which had opposed each other since the early years of their establishment) to become reconciled. Thus the kyais led by KH Abdullah Abbas endorsed his candidature.

After Gus Dur had been convinced of the seriousness of the support offered by poros tengah, he once again resorted to skillful manoeuvres. To get popular support from the Moslems, he revealed that he was a 29th-generation descendant of Prophet Muhammad. Such a claim led most Moslems to regard him as their chosen leader since, according to Islamic belief, Muhammad was not only a religious leader but also a statesman. Gus Dur’s descent, therefore, entitled him to the same privileges, namely, Moslems con-
sidered him as both their religious leader and statesman. Gus Dur also approached Habibie to look into the possibility of enlisting support from Golkar in case Habibie withdrew his presidential candidature. Gus Dur calculated that, if he depended only on the poros tengah and the functional groups, which had 121 seats and 65 seats respectively, he still could not compete with PDI-Struggle (with 153 seats), who also had support from white Golkar (19 seats), the nationalist parties like PKP, PNI Supeni, PNI Marhaen (17) and the TNI/POLRI representatives (58). However, he believed that PKB (51 seats) would vote for him, although initially this party had pledged its support for Megawati.

Meanwhile, the voice of the regional representatives listened to the voice of their patron, white Golkar. This was because the latter’s members, such as Akbar Tanjung, Marzuki Darusman, Fahmi Idris and Slamet Effendi Yusuf, had extensive relations with its regional cadres since they had been active in Golkar from the early years of the New Order government. In contrast, most of green Golkar’s members, such as Marwah Daud Ibrahim, Muladi, Adi Sasono, Djimly Asshidiqie and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, were newcomers in politics. Another member, A.A. Baramuli, had no roots in the regional districts. In Gus Dur’s calculations, the regional representatives, with attitudes similar to the military’s, would follow white Golkar and vote for Megawati if Habibie withdrew his candidature. Therefore, Gus Dur and his supporters focused their attention in splitting the votes of these forces. In offering the vice presidency to General Wiranto, Gus Dur, should he be elected as president, expected to draw the support of the military and part of the regional representatives to himself. At the same time, he also tried to detach white Golkar from Megawati by offering its leader, Akbar Tanjung, the same position that he had offered to Wiranto. These moves were expected to undermine the support of Megawati’s allies.

The rejection of Habibie’s accountability speech by the MPR boosted Gus Dur’s chances to the point that he was now certain of becoming president (Forum Keadilan, 5 September 1999). PKB’s disappointment with PDI-Struggle for not being serious in supporting its chairman, Matori Abdul Djalil, in becoming the
chairman of the MPR\textsuperscript{13} led to the withdrawal of its support for Megawati. This meant that its previous pledge to campaign for Megawati to become president was now an empty commitment. PKB made this complete about-turn because it realized that it would get nothing in the MPR session if it continued to vote for Megawati. PKB then decided to go all-out in support of Gus Dur.\textsuperscript{14} PKB nominated Gus Dur 20 minutes before the nomination deadline of 7 am (20 October 1999). Given this changed attitude, the voice of the middle axis was unanimous with 172 votes (the 121 votes of other \textit{poros tengah} members and 51 votes of PKB) supporting Gus Dur.

Gus Dur’s camp became even more confident at winning the presidency after the MPR’s rejection of Habibie’s accountability speech because A.A. Baramuli had promised them that – should this happen – around 100 members from his camp would vote for Gus Dur. They were displeased with white Golkar, whom they suspected of engineering the rejection of Habibie’s speech and garnering support for Megawati. Thus, the number estimated by Gus Dur’s camp at that time was 370 votes for their candidate, while Megawati would receive 324 votes.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, this estimation was not too far from the eventual result of the MPR’s vote on 19 October 1999, which included 691 members from its total of 694 members (three persons were absent).\textsuperscript{16} Gus Dur obtained 373 votes against Megawati’s 313 votes; five members abstained.

A study of the presidential election results suggests that the background of the streams and economic-political interests of the parties determined their preferences in voting. Golkar from the developmentalist stream, in fact, was not homogeneous. Green Golkar, which was dominated by purist Moslems, preferred to side with the \textit{poros tengah} in support of Gus Dur. White Golkar, which was dominated by the weak Moslems, supported the nationalist stream (Megawati is PDI-Struggle). Meanwhile, the military, which had been part of the New Order elite and was closer to developmentalist and nationalist streams than the other streams, had no choice but to be realistic. Since Gus Dur offered their commander-in-chief the vice presidency, they voted for the Islamic
stream. They hoped that if Wiranto became vice president, he would have the power to protect the military’s economic and political interests.

This behaviour indicates that there was a strong relationship between socio-cultural and political-economic factors in determining the composition of political coalitions among the parties. As such, it undermines the argument by Robison (1990: 71–75) that the political culture approach is useless as it is inadequate in explaining the socio-political dynamics. Green Golkar preferred to form a coalition with the middle axis (political Islam) rather than with the PDI-Struggle (nationalism). In contrast, white Golkar preferred the nationalist camp rather than Islam for its coalition partner. These decisions were not solely influenced by the political and economic benefits gained by the respective parties, but also determined by their ideological and political thinking. Since the political culture approach builds in such socio-political dynamics, it is adequate in explaining these socio-political phenomena. Another example could be seen in the political behaviour of the military. Although the military voted for the middle axis candidate in order to protect its economic and political interests, the performance of Gus Dur as a moderate Moslem also formed part of its considerations. The military believed that he would not threaten Pancasila by replacing it with an Islamic ideology.

Soon after he was elected, however, Gus Dur told Wiranto and Akbar Tanjung that it was impossible for him to keep his promise to appoint one of them as vice president. For the former (Wiranto), Gus Dur argued that the anti-military feelings among the people were very strong. Therefore, it would only increase their hostility and lead to riots if he persuaded the MPR members to elect Wiranto. Meanwhile, for the latter (Akbar Tanjung), Gus Dur said that if he appointed him, Megawati’s supporters would get angry and riots would be inevitable. Gus Dur told them that he thus had decided to choose Megawati as his vice president.

Wiranto, who had been nominated by Golkar, had no hope of winning against Megawati, who was expected to get more support from the MPR members. Accordingly he withdrew his candidature.
on 21 October 1999. According to Besariman,17 Wiranto’s withdrawal was important to avoid embarrassment for the military. However, this did not mean that the military left the MPR session empty-handed. Its leaders had made sure that Gus Dur, a candidate sympathetic to them, was elected and that any reform of the military’s political role would be gradual. Given such considerations, it can be understood why Hamzah Haz, who was nominated by the middle axis for vice president, finally lost the competition to Megawati.18 It seems that the final days of the 1999 MPR session became a time for political reconciliation rather than contestation among the political parties, since all major parties gained strategic positions: Golkar gained the DPR speakership (Akbar Tanjung), the Reform faction gained the MPR speakership (Amien Rais), PKB gained the presidency (Gus Dur), and PDI-Struggle gained the vice-presidency (Megawati Soekarnoputri). Nor did the TNI/ POLRI’s representatives, or those parties (like the PPP) that had joined the middle axis, leave the session empty-handed either. The candidate to whom they had given their support had been elected president.

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTESTATIONS

Five months before the MRP session, Soeharto had predicted that Gus Dur would become the next president.19 He also predicted that neither Megawati nor Amien Rais would gain the presidency. His explanation, however, was not based on rational calculation but mysticism. According to him, he had given his sapphire ring (cincin batu merah delima) and dagger (keris) to Gus Dur in May 1999. This meant that he had transferred the wahyu (mandate) of power to Gus Dur.

In traditional Javanese belief, the sapphire ring and the dagger were believed to have supernatural powers, and gave spiritual authority for its owner to take power.20 This phenomenon proves once more that the political culture approach is still useful to study socio-political dynamics. Therefore, it was possible that Wiranto’s reluctance to declare martial law and stage a coup against Habibie at that time was not solely influenced by the strong anti-military movement but also by Javanese beliefs. As a former adjutant to
Soeharto and, especially as a Javanese, Wiranto believed that Soeharto had yet to transfer his power to him. Soeharto had only given him a decree authorizing him to declare martial law. He had not given his *wahyu* (mandate) of power (the ring and the dagger) along with the decree. Therefore, Wiranto did not seize power as he believed this action would only destroy him. In Soeharto’s eyes, however, Wiranto’s reluctance to declare martial law was seen not only as cowardly but also revealed him as unsuitable to receive the *wahyu*. That was why Soeharto did not give the ring and *keris* to Wiranto.22

The military’s expectation that Gus Dur would be sympathetic to it and agree with its plans to conduct internal reforms gradually was realized but only for a while. Moreover, he also appointed six generals in his cabinet. They were Wiranto (Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security as well as Commander in Chief), Agum Gumelar (Minister of Transportation), Soerjadi Soedirdja (Minister of Internal Affairs), Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Minister of Mining and Energy), Freddy Numberi (Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment) and Widodo AS (Commander in Chief). However, this military happiness was quite short-lived. Less than one month after taking his presidential oath, Gus Dur started to intervene in the military’s internal affairs when Wiranto conducted his re-shuffle in November 1999 (Table 8). He asked Wiranto, if not actually forced him, to appoint Lieutenant General Luhut Panjaitan as KASAD. In contrast, Wiranto proposed one of his protégés, Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago. As noted by O’Rourke (2002: 335), a compromise was finally reached between the two parties, namely, they appointed Lieutenant General Tyasno Soedarto. However, this new KASAD was considered as Gus Dur’s man since his assignment was basically based on Gus Dur’s presidential instruction. By appointing him, Gus Dur not only expected to control the military as part of his efforts to consolidate his power but also to force the military to speed up its internal reforms. The military had not expected the president to act this fast. As a consequence, it led to intensified contestation between Gus Dur and the military, particularly after he sacked Wiranto from his post.
as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security on 15 January 2000.

Meanwhile, the changing of the military’s name from ABRI to TNI reflected its entire internal reforms, particularly its reduced role in socio-economic and political affairs (*Media Indonesia*, 6 April 1999). Formally, this name change came into effect from 1 April 1999 in line with the separation of the police (POLRI) from the military (ABRI). However, the reduction of its dominant role took place just after Gus Dur became president. In terms of this separation was that domestic security affairs, as stipulated by Tap MPR Number VI/2000, became the responsibility of the police (POLRI);

*Table 8: Permutations with TNI in the first month of the Gus Dur government (4 November 1999)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>New Officer</th>
<th>Previous Officer</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
<td>Admiral Widodo AS</td>
<td>General Wiranto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Gen. Tyasno Soedarto</td>
<td>General Soebagio HS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Cdr in Chief</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Fachrul Razi</td>
<td>Admiral Widodo AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. Gen, Dept. of Def</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Soegiono</td>
<td>Lt. Gen Fachrul Razi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AFTER THE NEW ORDER

Table 8: Permutations with TNI in the first month of the Gus Dur government (4 November 1999) (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>New Officer</th>
<th>Previous Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Army Intelligence Bureau</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Arie Kumaat</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Tyasno Soedarto</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Bangkit, 8–14 November 1999.*
TAP MPR Number VII/2000, stipulated that the military (TNI) would only be responsible for the defence of the state. The name change of the military was also aimed at changing its negative image in the people’s eyes since the name ABRI suggested that the behaviour of the military was violent.

By contrast, the term TNI seemed to connote a good image in the people’s memory; the army was seen as a freedom fighter that had a close relationship with the people, and also as the defender of the nation (Widiarto, 1999; Mangoenprojo, 1999). Moreover, the re-employment of the name TNI also strengthened its legitimacy and the notion that the Indonesian military was unique. As noted by Said (1991: 2–3), the Indonesian military was not formed by the government or political parties but by the people. This historical legitimacy helped to legitimize the military in its socio-economic and political roles, although this may not be the dominant role as in the past. On the contrary, most civilians particularly the students and academics, demanded the abolition of the military’s role in socio-political affairs. They wanted the military to go back to its barracks. In order to defend its role, therefore, the military had to cooperate with the new democratic regime in its internal reforms agenda. The following discussions concern the reforms, which became the arena of contestations between the military and the civilian government under President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).

THE SEPARATION OF THE POLICE

The separation of POLRI from ABRI, effective from 1 April 1999, was based on the Presidential Instruction Number 2/1999, which invalidated TAP MPRS Number II/MPRS/1966, a previous order that had incorporated POLRI as part of ABRI. This move also marked the changing of the military’s name from ABRI to TNI. According to Wiranto’s speech on 13 March 1999, this separation was aimed at developing the professionalism of POLRI. It meant, as stipulated in TAP MPR Number VI/MPR/2000, the police would be responsible for internal security only, and no longer would be involved in defence (Tap MPR Number VII/MPR/2000), which became the full responsibility of the military.
The integration of POLRI into the military body (ABRI) in the early days of the New Order regime reflected the strong influence of political culture in Soeharto’s policy-making process. From a political culture perspective, the integration would not only strengthen Soeharto’s political position but also reduce the threat from his political enemies. This relates to the idea of power in Javanese culture, which is symbolized by a lamp (Anderson, 1990). The brighter the lamp shines, the more powerful the king is. He is not only capable of maintaining the unity of his territory but also the harmony and prosperity of his people. On the contrary, the lamp becomes dim when the power of the king fades. This is characterized by the emerging regional rebellions that demand the separation of their territories.

Since unity and integrity of the territory are the most important factors showing how powerful the king is, it could be understood why Soeharto integrated the police into the military body. This not only made the military stronger in guarding Indonesia as a unitary state but also in managing the harmonious life of the people. During the Soeharto era, this harmonious life was understood to mean that the people should be passive, silent and obedient to any government policy. In addition, ABRI, as the political tool of Soeharto, would adopt any measure, including violence, in order to silence the regime’s critics as their opposition disturbed the harmonious situation. Since Soeharto’s lamp became dim as the reform movement strengthened, therefore the police finally demanded to separate from ABRI.

Indeed, the people had wanted the separation of POLRI from ABRI since 1993. However, ABRI did not give any response to their demand even though POLRI had also wanted it and accordingly made a proposal to separate. For POLRI, such a demand was understandable since it did not want to be seen as the sacrificial lamb of the military. In the case of the Trisakti student shootings, for instance, the army accused police officers of being the snipers behind the killings. In refuting this, the Chief of Police, General Dibyo Widodo, said all his officers used only rubber bullets or blanks. It was impossible, therefore, that the snipers were
his officers. His denial, of course, displeased the military, which had plotted to make scapegoats of the police. Consequently, the commander-in-chief forced General Dibyo Widodo to resign as he had not followed his superiors’ orders. The military saw the police as the party that had tarnished ABRI’s image. As the internal component of the military which directly came into contact with people, these were opportunities for the police to indulge in corrupt behaviour, and besmirch ABRI’s reputation. Although the military, especially the army officers, were themselves corrupt, the military felt that the police’s demand for money from drivers, particularly those managing public transportation, was extremely embarrassing.

The mutual resentment felt between the two wings of the military often ended with clashes. When the religious conflict blew up in Ambon, for instance, both the army and the police officers supported the Christians since they saw that those who had initiated the conflict were the Moslems. The consequences of their moves were reflected in the damage to the houses of worship in the area of conflict. In January 1999, at the start of the conflict, only the mosques were destroyed. But when it escalated, Moslem soldiers from Wirabuana Military Command (KODAM VII) were deployed to the troubled area at the end of February 1999, and many churches were razed to the ground. The government tried to reconcile the two conflicting parties by marking a demarcation area, which placed the police (BRIMOB) in the Christian location and the army (KOSTRAD) in the Moslem area. This arrangement, however, led to clashes between the two forces. Both the police and the army, which were expected to act as peace-makers between the two religious groups, ended up shooting at each other (Gamma, 29 August 1999), with the police supporting the Christians and the army on the side of the Moslems.

The main reason behind these clashes was due to the small allowance each soldier and policeman received for his daily necessities like food. They only received Rp. 4,700 (US$ 0.5) per day (Gatra, 17 February 2001), and this paltry sum was not enough to buy their daily meals, especially in turbulent areas like Ambon.
To cope with this problem, they were supported by the people who provided the basic necessities for them. With the police (BRIMOB) placed in the Christian area and the military (KOSTRAD) in the Moslem area respectively, close ties between the officers and their ‘supporters’ developed. Under such circumstances, it was very difficult for either the army or police to be neutral when they dealt with troublemakers: the police took the side of the Christians and the army the side of the Moslems. Since the two forces were deeply involved, the religious conflict in Ambon consequently became difficult to resolve. Although prompted by different reasons, clashes between the police and the army also broke out in other places, like Sampit, Central Kalimantan. The ethnic conflict between the Madurese and the Dayaks in March 2001 was also marked by clashes between the two groups of officers. The police felt that they were in charge and rejected army intervention. The army became antagonized by the police and, as in the case of Ambon, not only did both forces fail to resolve the conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese, but ended up fighting each other (Kompas, 6 March 2001).

Furthermore, Tamagola (Tempo, 23 January 2000) asserted that the clashes between the army and the police in the Moluccas in general and Ambon in particular were instigated by the army in order to intensify religious conflict in the area. Given the volatile situation, the army would have enough justification to re-establish the Pattimura Military Command (KODAM X). At first, the civilian government disagreed with the army’s proposal to restore the Command, but since the conflict was difficult to put down, the former agreed with the latter. As argued by Tamagola, this enabled the army to regain its economic and political role in that turbulent area.

Police displeasure at the army was also influenced by the slow pace with which POLRI could be separated from ABRI. In trying to explain the seeming dragging of feet in this operation, Wiranto argued that it needed time in preparing to change the doctrines, training and educational system and organizational development (Kompas, 4 October 1999) that would affect POLRI. Therefore, the
separation could not be implemented as speedily as demanded by POLRI. However, it was also possible that the delay was not influenced by the reasons as argued by Wiranto, but determined by the fact that the military needed the police to be scapegoats for the Ambon riots. Senior army officers calculated that only if the police were still under their control could the army use them to cover up their own errant behaviour.

Studying the slow progress of the proposed separation of POLRI from ABRI, Gus Dur tried to force-march the military soon after his presidential oath on 21 October 1999. He was supported by the radical reformist officers of the army (Agus Wirahadi-kusumah’s camp). Similarly with Gus Dur, they had argued that the six months needed for the preparation to be completed (1 January 2000–1 July 2000), as proposed by the status quo camp, was far too long. In contrast, the moderate reformist officers of the army (Agus Widjojo’s group) preferred a more gradual period to bring about separation till the problems faced by the army officers (such as accusations of their involvement in committing crimes against humanity in East Timor) were resolved. It seemed that the moderate officers tried to save their colleagues, particularly those from the status quo camp. By proposing a gradual separation process, they hoped to buy enough time to fabricate lies and save their own skin. As mentioned earlier, they planned to make the police scapegoats for what the army had done in East Timor and other turbulent areas in the country.

In order to hasten the separation process of POLRI from ABRI, the President made known his expectation to Admiral Widodo when Wiranto handpicked him to take over as the Commander in Chief from Wiranto in November 1999. Since Wiranto’s the main consideration in choosing Widodo as his successor was because of his weakness (O’Rourke, 2002: 329), Gus Dur perhaps expected that he too could control him. With a naval officer as Commander in Chief, Gus Dur assumed that it would not only facilitate his desire to reposition Indonesia as a powerful maritime state, as during the Majapahit kingdom in the thirteenth to fifteenth century, but also to weaken Wiranto’s power.
Besides, he also expected that the removal of Wiranto from the line of command would speed up the separation and ensure the autonomy of the police. It meant that, structurally, POLRI would be under presidential control. Before that could happen, however, there were many consequences that the police would have to face. One of the problems was the limitation of the police personnel. Given the ratio of 1:1,250 between the police and the population, the police were unable to handle the riots taking place nationwide. They had to ask the military, especially the army, to help them. Since its expenditure budget for 2001 was only Rp. 4,63 trillion (US$ 4.63 billion), POLRI could not afford to settle their debt to TNI, which amounted to Rp. 95 billion (US$ 9.5 million) the previous year. It had been spent by TNI to deploy soldiers to the turbulent areas in order to restore peace (Gatra, 17 February 2001).

THE ABOLITION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL COUNCIL
The second component of the military’s internal reforms to become an arena of contestation between the Gus Dur government and the military was the abolition of the Socio-Political Council at the national and regional (provincial) levels. Unlike with the separation of POLRI from ABRI, where there were different views in terms of its implementation period among the military factions, the second initiative was received favourably by both the radical and moderate reformist officers. That is, they agreed to the abolition as soon as possible of the Council, which was led by the Commander in Chief and regional military commander at the national and provincial levels respectively. In the circumstances, the status quo officers had no choice but to accept the united position of the other two factions.

The agreement of the two camps to abolish the body for BAKOSTRANAS (Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional, Body for the Coordination of National Stability) and body for BAKOSTRANASDA (Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Daerah, Body for the Coordination of Regional Stability) on 8 November 2002, automatically also implied abolition of the Central Council of Socio-Political Affairs (CCSP) and the Regional Council for Socio-
Political Affairs (RCSP). Although the names of those bodies were different, they can be considered to be the same institution since their duties were similar. Not only did they give input and information to the President and the governors on the current political situations, but also they arrested activists who criticized the government.

The CCSP and RCSP also carried out checks (melitsus) on potential candidates for public service or standing for Parliament as well as people suspected of being involved in illegal organizations. As mentioned by Said (The Straits Time, 9 March 2000), the main thing they wanted to determine was whether or not the candidate was pro-communist. In short, during the New Order era, the military had the authority to determine the ‘fate’ of potential candidates, especially those critical of the government. Whoever was stigmatized by the military as tidak pancasilaist (as being against Indonesia’s state ideology of Pancasila) would encounter difficulties in their lives. Not only would they find it extremely difficult to get jobs once the military marked their identity cards with ‘OT’ (organisasi terlarang, forbidden organization) on but also to deal with public servants, particularly in arranging certificates or other legal documents. These measures supported Suryadinata’s argument that, during the New Order era, Geertz’s trilogy of streams, namely, Santri, Abangan, Priyayi (Geetz, 1960), had permeated into Pancasila and Islam (Suryadinata, 1992: 5–6; 1998: 29). Indeed, the regime did not tolerate other streams existing in Indonesia at that time.

The bogeyman of communism, as used by Wiranto (Suara Pembaruan, 2 July 1999), was a main consideration employed by the military to delay the abolition of the CCSP and RCSP (Suara Pembaruan, 2 July 1999). They suspected the PRD and other hardline student organizations, such as FORKOT and JARKOT, to be part of the communists’ resurgence in Indonesia. Even the radical reformist officers who agreed firmly with the abolition of the military’s role in socio-political affairs were also careful in responding to the issue. It seemed that once somebody became a member of the military, the anti-communist feeling was internal-
ized in his blood. In terms of approach, however, the radical reformist officers did not agree with the violence and the stigmatization measures. In order to place effective checks on the resurgence of communism, they preferred using the democratic approach, namely, letting the people decide what was best for themselves. The radical officers believed that, if the people were reasonably prosperous and justice was upheld, it would be difficult for the communists to infiltrate the masses. Given the abolition of the two councils, moreover, the other socio-political institutions could carry out their functions, including obstructing the resurgence of communist power.

Meanwhile, the civilian government was skeptical of the military’s argument that the abolition of CCSP and RCSP had to be postponed because of a possible resurgence of communist power. For the civilian government, the communist bogeyman no longer existed in Indonesia. As such the government had to constantly put pressure on the military to agree with the abolition of the two repressive councils. The struggle between the government and military on the councils came to a head when Gus Dur announced the abolition of BAKOSTRANAS and BAKOSTRANASDA on 8 March 2000. In order to convince those people concerned that the communist threat was only an issue engineered by the military to defend its socio-political role, Gus Dur proposed the cancellation of Tap MPRS Number 25/MPRS/1966, the legislation prohibiting communism in Indonesia. The military and the Islamic parties predictably rejected his proposal. Thus, this issue would continue to colour Indonesian politics in the future.

THE CHANGING OF SOCIO-POLITICAL STAFF
According to Wiranto, the reformation of the Socio-Political Staff of the military into Territorial Staff was aimed at supporting the future vision of the TNI as a modern defence force whose duty would be to defend the sovereignty of the country and support nation building as well as national development. Therefore, ideally doing away with the Socio-Political Staff would end the military’s involvement in socio-political affairs and allow it to concentrate on defence matters, as carried out by its Territorial Staff. In reality,
however, it was difficult to abolish the military’s role in socio-political affairs since, from the day the struggle for independence began, the military had already assumed concurrent defence and political roles (Crouch, 1978: 25).

The intention was that reforming the Socio-Political Staff of ABRI into the Territorial Staff of the TNI would be followed by changes to the military’s territorial structure, i.e. a reduction in the political control exerted by the military on the regions. Military headquarters instead took contradictory measures that sought to increase rather than reduce its territorial control. Using the issue of the resurgence of communism and invoking the military’s duty to prevent possible national disintegration, in his role as Commander in Chief General Wiranto issued Decree Number 98/P/V/1998 on 151 on 18 May 1998 authorising the reestablishment of the Regional Military Command (KODAM). The seven KODAMs, which were liquidated by General Benny Moerdani in 1984, as mentioned in the Decree, would be reestablished. In the first period (1999–2000), the headquarters planned to restore the four KODAMs, namely, KODAM I/Iskandar Muda, KODAM XVI/Pattimura (effective since 20 May 1999), KODAM IX/Tanjungpura and KODAM X/Lambungmangkurat. In the second period (2004–2009), the rest of the three KODAMs, namely, KODAM III/Imam Bonjol, KODAM XII/Sam Ratulangi and KODAM XV/Nusa Tenggara, would be restored. Given the restoration of the KODAMs, Indonesia would again have seventeen KODAMs in the future. The other ten KODAMs are KODAM II/Bukit Barisan, KODAM IV/Sriwijaya, KODAM V/Jaya, KODAM VI/Siliwangi, KODAM VII/Diponegoro, KODAM VIII/Brawijaya, KODAM XI/Mulawarman, KODAM XIII/Hasanuddin, KODAM XIV/Udayana and KODAM XVII/Trikora.

From a political culture perspective, the military’s plan to reestablish the KODAMs was not only seen as part of its measures to deal with political instability but also reflected its inner world, as studied by Britton (1992). This is because the military, which considered itself as satria by nature (knights, defenders of truth and justice – see page 170), tended to develop its territorial structure.
since the structure reflected the expanse of its power. Given the re-establishment of the KODAMs, many military officers could hold commander positions again – many satrias would be reborn.

Furthermore, the military, as satria, wished to maintain its traditional roles both as military commanders and political leaders (the government) concurrently (Onghokham, 1985). Moreover, it identified itself as not only as a tool of the state but also its protector. Such a self-perception is deeply rooted in the military’s traditional position. During the earlier era of Javanese kingdoms, besides being commanders, the military also held such political positions as temenggung (head of the county) and adipati (mayor). In the same vein, the military insisted on re-establishing the KODAMs in order to regain its political control over society, particularly after the reduction of its formal role in political affairs.

The military’s move to re-establish the KODAMs, in fact, contradicted its plan to withdraw from socio-political affairs. Given the re-establishment, the debate on the territorial structure between the Armed Forces Headquarters and Army Headquarters came to an end with the latter as a winner. As such, soon after its announcement, the plan received strong objections not only from civilians but also significant segments in the military. Represented by Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, the radical reformist officers earned much political capital and attention by criticizing the top military leaders; not only did the plan to bring back the KODAMs reflect the status quo’s interest in defending their role in socio-political affairs, but also this would be wasteful expenditure since for, the initial development, it would need at least Rp. 25 billion (US$2.5 million) to set up one KODAM (Forum Keadilan, 26 December 1999).

According to the radical officers, if the headquarters were sincere in wanting to withdraw from politics, not only KODAM and KOREM had to be abolished but also the lower ranking military bodies, such as KODIM, KORAMIL and BABINSA. This abolition was aimed at giving a bigger role to the police and the regional administrations along with the implementation of the decentralization policy in the country. The radical officers’ worry
of the possibility of clashes between the police and the military was later demonstrated when the two forces were deployed together to restore peace in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, in March 2001 following clashes between ethnic Dayaks and Madurese. The animosity of the police towards army intervention ignited that clash.

The civilians, particularly the reformist politicians in the parliament, the human rights activists and the newly democratic regime, rejected the re-establishment of the KODAMs from the beginning and supported the radical officers immediately. To put pressure on the status quo camp, President Abdurahman Wahid promoted the radical officers’ patron, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, to be Commander for Strategic Command of the Army (PANGKO-STRAD), replacing Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman (Kompas, 29 February 2000).

Gus Dur’s attitude not only reduced the military’s support towards his government but also strengthened its resentment of him. Again, he was being seen as confronting the military, just as he had done earlier with General Wiranto and Major General Sudrajat. Gus Dur’s pressure on Wiranto to resign from his ministerial post, since the latter was suspected of having committed human rights abuses in East Timor, displeased Wiranto’s protégés. When the Human Rights Commission was waiting for Wiranto to answer his summons and rumours were spreading on Gus Dur’s desire to reshuffle certain military commands, one of Wiranto’s protégés, Major General Sudrajat, then the Armed Forces spokesman, spoke out in public in opposition to the president. He declared, According to the Constitution, the president holds supreme authority over the army, navy and air force. This does not mean that he is the commander-in-chief – that term is used only in the US’ (Republika, 28 December 1999). Sudrajat’s insurgent attitude angered Gus Dur, who wanted to sack him for insubordination, but the military leadership resisted.

In his new position, Wirahadikusumah became more outspoken. He not only criticized his opponents, especially those from the status quo camp as officers who were weak in character, but also
called on his superior, General Wiranto, to resign from his defence ministry position because the latter was being accused of human rights violations in East Timor. Wiranto was held responsible for applying the ‘contingency plan’ in the post-ballot period of East Timor. As asserted by Djoko Soegianto of the Human Rights Commission, there were strong indications that serious human rights abuses took place in East Timor. These took the form of massacres, searches and seizures, theft, brutality towards women and children (including rape and sexual molestation), forced evictions, arson, looting and vandalism. Furthermore, Soegianto emphasized that all crimes against humanity in East Timor occurred due to the failure of the armed forces chief to guarantee public security surrounding the balloting process. For this reason, General Wiranto, as armed forces chief and minister of defence at that time, was the party that must be held responsible (Kompas, 1 February 2000).

East Timor in the post-ballot period not only jeopardized General Wiranto’s career but also the career of other military officers, particularly the junior ones who were namely, military academy alumni from the early 1980s. This situation, however, did not threaten a shortfall in officer as the average number of military academy alumni had been 397 per year since the 1970s. When Wiranto was ousted from his office, the careers of other senior officers not involved in the human rights abuses (like Lieutenant General Endiartono Sutarto and Major General Kiki Syahnakri, for instance) rocketed. Their image as professional soldiers also hastened their promotion (Kompas, 2 June 2002). What was commonly heard by the military officers over the loss of East Timor was criticism for their failure to defend the unity of the nation. In the military’s eyes, the loss tarnished its image as guardian of the nation. However, the military’s failure in defending East Timor was used by the radical camp to strengthen their argument that the re-establishment of the military territorial commands was no longer relevant since there was no guarantee that the military could defend the unity of the nation. The loss of East Timor and the military’s failure to eliminate the Free Aceh
Movement despite thousands of troops being deployed in the region reflected the ineffectiveness of the military territorial structure, they said.38

Such a radical attitude on the part of Wirahadikusumah not only upset the status quo camp but also the moderate officers; arguments like those could threaten their career interests as well. Wirahadukusumah’s suggestion to reduce the number of KODAMs, for instance, upset moves by certain quarters to maintain the military’s socio-political role. Moreover, his determination to deal with the officers who were suspected of gross human rights violations in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya (Papua) (Forum Keadilan, 26 December 1999) would not only drag the status quo generals into widely-publicized trials,39 but also the moderate generals as well. Therefore, predictably these two military camps conspired to block his military career. The opportunity came soon enough. Disappointed with the Chief of Army Staff (KASAD), General Tyasno Soedarto, for no longer being loyal to him, Gus Dur looked to have Soedarto replaced by Wirahadikusumah. Here, the president’s measure was also aimed at retiring the non-reformist generals one by one.

However, military headquarters rejected his proposal to promote Wirahadikusumah. Twelve generals even threatened to resign from the military if Gus Dur insisted on promoting Wirahadikusumah as KASAD (Tempo, 19 March 2000). They preferred Lieutenant General Endriartono Soetarto for that position.40 In order to strengthen their hand they approached Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri for her support in opposing Gus Dur’s move. Since Megawati agreed with the military’s view, Gus Dur reluctantly agreed to appoint Lieutenant General Endriartono Soetarto as KASAD, replacing General Tyasno Soedarto. Gus Dur was fully aware that without support from Megawati’s PDI-Struggle, which had the largest bloc of 153 seats in the 694-seat parliament, he could not defend his presidential position until the end of his term in 2004.

Such a tense relationship between Gus Dur and the military raised the possibility of a military coup. This however, was im-
The military’s bad image during the New Order government and strong international pressure for the democratization process in Indonesia had forced it to think twice about staging a coup. However, the strong resistance of the status quo and the moderate camps against his proposal in promoting Wirahadikusumah made Gus Dur more realistic in assessing the situation. In order to avoid confrontation with them, he no longer insisted on appointing Wirahadikusumah as Chief of Army Staff (KASAD). In other words, he ‘dumped’ Wirahadikusumah in order to save his presidency (O’Rourke, 2002: 373). He was well aware that these two forces were more powerful compared to the radical camp, especially as most of the territorial commands were still held by officers loyal to them.

Moreover, the officers who held governorships and posts as mayor had also appointed by Wiranto during his time as Commander in Chief. This meant that they could be considered Wiranto’s men. Out of 26 governors and 293 mayors, 15 officers (57.7 per cent) and 119 officers (40.6 per cent) were from the military (Table 9). Moreover, presumably they also had adequate funding to conduct political manoeuvres since these military governors occupied rich provinces with regional budgets worth more than Rp. 5 billion (US$ 500,000) per annum (Table 10).

Hence, Gus Dur’s statement that only 10 per cent of the military was not loyal to him (The Straits Times, 21 March 2000) could be seen only as a bluff to obscure reality. Apparently, he did not have the courage to continue his confrontation with the military. In order to safeguard his presidential position, Gus Dur had been forced to be realistic. Instead of promoting Wirahadikusumah, he removed him from his position as PANGKOSTRAD in August 2000. The new officer appointed was Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu. Although Ryacudu was considered a member of the radical officers camp, in terms of character he differed from Wirahadikusumah. Unlike his predecessor, Ryacudu was quiet and did not
### Table 9: Number of governors and mayors and their background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Governor (bupati)</th>
<th>No. of municipalities</th>
<th>No. of military mayors (walikota)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKI Jakarta</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jogyakarta</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sumatra</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kalimantan</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya (Papua)</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kalimantan</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor*</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>27 Provinces</strong></td>
<td>Military (15)</td>
<td><strong>329</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: East Timor separated from Indonesia on 30 August 1999.
Source: Data Gubernur dan Bupati, Depdagri, 1999.
like to speak his mind publicly: this made the other military camps accept him. His silent demeanor not only reduced friction among the officers but also limited public discussion of the military’s internal problems. Following the replacement of Wirahadikusumah, those supporters from the radical camp with a similar tendency to conduct self-criticism exercises publicly, like Major General Saurip Kadi and Colonel General Romulo R. Simbolon, were also removed from their military positions. This situation strengthened the moderate camp, which now not only occupied strategic positions within the military body but also became the mainstream group. For the time being, it could be said that this camp controlled the military organization.

Compared to the radical and moderate camps, the status quo camp, by nature, did not want to lose their socio-political privileges. To defend these privileges, one of their measures was to create

Table 10: Relationships between provincial budgets and governors’ background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial budget (p.a.)</th>
<th>Military governor</th>
<th>Civilian governor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rp. 500–2500 billion (US$ 50–250 million)</td>
<td>4 provinces (Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rp. 100–250 billion (US$ 10–25 million)</td>
<td>9 provinces (North Sumatra, Riau, East Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, South Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi)</td>
<td>6 provinces (Central Kalimantan, Jogyakarta, Aceh, Lampung, Bali, Maluku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; Rp. 100 billion (&lt; US$ 10 million)</td>
<td>2 provinces (Bengkulu, South Sumatra)</td>
<td>6 provinces (East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, Jambi, Southeast Sulawesi, East Timor*)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: East Timor separated from Indonesia on 30 August 1999.  
Source: Data Gubernur dan Bupati, Depdagri, 1999.
political instability. Therefore, they were suspected of being behind the riots which happened at about the same time that the military came under the civilian government’s pressure to phase out their political role in line with the new paradigm. This situation was aggravated by the involvement of Soeharto’s cronies in starting riots in order to create a chaotic situation. Their intention was to keep the new government busy in restoring order so that it would not have the time to investigate their involvement in corruption and other misdeeds during the New Order period.

THE ABOLITION OF ‘KEKARYAAN’
The fourth arena of contestation between the new democratic regime under President Gus Dur and the military was the abolition of military assignments to civilian posts (kekaryaan ABRI). Together with changing the name of the Socio-Political Staff of ABRI to the Territorial Staff of TNI, the other supporting institutions under the Socio-Political Staff, like the Officer Staff (Staf Karyawan, SYAWAN) and the Body for Staff Development (Badan Pembinaan Kekaryaan, BABINKAR) of ABRI, were automatically abolished. This meant that the process of demilitarization in the bureaucracy had begun and had the potential to affect a lot of positions; at that time, the number of active and retired officers holding civilian posts were 6,899 and 5,547 officers respectively (Bhakti, 1999b: 143). These figures exclude those officers (shown in Table 9) working as governors or mayors.

Kekaryaan is the military’s programme to appoint its officers to non-military posts. This functions like a tour of duty for the officers. Although the military has always denied that this programme is an integral part of its dual function role, after studying its kekaryaan system and the civilian posts occupied by its officers, it is not easy to deny that kekaryaan is an integral part of Dwifungsri. In its placement of staff, for instance, the military has three approaches, namely, the appointment, distribution and request systems. The appointment system involves placement of the officers in civilian posts since, according to BABINKAR, these posts are important to safeguard national political stability. The distribution system involves placement of retired officers or soon-to-retire officers in civilian
positions. In so doing, the military retirees to secure a future job and income. Meanwhile, the request system involves the appointment of officers in response to requests from government departments, needing the expertise of the military appointee. If the military only employed the third approach, the request system, it would be correct to say that *kekaryaan* was not an integral part of *Dwifungsi*. But since the military also adopted the two first approaches, it is difficult to deny that *kekaryaan* is a part of *Dwifungsi*.

*Kekaryaan* in the military had been implemented since General Nasution became Chief of Army Staff in 1958. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the corporate ideology of the military, the Middle Way concept of Nasution, was not only proposed for the sake of military unity and its position within the state, but also to legitimize its non-security role (even though this was limited compared to during the Soeharto era, when the term Middle Way gave way to *Dwifungsi* in 1966). In terms of regulation, however, *kekaryaan* received its legal basis after Soeharto issued Presidential Decision Number 79/1969 authorizing the Minister of Security and Defence and Commander in Chief to Develop the *kekaryaan* programme (Notosusanto, 1991: 304–305). This decision, issued on 4 October 1969, led military headquarters to form the Body for Staff Development (BABINKAR) within ABRI. Its main duty was to organize managerial training for the officers and arrange for their assignment to civilian posts. To strengthen the *kekaryaan* policy, the Minister of Security and Defence/Commander in Chief issued Decree Number Kep/42/XI/1975 on the organizational and procedural principles for BABINKAR (Notosusanto, 1991: 307). This authorized the headquarters to establish a new body, the Staff Development Council (Dewan Kekaryaan, WANKAR) within ABRI. Its membership was representative of the military forces and its main job was to give input to headquarters regarding the assignment of military officers to civilian posts. Thus, the military had maximized its reach in order to strengthen its control over society.

With the abolition of the *kekaryaan* programme, military headquarters offered two options to the officers who were occupying civilian posts. First, they could resign from their military commis-
sions and become civil servants. For the officers who chose this option, they were considered retired from the TNI. Second, they could give up their civilian posts and continue with their military careers (The Straits Times, 2 June 1999). Interestingly, most of the officers preferred the first option. According to the forms they returned to headquarters, around 69 per cent of them took the first option. The rest (31 per cent) decided to rejoin the military body (Tempo, 12 April 1999). There are two reasons why the officers preferred the first option. First, upward mobility in the military structure was limited. For the officers who did not have strong patrons at headquarters and good records during their stints in the military academy and other commanding training centres (SESKOAD and SESKO ABRI), their career development was definitely limited. It was thus impossible for them to reach high positions within the military hierarchy. Second, their civilian position not only gave them access to many more positions on promotion or transfer within the bureaucratic hierarchy, but also better facilities and benefits compared to the military, particularly for housing, car, salary and extra allowances. Besides, they could also work 5–10 years beyond the military retirement age.

By and large, economics was the main factor behind the officers’ choice of civilian posts. In line with the impending regional autonomy, such choices were rational. They could maintain their close relationships with the foreign and Chinese bourgeoisie, the middle class and politico-bureaucrats, as they did under the New Order era. Not only did they get to maintain their luxurious lifestyles they also accumulated wealth. This prospect had been made possible by the decentralization policy, whereby all investments, including foreign investments, were no longer handled by the central government but directly by the local governments where the companies operated. This presented local bureaucrats with numerous opportunities to receive bribes from the companies concerned.

Whatever the military officers’ choice, it created problems for the new democratic regime. Their decision to retire from the military and continue as civil servants caused bottlenecks in the civilian government, which had been unable to promote their own
THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AFTER THE NEW ORDER

civilian officers as those posts were still held by the officers concerned. Meanwhile, the military officers assigned to civilian posts who had decided to return to barracks were slow in vacating their civilian jobs. Their procrastination had been prompted by the headquarters’ announcement that there was no guarantee returning officers would get higher positions within the military hierarchy.\(^4\) Besides, they would also lose the extra salary they once enjoyed when they left their positions in the military. In the State Secretary’s office, for instance, there were 38 major generals who were unwilling to give up their posts. Fortunately, the radical officers helped the government to put pressure on the status quo and moderate officers who were reluctant to leave their civilian positions. The former even criticized the latter by telling them that, if they joined the military to become military generals, it was the right place for them; but if they used the military to become governors, mayors and other civilian positions, they were in the wrong place.\(^4\)

To intensify his pressure on them, Gus Dur warned that officers suspected of committing crimes against humanity, whoever they were, including General Wiranto, could be put on trial (Tempo, 20 February 2000).\(^4\) Gus Dur thought his strong statement would make the military realize that his government was legitimate and could take any action to force it to follow his orders, including vacating the civilian positions its officers were occupying. But neither Gus Dur’s warning nor the radical officers’ criticism brought the desired outcome. Instead, the riots in Ambon continued and the shaman killings in Banyuwangi even intensified (Tempo, 9 January 2000; Tempo, 25 February 2000).

In addition, suddenly there was a series of bombings of strategic and public locations such as the Jakarta Stock Exchange and several churches in Jakarta, Medan and Batam. The officers from the status quo camp were suspected of being behind these affairs. It was their way of showing their resentment against the civilian government since the latter had tried to prune their privileges sooner rather than later (Tempo, 8 October 2000). Relating to this case the former Defence Minister, Juwono Soedarsono, asserted:\(^6\)
Every time there is a court case involving Soeharto or a high official from the past, a riot always ensues. It’s very clear that this is the result of conflict between the ruling elite... Those who are behind the riots are people defending Soeharto. I strongly suspect that these are former officials from Soeharto’s last cabinet who were used again in Habibie’s cabinet – i.e. my former cabinet colleagues ... By defending Soeharto, these people are really trying to defend themselves (Tempo, 19 July 2000).

He explained further:

These people are aware of the government’s difficulty in overcoming the four or five cases of ongoing violence in areas such as Aceh and Maluku – not to mention the tensions surrounding the upcoming annual MPR session. Therefore, I can confirm that there is a deliberate and systematic effort to overburden the security forces, in order to create the impression that the government is ineffective and unable to control the situation (Tempo, 19 July 2000).

Furthermore, Major General Sudrajat’s statement (see page 147 above), strongly hinting at the possibility of the military staging a rebellion if it were forced too strongly to leave its role, revealed the linkage between the government’s pressure towards the military and the riots (Suara Pembaruan, 23 January 2000; O’Rourke, 2002: 343). As usual, however, the military used the riots as a justification to maintain its socio-political role. In short, it had always claimed that without its presence in such a role, the situation could have worsened because no other parties could conduct preventive measures as well as the military. They argued that the socio-political role of the military, although not as dominant as before, was needed in order to maintain political stability in the country.47

THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PARLIAMENT

In contrast to the moderate camp, which still demanded the continuing presence of military representatives in parliament, the radical camp agreed to their abolition. In such a situation, there was no choice for the status quo camp but to support the moderates’ grievances. In the beginning, the status quo camp rejected the policy to reduce the military’s representation in parlia-
ment, but they finally relented due to strong popular pressure, particularly from academics and reformist politicians (Tempo, 28 December 1998). Golkar had proposed 25 seats for the military and the police representatives, while the PPP proposed 5 seats only for them (Bhakti, 1999b: 207). The LIPI academics, for instance, proposed 15–25 seats for TNI/POLRI representatives. In addition, LIPI also stressed that the military representatives must not have any voting rights, as they were not elected but appointed to parliament (Bhakti, 1999b: 208).

In numerical terms of representation, however, the academics and political parties’ proposals were seen by the military as too small. This contradicted its earlier statement, which asserted that the military would accept any number given as its percentage of representation (Republika, 11 January 1999). The military wished for at least 8 per cent (40 seats) of the total DPR membership to be allotted. But the civilian politicians, especially PPP, rejected the military’s demand. They saw 40 seats as too many since their total numbers (military and police) were only 500,000 officers. Facing such a strong rejection, General Wiranto called Hamzah Haz, the Chairman of PPP. This meeting was allegedly used by the military to threaten Haz, as he had made a statement that the military representatives in DPR would be 38. This constituted half the number of military representatives in the 1997 parliament. Its quota then was 75 seats at that time, and soon after the civilian politicians had agreed to that number. Regulation Number 4/1999 on the Position and the Structure of MPR/DPR/DPRD Members was approved. This decree stipulated that the number of TNI/POLRI’s representatives for DPR RI (national level) was 38 seats and 10 per cent for the regional levels (DPRD I for the provincial and DPRD II for the municipality levels). Since the membership of DPRD I and DPRD II was approximately 150–175 persons and 50–70 persons respectively, the military’s quota in DPRD I was 15–18 seats and in DPRD II 5–8 seats.

During the first two decades of the New Order, the number of military officers in parliament steadily increased over time. In 1967, out of 350 DPR members, 43 (12.3 per cent) were military repres-
entatives. One year later, in 1968, the number had increased to 75 officers (18.1 per cent) out of 414 parliamentary members. As stipulated in Regulation Number 16/1969, the quota for the military became 75 seats (16.3 per cent) from the 460 total seats in parliament. This number remained during the 1972–84 period. From 1985, soon after ABRI had claimed for itself the title of *dinamisator* (dynamizer) and *stabilisator* (stabilizer) of development (Regulation No. 20/1982), the number of their representatives was raised to 100 persons (20 per cent) of a total of 500 parliamentary members. This number was later reduced to 75 persons (15 per cent) in 1997 and 38 (7.6 per cent) in 1999 (based on Regulation Number 4/1999).49

The military’s reluctance to end its presence in the DPR reflected its capacity to free itself from the shadow of its dominant role in the past (*Tempo*, 28 December 1998). During the New Order era, together with the bureaucrats, they became the sole decision-makers of the country. In fact, only a few officers were involved in the policy-making process. However, this could not be seen as reflective of the individual position but the institution (King, 1982). Their involvement in the policy-making process manifested the whole interests of the military organization. In other words, the ultimate authority of the military was not exclusively vested in an individual ruler but resided in the military as an institution. Therefore, it was not easy for the Gus Dur government to force the military to withdraw its involvement in socio-political affairs.

Although the number of military representatives in the DPR was limited to 38, only four parties gained more seats than TNI/POLRI. These were PDI Struggle (153 seats), Golkar (120 seats), PPP (58 seats) and PKB (51 seats). The other parties, had fewer seats, among them PAN and PBB, which only gained 34 and 13 seats respectively. This made TNI/POLRI the fifth largest bloc in the national parliament. The same phenomenon also happened at the regional levels (DPRD I/II) of government. This raised popular criticism of the military since without doing anything it gained a total of 1,400 seats in the DPR and DPRD I/II (*Tempo*, 8 October 2000). Criticism also came from military officers. The
radical camp stated that the military did not have a right to sit in the parliament, not only because its representatives were not elected but also because its presence in the DPR violated its commitment to stay away from day-to-day politics. Military headquarters responded to this criticism positively. In order to convince the people that the military would fully implement its new paradigm, General Widodo AS, Commander in Chief, stated that, from 2004 and 2009 respectively, the military would no longer have representatives in the parliament or assembly (*The Straits Times*, 26 February 2000).

In *realpolitik*, the small number of military representatives in parliament did not reflect its weakened influence. Indeed, it still possessed the leverage to influence parliament, but the military would only exercise this when the civilian government intervened in its internal affairs too deeply. When Agus Wirahadikusumah was promoted to PANGKOSTRAD, for instance, the officers from the moderate and the status quo camps disagreed and made this clear to President Gus Dur. They ordered their representatives in the DPR to influence the other MPs to assert their right to interpellation, i.e. to call formally on the executive to explain a policy or action. In this instance, they aimed to have parliament question the president over two graft scandals popularly known as 'Bulogate' and 'Bruneigate'. These military representatives used the indirect approach to influence the other members. During the afternoon tea break, they initiated discussion on the president’s involvement in these scandals and stressed the importance of the DPR in questioning the president on those cases. Using this approach, they were finally successful in influencing the parliament members to exercise the DPR’s right of interpellation and question the president on those allegations.

Moreover, the DPR also formed the Special Team (Panitia Khusus, Pansus) to collect evidence of the president’s involvement in the two cases. When Pansus reported their findings before the DPR meeting on 1 February 2001, all groups except the PKB accepted their findings. This meant that Gus Dur was accused of complicity in the two graft scandals. Interestingly, the TNI/POLRI group
which was usually neutral accepted the findings, too, suggesting its unhappiness with the President for meddling in its internal affairs, such as his request to promote Wirahadikusumah as KASAD (Forum Keadilan, 14 November 1999). Besides, the military was also disgruntled because he had wanted to use it as his own political tool to get rid of his political opponents. Therefore, it refused to support him when he proposed to declare martial law and dissolve parliament. The military’s rejection disappointed Gus Dur and led to strained relations between the two parties. For Gus Dur’s opponents, this situation helped to consolidate their power to censure him, going by the regulation that the censure process could lead to his impeachment (Regulation Number 4/1999) if his opponents had a chance to unseat him by exploiting any controversial issue.

NON-INVOLVEMENT IN DAY-TO-DAY POLITICS

The internal reforms of the military on non-involvement in day-to-day politics included three issues: (a) severance of organizational relationships with Golkar and establishing a proper distance with the other parties, (b) neutrality of the military in the elections, and (c) the changing paradigm in the relationship between the military and its big family (Keluarga Besar ABRI, KBA). Another indicator not mentioned in the internal reforms of the TNI but nevertheless important in measuring its involvement in day-to-day politics is the civilianization of the Department of Defence. According to the radical officers, it has been impossible for the status quo and the moderate officers to implement these reforms willingly. As long as they still wish to occupy civilian positions, such as minister and general secretary in the department, the military will not give up its involvement in day-to-day politics.

To support their argument, the radical officers asserted that the military was far from neutral during the 1999 election. It still supported Golkar. During the meeting in the headquarters three days before the election (4 June 1999), which was attended by the regional, sub-regional and district military commanders, General Wiranto and Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
Commander in Chief and Chief of Territorial Staff respectively, prepared a slide (transparency) explaining the military position during the election. In short, they instructed the commanders to support the fortunes of Golkar. They needed to do that since Golkar had nominated General Wiranto as the next vice-president (Kompas, 20 September 1999). Without the victory of Golkar, it was impossible for their Commander in Chief to occupy that position.

By and large, most analysts like Crouch (1978) and Said (1991) agree that the military has been involved in politics since the struggle for independence. In terms of origin, however, there has yet to be a consensus among academics on when the military became formally involved in politics. Muhaimin (1987), for instance, referred to the 17 October 1952 Affair – when Nasution aimed a cannon at the presidential palace to protest against civilian intervention in military affairs – as the first date of its formal involvement in politics. As the author has argued in Chapter 3, February 1954, when Nasution formed his political party (IPKI), is more appropriate as the first date of the military’s formal involvement in politics. This involvement received further political legitimacy after Nasution proposed his Middle Way concept in 1958. The military’s involvement deepened particularly after Sekber Golkar, initially formed to block the spread of communism, was transformed into a new political party – Golkar – in 1969. Together with the military and bureaucracy, this party finally became the main pillar of the New Order regime.

The military’s involvement in day-to-day politics during the New Order era was therefore deep-rooted. After ten parties had fused to become three parties in 1973, namely (PPP, Golkar and PDI), the military not only dominated the Golkar leadership but also intervened in the affairs of the other parties. Only a cadre who had the blessing from the military could lead the party. Therefore, it can be understood that, when Megawati Soekarnoputri was unexpectedly elected as the chairman of PDI, the military was behind her removal on 27 July 1996. This happened not only because it had not given its blessings to her but also it saw her popularity as a threat to the continuation of its dominant role in politics. Among
others, the most worried person over Megawati’s election was Soeharto. He believed that she would become a threat to his bureaucratic authoritarian government or, in Soeharto’s calculation, she would destroy the political stability that he had tried to maintain. Therefore, he ousted Megawati and her supporters at all costs.

Given the deep involvement of the military in politics, it seems that it will be difficult for it ever to leave the political arena. As such, a break in its organizational relationships with Golkar is not tantamount to its detachment from day-to-day politics. Rather, the military still maintains its involvement in politics by using the retired officers to join the parties. Many of them, in fact, occupy strategic positions in the parties. Major General Suwarno Adiwijoyo, for instance, is General Secretary of Amien Rais’s party (PAN). Meanwhile, Major General Theo Syafie and Major General RK Sembiring Meilala are chairmen in PDI-Struggle. Besides, more than 150 retired officers, including Lieutenant General Solichin GP, also joined this party (Bangkit, 15–21 May 2000).

Moreover, the changing paradigm of the military relationship with its big family of active, seconded and retired servicemen (Keluarga Besar ABRI, KBA) – which means it no longer requires KBA’s members to support Golkar – does not mean it no longer undergoes changes from within. Not only did the military have retired officers joining the political parties but also it employed others like Edi Sudrajat and Try Sutrisno to form the Unity and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKP). The military had expected that most members of its big family would vote for the PKP (Merdeka, 11 February 1999). This would have meant that the retired officers’ involvement in politics was coincidental, more than anything the result of a military headquarters’ political blueprint. According to Wirahadikusumah, however, military headquarters had intentionally urged, if not planned for, these retired officers to join the parties. Only through this measure would they be able to indirectly control the political direction of the country.

The phenomenon of the military involvement in day-to-day politics, especially its biased nature in the elections, was difficult to prove. In contrast to previous elections in the Soeharto era, where
the military’s intervention was easily identifiable since it had been conducted openly, in the Reform era this was no longer the case; now the military adopted an indirect approach. All the military did was to ask the businessmen to support Golkar financially (Tempo, 14 June 2000). Such a situation complicated attempts by the civilian government to force the military to give up its involvement in day-to-day politics. Therefore, one solution was for the government to try to demilitarize the Department of Defence and separate the positions of Minister of Defence and the Commander in Chief.

Given such a separation, military headquarters would be under the Department’s control. It was hoped that this would block the military’s political manoeuvres in the future. Since the process of civilianizing the Department of Defence has yet to be resolved, the contestation between the civilian government and the military in that process will continue. This was shown by the contradictory statements made by Juwono Soedarsono, the first civilian to become Minister of Defence, and his successor, Mahfud MD. According to Soedarsono, he had planned to replace 11 officers from the first echelon in March 2001 (Tempo, 10 September 2000). Since Gus Dur removed him suddenly, the plan was stalled. In contrast, his successor, Mahfud MD, who was promoted on 1 September 2000, stated that he could not implement his predecessor’s policy. Since the Department still needed their expertise, he argued, only four officers would be replaced (Suara Pembaruan, 2 January 2001). This indicated that the headquarters was still reluctant to civilianize the Department of Defence. As mentioned earlier, the contestation between the new civilian regime and the military on this agenda in particular and its involvement in day-to-day politics in general, will continue in the future.

THE REVISION OF MILITARY DOCTRINES
Compared to the other internal reforms of the military, where the implementation was very limited, the revision of its doctrines was still left behind. Arguably, the military did not revise its doctrines as, once it did so its role did not revise its doctrines as, once it did so, its role in socio-political affairs would come to an end. The military would no longer have any legal basis to legitimize its
socio-political role. Therefore, it retained the doctrine of *Hankamnata* (*Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*, Total People’s Defence) as this legalized the implementation of the *Hankamnas* (*Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional*, National Defence Security) system. The significance of this doctrine was such that the military not only had the right to establish regional, sub-regional and district commands but also form the sub-district command and Badan Pembina Desa (Non-Commissioned Officer, BABINSA) as the realization of the *Hankamnas* system.

Nor did the military revise its *Tjatur Dharma Eka Karma* (Four Services One Desire) doctrine, which manifests the unity of the police and the military within one body (namely, ABRI) even though this ought to have been nullified by the separation of police from military since 1 July 1999. This is an indication that the military still harboured strong intentions of, if not controlling, the police then intervening in its affairs.

Instead of revising its doctrines, the military avoided discussing them publicly on the grounds that, once this was done, the concepts of power, rule and intervention would be opened for examination and discussion in the new democratic Indonesian society. If that happened, it would open its own spleen, since people would adopt these concepts to expose its past misdeeds. In addition, public criticism of the military was expected to intensify. To preempt such a situation and more importantly to divert the attention of people from its efforts to maintain its socio-political role, the military used popular jargon, like being professional soldiers and politically neutral (Van Doorn, 1971). Since the military had yet to revise its doctrines, as Rudini has argued (*Kompas*, 21 December 1999), it could not implement its internal reforms completely. Therefore, the radical officers’ suggestion on reducing the number of KODAM and the abolition of KORAMIL and BABINSA, for instance, was more utopian than realistic. Such an attitude could be interpreted as the military’s way of waiting for the right time to regain its dominant role.

Compared to the other internal reforms of the military that became public issues, the revision of its doctrines has not received enough attention. As a result, the contestation between the military
and the civilian government on this issue has been low key due to the lack of public pressure on the issue. This reflected perceptions of grave concern not in the military’s ‘software’ (the doctrine) but in its ‘hardware’ (the implementation of its doctrine in daily life). In other words, people have judged the military based on its behaviour and not on its doctrine. Greater violence would further tarnish its image in people’s eyes.

ECONOMIC CONTESTATIONS
In the same way that it was reluctant to revise its political role, the military had yet to take any actions to reduce its economic role. It ran its businesses as usual through its foundations, which acted like pure business concerns. So far, the changing role of the military in economic affairs has not meant it has had to withdraw from business activities, only that it has suffered a loss in the privileges that it enjoyed in the past. Nowadays, it has to follow the rules of the game and compete fairly with its business rivals in order to win tenders and get business licenses, unlike previous times when it could obtain these easily. Also it cannot any longer intervene in the bureaucracy so effortlessly to win government tenders for cukongs (ethnic Chinese capitalists) close to the military. This is an indication that its role in economic affairs has declined.

THE INSTITUTIONAL BUSINESS OF THE MILITARY
As regards the institutional business of the military, even now it is difficult for Indonesia’s civilian government to intervene in its day-to-day operational activities. The contestation between the Gus Dur government and the military on the latter’s economic role was thus limited to the auditing of the foundations’ funds. This was expected to reduce the corrupt practices in the companies of the various foundations, but the military regarded the government audit of its foundations’ funds as unnecessary intervention in its internal affairs. In response the military also hired another auditor to cross-check the auditing results of the government auditor. By resorting to this tactic, it hoped to come up with different data which could be used to refute any findings of inappropriate expenditures revealed by the government auditor.
In fact, when examining the nature of the military’s business enterprises, Indonesia’s civilian government has found the whole issue a most perplexing matter. Civilian officers were aware that they could not intervene much in the military’s businesses since government revenue could not meet the huge requirements of the military’s budget. They could only support 25 per cent of the total military spending each year, the remaining 75 per cent coming from the profits of military companies. This was not a new phenomenon, but dated back to the birth of the Republic (Tiras, 28 July 1997).

Indeed, military involvement in business began at the time of the struggle for independence. As noted by Cribb (1991: 95), the insurgent military’s business was smuggling and trading the most profitable commodity at that time, namely, opium. Given this business, the military could prolong its struggle since it had money to buy weapons. Its daily meals were supplied by the people. From the standpoint of history, the villagers became its protectors as the soldiers moved from one place to another during guerrilla warfare. Such situations, as mentioned by Soeharto, made the military feel that its relationship with the people was inseparable, like fish and water. Without support from the people (water), the military (fish) could not have survived in waging the guerrilla warfare. However, this relationship was later manipulated by the military for its own interests. The military argued that, since it had to repay the people for their contribution during the struggle for independence, it needed to be involved in politics, claiming that through politics it would not only provide people with security, but also bring about economic development to benefit the people.

The military involvement in smuggling continued and even intensified following its organizational development. After Nasution introduced the national defence system, namely, Hankamrata (Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta, total people’s defence), in 1957, he divided Indonesia into 16 military regional commands. Since the government did not have enough money to meet the military’s operational budget, the regional commanders had to get the money by themselves. Most commanders, of course, chose to smuggle
opium and other profitable commodities such as sugar, rubber and copra since this was the easiest way to obtain cash. As long as this illegal activity was not too much, military headquarters tolerated these enterprises. But when these exceeded permissible limits, it was forced to admonish the recalcitrant officers, like the regional commanders of KODAM II/Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra), KODAM IV/Diponegoro (Central Java) and KODAM VII/ Wira-buana (South Sulawesi) who had engaged themselves in smuggling not only to fund their operational budget but also to enrich themselves personally.

Except for the commander of KODAM IV/Diponegoro, there was no further action taken against the remaining regional commanders. When military headquarters found out that the Diponegoro commander, Major General Soeharto, had kept too much money from smuggling activities for himself, Generals A.H. Nasution and Ahmad Yani, the Army Chief of Staff and his First Deputy, proposed that a military tribunal be formed to take action against Soeharto. However, General Gatot Soebroto, the Vice-Chief of Army Staff, did not agree with the two generals and proposed a face-saving way where by Soeharto was removed from his commander’s post and sent to the Army School of Command. Since Indonesia was under martial law at that time and the unity of the officer corps was very important to maintain law and order, they finally agreed with Soebroto’s proposal (Cribb, 1991: 77; Crouch, 1978: 522). In 1959, Soeharto was sent to the Army’s Command School.

The historical background of the officers’ involvement in business was used by the military to legitimize its role in economic affairs. The military’s perception that it was not only a political ‘stabilizer’ but also the ‘dynamiser’ of development, as stated in Regulation No. 20/1982, led it to transform its numerous foundations into pure business concerns. According to the military, this transformation not only made possible its optimum contribution to economic development of the nation but also raised the soldiers’ prosperity.58

From the political economy perspective, this military involvement in business had both positive and negative aspects. The
positive aspect of the military involvement in business was that it offered the solution to the problem of the huge deficit in the military budget. The profits were not only used to purchase new weapons but also to speed up military operations in turbulent parts of the country. Given sufficient operational funds, the military could be flexible in its choice of tactical approaches in suppressing rebellions and social conflicts, and recouping damages caused by military operations. In short, one of the positive outcomes of the military’s involvement in business was independence from government financial support and self-sufficiency in guarding national stability. However, the military’s argument that its involvement in business was to increase the soldier’s prosperity has yet to be conclusively proven. As mentioned by Juwono Soedarsono, former Minister of Defence, most soldiers live in poor conditions. They do not own the houses they live in and their salary is barely enough for daily meals (Tempo, 10 September 2000). It is axiomatic that those who enjoy the profits from military businesses are the high-ranking officers and not the junior officers.

By and large, the economic crisis following the 1997 Asian crisis affected the military. Like most other businesses in the country, the military businesses also suffered financially. This in turn had a negative impact on the military budget. Such a situation not only reduced the military’s capability to deploy soldiers in order to restore security in the conflict areas but also to purchase and upgrade military equipment. At the same time, private companies, particularly the military’s business partners, who previously had tended to support the military when it asked for their financial assistance, were faced with financial constraints too. Therefore, it was highly possible that they could not provide financial support for the military’s operations at the moment. Unfortunately, instead of raising funds for their unit, certain military commanders had spent the military’s foundations’ funds in inappropriate ways. The misuse of KOSTRAD’s foundation funds by Rp. 173 billion (US$ 17.3 million) was one such example. In short, the economic crisis that affected the business atmosphere in general and the military business in particular indeed stopped the military from intensifying—
ing its operations to restore security in Indonesia’s troubled regions. As a consequence, in order to raise funds to meet its annual budget, the military was suspected of illegally exploiting the forest through its logging company.

Meanwhile, the negative aspect of the military’s involvement in business not only reduced its professionalism but also made corruption, collusion and nepotism rampant in its ranks. For the non-commissioned officers, corruption was forced upon them by circumstances beyond their control. Their salaries were insufficient to meet their basic needs, forcing them to indulge in acts of corruption. In contrast, the high-ranking officers became corrupt and abused their power, motivated by greed to maintain a luxurious lifestyle (Samego, 1998b: 135). They thus accumulated wealth for themselves.

The Suharto government had condoned the officers’ illegal activities in return for their loyalty. In other words, the government intentionally bought their loyalty by letting them commit corruption, collusion and nepotism. To maximize its profit, the military worked together with foreign investors, the Chinese bourgeoisie, the middle class (the urban technocrat/administrative/managerial class) and the politico-bureaucrats. Robison has described the New Order as a government comprised of a complex alliance embracing all those factions (Robison, 1986; 1990). Indeed, the military was not only a comprador class that became the local agents of foreign investors, as argued by Budiman (1992), but also exploiters of the nation’s wealth.

From the political culture perspective, the military involvement in business constituted an interesting phenomenon. In contrast to its involvement in politics, which received cultural legitimacy, the participation of military personnel in business was traditionally seen as disgraceful. This is related to the satria (knight) concept. In Javanese belief, satria refers to the defender of truth, chastity and justice, as well as the apparatus in governing the state (Britton, 1992). In short, satria was the ruling class that dominated the political positions during the era of the Javanese kingdoms (Onghokham, 1985). Since the military considered itself as satria, it was expected to behave like one: honest and fair. Besides,
business is often perceived as unfair and dishonest on the grounds that it seeks profit. The satrias, therefore, were not keen to involve themselves in business activities.

They nevertheless usually married their daughters off to the sons of saudagar (businessmen). They resorted to this move because they needed to maintain their glamorous lifestyle as aristocrats (Koentjaraningrat, 1984: 75–76), and only the saudagar could supply their ongoing needs. Nowadays, as satria, the military no longer marry their daughters off to the sons of businessmen, preferring instead to use the businessmen, especially the cukongs, to run their companies (Robison, 1986: 255). The military in turn holds directorships in the companies, but merely as a formality. A similar phenomenon took place in the state enterprises like Pertamina, Aneka Tambang and Krakatau Steel.59

From the state enterprises, especially Pertamina, the military officers obtained money to develop their institutional and personal companies. This took place for at least two decades, from the establishment of Pertamina in 1968 until 1988. During this period it was led by the generals, namely Lieutenant General Ibnu Sutowo (1968–76), Major General Piet Harjoto (1976–81), Major General Joedo Soebono (1981–84) and Major General A.R. Ramly (1984–88). Unfortunately, there were no reliable statistics on how much money the military siphoned off from Pertamina to establish its companies. The only record known publicly was that Pertamina disbursed loans to the tune of US$ 10.5 billion when Ibnu Sutowo resigned in 1976 (Time, 1 June 1998). As much as US$999 million in revenue from oil sales could not be established when Pertamina’s accounts were audited. There had not been single report on Pertamina’s financial position since 1988 when the company ceased being managed by the military. The first civilian to become Pertamina’s director was Faisal Abda’oe (1988–97), who was then succeeded by Soegianto (1997–98), Martiono Hadianto (1998–2000), Baihaki Hakim (2000–03), Arifii Nawawi (2003–04) and finally Widya Purnama (since August 2004). Many believed that it was due to Pertamina that the military owed the establishment of its enterprises. As noted by Lowry (1996: 137), moreover, the initial capital of its
businesses, among others, also came from the allocation of state forestry concessions to private companies and payment of shares by parties seeking the award of contracts.

The military withdrawal from Pertamina’s management in 1988 was at least influenced by two factors. First, it was a response to demands for economic liberalization in the country. Since oil was still the main foreign exchange earner, the management of Pertamina had to be handled by civilian professionals for the company to reach optimum efficiency. Second, Soeharto’s children began their business activities in 1985. Since the military’s other companies were no longer infant enterprises, it was in a position to withdraw from Pertamina, thus paving the way for Soeharto’s children to milk the giant oil company as much as they wanted to (D&R, 19 July 1999).

Institutionally, the military business is divided into two types, namely: (a) businesses managed by the Department of Defence and military headquarters; and (b) businesses owned by the respective armed forces (army, navy, air force and police) (Singh, 2001b). The businesses under the Department of Defence and military headquarters are yayatans (foundations), like Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, Yayasan Satya Bhakti Pertiwi and Yayasan Markas Besar ABRI (YAMABRI). In turn, these run a university, the Universitas Pembangunan Nasional (UPN, National Development University), and a number of property leasing companies, like the Sudirman business complex.

According to an audit carried out by the state auditor (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK, the state auditing body), the last foundation, YAMABRI, caused the government to incur a financial loss as huge as Rp. 23.436 billion (US$ 2.4 million) during the first half of 2000. Compared to the businesses run by the respective armed forces, however, the companies under the control of the Department of Defence and military headquarters were seen by the government as small businesses. Therefore, there was no contestation between the new civilian government under Gus Dur and the military over these businesses. The contestation between the two parties, however, took place over the vast array of businesses run by the respective armed forces.
There are two types of business in the respective armed forces: cooperatives and companies managed by a foundation. As the small cooperatives in sub-district and district areas, only sell basic goods to their members, these are managed by the petty officers themselves. The big cooperatives are managed much like the companies run under one of the various armed forces’ foundations; they are run by cukongs and civilian professionals. The activities of all these businesses lack transparency, no records being available as regards the assets or profit levels. Since these companies have been suspected of providing funds for the military’s political manoeuvres, at different times the people (particularly the students) have demanded that the government take them over. So far, such demands have fallen on deaf ears because the military has flatly rejected them. Moreover, civilian governments since 1999 have also realized that they lacked the funds to meet the military’s huge budget and therefore have allowed the military to retain its businesses. Here, the contestation between the civilian government and the military on these businesses has been limited to the government efforts to audit the institutional business of the military.

By and large, the contestation between the Gus Dur government and the army took place over the companies run by the military foundations. Under Kartika Eka Paksi foundation, the army has 26 companies in the construction, banking, property, timber and plywood sectors. The army also has other companies, like cooperatives, that operate from the headquarters to the sub-district army commands. Furthermore, the Special Forces under the army, namely, KOPASSUS and KOSTRAD, also have their own businesses under their respective foundations. However, there is almost no existing data on their total assets and profit levels. Although only part of the assets of PT Truba Group (some of companies under Kartika Eka Paksi foundation) are documented, these amount to Rp. 950 billion (US$ 95 million). The value of the rest of the assets is unknown. Meanwhile, the names of the army’s institutional businesses can be seen in Table 11.

According to the results of the state auditing body (BPK), much of the army’s foundation funds were spent in ways not
Table 11: Business institutions of the army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution/Name of company</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KARTIKA EKA PAKSI (foundation)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PT Aerokarto Indonesia</td>
<td>Remote sensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Asuransi Cigna Indonesia</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Cilegon Fabricators</td>
<td>Supplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kayan River Indah Timber Plywood</td>
<td>Plywood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kultujaya Tri Usaha</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Lukita Wahana Sari</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Meranti Sakti Sindah Plywood</td>
<td>Plywood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Meranti Sakti Indonesia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Mina Mulia Djaya Bhakti</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Panca Usaha Palopo Plywood</td>
<td>Plywood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Pondok Indah Padang Golf</td>
<td>Sport and recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Private Development Finance Co.</td>
<td>Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ofina</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PT Sinkora Indonesia Lestari</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Sumber Mas Indonesia</td>
<td>Logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Sumber Mas Timber</td>
<td>Timber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Tri Usaha Bhakti (Truba) Anugerah</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Truba Gatra Perkasa</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Truba Jurong Engineering</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Truba Jurong Engineering Pte.Ltd</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Truba Sedaya Industri</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Sakai Sakti</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kayan River Timber Products</td>
<td>Timber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Sempati Air</td>
<td>Air transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT International Timber Corp. Indonesia</td>
<td>Logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bank Artha Graha</td>
<td>Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Danayasa Artha</td>
<td>Property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 11: Business institutions of the army (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution/Name of company</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dharma Putra Kostrad (foundation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Mandala Airlines</td>
<td>Air transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bank Windu Kencana</td>
<td>Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Dharma Rimba Kencana</td>
<td>Logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Garuda Mataram</td>
<td>Sole agent for VW (cars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kobame Kopassus (foundation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kobame Propertindo</td>
<td>Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT KMP Tribuana</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inkopad (cooperative)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kartika Plaza Hotel</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kartika Aneka Usaha</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kartika Buana Niaga</td>
<td>Export-Import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Duta Kartika Cargo Service</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchid Palace Hotel</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kartika Cipta Sarana</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Mina Kartika Samudera</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Rimba Kartika Jaya</td>
<td>Timber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Mitra Kartika Sejati</td>
<td>Shrimps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kartika Inti Perkasa</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kartika Summa</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Mahkota Transindo Indah</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primkopad (cooperative)</strong></td>
<td>A small co-op found in every military territorial command (KODAM, KOREM, KODIM); it sells basic goods for soldiers and their families.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

commensurable with its normal military activities. This was easy to identify since there were no detailed records on the expenditures concerned. The misuse of expenditure funds in Yayasan Dharma Putra Kostrad (YDPK) was as huge as Rp. 207,437 billion (US$ 20.7 million) during the first half of 2000. Meanwhile, the auditor also found that Rp. 87,975 billion (US$ 8.7 million) and Rp.14,023 billion (US$ 1.4 million) of the funds of Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi and Yayasan Kesejahteraan Korps Baret Merah (KOBAME) respectively were missing (Tempo, 19 November 2000). Since there were no detailed records for the expenditure, it was suspected that the money was embezzled by the officers.61

It could also be that the money was used by the army to conduct military operations in the turbulent areas, like Aceh and Maluku. There is also a possibility that the money was used by the army to create political instability in the country; only by creating turmoil could the military justify its claim to maintain its prevailing role in socio-political affairs. Whatever the explanations, it was clear that the funds were not used to increase the soldiers’ prosperity, as often is stated by the officers. Most likely, much likely the money was spent to maintain the luxurious lifestyle of the high-ranking officers.

In order to show that the audit carried out by the state auditing body (BPK) was incorrect, the army hired other auditors to produce another set of results that indicated that all its expenditure could be accounted for. Many people, of course, did not believe that the officers did not misuse the foundation funds. Moreover, the radical reformist officers also rejected this second audit, believing that the status quo and moderate officers intentionally wanted to hide the truth. In order to prove that there were corrupt officers, at the time of his promotion to PANGKO STRAD in March 2000 (see page 147 above), the radical reformist patron Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, a hired an independent and well-known auditor (Price Waterhouse Cooper) to audit the accounts of Yayasan Dharma Putra Kostrad.

The auditing results that Price Waterhouse Cooper came up with surprised many. During the four months (November 1999—February 2000) of Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman’s leader-
ship as PANGKOSTRAD, as much as Rp. 17.3 billion (US$ 17.3 million) of the foundation funds were misused (Tempo, 30 July 2000).
The status quo and moderate officers were of course unhappy with Wirahadikusumah’s disclosure, seeing his action as unethical since it tarnished the military’s image in the people’s eyes. Since these two camps were still powerful and dominated the strategic positions within the TNI, they influenced the headquarters to remove Wirahadikusumah. In September 2000, he was forced to give up his commander post after only seven months (March–September 2000) in the Strategic and Reserve Command of the Army (KOSTRAD).

Like the institutional businesses of the army, the air force’s businesses also comprised cooperatives and foundations. Its cooperatives, however, were not run along the lines of the big businesses, like those of the army’s cooperatives, which manage the hotel, construction and services businesses (Table 11). The central cooperatives of the air force, like its smaller cooperatives, only sold basic goods for its petty officer members. However, the companies under the air force foundation, like Yayasan Adi Upaya and other army foundations, ran big businesses comprising 18 companies in the hotel, construction, timber, finance and services sectors (Table 12).

Unlike the army, which rejected government intervention to audit the accounts of its foundations, the air force allowed scrutiny of its financial affairs so long as the management of its companies was not interrupted. The air force also accepted the results of an independent public auditor, which found that as much as Rp. 13.98 billion (US$ 1.4 million) of its foundation funds had been misused by the officers during the first half of 2000 (Tempo, 19 November 2000). It also did not hire another auditor to challenge the government’s auditing result. The soft attitude of the air force was seen as a clever move to avoid tarnishing its own image. With the army’s case in mind, the air force pre-empted a possible barrage of public criticism simply by not questioning the independent findings of its messy accounts. It was a good exercise in damage control.

Under the prevailing circumstances, the taciturn attitude of the air force was therefore the best course of action to prevent further disclosures of improper disbursement of their foundation’s funds.
### Table 12: Business institutions of the air force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution/Name of company</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADI UPAYA (foundation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Angkasa</td>
<td>Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Chandra Dirgantara</td>
<td>Spare parts of airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Upaya Guna Dirgantara</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Khresna Puri Dirgantara</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Dirgantara Husada</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Padang Golf Halim</td>
<td>Sport and recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Persada Purna Wira</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Surya Dirgantara</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Purna Wira Sarana</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Angkasa Puri</td>
<td>Hotel and construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Angkasa Wana</td>
<td>Logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Aerokarto Indonesia</td>
<td>Remote sensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Konstruksi Dirgantara</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Dirgantara Air Service</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Jasa Angkasa Semesta</td>
<td>Construction &amp; services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Mediarona Dirgantara</td>
<td>Magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Green Delta</td>
<td>Logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Cargo Dirgantara</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INKOPAU (cooperative)</strong></td>
<td>This cooperative sells basic goods and other services to the air force officers working at Air Force HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIMKOPAU (cooperative)</strong></td>
<td>The purpose is similar to Inkopau but Primkopau operates in the territorial commands (the air bases and their complexes).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The move was also read as the senior officers’ strategy not to antagonize the petty officers since they were always used as convenient scapegoats. The high-ranking officers had always argued that the profits of their institutional businesses were channeled towards the ordinary soldiers. In reality, this was far from the truth.

Unlike the cases of the foundations under management of the army and the air force, the State Auditor (BPK) found nothing inappropriate in the accounts of the foundation run by the navy (Yayasan Bhumyamca) (Tempo, 19 November 2000). In terms of numbers, the companies run by the Yayasan Bhumyamca were fewer than for the first two armed forces, just 15 companies operating in the property, construction, electronic and services sectors (Table 13). The assets of these companies amounted to Rp. 200 billion (US$ 20 million). Like the first two armed forces, the navy also ran cooperatives which sold basic necessities to its petty officers.

Since the State Auditor did not find any misuse of expenditure in the navy’s Yayasan Bhumyamca, there was no further contestation between the new civilian government and the navy. But this did not mean that corruption did not exist in this naval foundation. Compared to its counterparts in the army and air force, the navy officers were less greedy. They only siphoned off small amounts of the foundation’s funds, a move regarded by the State Auditor as insufficient to warrant a full-scale investigation.

Although the Indonesian police (POLRI, Polisi Republik Indonesia) was formally separated from the military body from 1 April 1999, the institutional business of the police requires some scrutiny here. This is necessary not only because its institutional business started soon after POLRI was incorporated within the military body (ABRI) in 1967, but also because part of the profits had also been used to support military operations. Moreover, POLRI’s organizational structure is similar to that of the army. It consists of the regional police headquarters (Polisi Daerah, POLDa), the residency police office (Polisi Wilayah, POLWIL), district police offices (Polisi Resort, POLRES) and sub-district police offices (Polisi Sektor, POLSEK). These broadly correspond to the regional military command (Komando Daerah Militer, KODAM), sub-regional military
Table 13: Business institutions of the navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution/Name of company</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BHUMYAMCA (foundation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Bahari</td>
<td>Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bhumyamca Sekawan</td>
<td>Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Admiral Lines</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Yala Trading</td>
<td>Trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Yala Ladang Kurnia</td>
<td>Plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT KGA</td>
<td>Plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Dok Koja Bahari</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT ATMI</td>
<td>Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Halmahera Kay</td>
<td>Timber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bhumyamca Film</td>
<td>Film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Yala Persada</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Samudra Guna Maritim Utama</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Yala Gada</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Yala Laut</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Yala Gitatama</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INKOPAL (cooperative)</td>
<td>This cooperative sells basic goods and other services for the navy who work at Navy HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIMKOPAL (cooperative)</td>
<td>The purpose is similar with Inkopal, but Primkopal operates in the territorial commands (the navy bases and their complexes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

command (Komando Resort Militer, KOREM), district military command (Komando Distrik Militer, KODIM) and sub-district military command (Komando Ranting Militer, KORAMIL) in the army structural organization system. Like the army, the police had also committed many human rights violations. Given this reality, the new democratic regime insisted on auditing the police foundation (Yayasan Brata Bhakti), although it had already been separated from the military body. The audit was aimed at minimizing the misuse of the police’s foundation funds.

Similar to the earlier three armed forces bodies, POLRI also had cooperatives that operated from the level of police headquarters dawn to the sub-district police office. Under the Yayasan Brata Bhakti, POLRI has eight companies in the insurance, timber and garment sectors (Table 14). Relating to the police foundation, there were interesting results found by the state auditing body (BPK) to the extent that there was no misuse of funds in the foundation (Tempo, 19 November 2000). However, this was no indication that the police officers were clean and did not siphon money from the foundation. Like the navy, perhaps, the police only took small amounts of the foundation’s funds. As such, the State Auditor did not pursue further investigations since the government financial loss was negligible. Besides, it was also possible that the reason why the police took relatively small amounts of cash from the foundation’s funds was because officers could procure funds from other sources, such as vehicle taxes and driving license fees, among others. There was hence no necessity for the police to take money from the foundation unless it was absolutely necessary.

A study of the misappropriation of funds of the foundations (particularly those belonging to the army and air force) suggests that the military’s involvement in business has not been as beneficial as the military has claimed it to be. Military officers have always justified their moves on the grounds of increasing the soldiers’ prosperity. As mentioned by former Minister of Defence, Juwono Soedarsono, however, since 1950 there had been no tangible improvement regarding this (Tempo, 10 September 2000). In the year 2000, for instance, the latest salary and other benefits for sergeant
officers were only Rp. 9 million (US$ 900) per annum on average. For corporals, the picture was even more gloomy; their average annual salary and benefits were Rp. 4 million (US$ 400).

It was thus impossible for the petty officers to fulfill their basic needs based on dismally low salaries such as those mentioned. They also had to pay rent for housing as they could not afford to buy houses. In contrast, the high-ranking officers lived very comfortably. They had palatial homes, expensive utility vehicles and family businesses.\textsuperscript{62} Looking at this reality, it could be understood why critics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution/Name of company</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRATA BHAKTI (foundation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Tansa Trisna</td>
<td>General trading, timber, chemicals, shrimps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bhara Induk</td>
<td>Logging concession and garment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Braja Tama</td>
<td>General trading, logging concession, hotel and plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Braja Tara</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bhara Union</td>
<td>General trading and logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Asuransi Bhakti Bhayangkara</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Sapta Pirsa Mandiri</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Yudha Bhakti</td>
<td>Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INKOPPOL (cooperative)</td>
<td>This cooperative sells basic goods and other services for the police officers who work at Police HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIMKOPPOL (cooperative)</td>
<td>This is the small co-op found in every police territorial command (POLDA, POLWIL, POLRES); it sells basic goods for police officers and their families.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

demanded that the civilian government to take stern action against military businesses. Whether the government closed down the military businesses or took them over, the most important thing for the critics was that errant officers should no longer have the financial resources to maintain a corrupt lifestyle. To give legal basis to their demand in closing down military businesses, the critics referred to Government Decree Number 6/1974, which prohibited the military from running businesses. But since the new civilian government was still incapable of meeting the huge budget requirements of the military, it did not have any choice but to let the military continue with its businesses. What the government could do was limited to auditing the military’s accounts, the idea here being to minimize the corruption and misuse of funds in military foundations.

THE NON-INSTITUTIONAL BUSINESS OF THE MILITARY

As defined by Samego et al (1998b: 97), the non-institutional business of the military comprises those businesses owned by retired officers, the personal businesses of active officers and those belonging to military families. In contrast to Samego, who focuses his discussion on the retired officers’ businesses, this section examines the military family businesses. Such an approach is taken because most of the retired officers have already withdrawn from the business world. Moreover, like General Soemitro, many of them have already passed away. Furthermore, most of their businesses have been taken over by Chinese businessmen or are run by their children and grandchildren. For those retired officers who are still alive and have their names still listed on the boards of various companies, their positions are only nominal, such as director. Intentionally, the new owners of the companies put their names on the board so as to facilitate getting tenders and circumventing the bureaucratic hurdles when dealing with government institutions.

This section also discusses the foundations owned by Soeharto. The contestation between the new civilian government and Soeharto over his foundations took place after the government came to suspect Soeharto of using the foundations to fund various political man-
oeuvers. It was possible, therefore, that Soeharto was behind the political chaos current at the time in the Republic (Time, 8 February 1999).

For the second type of non-institutional businesses of the military, namely, the personal businesses of the active officers, there is no available data so far because, by and large, they only become the backers of cukongs. In addition, they also acted as brokers, particularly for military equipment and weaponry businesses, and as such were unhappy with the police when POLRI bought weapons from Russia directly and bypassed them (Tempo, 1 April 2001). These brokers do not run their businesses directly but through family members and cukongs. Thus they have not only avoided public attention but also avoided any accusation of having broken the aforementioned Government Decree Number 6/1976 prohibiting active military officers from being engaged in business activities.

In contrast, the family businesses of the retired generals still operate as usual today, some of which have been transformed into conglomerates. Table 15 gives a rough picture of their business empire. In particular, there are six families that have been successful in developing their business empires. They are the families of former president Soeharto, Major General Suhardiman, Brigadier General Sjarroebi Said, Lieutenant General Ahmad Tahir, Lieutenant General Ibu Sutowo and General Benny Moerdani. It is difficult to attribute their business success to hard work. More likely, it was made possible by the wide-ranging relationships between the retired officers and business society since their days of active duty. Success also came from their privileges in getting bank loans, winning tenders and choosing the most profitable projects.

In the context of the civil-military relationship, therefore, the non-institutional business of the military has been as bad as its institutional business practices. The generals and their families used force, including threats and violence, in order to gain tenders and develop their businesses. Not only has this damaged the development of a business environment based on fair competition but also at the personal level it caused suffering, particularly those forced to sell their land to predatory companies.
Of course, with such business practices, the businesses of the generals and their families thrived. This enabled them to maintain a glamorous lifestyle. At the same time, part of their business profits was contributed to Golkar’s political funds during the New Order period. This is related to the fact that most of the families of the generals, particularly their children, became members of Golkar, often holding leading positions. For occasional purposes, like conferences hosted by the military, for instance, the generals and their families were believed to have made financial contributions.

The family businesses of the retired generals support the political economy argument, that military involvement in business has not been to make ordinary soldiers more prosperous, as is usually claimed by the senior officers, but rather to maintain the luxurious lifestyles of the latter. Since the companies under the respective foundations of the armed forces only gave senior officers limited benefits compared to their personal business, this led them to finally establish family businesses. The generals could thus mislead the people by saying that their families were the real owners of the businesses and not them personally. As they were not directly involved in operating the companies, they could claim for themselves the status of *satria* who upheld chastity and justice (Koentjaraningrat, 1984).

Unlike the institutional businesses of the military where the civilian government had independent auditors to conduct checks on the accounts of its foundations, the same measure could not be applied to the family businesses of the retired generals, on the grounds that these were private. Thus, the government did not have any right of intervention. What the new civilian government could do was to cancel their business agreements, even though this caused financial losses to the government because they raised the cost of the projects. Since people were more concerned with former president Soeharto’s family businesses, the new civilian government focused its attention on them. The other retired officers’ family businesses were not examined since their political significance was not nearly as strong as the Soeharto family. By taking on his family, the new civilian government also expected more support from the people in governing the country.
### Table 15: Family businesses of the retired generals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Name/relationship</th>
<th>Group of Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soeharto</td>
<td>Sigit Hardjojudanto (son)</td>
<td>Nusamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siti Hardijati Rukmana (dau)</td>
<td>Citra Lamtoro Gung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bambang Triharmojo (son)</td>
<td>Bimantara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hutomo Mandala Putra (son)</td>
<td>Humpuss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indra R. Kowara (son-in-law)</td>
<td>Teknik Umum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ari Haryo Wibowo (gr'son)</td>
<td>Arbanas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibnu Sutowo</td>
<td>Ponco Sutowo (son)</td>
<td>Nugra Sentana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achmad Tahir</td>
<td>Adi Putra Tahir (son)</td>
<td>Hanurata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surya Dharma Tahir (son)</td>
<td>Hanurata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benny Moerdani</td>
<td>Robby Sumampow (partner)</td>
<td>Denok Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soedjono Humardani</td>
<td>Djoko S. Humardani (son)</td>
<td>Mutual Int'l Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saso Soegiarso (son-in-law)</td>
<td>Pakarti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salim Humardani (son)</td>
<td>Non-Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soedarmono</td>
<td>Tantyo A.P. Soedarmono (son)</td>
<td>Manggala Pratama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Ardiyanti and Bambang R. (daughter and son-in-law)</td>
<td>Non-Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustanil Arifin</td>
<td>Arifin Bey (son)</td>
<td>Non-Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arifin Sanaam (son)</td>
<td>Non-Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soemitro</td>
<td>Andi Saksmo Soemitro</td>
<td>Rigunas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugandhi</td>
<td>Mien Sugandhi (wife)</td>
<td>Trafindo Perkasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Soeprapto</td>
<td>Bambang Soeprapto</td>
<td>Techno Coemrsia Int'l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soerjo Wirjohadiputro</td>
<td>Adiwartsita (son)</td>
<td>Non-Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sorjanto Soerjo (son)</td>
<td>Summa Surya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasnan Habib</td>
<td>Teuku Sjahrul (son)</td>
<td>Mas Muda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoga Soegama</td>
<td>Bambang R. Kumbo Y. (sons)</td>
<td>Great River Int'l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogi S. Memet</td>
<td>Lili Sumantri (?)</td>
<td>Bandung Cipta Permai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z.A. Maulani</td>
<td>Haryogi Maulani</td>
<td>Balisani</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Iswandi (1998: 231).*
The first step taken by the new civilian government in its struggle with Soeharto’s family was to try weakening his family businesses by cancelling their business agreements with Pertamina. This is discussed in detail below. The second step was the examination of their mark-up practices on the value of government projects won by them. Here, however, these government efforts proved to be ineffective; up till the present, with the exception of Tommy Soeharto (see below), nobody from the Soeharto family has been jailed for their shady business dealings. So far, they have been just witnesses in the trial of former ministers who were investigated by the attorney general for alleged corruption when in office. However, although they only were called as witnesses, and not prosecuted themselves nonetheless the government served notice to all military businessmen, particularly the retired generals’ families, that they no longer had the privileged status that they had had in the past.

According to Professor Sadli, former minister of Mines and Energy in the third Soeharto development cabinet, Pertamina was treated like a cash cow for Soeharto family members to milk at their leisure (D&R, 19 July 1999). The money to develop their business empire mostly came from Pertamina. He noted that, before 1985, the financial health of Pertamina was not too bad. Although corrupt practices were already evident, conditions only worsened when Soeharto’s children began their foray into business in 1985. Hutomo Mandala Putra, popularly known as Tommy Soeharto, the youngest son of Soeharto, milked Pertamina through his company PT Elnusa Petro Teknik. His older sons, Bambang Trihatmodjo and Sigit Harjojudanto, used Perta Oil Co. Ltd. and PT Panutan Selaras respectively to accumulate their capital. They also had their own oil wells in Cepu (Central Java), Banyu Island, Palembang (South Sumatra) and Cirebon (West Java). These incidents showed just how badly Pertamina was being drained.

In the period from 1 April 1996 to 31 March 1998, for instance, the number of Pertamina projects cornered by Soeharto family members was a staggering 159 (Forum Keadilan, 25 July 1999), resulting in a financial loss for Pertamina as huge as Rp. 43 trillion...
(US$ 4.3 billion). By such an extensive milking of Pertamina, Soeharto’s family succeeded in developing their own conglomerates, namely: Humpuss Group (Tommy Soeharto), Bimantara Group (Bambang Trihatmodjo), Lamtoro Gung Persada (Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, so-called Tutut), Nusamba (Sigit Harjojudanto and Bob Hasan) and Arbamas Group (Ari Sigit, grandson of Soeharto). Their respective wealth is estimated as follows: Bambang Trihatmodjo US$ 3 billion, Tommy Soeharto US$ 800 million, Sigit Harjojudanto US$ 800 million, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut) US$ 800 million, Siti Hedijati Hariyadi (Titiek) US$ 75 million, Siti Hutami Endang Adiningihs (Mamik) and Ari Sigit US$ 30 million. The family also controls some 3.6 million hectares of land, an area larger than Belgium (Time, May 24, 1999).

Soeharto himself had run many foundations. In principle, they were established as charities, and indeed they funded a large number of hospitals, schools and mosques. At the same time, however, they also functioned as giant slush funds for the investment projects of his cronies and his political activities, including financing his political vehicle, Golkar. Of Soeharto’s 12 foundations, seven were most significant. These were Supersemar, Dharma Bhakti Sosial (Dharmais), Dana Abadi Karya Bhakti (Dakab), Amal Bhakti Moslem Pancasila, Serangan Umum 1 Maret, Bantuan Beasiswa Yatim Piatu Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikora) and Sejahtera Mandiri (Aditjondro, 1998). These seven foundations had accumulated funds to the value of Rp. 5.4 trillion (US$ 690 million). The remaining foundations were Nusantara Indah, Dharma Kusuma, Dwikora, Seroja and Purna Bhakti Pertawi.

According to the findings of Attorney General Soedjono Atmonegoro, the foundations received money from all state-owned banks (2.5 per cent of their profits), from businessmen (2 per cent of company income) and from civil servants (a portion of their monthly salary). Moreover, the foundations also gained money from other sources, like Bank Duta, where they were large shareholders in the bank. Nor was it only Soeharto to set up foundations; so, too, did his family (Table 16).64 As noted by Aditjondro (1998), however, no one knows the exact amount of money owned by their foundations.
The struggle between the new democratic regime and Soeharto family took place over the cancellation of 159 Pertamina projects related to his family and the expropriation of his seven foundations. The government rationale for cancelling the Pertamina projects was based on the audit result of an independent auditor, Price Waterhouse Cooper, which revealed that most Pertamina projects were mismanaged. As mentioned earlier, this had inflicted a financial loss for Pertamina as huge as US$ 4.3 billion between 1 April 1996–31 March 1998. As for the expropriation of the funds of the seven foundations, the new democratic regime justified this on the suspicion that the funds were derived from corrupt practices. They had also been used by Soeharto as his financial machine for all kinds of underhanded tactics, including buying the loyalities of officers and bureaucrats.

The government measure to freeze the Soeharto foundations, in fact, could minimize his chances to behave like a Javanese king who had brought the country down along with his own downfall. This meant the king could use his wealth to create riots and cause political instability in order to make the country collapse and the people suffer. The main purpose of Soeharto’s behaviour was that he wanted people to think that the situation was much better during his time in power when compared to the new government, said his critics. Unfortunately, the government was not bold enough to put him on trial for his corrupt practices. It did not take any action despite the fact that before he became sick, Soeharto stated that he was willing to be put on trial.

It appears that Soeharto was like an old tiger that still frightened people. This could be discerned by a government statement which asserted that it was very hard to bring corruption charges against him since he acquired his foundation funds from private businesses, not from state enterprises. Hence, the government ignored the fact that all state banks, for instance, had been compelled by him to give 2.5 per cent of their profits to the foundations. So far, among Soeharto’s extended family, only Tommy has been found guilty of a crime, initially of evading taxes when his company (Timor Putra Nasional) imported cars from South Korea.
THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AFTER THE NEW ORDER

Table 16: Foundations controlled by the Soeharto family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Name of Foundation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soeharto</td>
<td>Yayasan Supersemar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Dharma Bhakti Sosial (Dharmais)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Dana Abadi Karya Bhakti (Dakab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Amal Bhakti Moslem Pancasila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Serangan Umum 1 Maret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Bantuan Beasiswa Yatim Piatu Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikora)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Dwikora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Seroja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Nusantara Indah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Dharma Kusuma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Purna Bhakti Pertiw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Sejahtera Mandiri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien Soeharto</td>
<td>Yayasan Harapan Kita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(deceased)</td>
<td>Yayasan Kartika Chandra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Kartika Djaja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Dana Gotong Royong Kemanusiaan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siti H. Rukmana</td>
<td>Yayasan Tiara Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tutut)</td>
<td>Yayasan Dharma Setia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan TVRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Tri Guna Bhakti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambang T &amp; Halimah</td>
<td>Yayasan Bhakti Nusantara Indah (Tiara Putra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Bimantara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Bhakti Putra Bangsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommy Soeharto</td>
<td>Yayasan Tirasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Ikatan Motor Indonesia (IMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titiek Prabowo</td>
<td>Yayasan Kerajinan Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Hati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yayasan Pencari Dana KONI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siti Hutami E.A.</td>
<td>Yayasan Taman Buah Mekar Sari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mamiek)</td>
<td>Yayasan Bunga NusantaraS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aditjondro (1998)

without paying any duty. Subsequently, he was a fugitive from justice for two years. It was only in July 2002 that he was sentenced to 15 years in jail for masterminding the murder of a Supreme
Court judge, illegal possession of weapons and evading a graft conviction.

Rumours predictably spread among the people that the government was not serious about catching him. There were strong suspicions that the government, particularly the police, were bribed by Tommy, which explained to a large extent why he had not been arrested. Meanwhile, Bambang and Tutut were the only witnesses for the corruption case involving Ginandjar Kartasasmita and Faisal Abda’oe, the former minister of mines and energy and the director of Pertamina respectively. Tutut became the witness for Kartasamita, who was accused of marking up the value of Pertamina projects. The tender for this project, namely, the installation of gas pipes across the length of Java, was won by her company (Tempo, 22 April 2001). At the same time, Bambang became the witness involving Abda’oe, who faced similar charges over another project, the Balongan project in Cirebon (West Java), the tender of which was won by Bambang’s company.

The government action to examine Kartasasmita and Abda’oe, among others, was to remind both the active and retired generals that they no longer had privileges as before. In short, whoever they were, they would be investigated for corrupt practices and other criminal offenses (Tempo, 22 April 2001). This was what the civilian government could do so far in dealing with the retired officers and their families.

In contrast to the Soeharto family, the contestation between the new democratic government and the other retired generals’ families has yet to take place. The family businesses of Lieutenant General Suhardiman, Brigadier General Sjarroebi Said, Lieutenant General Achmad Tahir, Lieutenant General Ihnu Sutowo and General Benny Moerdani have operated as usual. The government also did not examine PT. Sarana Buana Handara, one of Ihnu Sutowo’s family companies, which had occupied government land illegally to build the Hilton Hotel and the Jakarta Convention Centre. This was because, unlike the Soeharto family, they did not arouse public resentment to the same extent. Politically, they were also not considered as a tool for the government with which to whip up
popular support; therefore, the government was prepared to let them operate their businesses as usual.

To maintain his wealthy lifestyle, Lieutenant General Suhardiman formed Evergreen Valley, which operated hotel and property businesses. He built bungalows in Legian (on Bali) and Puncak (in West Java). With his family, he also built serviced apartments on 5 hectares of land in Yogyakarta (Info Bisnis, 7th edition/I, 1995). His initial capital to set up his businesses was allegedly procured from PN Djaya Bakti when he was a director in this state company (1961–66). Soon after Soeharto took power from Soekarno in 1966, his regime changed the company’s name to Bulog (the state logistic body). Suhardiman, meanwhile, was appointed to his new post as top economic intelligence official in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Israel.

Compared to other retired generals’ families, however, the Suhardiman’s family business was modest. The Ibnu Sutowo family, for instance, had 20 companies under the Nugra Sentana Group. As a former director of Pertamina (1968–76), many believed that he gained his initial capital from Pertamina. As mentioned earlier, Pertamina had a US$ 10.5 billion debt when he left office. However, there were no reported figures on how much money he had siphoned from the Pertamina. Although Parliament had demanded that he be put on trial, the government did not take any action against him, fearing a threat by him to expose his White Book if he was put on trial. Ibnu Sutowo’s book allegedly documented a list of high-ranking officers who had gained money from Pertamina when he was its director. It was widely believed that Soeharto was on the list of names too (Forum Keadilan, 25 July 1999).

As shown in Table 17, Ibnu Sutowo’s group operated in many sectors: hotel, shipping, finance and agriculture. Unfortunately, there is no documentary proof of its net profits. From the hotel sector, for instance, before the 1997 Asian economic meltdown hit the country, the group made as much as Rp. 40 billion (US$ 4 million) in net profits per annum. At the same time, their financial sector made a significant gain of about Rp. 24 billion US$ 2.4 million (Samego, 1998b: 106–107). Since the crisis, there had been no results published from any of his companies.
## Table 17: Companies owned by the family of Lt General Ibnu Sutowo (Nugra Sentana Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT Adiguna Shipbuilding and Engineering</td>
<td>Shipbuilding, ship maintenance and fiberglass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Alas Helau</td>
<td>Logging and building investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Artana Pasific</td>
<td>Sea products and sea insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bali Handara Countr Club</td>
<td>Golf, restaurant and cottage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Cipta Paramuda Sejati</td>
<td>Storage rental and mgmt consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Delta Sentana</td>
<td>Trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT FMC-Santara Petroleum Equipment</td>
<td>Petrol trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Hendra Ghraha</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Indobuild Co.</td>
<td>Real estate and hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Inggom Shipyard</td>
<td>Shipbuilding and ship repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Intan Sengkunyit</td>
<td>Shipbuilding and ship repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kertas Kraft Aceh</td>
<td>Pulp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Nisdemi</td>
<td>Suppliers and sea equipment assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Nugra Santana</td>
<td>Stock exchange, marketing and property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Bank Pacific</td>
<td>Banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Pelumin</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Sarana Buana Handara</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Tirtajaya Shipyard</td>
<td>Shipbuilding and repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Tunas Tour and Travel</td>
<td>Travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Adiguna Mesin Tani</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Samego (1998: 104).*
Meanwhile, the family of Brigadier General Sjarnoebi Said built up its business empire in the automotive sector. Like Sutowo, many believed that he also obtained his initial capital from Pertamina at the time when he was the head of Pertamina’s maintenance division during the early 1970s. Like Sutowo, however, there was also no record of how much money he may have siphoned from Pertamina.

Under the Krama Yudha Group, Said and his family operated nine companies. These are PT. Braja Mukti Cakra, PT. Colt Engine Manufacturing, PT. Karya Yasantara Cakti, PT. Krama Yudha, PT. Krama Yudha Kusuma Motor, PT. Krama Yudha Ratu Motor, PT. Krama Yudha Tiga Berlian Motor, PT. Staco Tiga Berlian and PT Wira Dedana. Their two companies, namely, PT. Colt Engine Manufacturing and PT. Karya Yasantara Cakti, were allied in a partnership with the Japanese company, Mitsubishi. Together with Astra and Indomobil Groups, they became the three biggest automotive companies in Indonesia. From the automotive business, they made Rp. 105 billion (US$ 10.5 million) net profit on average per annum before the crisis (Samego, 1998b: 110). Like the Nugra Sentara Group, there have been no comprehensive profit figures for the Krama Yudha Group published since 1997.

The cases concerning the family businesses of Lieutenant General Achmad Tahir and General Benny Moerdani were basically similar. To maintain their wealthy lifestyle, Tahir formed Hanurata Group while Moerdani, together with Robby Sumampow, built the Batara Indra Group. For the latter, their businesses operated mostly in East Timor after Indonesia annexed the territory in 1975. Although East Timor became independent in 1998, Batara Indra Group still continues to operate in the country. Its main business activities are coffee and yellow sandalwood as well as construction (Table 18). Before the crisis, they made between Rp. 69–96 billion (US$ 6.9–7.6 million) in net profits per annum (Samego, 1998b: 121).

Meanwhile, under the Hanurata Group, the Tahir family has ten companies (Table 19) in the textile, hotel, construction and timber sectors. As with Sutowo and Said, Tahir’s start was made at Pertamina, where he was the general assistant to the Pertamina director. His initial capital was derived from commissions as high as
US$ 80 million given by Siemens after he had selected this company to successfully bid for the Pertamina tender in 1972. Before the crisis, his group of companies made between Rp. 30–35 billion (US$ 3–3.5 million) in net profits per annum (Samego, 1998b: 118). Like the other companies, there has been not a single figure on net profits reported by the companies since the economic crisis hit the country.

The lack of financial reports for all these companies indicates that the economic crisis which hit Indonesia from 1997 caused their collapse. They were not only unable to defray operational costs but also had no way of repaying their installment loans. The companies of Soeharto’s children, for instance, had loans as high as US$ 800 million from four banks. They have not been able to repay the loans. Similar phenomena also happened to the other companies in the country, whether they were military-related companies or not. Unlike South Korea and Thailand, Indonesia has yet to recover from the crisis. This economic situation was not only aggravated by the political instability in the Republic but also by the inability of the companies to adjust their business strategy. The crisis proved that they were only ersatz capitalists. They were rent-seekers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT Andi Baladika Agung</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Branta Mulia</td>
<td>Chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Motollain Corporation</td>
<td>Telecommunications equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Nee Diak</td>
<td>Shipping industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Rempah Kencana</td>
<td>Coffee and yellow sandalwood oil ind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Wawasan Globalindo Sentosa</td>
<td>Stock exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Widya dana Persada</td>
<td>Stock exchange</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Samego (1998: 122).*
Their businesses grew into conglomerates not because of efficiency but rather due to the huge loans taken out as well as the privileges given by the government. Predictably, it was easy for them to collapse and difficult to recover when the economic crisis hit the country so hard. Nor is this situation likely to improve quickly given the massive cost of reconstruction after the devastation of Sumatra by tsunami in December 2004.

Until now, the military businesses have been assumed to be great business empires. According to Lowry (1996: 145), this happened because many people could not tell the difference between the institutional and non-institutional businesses of the military. Except for the companies under the Army’s foundation, Kartika Eka Paksi, no other similar comparison had been made with the military’s other foundations. In contrast, the non-institutional businesses of the military were transformed into conglomerates. However, unlike

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT Bumi Sumber Sakti</td>
<td>Stock exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Rates Tori</td>
<td>Textile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Gula Putih Mataram</td>
<td>Sugar industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Gunung Madu Plantation</td>
<td>Sugar industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Hanurata Co. &amp; Ltd</td>
<td>Stock exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kaldold Utama</td>
<td>Timber and logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kartika Chandra</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Marga Mandala Sakti</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Malarapi Timber</td>
<td>Timber and logging concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Santi Murni Plywood</td>
<td>Timber and logging concession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lowry, who has argued that the political impact of the armed forces involvement in business was minimal so long as there remained close linkages between the institutional and non-institutional businesses of the military and its partners, the author would stress the opposite view. In fact, the close linkages not only acted as a brake on the economic and political reforms but also gave the military more cash to conduct its political manoeuvres. The military could even ask businessmen to give more money to support these manoeuvres. Therefore, the new democratic regime has needed to put a stop to this activity if it is to apprehend them in order to minimize this wasteful expenditure. The government’s ability to bring in independent auditors to check on the military’s financial expenditure is a key measure that should make it possible not only to control the military’s manoeuvres but also restrict the glamorous lifestyles of its top officers.

THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN THE FALL OF GUS DUR

In response to Gus Dur’s pressure for implementing its internal reform completely, the military reshuffled its top leadership four times during his presidency. This created difficulties for Gus Dur to consolidate his power. In other words, he failed to achieve his objective. This could be seen by the reluctant attitude of the military to implement its internal reforms as discussed earlier. This could also be discerned by the attitude of military headquarters in not supporting his political manoeuvres, particularly his decision to declare martial law and remove the Chief of Police, General Surojo Bimantoro. Meanwhile, his supporters from the radical reformist group of officers could do nothing to support him. They not only lacked the numbers (that is, they comprised only 10 per cent out of the total number of senior officers) but also they held no strategic positions within the military body.

Instead of succeeding to control the military, Gus Dur lost his power. Accusing him of embezzling money from the Yanatera Bulog Foundation and grant from the Sultan of Brunei (popularly known as Bulogate and Bruneigate) and violating the constitution, because he sacked the Chief of Police without asking for parliament’s approval, the Assembly (MPR) finally impeached him. He fell from
power after less than two years as president. On 23 July 2001, Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri was sworn in as the new president to replace him.68

The fall of Gus Dur was seen by many as a sad fact, particularly because he was initially expected to be able to solve Indonesia’s economic and political problems. Initially, his crafty road to become president strengthened the hopes of the people. Unfortunately, his political manoeuvres and policies, as well as his controversial comments, lost him the opportunity to make Indonesia better. Moreover, he threw away an opportunity to democratize Indonesia.

When Gus Dur was elected as president on 19 October 1999, many believed that he would be able to bring about a peaceful situation. This would hasten economic recovery in the country. Moreover, many were also confident that he would be able to force the military back into its barracks and into becoming professional soldiers. Relating to this point, Nurcholish Madjid commented that, in contrast to Soekarno, who failed to control the military, Gus Dur would succeed because he wished to make good his record as a real democrat (Nurcholish Madjid, 2000). Therefore, he would employ every effort in order to cut down to size the military’s dominant role in socio-political affairs. In other words, he would consistently put pressure on the military to abandon its dual-function role.

Gus Dur’s serious attitude towards diminishing the dominant role of the military in socio-political affairs could be seen in his policy towards it. Only one month after his inauguration as president, a major reshuffle was announced by the Armed Forces Headquarters involving more than 100 senior officers. From then onwards, army domination in occupying the position of Commander in Chief since the early years of Soeharto government came to an end. Admiral Widodo Adisucipto was handpicked by General Wiranto to replace him. Although the reshuffle was done by Wiranto, Gus Dur expected that the promotion of a naval officer would facilitate his control of the military. Moreover, the assignment of Tyasno Soedarto as new Army Chief of Staff to replace General Soebagyo, based on his presidential instruction, made Gus Dur even more confident that
he soon would be able to control the military. His confidence strengthened, particularly after the military conducted three other permutations. As noted by the Journal *Indonesia* (2000: 126), these took place as follows: (a) the second reshuffle was conducted in February 2000 involving 74 senior officers; (b) the third was in June 2000 involving another 122 senior officers; and (c) the last permutation happened in August 2000 involving a smaller number of officers.

However, Gus Dur’s efforts to control the military failed. His efforts to control Admiral Widodo Adisucipto and General Tyasno Soedarto, then the Commander in Chief and Army Chief of Staff respectively, and promoting those from the radical reformist camps to hold strategic positions within the military, in fact had only a limited impact on the military as an institution. The limited support he had from within the military and its junior status — within the radical camp, apart from Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Major General Saurip Kadi and Brigadier General Romulo R. Simbolon, most of his supporters were still at the rank of colonel — further undermined his manoeuvres. This was because most of the strategic positions within the military, including the regional commander’s position, must be held by at least the rank of major general. This meant the reshuffles only replaced one officer with another who came originally from the same status quo and the moderate reformist camps, namely, camps that disagreed with the idea of civilian supremacy and a return of the military to the barracks.

Unfortunately, his efforts to control the military were not followed by corresponding moves to maintain strong support from civilian politicians. Instead of strengthening the coalition among them, Gus Dur sacked Hamzah Haz, chairman of the United Development Party, from his ministerial position only one month after his appointment as Minister of Investment. This was followed by further dismissals involving Jusuf Kalla of Golkar (Minister of Trade and Industry), Bambang Sudibyo of PAN (Minister of Finance), Laksamana Sukardi of PDI-Struggle (Minister of Investment who had replaced Hamzah Haz), Yusril Ihza Mahendra of PBB (Minister of
Justice and Human Rights) and Nurmahmudi Ismail of PK (Forestry Minister). After the dismissals of Jusuf Kalla, Bambang Sudibyo and Laksamana Sukardi, most political parties began to withdraw their support from Gus Dur. They were angry with him, particularly in relation to his controversial comments accusing the sacked ministers of unprofessional conduct and being corrupt. Therefore, when the right time to attack him came, most political parties got their members in parliament to use their prerogative to question Gus Dur about his involvement in the Buloggate and Bruneigate cases. From then on, Gus Dur was forced to spend his energies on political manoeuvres against his opponents, thus neglecting economic recovery programmes. As a consequence, people saw his government as a failure and demanded his resignation.

At the same time, as we have seen, the military was also unhappy with Gus Dur for intervening so much in its internal affairs. After sacking General Wiranto from his post as Coordinating Minister of Security and Politics, Gus Dur had confronted the military not least in his desire to sack Major General Sudrajat, then the Armed Forces spokesman and ‘promote’ Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah to become KOSTRAD commander. Gus Dur’s moves were regarded as excessive by the military, especially among status quo and moderate officers. They accused him of messing up their promotion system, which was an integral part of the military institution. Moreover, he was also seen as too aggressive in opposing the military, particularly in relation to the implementation of its internal reforms. And here, of course, the military was concerned because these reforms threatened to directly lead to a reduction of its privileges in economic and political affairs.

Furthermore, there was another factor that made the military fed up with Gus Dur, namely: when making a decision, he always sought the advice of the Nahdlatul Ulama Council or the so-called Dewan Syuro’ PBNU (Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, General Board of the Nahdlatul Ulama). The military was worried that, if this continued, sooner or later Indonesia would be transformed into an Islamic state and Gus Dur would become the Saddam Hussein of Indonesia.69 Besides, he was also too close to activists, including left-
ists like the Democratic People's Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD) whom the military disliked since they were viewed as the enemy (communists). The military's displeasure with Gus Dur led it to conduct manoeuvres to upset his government and, if possible, unseat him. At least three measures were employed by them to de-legitimize Gus Dur. These were as follows.

First, as mentioned earlier, the military influenced the other parliamentary (DPR) members and political parties to censure Gus Dur. Specifically, the military representatives in parliament, supported by the retired generals, began to approach the other parliamentary members to censure Gus Dur when he was suspected of being involved in embezzling money from the Yanatera Bulog Foundation and the grant from the Sultan of Brunei. This military movement influenced Kwik Kian Gie and Arifin Panigoro to establish a loose alliance of the Caucus of November 11 and Jenggala group respectively. The military's support for the two groups could be identified by the presence of Budi Harsono and Hari Sabarno, chief of the military group in the DPR and Assembly (MPR) respectively, in the meetings organized by the two. These meetings, particularly those conducted by the Jenggala group, discussed the political manoeuvres necessary to get rid of Gus Dur. It seemed that Megawati supported her subordinates' actions since she had never asked them to dissolve the groups. She had even approached the military in order to gain its support. By her own visit to the headquarters of the Army Special Forces and the Army Strategic Reserve in September 2000, she expected the military to be her ally (Indonesia, 2001: 152).

Second, the military intensified the political instability in the country. As noted by the Minister of Defence, Mahfud MD, certain elements within the military were believed to be behind the violence in the country (The Straits Times, 5 October, 2000). These were, of course, the anti-reform generals who sheltered within the status quo camp. To destabilize the political situation and tarnish the Gus Dur government, they sparked off nationwide violence, such as the killing of shamans in Banyuwangi (East Java), the intensifying of ethnic conflicts in Ambon and Central Kalimantan.
and the bombing of public buildings, like churches, mosques and shopping centers. They were also suspected of being behind the 'sweeping' of leftist books in bookstores run by the radical Moslems. Besides, these actions were aimed at diverting the government’s attention away from their wrongdoings during the New Order government, particularly in relation to cases of corruption and crimes against humanity. By creating political instability this way, they kept the civilian government busy in restoring peace so that they could be left alone.

Last, the military ignored Gus Dur’s order and showed its displeasure towards him. In order to show that the military was no longer behind Gus Dur, the military officers, particularly the army generals, always declined his invitation to have breakfast together at the palace, preferring instead the company of Megawati Soekarnoputri, whom they visited a couple of times. However, the clearest sign that the military was no longer behind him was Army Chief of Staff General Endiartono Sutarto’s statement that the military supported his censure in parliament. This, he claimed, was to protect the people from the worsening situation. Moreover, he also stated that if Gus Dur insisted on declaring martial law in response to the MPR decision to impeach him, the military would not support him (Tempo, 21 May 2001). Besides, the military headquarters rejected his order as well when he sought to replace General Endiartono Sutarto with his supporter, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah.

For the Vice Army Chief of Staff position, he wished to promote Major General Saurip Kadi to replace Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri; for the Commander of the Strategic Command, he preferred Lieutenant General Kivlan Zen to Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu (Gatra, 26 May 2001). Unfortunately for Gus Dur, the police also disobeyed him when he sought to have sacked its Chief of Police, General Soerojo Bimantoro.

Both the military and political parties, united in their animosity towards Gus Dur, finally worked together to hasten the process of removing him and electing Megawati Soekarnoputri as the new president (Tempo, 11 February 2001). It seemed that Gus Dur was aware of the situation. In order to counter their manoeuvres, he
employed three approaches. First, he reiterated his claim to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, the Ming dynasty rulers and Raden Patah, the King of the Demak kingdom in fifteenth-century Java. Second, he spread news of the dream supposedly dreamed by kyai khos (the Islamic clerics with supernatural power) from Nahdlatul Ulama. This depicted Wali Songo (the nine saints who spread Islamic teachings in Java), King Airlangga of the Kahuripan kingdom from eleventh- to twelfth-century Java and King Brawijaya of the Majapahit kingdom in thirteenth- to fifteenth-century Java as supporting him to continue as president till 2004 (Gatra, 16 December 2000). Last, he went to Medina in Saudi Arabia to perform the istighosah (praying for the happiness of people in the Republic) in Raudah, a place near the Prophet Muhammad’s house. Moslems believe that whoever prays in this place, God will fulfill his or her wish.

Gus Dur also conducted other political manoeuvres, like approaching Rachmawati Soekarnoputri in order to influence her against her eldest sister, Megawati Soekarnoputri, who had agreed with the impeachment process against him. His aim was to show the military and politicians that even in the Soekarno family, there was a difference of opinion regarding the impeachment process against him. He expected this to become one of their considerations. Furthermore, he also established a Team of Seven to approach the political parties not to continue the process. This team consisted of Alwi Shihab (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security), Rizal Ramli (Coordinating Minister for Economics), Moh. Mahfud MD (Minister of Defence), Baharuddin Lopa (Minister of Justice and Human Rights), Marzuki Darusman (Attorney General) and Surjadi Soedirdja (Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy).

Looking at Gus Dur’s efforts to save his presidential position, it seems that he employed the political culture approach to regain his legitimacy and maintain his popular support. By once again highlighting his genealogical origins and praying in Raudah, he expected these actions would strengthen Moslem support for him since they considered him to be the descendant of Prophet Muhammad and a
person blessed by God for having prayed in Raudah. By spreading the dream of kyai khos on Wali Songo and the old Javanese kings’ blessing, he expected the Javanese, who were mainly abangan and weak Moslems, to keep supporting his leadership till 2004. With the support of these Moslems and abangans, Gus Dur wanted to show the politicians in the DPR/MPR that he still had popular support. Their effort to impeach him, therefore, did not reflect the people’s opinion; it was only their personal ambition. However, his efforts to stop the MPR Special Session failed. Using Anderson’s term for the Javanese concept of power, Gus Dur was like a dim lamp. Although he announced the presidential decree on martial law, he still lost his position. His political opponents succeeded in removing him.

NOTES
1 For a list of these 48 parties and for more discussions on the 1999 election phenomenon, see Suryadinata (2002).
2 During the New Order era, the number of DPR members was 500, with a quota of 75 seats reserved for appointed military representatives.
3 This number became 694 seats, since 6 (Golkar) seats from East Timor were abolished following its independence from Indonesia (referendum conducted on 30 August 1999). During the New Order era, the MPR had 1,000 members, made up of all DPR members (500 persons) and a further 500 members from the regional representative and functional groups.
4 Feith (1970: 14) notes that during the Old Order era there were five streams of thinking among political parties, namely, Communist, Radical Nationalism, Javanese Traditionalism, Democratic Socialism and Islam. The establishment of new political parties in the Reform era has been seen by the academics as the re-emergence of political streams in Indonesia. See, for instance, Hooker (2000: 307).
5 For further discussions on Pancasila and Political Islam, see Suryadinata (1992; 1998).
6 For more details about the 1999 election, see Suryadinata (2002).
7 These Islamic parties are: United Development Party (PPP), Crescent Star Party (PBB), National Mandate Party (PAN), Justice Party (PK), Nahdlatul Ulama Party (PNU), United Party (PP), Islamic Union Party (PSII), New Masyumi Party (PMB), Popular Sovereignty Party (PDR),
Moslem National Awakening Party (PKU). They were grouped into four faction, namely, the faction of United Development Party (PPP), Crescent Star Party (PBB), Reform (PAN and PK) and Daulah Ummah Associations (PNU, PP, PSII, PMB, PDR, PKU). There were a total of 10 factions in parliament. The rest of the factions were PDI-Struggle, Golkar, PKB, TNI/POLRI and the faction of Love the National Democratic Party (Kompas, 6 October 1999).

8 For the anti-Habibie movement, the supporters of Habibie, like Baramuli, Muladi, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, Djimly Assidique and Adi Sasono, were called the black Golkar (Golkar hitam) since they supported the status quo (Habibie was seen as part of it). This camp had approximately 100 members. Meanwhile, the term white Golkar (Golkar putih) was given by the anti-Habibie movement to Golkar members who did not support Habibie’s candidature for president. They were, among others, Akbar Tanjung, Marzuki Darusman, Fahmi Idris and Ferry Mursidan Baldan. There were about 20 persons in this group.

9 In contrast, as part of poros tengah, PBB still doubted the seriousness of Gus Dur since the latter often changed his mind and attitude. In order to anticipate Gus Dur’s withdrawal from his candidature at the last minute before the vote, the chairman of PBB, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, offered himself as a presidential candidate. After being convinced that Gus Dur was serious, Mahendra withdrew his candidature.

10 The root of their conflict was the NU accusation that Muhammadiyah only followed the scriptures and ignored the local culture. In short, for NU, Muhammadiyah did not observe the need for local culture to be adapted to Islamic teaching. In contrast, Muhammadiyah called itself a modernist party and accused NU of being traditionalist since it did not implement pure Islamic teachings.

claim that he was of Ming Dynasty descent, see Bangkit, 4 November 1999.

12 Habibie delivered his speech to the 19 October 1999 session of the MPR. In the vote that followed, 355 MPR members rejected the speech, 322 accepted, 9 abstained and 4 spoiled their ballots. See Bourchier (2000: 24).

13 He lost to Amien Rais who was supported by the poros tengah and Golkar. Matori gained 279 votes but Amien Rais won with 305.

14 In the beginning, Matori insisted on keeping his promise to vote for Megawati. This brought up the issue that there was a rift in the relationship between Matori and Gus Dur. Until one day before the election of the MPR’s speaker, Gus Dur still criticized Matori and accused him of receiving billions of rupiahs as bribes from PDI-Struggle. To clarify this problem, Matori conducted a closed-door meeting with the PKB faction. The rift between them narrowed after Matori stated that PKB would vote for Gus Dur. Moreover, he was more confident with his movement since the kyais who were conducting a meeting in Langitan, East Java had decided to give their blessings for Gus Dur to be elected as president.

15 Support for of Gus Dur came from the poros tengah (172), the functional groups (65), the military (38) and green Golkar (98). Megawati gained her support from PDI-Struggle (153), the regional representatives (135), white Golkar (19) and FKKI (17).

16 As mentioned earlier, the number of MPR members was originally 700 persons. Since six members from East Timor withdrew their membership at the time of independence from Indonesia, the total number of MPR members was now 694 persons only.

17 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Amy’s Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

18 Ibid.

19 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

20 According to Javanese belief, wahyu could leave the owner once he abused its power and committed crimes. See Anderson (1990); Koen-tjaraningrat (1984).

21 For evidence that Wiranto still held Javanese beliefs, see his statement before the governors’ meeting on 26 April 1999. He asserted that the parties that did not get popular support should not become heartsick and practise black magic on their rivals (Merdeka, 27 April 1999).

22 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).
23 See also, the interview in the daily, *Rakyat Merdeka*, with Kemal Idris (*Rakyat Merdeka*, 5 April 1999).

24 For more details on the religious conflict in Ambon, see *Media Indonesia* (12 December 1999), *Tempo* (6 February 1999) and *Tempo* (23 January 2000).

25 The government action to deploy soldiers from Wirabuana Military Command (Kodam VII) was similar with what the Dutch government had done in the seventeenth century. When religious conflict took place in Maluku, the Dutch asked the Sultan of Makassar to help them restore the peace. Since the kingdom’s soldiers deployed by the Sultan were Moslems, the slaughtering of the Christians could not be ignored. For more discussions about this subject, see Vlekke (1959).

26 For more details about the damages, see *Tempo* (6 February 2000).

27 Out of Rp. 4.63 trillion, 76% was for routine expenditures like the officers’ salaries, the other 24% was for operational expenditures.

28 Bakostranas and Bakostranasda were established on 5 September 1988 based on the presidential decision (Keppres Number 29/88). They were proposed to replace Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Command for Restoration of Security and Order), which was widely criticized since it often conducted repressive actions, such as imprisoning people without trial. The two institutions were included in this discussion since they were part of the proposals for military reform.

29 This stamp (OT) meant that the cardholder was seen as a member of an illegal organization and considered an enemy of the nation. This policy was effective from 1967, after the 30 September Movement (G30S) abortive coup that was claimed by the New Order government to be a communist rebellion. For details of the controversy on that affair, see, for instance, Anderson and McVey (1971).

30 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Commander of the Army’s Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999). For comparison on the military’s involvement in the *preman*’s action in destruction, particularly books associated with communism, see O’Rourke (2000: 401).

31 The Socio-Political Staff of ABRI was established on 29 July 1991 (based on the military Commander in Chief’s Decree Number 05/VII/1991). The aim of the establishment, among others, was to widen the military role in socio-political affairs and to tighten its control over society.
32 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army’s Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999). Also, see Suara Pembaruan (2 July 1999).
33 See Suara Karya (22 May 1999).
34 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).
35 Djaja Suparman was reassigned to his new post as Chief of the Military’s Command School (SESKO TNI) replacing Agus Widjojo, who was promoted to Chief of Territorial Staff. The former Chief of Territorial Staff, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was appointed Minister of Energy and Mines in the unitary cabinet of Gus Dur (O’Rourke, 2002: 360).
36 This contingency plan drafted the military’s planning to conduct destructive actions in East Timor in the post-ballot period. The military, however, denied it. For more details about this discussion, see O’Rourke (2002: 340–558).
37 They were Major General Adam Damiri (former commander of Irian Jaya and the Moluccas), Brigadier-General FX Tono Suratman (former military commander of East Timor), (police) Brigadier-General Timbul Silaen (former chief of police of East Timor), Colonel M. Nur Muis (former military commander of East Timor), Colonel Herman Soediono (former regent of Covalima), (police) Lieutenant-Colonel Drs Hulman Gultom (former chief of police in Dili), Lieutenant-Colonel Sujarwo (former military commander in Dili), Lieutenant-Colonel Asep Kuswandi (former military commander of Liquica), (police) Lieutenant Colonel Drs Adios Salova (former chief of police of Liquica), Lieutenant Colonel Lilik Kushardiyanto (former military commander of Suai), (police) Lieutenant Colonel Gatot Subiaktoro (former chief of police of Suai), Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudradjat (former commander of the Tribuana Satgas, a KOPASSUS unit), Lieutenant Colonel Endar Priyatno (former Dili military district commander) and Lieutenant Sugito (former subdistrict commander in Suai). See Van Dijk (2001: 561–562).
38 Interviews with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999) and Colonel Romulo R. Simbolon, Staff of the Armed Forces Headquarters (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).
39 Among others, they included, General Wiranto, Major General Adam R. Damiri, Brigadier General F.X. Tono Suratman, Brigadier
General Timbul Silaen and the former trusted assistant of Prabowo, Major General Zaki Anwar Makarim (Tempo, 13 February 2000).

40 Lieutenant General Endriartono Soetarto was a professional soldier and independent-minded. Therefore, he was highly regarded by both the military officers and civilian politicians at large. Besides, his position as a former presidential adjutant, like Wiranto and Tyasno Soedarto, made his relationship with these two generals smooth since he was seen as neutral to them. For more detail about Endriartono Soetarto, see O’Rourke (2002: 360, 390).

41 See interview in Tempo with Minister of Defence, Juwono Soedarsono (Tempo, 9 July 2000).

42 For more details about complex alliances between the military, foreign and Chinese bourgeois, the middle class and politico-bureaucrats, see Robison (1986; 1990).

43 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).

44 Ibid.

45 For related news about Gus Dur’s manoeuver to force the military to hasten its internal reforms, see, for instance, Tempo (9 January 2000); Tempo (1 Oktober 2000).

46 Mohammad Mahfud, the newly appointed Minister of Defence, agreed with Juwono Sudarsono. His opinion was that the strongmen (military and civilian) from the inner circle of the previous regime were behind the bombing (Reuters, 15 September 2000; Kompas, 28 December 2000).

47 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army’s Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

48 According to Hasballah M. Saad (Chairman of PAN); Faisal Basri (General Secretary of PAN) and Agus Miftah (Chairman of PARI), the meeting between Wiranto and Hamzah Haz was part of the military’s efforts to warn the civilian politicians in general and Haz in particular. In addition, they reminded the civilian politicians that if the latter did not agree with the military’s request on the number of its representatives in parliament, not only would the discussion of the Political Regulation be deadlocked but also political instability could arise. Discussion with Hasballah M. Saad and Agus Miftah (Jakarta, 6 September 1999) and Faisal Basri (4 October 1999).

49 The composition of the 38 TNI/POLRI representatives was: 2 lieutenant generals in the army, 8 major generals in the army, 11 brigadier
generals (9 in the army and 2 in the police), 2 major generals in the air force, 5 brigadier generals in the air force, 2 rear admirals, 4 commodores, and 4 colonels in the army (Kompas, 4 October 1999).

50 The former related to the corruption case in the Yanatera foundation of Bulog, involving Rp. 35 billion (US$ 35 million) and involving the presidential aide, Suwondo. The latter concerned the Sultan of Brunei’s contribution of nearly US$ 2 million to support the restoration of peace in the troubled province of Aceh. Since the president did not report this contribution of money to the parliament, they suspected that he had used it for his own ends.

51 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 Agustus 1999).

52 Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, The Joint Secretary of Functional Groups) was established on 20 October 1964.

53 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

54 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999).

55 For more details of this military doctrine, see the National Defence Doctrine (Doktrin Pertahanan-Keamanan National) and Tjatur Dharma Eka Karma Doctrines (Doktrin Perjuangan ABRI Tjatur Darma Eka Karma) (Staf Pertahanan Keamanan, 1967).

56 Interview with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Military’s Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999).

57 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

58 Interview with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Military’s Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999). Also, see the interview of Forum Keadilan with Lieutenant General Suyono, ABRI’s Chief of General Staff (Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1999).

59 According to Richard R. Robison (1986: 211–212) there were six sectors in Indonesian government enterprises, namely: (1) resources (Pertamina, PN Timah, PN Aneka Tambang, dan Inhutani); (2) infrastructure (PT Telkom and PLN); (3) banking (Bank Indonesia, BRI, dan BNI 1946); (4) manufacturing (PT Pusri, Industri Semen Gresik, Semen Padang, Krakatau Steel, PT Asahan, and IPTN); (5) commodities (Bulog); and (6) others (PT Perkebunan, PELNI, PJKA, and Garuda Indonesia).

60 This financial loss happened because the income of the Soedirman business complex, located on government land, was not deposited with
the government treasury but appropriated by the military officers. See, 
_Tempo_, 19 November 2000.

61 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant 
for General Planning for the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 
1999).

62 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant 
for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 28 August 
1999).

63 Lieutenant General Solihin GP called the officers who became backers 
of _cukong_ as _anjing herder_ (German shepherds). See _Info Bisnis_, 3rd edition, 
1995.

64 As for the foundations controlled by the late Madam Tien Soeharto, 
there is no record on who is running them today. It is suspected that 
Tutut took them over soon after her mother passed away.

65 Interview with former President Soeharto (Jakarta, 19 June 1999).

66 The first reshuffle was conducted by General Wiranto, the second by 
Tyasno Soedarto, the third and fourth by General Endriartono Soetarto. 
For more details about this discussion, see O’Rourke (2002: 109, 328, 390).

67 They were removed from their strategic positions within the military 
after a document, popularly known as the Bulakrantai document, was 
found. This document depicted a scenario of the radical officers planning 
to promote their patron, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, 
to become Commander in Chief. Many suspected this document was 
forged by their opponents in order to tarnish their image. Since the 
headquarters were dominated by the status quo and moderate camps, 
the radical officers were finally removed from their posts. For more 
details on the Bulakrantai document, see _Tempo_ (18 June 2000).

68 For further discussions on the impeachment process of Gus Dur, see 
Suryadinata (2002).

69 Confidential interview (Singapore, 26 and 30 July 2001).

70 Jenggala is the name of a street in South Jakarta where Arifin 
Panigoro lived. Since the opponents of Gus Dur, like Alvin Lie (PAN), 
Ade Komarruddin (Golkar) and Heri Achmadi (PDI-Struggle), used his 
house for their regular meetings, they were popularly known as the 
Jenggala group (Tempo, 11 February 2001).

71 To neutralize any conflict between the radical officers who supported 
Gus Dur and the status quo and moderate officers who were against 
him, General Endriartono Sutarto invited 55 senior officers to Army
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Headquarters for a meeting. This effected a reconciliation between the two opposing camps. Since then, the military could be considered to be solid. For more details about the meeting, see Kompas (2 March 2001).

72 For more details about this story, see Gatra (3 March 2001).

73 For more details about this discussion, see The Straits Times (7 June, 2001).

74 For more details about the Team of Seven, see Gatra (12 May 2001).

75 Instead of using the term Dekrit in this decree, he employed the term Maklumat. Since the term maklumat originally was Arabic, many speculated that Gus Dur intentionally employed it in order to get popular support from the Moslem community. Besides, there was another speculation that Gus Dur did not use the term of Dekrit because it would tarnish his image as a democrat. In Indonesian political history, the term Dekrit was associated with the dictatorial period of rule by decree after Soekarno dissolved parliament in 1959. Therefore, Gus Dur avoided using the term.
GUS DUR’S BRAVERY IN CONFRONTING THE MILITARY once again raised the possibility of the military returning to its barracks. However, this discussion became irrelevant following his downfall because his successor, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and her party, PDI-Struggle, were well-known for their their close relationship with an soft approach towards the military. In terms of the number of retired generals who joined political parties, perhaps only Golkar matched PDI-Struggle, with more than 150 retired senior officers enrolled in this party. Therefore, the rise of Megawati is seen to be associated with the military regaining its role in socio-political affairs, although the role is less dominant than before.

This chapter analyses Megawati’s supportive attitude towards the military and the efforts of the latter to establish its new role via internal reforms. It seems that the new role was similar to the Middle Way concept of General Nasution. In comparative terms, it is compatible with the Turkish model of civil-military relations.

THE PROMOTION OF GUS DUR’S OPPONENT
There is a counter argument which asserts that the close ties between Megawati and the military, in fact, were personal and not institutional. This only meant that her relations with the senior officers, particularly the Javanese officers, were cordial because they were good generals. There are indications that she disliked the military as an institution because her family had suffered at its hands during the New Order era. However, there was no evidence during her presidency or beforehand that Megawati was anti-military. Her statements and political behaviour, including her political approach as found in her book, Bendera Sudah Ku Kibarkan (1
Unfurled the Flag) (Megawati, 1997), were actually pro-military. This also could be identified by her support for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during the vice-presidential election after she was sworn in as President. The 118 votes gained by Yudhoyono originally came from anak asli (the old members of PDI-Struggle). Meanwhile, anak kos-kosan (the new members of PDI-Struggle), led by Arifin Panigoro (approximately 35 persons), voted for Hamzah Haz. Thus, the argument that claims Megawati’s dislike of the military has yet to be conclusively proven.

The soft approach of Megawati and her party, PDI-Struggle, towards the military was manifested in their preference to work together with the military. In the view of the vice-secretary of PDI-Struggle, Pramono Anung, PDI-Struggle considered the military an asset of the nation essential to the nation’s political processes. This reflected their acceptance of the military. Therefore, it was not a surprise when Megawati chose four generals to become her cabinet members. They were Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs), Hari Sabarno (Minister of Home Affairs), Agum Gumelar (Minister of Transportation) and A.M. Hendroprijono (Chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency). In contrast to the inauguration of Gus Dur’s first cabinet, which was only attended by the Army Chief of Staff, her cabinet inauguration was attended by the chiefs of staff from the various military forces. This not only reflected their acceptance of her as their supreme commander, as stated in UUD 1945, but also they were confident that Megawati would not interfere as Gus Dur had done with the implementation of the internal reforms of the military. Rather, she would give the military a free rein to interpret their mandate.

Such confidence in Megawati by military leaders was not misplaced. In contrast to Gus Dur, during her presidency she conducted few measures that displeased the military. In the case of the military reshuffle, for instance, she waited patiently until the situation was conducive to do it. Megawati also made no comments relating to the trial being faced by the officers accused of crimes against humanity and East Timor during the post-referendum period in 1998 or in
Aceh. Again, she kept quiet when military headquarters appointed a controversial officer because of his involvement in the May 1998 Tragedy, Lieutenant General Sjafri Sjamsoeddin, the military spokesman replacing Marshal Graito Usodo on 15 February 2000. It seems that she considered the promotion of Lieutenant General Sjamsoeddin as an integral part of the TNI consolidation repairing the internal splits of the Gus Dur era.

After Megawati became sure that the situation was conducive for the reshuffling of the military leaders, she did it. She appointed Vice Marshal Chappy Hakim as Air Force Chief of Staff replacing Marshal Hanafie Asnan and Vice Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh as Navy Chief of Staff replacing Admiral Indroko Sastrowiryono. Meanwhile, KOSTRAD's Commander, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, was appointed as Army Chief of Staff replacing General Endriartono Sutarto, who was promoted to Commander in Chief, replacing Admiral Widodo AS. Soon after he occupied his post, General Endriartono Sutarto reshuffled 143 officers on July 2002. This measure was believed to be targeted at officers suspected of belonging to the radical wing in the military, i.e., the group of the late Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah.

Studying the names of the officers promoted by Megawati, it seems that most of them were opponents of Gus Dur. General Ryacudu, for example, mobilized the soldiers and army tanks around the presidential palace in order to show his displeasure with Gus Dur as he planned to liquidate the parliament and declare martial law. His manoeuver was supported by the Army Chief of Staff, General Endriartono Sutarto, who stated publicly that the military was no longer behind Gus Dur. Although the new military leaders are known as professional soldiers, they are still not prepared to go back to the barracks. This can be identified from their reluctance to discuss the implementation of internal reforms. Moreover, when the Assembly (MPR) amended the 1945 Constitution at its Annual Meeting in August 2002, where one of the amended articles was the liquidation of the functional groups of which the military was a part, General Endriartono Sutarto spontaneously stated that he disagreed with the amendment. Furthermore, he proposed that con-
sideration be given to a new amendment making this constitution a transitional one or, if this were not possible, to return to the original version of the 1945 Constitution. Such military attitudes raised the question of what kind of role the military wanted to have.

BACK TO THE MIDDLE WAY
The military’s reluctance to implement its internal reforms is a good indication that, in fact, it did not want to give up its socio-political role completely. Up till now, however, it has not been clear what kind of socio-political role the military wished to maintain. Many senior officers, such as Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani and Major General Djoko Besariman, only stated that the military wished to maintain its role, which need not be as dominant as before. To understand the exact role that it wished to maintain, two variables are employed. These are the implementation of its internal reforms and the military’s perception of developments in Indonesian society.

In terms of the implementation of its internal reforms, these have been formally implemented by the military since the Gus Dur era. As shown by an earlier discussion on the economic and political contestations between the military and the new civilian government under Gus Dur, however, the military has been reluctant to carry through with its reforms completely. The conflict situation regarding implementation ended with the new supportive attitude shown by Megawati towards the military. It seems that she learned from Gus Dur’s experience that pressuring the military to go back to the barracks was tantamount to losing the throne. She therefore just kept quiet when the military broke the promises it had stated in the White Book.

With regard to the White Book of the TNI on its New Paradigm, three parameters could be used to evaluate the military’s seriousness in implementing its reforms. These could also be employed to assess whether it had overreached its security role or not (Mabes ABRI, 1999: 30–31). These parameters are as follows:

First, does TNI involvement take functions from the other institutions? TNI will be selective and consistent and endeavour
to limit itself not to involve itself in the fields that have no relation to security and defence affairs (Mabes ABRI, 1999: 30).

This parameter states clearly that TNI would not take functions from the other institutions and involve itself in non-defence affairs. A study of its reluctance to implement its internal reforms suggests that the military was still involved in functions of the other institutions, e.g., the non-defence role. It had maintained its 38 representatives in the DPR and ten per cent in the respective local parliaments (DPRD I and DPRD II). This was not its legitimate right since it did not submit itself for popular consideration in the elections. As stated in Regulation No. 4/1999 on MPR, DPR and DPRD, Members of Parliament must be elected by the people. Thus, the military’s appearance in parliament not only went against an important clause of the constitution but also infringed on the rights of political parties that had worked hard to gain votes.

Although the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) ended its Annual Session on 11 August 2002, with an ‘outstanding and historic’ recommendation that the military and the police give up their non-elected seats in the legislature in 2004, there were ways for them to maintain their representation in Parliament and the Assembly. They could grab seats through the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) and political parties. Given their territorial structure, moreover, they constituted forces that were always approached by political parties and other interest groups. In short, it was impossible for parliament to be purged of its military presence completely.

The military also involved itself in a non-defence role by continuing to intervene in the affairs of the police despite the stipulation in TAP MPR No. VI/MPR/2000 that their duties are separate, namely, the police would be responsible for the security affairs, while the military, as regulated by TAP MPR No. VII/MPR/2000 was in charge of defence affairs. Indeed, its intervention ignited conflicts between the two forces. This not only happened in Ambon (July 2001) but also in Sampit, East Kalimantan (March 2001), when the two forces were placed together to quell riots and ethnic conflicts in the provinces. In the military’s view, the police officers
were too slow in restoring law and order. The police officers on the other hand insisted that they were in charge and saw the soldiers as too arrogant since they looked down on the police officers. Finally, they fought each other, and the exchange of shots killed 12 people in Ambon and four people in Sampit.

In relation to the student demonstrations, for example, the military did the same thing, namely, it did not see the demonstrations as part of the people’s right to participate in politics but as an action that had to be destroyed since it could destabilize the country. Such a response, as regulated in TAP MPR No. VI/MPR/2000 and TAP MPR No. VII/MPR/2000, interfered with the police function, namely, as a force that was responsible for internal security. The student demonstrations were indeed part of security affairs and not defence matters. In Ikrar Nusa Bhakti’s view, the military’s attitude revealed that it did not consider the students to be sons of the nation but as an enemy. Hence, it adopted the doctrine of ‘kill or be killed’ when facing the students, not only clobbering them but also killing them in the process.

Such evidence illustrates that the military has continued to usurp the functions of other institutions, particularly the police, and has had not withdrawn from fields that had no association with defence matters.

Second, does TNI widen its authority and become a group that seeks its own interests only and sacrifices the rights of the other parties? TNI cannot seek its interests only and widen its non-defence role as its privileges (Mabes TNI, 1999: 30–31).

This parameter from the white book asserts that no longer might the military widen its authority Simply to fulfill its own interests and sacrifice those of other parties. Studying its actions, however, a contrary view emerges. The military’s decision to re-establish seven liquidated regional military commands (KODAMs), as stipulated in the Decision of Commander in Chief No. 98/P/V/1998, shows that not only did it not want to lose its economic and political privileges but also it wished to widen its structural power. The larger number of territorial bodies could be seen not only as the military’s attempt to address the question of instability, but also
to maintain its structural power. This, of course, would benefit political parties that had close ties with the military, like Golkar and the PDI-Struggle. At the same time, in contrast, it would harm political parties seen to be anti-military, like the PRD and pro-democratic NGOs.

The stubborn attitude of the military towards criticism by academic and democratic activists on its measures, particularly in relation to the headquarters' plan to re-establish the KODAMs, indicated that the military would take any action to maintain its structural power. In short, there was no chance for civilians to change its decision. The other indications that the military would take any action to maintain its structural power were reflected by its officers' reluctance to give up their civilian positions. When the civilian government forced them to leave their civilian posts the bombings and communal violence spread nationwide. As discussed earlier, many suspected that military elements were behind that violence (Soedarsono, 2000; Mahfud, 2000). In other words, the violence reflected military displeasure towards the civilian government since it forced them to abolish their Kekaryaan programme. By creating the violence, they also wanted to show to people that national security was in danger. Employing such reasons, the military could justify its presence in civilian positions. Meanwhile, the civilian government had to accept it since they did not have experience in dealing with the violence.

Third, did TNI begin to ignore its main duty? Its dominant role in non-defence affairs during the past distorted the function of other institutions. The New Paradigm of the military is aimed to revise it and integrate the defence and non-defence role as one (Mabes ABRI, 1993: 31).

The last parameter to evaluate the military’s seriousness in implementing its internal reforms was whether it ignored its main function as defender of the nation or not. An examination of the military’s efforts to support Golkar during the 1999 general election (as it campaigned for General Wiranto to be vice-president) shows the military’s wish to maintain its political role. Military headquarters even instructed the regional, sub-regional and district
military commanders to support the victory of Golkar. This meant the military was not neutral during the election as required by its internal reforms. When it realized that Golkar was no longer a promising party, since the students, academics and NGO activists were consistently against the party, the military began to draw closer to PDI-Struggle. The military expected this would save its interests when Megawati came to power one day. When Gus Dur began forcing the military to implement its internal reforms completely, an action seen by the military as interference in its internal affairs, the military finally joined forces with other parties to impeach him and support Megawati.

The military’s wish to maintain its political role, of course, could lead it to ignore its main role as defender of the nation. It would only be busy in conducting political manoeuvres in order to gain political positions rather than to carrying out its main duty. This would be worsened by its involvement in business. As noted by Idria Samego (1998b: 138–141), this indeed impaired its professionalism. The military officers preferred to meet businessmen than check on the professional capacities of their soldiers in the field since associations with the former benefitted them, particularly in relation to maintaining their comfortable lifestyles. According to Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Military School of Command, such a trend had taken place since the middle of the 1980s, when the military businesses became bigger and bigger along with the economic development in the country. Since its economic and political role offered it a better life than its role as defender of the nation, the military finally refused to give it up.

Studying the three parameters, it seems that the military had yet to implement its internal reforms completely. It still appropriated the functions of other institutions and neglected its main role as defender of the nation. Unfortunately, Megawati did not pay any attention to this problem. Thus, the internal reforms constituted half-hearted measures by the military, being only part of the military’s efforts to manipulate popular dissent, which had strongly criticized its dominant role in the past (Bhakti, 1999c: 16). By proposing these reforms, the military hoped it could hide its real aims.
Such a phenomenon was not new for the military, as it had done this many times. The military usually changed the term of its paradigms, like Middle Way, Dwifungsi, and New Paradigm or the so-called Internal Reforms, in order to hide its real goals. Indeed, arguably the military has never considered giving up its non-defence role.

Besides the implementation of its internal reforms, other ways to assess the non-defence role that the military wished to maintain is through its perception of developments in Indonesian society. Most military officers, by and large, presumed that the democratic transition taking place in Indonesia constituted a dangerous path for political stability in the country because most people still felt euphoria about democracy, when many restrictions imposed by the New Order government had been removed. In the military’s view, this could lead to political instability as reflected by, among other things, the establishment of more than 200 political parties, the student demonstrations, the separatist movements in troubled provinces like Aceh and Papua, and the emergence of the Islamic radical movement. At the same time, the civilian government policy on decentralization had not succeeded in calming the situation. Therefore, the military deemed that the civilian government still needed to be reinforced by the military’s presence in non-defence role. This was not only important to guarantee the process of democratization in the Republic and to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation, but also to bring justice and prosperity to the people.

According to the military, the civilian government could not just detach the military from politics. This was because the military did not believe that the civilian politicians could guarantee that they were able to handle two problems crucial to the stability of national life. The first was the protection and implementation of Pancasila and UUD 1945 (the 1945 Constitution). The re-emergence of political streams could threaten the continuity of Pancasila and UUD 1945 as a state ideology and basic law in the Republic. Many political parties, like the Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) and People’s
Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD), did not adopt Pancasila as their ideological basis. The former had adopted Islam and the latter, socialism. These were not acceptable to the military. It suspected that once these parties gained popular support, they would replace Pancasila with their own ideology as the new state ideology. Should that happen, automatically this would also make UUD 1945 invalid.

The second issue was the protection of Indonesia as a unitary state \(\text{(Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, NKRI)}\). The demand of many provinces, like Aceh and Papua, to separate themselves from the Republic was seen by the military as a threat to Indonesia’s continued existence as a unitary state. Another threat came from the provinces where most of the population was Moslem (like South Sulawesi, West Java and Banten) and where they demanded the implementation of Syariah Law in their region. Relating to this case, the military held that civilian politicians were not only incapable of delivering justice to people, but also had failed to restore patriotism. In order to protect Indonesia as a unitary state, the military had no choice but to re-establish its territorial structure. This was in line with its self-perception as defender of the state \(\text{(bayangkari negara)}\). The military would also resort to all kinds of actions, including the seizure of power from civilian government in order to protect the unitary state. As stated by Besariman, ‘…in the situation where the state is in danger, the military has no choice but to take over power even though it is only for a while.’\textsuperscript{15} In short, the military did not want to become a ‘fire extinguisher’, just called in when the situation was critical. Rather, it wished to be involved in decision making processes in governing the country, mainly because civilian politicians, so far, had been incapable of preserving a united Indonesia.

As mentioned earlier, these two variables (the implementation of the reforms and the military’s perception of developments in Indonesian society) could be used to identify the non-defence role that the military wished to maintain. Studying the half-hearted reforms of the military and its distrust of politicians’ ability to safeguard Pancasila and maintain Indonesia as a unitary state, it seems
that the military does not want to become a civilian tool only. The military is aware that, once it implemented the parameters of the reforms completely—namely, no taking of the functions of the other institutions, no broadening of its authority and no neglecting of its main duty—it would come under civilian control. This does not mean, however, that the civilian government would be able to control the military completely, reducing it to the role of a mere ‘fire extinguisher’. Rather, the military would maintain a role in socio-political affairs, although not as dominantly as during the New Order era.

However, in the post-New Order era, it is not enough that the military wishes to maintain a socio-political role; popular support is also necessary. Since the days since the Reform Movements swept the Republic, the military has been severely criticized by students and academics who took its leaders to task for the violent activities during the New Order era. But now the civilian politicians were divided. That the military should see such divisions as threatening the existence of Pancasila and the stability of the unitary state, in fact, revealed its wish to be continually involved in the country’s socio-political affairs and to share power with the civilian administration. But, in practical political terms, the military saw the conflict between Gus Dur and the other politicians (Amien Rais, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Hamzah Haz, among others) as an opportunity to regain popular support. By highlighting this conflict, the military reckoned that it would be able to convince the people that without its presence, Indonesia could not exist. The military wanted to make the people aware that only the military would be consistent in protecting and defending Pancasila and a unified Indonesia, unlike the politicians, including those claiming themselves to be reformists but who were only busy conducting political manoeuvres for their own interests.

The role that the military wished to maintain was therefore one that was ‘not solely as a civilian tool’ but nevertheless ‘sharing power with civilians’. The role difference is even clearer when one re-examines the New Paradigm originally advanced by the military. Here, the military stated that it would change its socio-political
role in several ways, such as from control to influence and from direct to indirect influence. In other words, this new paradigm asserted that the military would no longer maintain a dominant role as had been the case during the New Order era. In its characteristics, this New Paradigm, in fact, appears to be compatible with Nasution’s Middle Way concept. In a speech delivered at a Military Academy celebration on 12 November 1958, Nasution pointed out:

"The Indonesian Armed Forces is not just the 'civilian tool' like in the Western countries, nor a 'military regime' which dominates the state power, but is one of many forces in the society, the force for the struggle of the people (kekuatan perjuangan rakyat) which works together with other people's forces (kekuatan rakyat lainnya)."

(Nasution 1971: 103)

Many observers have mistakenly thought that the New Paradigm of the military was a new ideological cornerstone, directing it to return to barracks. In fact, what the military really meant was going 'back to basics' and not back to the barracks. Although these concepts are similar, the military interpreted them differently. In the military’s view, 'back to the barracks' referred to the military’s role as a ‘fire extinguisher’ that is no longer involved in socio-political affairs. In contrast, 'back to basics’ referred to its role as an instrument of the state but still maintaining its involvement in socio-political affairs. Although it would not be as dominant as before, according to this role, the military would still have its representatives in the Assembly and hold civilian posts in government institutions. Here, legal changes to MPR representation made since the New Paradigm was formulated may not be a great obstacle. Since the amended 1945 Constitution has abolished parliamentary representation of functional groups in the 2004 Assembly, it is believed the military would use the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) a means to retain seats in the Assembly. Moreover, the military could also support somebody who the military is sure would 'struggle' in its interest. Since the military infrastructure is strong, it would be easy for the military to do so.
The wish of the military to go 'back to basics' relates to its wrongdoings in the past. During the Soeharto administration, the military had a dominant role and committed violence in order to perpetuate his power. During certain periods, the military even became his political tool. By proposing its New Paradigm, therefore, the military expected to go 'back to basics', reflecting its wish for a situation where it was not a political tool of the executive. This was the time when the military had employed the Middle Way of Nasution as a guide for its involvement in socio-political affairs. It seems that Gus Dur ignored this military mindset because he interpreted the New Paradigm as the military's return to the barracks. Therefore, he tried to force the military to implement its internal reforms completely, failing to realize that the military's pledge to conduct the internal reforms, in fact, was only part of its efforts to reduce criticisms directed at it (as well as a means to heal internal divisions, as shall be seen).

Since both the New Paradigm and the Middle Way concept of Nasution have similar characteristics – namely, the military not wanting to be a civilian tool, its wish to share power with civilians and not wanting to dominate socio-political affairs – it appears that the New Paradigm can be considered as the corporate ideology of the military very much in the same manner as was the Middle Way many years ago. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, this ideology emphasizes its usefulness for the sake of military unity and its position within the state (Van Doorn, 1971: xx–xxi). Besides responding to criticism of its dominant role, the New Paradigm was formulated to keep its unity. In this context, it can be seen as the middle way solution to accommodate the conflicts between the status quo and radical officers that occurred during the Gus Dur era. The former had demanded that the military maintain its dominant role in socio-political affairs whereas the latter had proposed the abolition of its non-defence role. Thus, the New Paradigm was an arena for the two parties to reconcile their contradictory positions. According to Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, the middle ground agreed upon was a situation where by the military maintained its relatively high role in economics and relatively medium role in political affairs.\footnote{15}
This meant the military would resist if the companies under the foundations of the respective military forces perceived interference by government and civilian politicians. The military wished to manage its businesses freely without any intervention from government and civilian politicians. In the political field, it had scaled down its involvement in day-to-day politics. As a consequence of its relatively medium role, the military would only be involved in the country’s policy-making process while maintaining its representatives in the Assembly and cabinet.

As mentioned earlier, the New Paradigm also asserted that the military was not an instrument of the government but of the state, where its role vis-à-vis the president ranged from critical supporter of the leader to spoiler (opponent). This could be seen during Gus Dur’s period in office. In the beginning, the military supported Gus Dur since his policy did not affect its interests. But once Gus Dur began to intervene in the placement and promotion of the officers, as in the case of Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, for instance, the military’s attitude towards him changed. The military’s displeasure against Gus Dur became stronger particularly because he supported Wirahadikusumah’s idea on the abolition of the territorial structure at the district level. It not only began to ignore his orders but also went against him, as shown by its withdrawal of support when he declared martial law. Together with the other civilian politicians, the military proceeded to impeach him. It became the spoiler of his presidency.

The rise of Megawati to become president made the military less concerned since, in contrast to Gus Dur, who always forced it back to the barracks, she was more accommodating towards it. However, the military still maintained its role as critical supporter towards her only as long as she did not intervene in its internal affairs and threaten its interests. However, should she have done just that, it is likely that the military would have assumed the role of spoiler again. However, such was not necessary as both sides shared similar ideas, like committing to protect Pancasila as the state ideology and Indonesia as a unitary state.

The good relationship between Megawati and the military does not mean that Megawati trusted them fully. She continued to be
watchful. Her appointment as head of Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Badan Inteljen Nasional, BIN) of Lieutenant General Hendroprijono, an officer who did not enjoy good relations with the top military brass, was proof of that. Hendroprijono was not just given the role of being her means to reduce military control over intelligence but also as the source of information for Megawati to know the true political situation. Up to the 2004 election, Hendroprijono’s support for Megawati was thought to be significant. Hence, in the final days of her presidency after her electoral defeat by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, she rewarded Hendroprijono by promoting him to full generalship. The same promotion was given to her Minister for Home Affairs, Lieutenant General Hari Sabarno, who was believed to have mobilized the bureaucracy in her support.

The relatively harmonious relationship between Megawati and the military was not only due to her conciliatory attitude towards the military; in addition, this was due to the recurrence of a split within the military body. Two cases triggered this internal split: the killing on 10 November 2001 of Theys Hiyo Uluay, a Papuan leader working for Papuan independence, and the growing insurgency in Aceh. With regard to the Papuan case, there were mutual accusations traded between KOPASSUS and KOSTRAD as to who was responsible for the murder. Indeed, both sides laid claim to being the best military unit; it was impossible for such an elite body to be involved in political assassination. The bad relations between them intensified when four officers from KOPASSUS were brought to trial for the murder.

As for Aceh, the Army Chief of Staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, was believed to be disappointed with the Commander-in-Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, since the latter was too slow in initiating military action against the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Here, he was too slow because he followed Megawati’s leadership style, which was always to procrastinate on the declaration of martial law in Aceh. Although martial law was finally declared on 16 May 2003, from the KASAD’s perspective its implementation came too late. Such different views among the military elite reflected the split among them and this preoccupa-
tion with internal consolidation led them to pay less attention to Megawati’s leadership. Consequently, their relationship stayed relatively smooth.

But military support for Megawati changed with the approach of the 2004 election. The victory of General Wiranto at the Golkar convention on 20 April 2004 led to his presidential candidacy under the Golkar banner while the resignation of General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister on Politics and Security led to his presidential candidacy under the Democrat Party banner. All this meant that the military was no longer solidly behind her. While it was true that the military did not exercise its right to vote and had expressed neutrality, there were indicators that not all the officer corps adhered to it. They not only pressed their family members to choose the presidential candidate with the military background but also mobilized the people. The case of Pesantren Al-Zaytun (in Indramayu, West Java) was one example which clearly indicated the absence of military neutrality. With the use of buses and the military trucks, voters were transported to Al-Zaytun to participate in the general election there. Their choice was former Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto. The problem was that they had already exercised their voting rights elsewhere.

Megawati had seen a decline in her popularity because she was seen to have neglected the ‘small people’ who once were her main supporters. This plus the shift of military support from Megawati to ex-military presidential candidates (General Wiranto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) all further weakened her position. Even so, as the incumbent president, Megawati still possessed strong political sources that enabled her to survive through to the second round of the presidential elections together with the popular Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono whereas Wiranto together with the other candidates (Amien Rais of PAN and Hamzah Haz of PPP) stumbled in the first round on 5 July 2004. In the second-round election on 20 September 2004, a combination of changed popular sentiments and military support led to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s electoral victory to become the first Indonesia president to win office via direct elections, defeating the incumbent President Megawati. The choice of a new
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president with a military background begs the question on future civil-military relations in the Republic. What model of civil-military relations can be expected?

THE TURKISH MODEL OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?
The ‘reactive’ attitude of the military is a key to understanding the TNI. During the Gus Dur era, such an attitude was shown when the military disapproved of the president’s excessive interference in its internal affairs, particularly in relation to the implementation of its internal reforms and promotion of the officers to hold strategic positions within the military body. To demonstrate that it no longer supported his leadership, the military mobilized its soldiers (and army tanks) around the presidential palace. When Gus Dur dissolved parliament and declared martial law, the military ignored his orders to support him. Without the military support, it was difficult for Gus Dur to save his presidential position. This fact showed that, in fact, the military is still a real political force in Indonesia. It not only has a strong infrastructure but also operates the big businesses and controls the intelligence units.

There was no reason for the military to be ‘reactive’ towards Megawati’s leadership. Her supportive attitude towards the military reassured it. In contrast to its acceptance of her, the military, by and large, was displeased with other politicians. During the 2002 Assembly Annual Meeting, the Commander in Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, reacted strongly over the amendment of the 1945 Constitution being discussed in the Assembly. This came about because the military considered it to be only in the politicians’ interest and not in the interests of the nation. This can be seen from their rejection of the establishment of the Commission on the Constitution. Therefore, the military proposed for consideration that the amended constitution be regarded as a transitional constitution or the Assembly return to the original texts of the 1945 Constitution. The military, however, did not force a showdown on the issue as the Assembly agreed to a gentlemen’s agreement on the subject, including that the Assembly would not amend the preamble of the 1945 Constitution or alter the form of the state from being a unitary state with a presidential cabinet.
The reactive attitude of the military towards Gus Dur and the amendment of the 1945 Constitution reminded the people of its past attitude five decades ago. Disagreeing with the politicians’ intervention in its internal reforms, the military aimed a canon at the presidential palace to pressure President Soekarno into dissolving the parliament and conducting an election as soon as possible. This military pressure upon the president, better known as the 17 October 1952 Affair, failed since the military was still weak at that time. As a result, the Army Chief of Staff, General A.H. Nasution, was sacked by the government. However, after the military consolidated its organization in Yogyakarta in the middle years of the 1950s and, encouraged by its involvement in extinguishing the regional rebellions, it started to consolidate its position as a defence and political force, although for the latter its role was still limited. Applying the Middle Way concept that was formulated by Nasution on 12 November 1958, the military did not want either to be a political tool of civilian or a military regime. Hence, the military used the Middle Way concept as a corporate ideology of the military, where its role in political affairs was limited but strong in economic affairs. In line with this, the military will interfere in the political arena, including taking over power, but only when the situation is dangerous for the country. Once the situation is under control, the military will return power to civilian control through a free and fair election.

The reactive attitude of the military towards Gus Dur, the amendment of the 1945 Constitution during the 2002 Assembly Annual Meeting and its commitment to take over power temporarily if the nation is in danger, all strengthen the argument discussed earlier that the New Paradigm of the military is in fact similar with the Middle Way concept. The reactive attitude of the TNI, which constitutes the main characteristic of the Middle Way concept, is not unlike the attitude of the Turkish military. Like the TNI, the Turkish military also upholds secular values. This originated from Kemal Ataturk’s teachings that have been followed by the Turkish Army until today.

Immediately after Ataturk was inaugurated as the first president of Turkey at the end of the First World War, he removed his
uniform. From his speech in Konya city during the early days of his leadership, it was clear that he believed in civilian supremacy. He stated firmly that the military had to be under civilian control. At the same time, however, he also asserted that the duty of the Turkish military was to defend the viability of modern Turkey from both internal and external threats. To fulfill his teaching, the Turkish military staged coups three times against civilian governments in order to defend Turkey as a secular state and save her from sectarian politics (political Islam) imposed by the civilian government. These three coups took place during the governments of Adnan Menderes (1960), Sulaiman Demirel (1971) and Bulen Ecevit (1980).

In every coup, the military straightened up the chaotic political situation and thereafter conducted a free and fair election. After the new government was established, the military returned the power to them. Such a reactive attitude of the Turkish military, although not in possession of the Middle Way concept like the TNI, allowed it to resist becoming a civilian tool or military regime. In short, it can be said that the Middle Way concept is similar to the Turkish model of civil–military relations. Here, the military, using Cohen’s category of the military role, becomes the Guardian Military (Cohen, 1992). It is the guardian of the nation.

NOTES
1 Confidential interview (Singapore, 26 and 30 July 2001).
2 After Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono lost his vice-presidential candidature, anak asli of PDI-Struggle then voted for Hamzah Haz. They had no choice but voted for him since the other candidate, Akbar Tanjung of Golkar, received strong resistance from students and academics over his candidature.
3 Discussion with Pramono Anung of PDI-Struggle (Singapore, 3 May 2001).
4 For more detail on General Safrie Sjamsoeddin’s promotion, see Kompas (16 February 2002).
5 For the position of Commander in Chief, Headquarters suggested two names, namely, General Djamari Chaniago and General Endriartono Sutarto. However, due to General Djamari Chaniago’s suspected close
links with Gus Dur, Megawati finally proposed only one candidate's name to the parliament, namely, General Endriartono Sutarto. For more detail, see Imanuddin (*Jakarta Post*, 22 May 2002).

6 Interview with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Military's Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999).

7 Interview with Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani, Chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Jakarta, 18 August 1999).

8 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army's Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

9 Interview with Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, Assistant for General Planning to the Commander in Chief (Jakarta, 27 August 1999). However, the military's support for Golkar was not as direct as before. They just called on businessmen to contribute money for Golkar's electoral activities.

10 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army's Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

11 For further discussions on the decentralization policy, see, for instance, Goodpaster and David Ray (2000) and Nombo (2000).

12 Interviews with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Military's Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999) and Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army's Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

13 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army's Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

14 Interview with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Military's Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999), Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani, Chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Jakarta, 18 August 1999) and Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army's Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

15 Interview with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Military's Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999).

16 For more discussions on the opportunistic attitude of the politicians, see Pabotinggi (*Kompas*, 9 August 2002).

THE THINK-TANK SOEGENG SARJADI SYNDICATE (SSS) is a non-profit organisation based in Jakarta. On 16 April 2004, it announced that the result of a poll it had just conducted showed that people thought the best pairing of presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the 2004 election was that of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla (Jakarta Post, 17 April 2004). This pair was considered to be the best because the two men represented a combination of elements: Java and outside Java, nationalism and Islam, military and civilian as well as indecisiveness and decisiveness. The first strand of these paired elements belonged to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the latter to Jusuf Kalla. In contrast, the other pairings (i.e. Megawati Soekarnoputri–Hasyim Muzadi, Amien Rais–Siswono Yudhohusodo, Wiranto–Solahuddin Wahid and Hamzah Haz–Agum Gumilar) in general only represented one strand of the coupling and was nowhere as comprehensive. It was thus not surprising that the pair of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono–Jusuf Kalla finally won the greatest popular support and were elected president and vice-president of Indonesia respectively. The presidential oath was administered on 20 October 2004. The peoples’ hopes are high for the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government. They hope the new government can soon overcome all the nation’s problems such as economic crisis, corruption, unemployment, communal conflict and terrorism.

But before the new government could function properly, a tsunami overwhelmed the provinces of Aceh and North Sumatra on 26 December 2004 causing more than 105,000 fatalities and damage
totalling around 20 trillion rupiah (USD 20 billion). Supported by friendly nations that gave assistance in the form of funds, equipment and food, together with civilian and military volunteers, the SBY government tried as quickly as possible to overcome the consequences of this disaster. The presence of volunteers (5,500 civilians and 3,300 military personnel) at the disaster locations triggered a debate between President Yudhoyono and the commander-in-chief General Endriartono Sutarto on the one side versus Vice President Jusuf Kalla, the coordinator of the National Co-ordinating Body for Disaster Handling in Aceh and North Sumatra, on the other side (Kompas, January 2005).

Both the president and the commander-in-chief agreed that the foreign volunteers (especially the military ones) could stay in Aceh and North Sumatra till 26 March 2005. With sufficient time and adequate equipment, they it was expected that they would be able to expedite their efforts at ‘situation recovery’ in the disaster locations (i.e. much more than could be achieved by civilian volunteers). In short, both the president and the commander-in-chief were realists in facing the problem. However, it appeared that the vice president disagreed with this March deadline, which he considered was too long. He pushed for the departure of foreign volunteers, especially military personnel, to leave Aceh and North Sumatra as soon as possible, believing that their prolonged presence harmed the image of Indonesia as a sovereign nation. Apart from that, their presence was also a blow to the pride of a government that was eager to show its people and the world that this government can truly handle the problems in Aceh and North Sumatra with its own resources.

Apart from the debate between president, commander of TNI and vice president on the presence of foreign troops, the disaster in Aceh and Northern Sumatra poses a double-edged sword for the SBY government. On the one hand, the Indonesian people know that, if the SBY government fails to implement the policies it elected on, this is because of its need to focus on disaster-handling efforts. On the other hand, the government’s belated response in handling the disaster finally revealed the very weak coordination among ministers in the new government. Such a situation has led to speculation that
the disaster in Aceh and North Sumatra has actually helped to save the image of SBY government. In other words, if this disaster had not happened, the public image of the SBY government would have slipped by now. After 100 days of the Yudhoyono presidency, there is still no strong signal that can convince the electorate that this government is serious in the implementation of its campaign promises for a pro-people action programme.

The disaster in Aceh and North Sumatra has served notice to President Yudhoyono that coordination between his ministers leaves much to be desired. As such, consolidation and political communication must work in tandem among the government officials. This is the prerequisite for the SBY government if it wants to overcome the manifold problems faced by the Indonesian people. Without such a step, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the new government is swamped by waves of corruption, collusion, nepotism, unemployment, communal conflict and terrorism, among others.

Especially on the terrorist problem, it seems that the position of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is not that different from Megawati’s position when she was president. Like Megawati, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also faces difficult choices. This is related to the United States’ accusation that international terrorist networks operate in Indonesia and its request that the government be firm in taking action against the radical Islamic groups in the country. Without sufficient evidence, however, it was impossible for Megawati at that time to act without angering other Islamic groups. Unfortunately, this situation was exploited by Islamic party leaders who used terrorism issues as their political tool to gain popular support from the Moslem community. Hence, they refuted the American accusation that said there were terrorists living in Indonesia. Even Hamzah Haz, then vice president, took the same stance. He stated that it was impossible that there was a terrorist among Indonesian Moslems and irrational to include Indonesia in the Jamaah Islamiah (JI) and Al-Qaeda networks. They were in denial that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, for instance, was part of the Jamaah Islamiah, an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Whether the accusation is correct or not, such a development was seen by the military as a threat since
it was not only dangerous for political stability in the Republic but also a threat to the existence of Pancasila as a state ideology.

Several bomb incidents, like those that happened in Bali at Padi’s Cafe and the Sari Club (on 2 September 2002) and in Jakarta at the J.W. Marriot Hotel (5 August 2003) and Australian Embassy (9 September 2004), proved the military was right to worry over the continuation of Pancasila as a state ideology. It stiffened the military’s resolve to be more serious in developing its territorial structure to tackle the emerging Islamic radical movements in the country. Therefore, soon after the Bali bombing, the Army Chief of Staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, immediately travelled around Indonesia instructing territorial commanders and other officers to act independently – no need to wait for orders from headquarters – now that there was a movement that could threaten the political stability of the country. He also instructed the officers to strengthen their relationships with bureaucrats, political parties, business people and other local leaders.

Such an immediate response from the military could be seen as part of its full support for Megawati, then president, since she was less decisive when faced with Islamic groups (Sudarsono, 2002). This response was also to pressure, if not liquidate, paramilitary groups, especially religious ones, because since the end of the New Order they had become competitors for the military to gain money (Mietzner, 2002). As the military and police, they successfully claimed a share of the lucrative protection business. Such a reality is ironic since the paramilitaries, by and large, were formed by the military during Soeharto’s era to be used as a political instrument to face down other forces against the regime, particularly in troubled areas like East Timor, West Irian (Papua), the Moluccas and Poso (Southeast Sulawesi). If it is linear politics, the choice of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president automatically raised the military’s hopes for a strong government policy on radical Islamic movements in general and terrorism in particular. There are hopes that, as a former general, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will have a more determined attitude compared to his predecessor, Megawati.
Regarding the military’s worry over the survival of Pancasila as the state ideology, it seems that its agreement not to be involved in day-to-day politics is an unlikely scenario of future civil-military relations in Indonesia. The retrogressive development of their relations will possibly take place. This can be seen from several articles of Regulation Number 34/2004 on the Indonesian military that give the opportunity for the military to be involved in politics again. Article 7 (clause 2), for example, mentions that in conducting its basic task – that is, to uphold national sovereignty and defend the Republic’s territorial integrity – the military can undertake both combat and non-combat operations. Here, the sensitive issue is the military rights in pursuing non-combat operations because included in this remit is assistance to regional government (which is of course a part of the political arena). Military involvement in regional government thus can be seen as efforts by the military to be involved in politics even if this cannot be said to be political involvement as such.

Apart from the above laws, other factors that may determine the return of the military to the political arena is Western views of the seriousness of the civilian government in dealing with radical Islam and the less reformist attitude of the younger generation of the military compared to their seniors now in power.

Western views on civilian government in the developing world has shifted, especially in the United States since its declaration of war against terrorism after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack. Issues like democratization and the military’s withdrawal from the political arena are no longer on Washington’s foreign policy agenda. In fact, the United States is disappointed with civilian governments in developing countries for being too slow and weak in responding to terrorist threats. In the Indonesian case, such United States disappointment was exemplified by the strong criticism of Indonesia by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz. He criticized the Indonesian government for doing nothing to suppress terrorism in the country and the United States took a dim view of the country for not supporting American efforts in tackling terrorism (Kompas, 11 October 2002). Following his comments, United States military aid to Indonesia was postponed temporarily. Even the endeavours...
taken by the current Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, for the resumption of military aid have not shown any encouraging signs of success to date.

Seen from the Indonesian perspective, the vast majority of the population are Moslems; indeed, Indonesia is the world’s most populous Islamic country. Like President Megawati, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono would be reluctant to take firm action against those Islamic organizations merely considered to be radical groups. The attitude of most Islamic leaders in the country, particularly from the Islamic political parties supporting these Islamic organizations identified as radical, made it even more difficult for the government to take action against them. So far, the government has only arrested the culprits involved in the Bali, Makassar (South Sulawesi) and Jakarta bombings. None of the Islamic organizations that were identified as radical have been dissolved.

The slow response of civilian leaders, like Megawati during her administration, has opened up the possibility for the United States to reconsider its attitude to the return of a military regime in the country or at least that Indonesia could be led by an ex-military figure. The firm attitude of the Pakistani military regime under General Musharraf’s leadership in fighting terrorism has furnished evidence for the United States on how effective a military regime can be in supporting American foreign policy compared to civilian regimes. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, there is a possibility that the United States would favourably consider Indonesia’s return to being ruled by a military regime or, in a certain middle way, at least led as now by a former army general.

Indeed, Indonesia is fertile ground for the military to make a comeback for power in the future. This is because the Indonesian military, like the Turkish Army, traditionally prefers secularism to sectarianism. The emergence of radical Islam in the country has displeased the military; its displeasure is even greater since the leaders of political parties are busy fulfilling their own interests. In such a situation, the United States’ support will determine whether the military will maintain its role as a guardian of civilian government or make a comeback for power as a ruler in its own right. The
direction, of course, will be determined by the younger generation of the military, many of whom are disappointed with their senior because the latter conducted internal reforms of the military.

Furthermore, as stated by Lieutenant General Z.A Maulani, most senior officers believe that there are no smarter persons outside the military who have their commitment and loyalty towards the development and unity of the nation. This self-perception not only made the military strongly self-confident but also versatile. The military’s claims to be the ‘stabilizer’ (stabilisator) and ‘dynamizer’ (dinamisator) of development, as propagated during the New Order era, were also influenced by this confident self-perception. It made the military look down on the civilian politicians, most of whom were only busy pursuing their own interests. Moreover, politically and ideologically, it saw itself as separate from the civilian government. Because of that, the military rejected the plan of Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono submitted to military headquarters that military businesses be placed under the Defence Ministry. The military also rejected when Juwono Sudarsono suggested that the military various businesses be turned into state-owned enterprises with their shares owned by all the soldiers (Kompas, 9 December 2004). Whatever the reasons may be for military rejection of these ministerial proposals, this response also reflected that the military does not want to be under civilian control. The military still considers itself as formed from the best of the national citizenry.

Indeed, this self-perception is also internalised among the younger generation of officers in the military, particularly among those military academy alumni from the generations of the later 1970s and early 1980s. Although there were those in favour of reform because of their hope for increased military professionalism, many were disappointed with their senior officers when the latter decided to introduce the New Paradigm of the military and carry out internal reforms. Since most of those disappointed were considered to be among the best cadets during their stint in the military academy and Army Command School, their view could be considered representative of their generation. In their view, there was no need for the headquarters to take any action to respond to
people’s criticisms and grievances. Although they demanded the abolition of Dwifungsi, the younger generation of military officers were confident that people would need them sooner rather than later once the euphoria of reform had subsided – not least because of continued riots, ethnic conflict and separatist movements in many provinces, like Aceh and Papua. Since the number of police is limited, the military presence to restore peace was indispensable. In the younger generation officers’ view, such situations reflected that, in fact, there was no need for the headquarters to propose any internal reforms.

The disagreement of the young officers towards the internal reforms confirmed Major General Djoko Besariman’s argument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Total Applicants</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
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<td>10,546</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>350</td>
<td>267 (3.80%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>6,922</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>278 (4.40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>6,057</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>281 (4.64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1977/78</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>7,958</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>203 (2.56%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>7,285</td>
<td>455</td>
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<td>455</td>
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<td>13,001</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1983/84</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1988/89</td>
<td>27,272</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>672 (2.46%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1989/90</td>
<td>27,339</td>
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<td>693 (2.55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
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<td>24,948</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>756 (3.03%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19,740</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>950 (4.86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>19,695</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>988 (3.02%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Markas Komando AKABRI (The Headquarters of the Military Academy)
that around 30 per cent of military officers, particularly from the new generation, were not keen on the headquarters’ decisions to implement internal reform. According to Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, the number was even bigger, around 60 per cent of the military officers. Therefore, he suggested that headquarters organise extra training and forums to change their thinking. In his view, they had to be aware that the military’s involvement in socio-political affairs only weakened its position since it became trapped in political games. The military would be strong if it returned to the barracks and focused on being professional soldiers. Unfortunately, the headquarters did not adopt his idea because it was seen to be unrealistic.

By and large, economic and political interests were the factors behind the displeasure of the younger generation of officers toward the headquarters’ decisions to adopt the New Paradigm for the military. In contrast to earlier-generation officers who had enlisted because they were either patriotic or had had no other job opportunities,4 younger-generation officers were consciously aware that the profession promised them a bright future. This could be identified by the trend of increasing numbers of applications, which had surged 400 per cent from the last years of the 1970s and early years of the 1980s (Table 20). They were interested in joining the military because they saw many senior military officers holding strategic positions in government: as minister, ambassador, director-general, governor and mayor, among others. The desks and privileges of their jobs afforded them a comfortable lifestyle. These were the attractions for them to join the military. Like their senior officers, they were also eager to enhance their socio-economic role by ensuring an equitable reach, what in a political economy perspective is called a struggle over the distribution of profits to the people (Race, 1980: 699)

A critical comment often heard among the younger generation of military officers about their senior officers’ decision on the internal reforms was that:

The generals just look after their own interests. They have gained position and money. In contrast, we just get wet and hot under the sun.
In other words, they complained that they had not gained anything but instead suffered in facing down demonstrators and rebels in trouble-spots like Aceh province. In their view, their senior officers back at headquarters were more preoccupied with their own present interests, neglecting concerns about the future. The officers from the status quo camp, of course, benefited from this unhappiness. In reference to the statement of Mahfud MD, then Minister of Defence during Gus Dur administration, that certain elements within the military were behind the violence (The Straits Times, 5 October 2000), it would appear that the status quo officers used the younger generation of military officers to intensify the disorder nationwide. Since most of them were district military commanders, it was easy for them to create riots.

Is it true that the generals in the military headquarter did not consider the future of their junior officers, as assumed by them? The author would argue against it. In fact, they are concerned for the future of their junior officers, as shown by the following facts. First, there is question of why the military had not abandoned Act No. 20/MPR/1982 on Defence and Security Principle and Act No.2/MPR/1988 on ABRI servicemen. One possible answer is the senior officers intentionally ignored these in order to provide a ‘bridge’ for their junior officers to regain the dominant role of the military when the right time came. Hence, regulations reaffirming its dominant role, as reflected by its claim that the military was the ‘stabilizer’ (stabilisator) and ‘dynamizer’ (dinamisator) of development, could be re-employed by the military to legitimize its return to power. The headquarters’ proposal to re-establish the regional military command (KODAMs) and the military right to undertake a non-combat military operation (Regulation Number 34/2004, article 7, clause 2 on the Indonesian Military) could be considered as an integral part of the senior military officers’ efforts to provide a ‘bridge’ for the younger generation officers to make a comeback to power one day.

Second, there are the existing military doctrines. Till today, there is not one single military doctrine that has been revised. Although the military formally submitted a new bill on State Defence that aimed to revise any regulations that enhanced the dominant
role of the military in socio-political affairs, this did not include revisions to military doctrine. As long as its doctrine is not revised, it is possible for the military to make a comeback for power. The doctrine of Hankamrata (Total People’s Defence), which became a cornerstone to the establishment of the military organizational structure (i.e., BABINSA, KORAMIL, KODIM, KOREM and KODAM), could become its instrument to seize power again. As happened during the New Order era, this military organizational structure not only became useful in controlling the socio-political activities of people but also was a repressive tool that Soeharto used. A similar case could happen in the future since the military doctrines have not been revised yet. Hence, there is a possibility that the police would support the political maneuvers of the military to regain its power; as stipulated in Catur Dharma Eka Karma doctrine, the police are part of the military. Although the police were formally separated from the military since 1 April 1999, the doctrine to this day has not been revised. Thus, there is a possibility that they could act together again in order to regain their dominant role in socio-political affairs.

Finally, there is the military’s view of the other strategic groups in society, particularly NGOs and political parties. By and large, the military was unhappy with most NGO activists and civilian politicians. They suspected that NGOs were agents of the Western powers since they were critical of the military. In short, the military saw NGOs as its enemies rather than as partners in developing the nation (Legowo, 2001: 70-81). At the same time, the military did not respect the civilian politicians. In its view, the politicians were not steadfast in their principles, quarrelled among themselves too much and seemed more interested in pursuing their own selfish interests. This was used by the senior military officers, particularly from the status quo and moderate camps, to propagate the argument that the idea of civilian supremacy was no longer relevant in Indonesia. In their view, whoever is more capable, irrespective of whether he or she is a military person or civilian, should govern the country. This could well be the other ‘bridge’ for the younger generation to reclaim power for the military.
Such evidence proves that, indeed, military headquarters has not ignored the future of the younger generation of military officers since it provided 'bridge' for them to regain the military's dominant role. Under President Megawati Soekarnoputri, military officers began to take stern action against anyone suspected of threatening political stability in the country. Such action could not have been implemented by them when Gus Dur was in power since he would have denounced them publicly. The result would have been to not only tarnish the military's even image more in people's eyes but also hamper its internal consolidation.

The arrest of PRD activists in Surabaya (East Java), Medan (North Sumatra) and Bandung (West Java) on 8 August 2001 (Tugas Kita, 10 August 2001) were examples that once again the military was beginning to use strong-arm tactics, as it had done in the past. This was the initial phase of violence which quickly worsened, as in the trouble spots of Aceh, Irian Jaya (Papua) and East Timor provinces during the New Order era. In Anderson's term (1999), such a phenomenon is called the 'process of brutalization'. He argues further:

A culture has developed in the military according to which in 'security' matters every element of human decency can be set aside with complete impunity: provided 'the boss' gives them the order (Anderson, 1999: 8).

Besides, the 'brutalization' also reflected the institutional crisis of the military since it was inclined to employ the easiest way to control people, namely, using the security approach. Therefore, the sudden death on 31 July 2001 of the radical officers' patron, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, helped the status quo and moderate officers in reemploying the 'process of brutalization' since there was no longer strong opposition within the military to control their behaviour. Wirahadikusumah's style of speaking openly with the people, particularly to journalists and activists, influenced his fellow officers to think twice if they wanted to employ 'brutalization' measures. Wirahadikusumah surely would have denounced their behaviour publicly. If that happened, not only would it have tarnished their image in the public's eyes but also blocked their future careers.
Megawati’s conciliatory attitude towards the military constituted a fertile ground for the younger generation of officers to begin ‘replanting their future tree of power’. Studying the academic background of the younger generation, however, it seems that most of them were only average students when in Senior High School. Their academic records were only 6.5 on average (Markas Komando AKABRI, 1996). This contrasts with the early cadets of the military academy, whose average academic records were 8. This means the academic quality of the military has, by and large, declined over the years. The best students who graduated in the late 1970s and early 1980s were no longer interested in enrolling in the military academy. The oil boom at the end of the 1970s and the increase in foreign investment in the early 1980s created more job opportunities in the Republic. These developments encouraged the best students to go to university and after graduation they joined private companies that paid them much better salaries compared to the military. As a rough indication of the low academic standards of the military, one has to refer to the soldiers’ ability to count when presented with simple mathematic questions. When General Soebagio HS, then Army Chief of Staff, asked a soldier how much seven multiplied by seven would amount to, his answer was a shocking 77. When he asked another soldier the product of nine multiplied by nine, the soldier candidly answered 94 (Republika, 17 March 1999).

Besides the relatively low academic standards of its recruits, the curriculum of the Military Academy and the Army’s Command School contributed little to broadening their perspective, especially in relation to the idea of military professionalism, as Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo and Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani have admitted. The curriculum of the Military Academy consists of 53 per cent non-military subjects, 22 per cent military subjects and 15 per cent sports (Maulani, 1997: 265–284). Meanwhile, the curriculum of the Army School of Command consists of 64 per cent non-military subjects, 34 per cent military subjects and 2 per cent sports. A study of the curriculum suggests there is too much stress on non-military subjects, which means that its training is not aimed at shaping the soldiers to become military professionals but...
to prepare the military to play a dual role. In other words, training is only an arena to strengthen the internalization of the idea of Dwifungsi in the officers.

As regards the future role of the military, it cannot be ignored that academic standards for the younger generation officers’ will determine the future of the military. Since these have been found to be lower compared to those of military officers who are presently in power, there are two possible scenarios regarding the future role of this younger generation of officers. First, they will be easily pushed by civilian politicians back to the barracks and fail to maintain the Middle Way role. They will not only be unable to use the bridges that their senior officers provided for them, but also fail to get benefits from the accommodating attitude of Megawati and (presumably) her successor since they had not established their foundations of power. Hence, they are likely to become military professionals with only one role, namely, the role of defence.

Second, it will be difficult for civilian politicians to suppress these young officers in the future since they will be more stubborn when compared to their seniors. Their low academic qualifications will make them more stubborn because they know they will always lose when arguing with civilians on certain issues. Dissatisfied with their Middle Way role and wishing to regain their dominant role in socio-political affairs, they will have no choice but to use the powers they have, particularly arms. This means there is a possibility that they will wage rebellions and stage coups against civilian governments in the future, especially if the civilian government forces them back into the barracks. Since their reason in joining the military was to gain economic and political privileges like their seniors, such government attitudes would anger them. Forcing them back to the barracks would ignite their displeasure against the government, and in turn might lead to rebellion.

As mentioned earlier, the role of the United States is an important part of the equation determining the future role of the military in Indonesia. Washington’s displeasure with the civilian government for being slow in supporting its war against terrorism has opened up the opportunity for the younger generation of the
military to stage a power comeback one day. This relates to the possibility of the United States seeking new supporters who are firm in fighting terrorism. Here, the younger generation of the military could well be candidates for this role and as a consequence gain support from the United States for a return to power. With the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former army general, as president, the bridge for the military’s return to power is open again. But all this is also dependent on the vision and political attitude of the new president. If he wishes to be noted as a leader who brings about a democratic consolidation, then he will close the bridge to any return of the military to the political stage. On the other hand, if he is weighed down by the interests of his esprit de corps, then the military’s domination in Indonesia’s body politics will be hard to avoid.

Therefore, it is difficult to predict which scenario is likely to happen in the future. Besides the role of the United States and attitude of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the achievement of four other goals will determine the future role of the military. These are the maturity of civilian politicians, the success of the civilian regime in developing economics and politics, the development of a civil society in the Republic and the ability of civilian governments to provide for the military’s budget and modernize its equipment and weaponry. If these four goals are achieved, the idea of civilian supremacy will win and the military will be forced to return to its barracks. In contrast, if these fail to be realized, the military will take over power. Although it might not be long before the military then handed power back to a civilian government, the military would regain its significant role in socio-political affairs. Like the uncertainties which almost always befall Indonesian politics, only time can prove which scenario indeed comes to pass. But the author’s own prediction is that the future role of the military will be to share power with civilians in governing the Republic.

NOTES

1 The two pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates that won the first round of election on 5 July 2004 were Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla and Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi.
In connection with that, the polling results of Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate (SSS) which was announced on 1 September 2004 indicated that in the second round of presidential election on 20 September 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla obtained 41.30% votes, Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi 34.68% and undecided voters 24.02% votes. The actual electoral results showed that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono obtained 47.14% votes, Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi 30.29% votes and undecided voters 22.56%.

2 Interview with Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani, Chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Jakarta, 18 August 1999).

3 Interview with Major General Djoko Besariman, Chief of the Army’s Command School (Bandung, 21 October 1999).

4 Discussion with Major General Bennet Silalahi, Director of the School of Management (Jakarta, 18 August 1999).

5 For recent discussions on the role of NGOs in democratizing Indonesia, see, for instance, Soesastro (2000).

6 Interviews with Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, Chief of the Indonesian Military’s Command School (Bandung, 23 August 1999) and Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani, Chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Jakarta, 18 August 1999).
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