Attitudes toward Attitude
Kenneth Burke's views on attitude

Master Thesis in Rhetoric
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Abstract

In this thesis, a review of Kenneth Burke's use of the term attitude in his published works as well as in some unpublished notes, drafts and letters, is performed. Three periods of different usage are found. Early works feature a pervasive attitude with elements of both body and mind. This attitude is then subsumed into the pentad and the physiological connection is diminished, but attitude is given an important function as a connective between action and motion. The later Burke reinstates attitude as central to his theory of symbolic action, reconnects it to the physiological and includes it in the Pentad with parsimony-inducing effect. The attitude is then found to aid rhetorical analysis and show promise in being able to help analyse expressions not wholly in the realm of the conscious, be they in the form of a Bourdieu social practice or barely conscious rhetorical markers in conversation.

Key terms: Kenneth Burke, attitude, symbolic action, Dramatism, Pentad, Hexad
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2 Introduction

Rhetorics is a vast and changing discipline. The rhetoric of Aristotle – brilliant as it was – is not quite the one we have today. With the 20th century and its new forms of communication and societal organization rhetoric needed to – and did indeed – change through the ministrations of new theorists such as Kenneth Burke. Where Aristotle defined rhetorics to be "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" Burke broadened the definition considerably. In his *Rhetoric of Motives* he defined rhetoric as "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols." Burke also declared that identification, not persuasion, was the key term for rhetoric. With this much broader definition of rhetoric, new things come into focus such as the persuasion to, or identification with, an attitude.

The importance of attitude for our ways of forming and receiving as well as persuade toward opinions is something I find to be very interesting. There is here, I think, an enormous potential for explaining and exploring the somewhat messy underworks of our rhetorical lives. We are only partly rational beings and it is hard to explain why we adopt an opinion at certain times but not at others if you just consider cold factual arguments. Traditional explorations of pathos also falls somewhat short since we tend to receive the pathos-part of suasive communication differently depending on, well, attitude. Think of the common image of a negative teenager, arms crossed and not accepting anything.

So what is attitude? It is a simple enough word and we can use it without fear of being misunderstood in ordinary language, but if it is to be a part of rhetorical analysis we need far more precise knowledge of what it is and what place it can take in rhetorical theory. Above mentioned Kenneth Burke and his works form a good starting point to an exploration into the inner workings of attitude. He is one of the great 20th century theorists within the field of rhetorics and he seems to have had a lasting interest in attitude. He named one of his earlier

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books *Attitudes toward History*\(^5\) and in an addendum to *A Grammar of Motives*\(^6\) he wrote that he sometimes added attitude to the five pentadic terms when conducting analysis.\(^7\)

Originally, I planned to have an exploration of Burke's thoughts on attitude as a small part of this thesis and then to develop a practical method of rhetorical analysis based on it, but as it turned out, the exploration grew to be somewhat larger than I had anticipated. I was kindly provided the opportunity to study materials in the Burke Archives of the Penn State Special Collections and what I found there combined with what is in the published works of Kenneth Burke is more than enough to fill this thesis to the point of breaking.\(^8\) In short, this thesis is an exploration of the place and function of attitude in the theories of Kenneth Burke. Hopefully it can serve as a base for future developments of tools for rhetorical analysis.

### 2.1 Purpose and research questions

The over-arching question this thesis tries to answer is how *attitude* may help us understand how communication works. To narrow it down, the immediate purpose of this thesis is, simply put, to figure out what *attitude* is according to Burke and what that implies for rhetorical analysis. It is, however, not a given that there is only one meaning to *attitude*. Burke lived through almost the whole of the 20\(^{th}\) century and he worked on subjects dealing with, or at least touching on, *attitude* during a considerable part of his long and productive life. The way he uses the word *attitude* seems to change and the space it occupies in his writings certainly does change. It seems clear, especially in light of the additional page about *attitude* and the pentad published in the Meridian paperback version of *A Grammar of Motives*, that whatever else, *attitude* plays an important part in Burke’s dramatism. With that in mind and to help explore the subject, this thesis will try to answer the following research-questions:

What does Burke mean by *attitude* in his earlier works?

Is there a development of meaning of *attitude* in Burke’s works and if so, how does it develop?

What place, if any, does *attitude* take in dramatistic theory and what is its impact on rhetorical analysis?

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\(^8\) I would not have found as much were it not for the excellent staff at the archives. Many well deserved thanks also go to Cheryl Glenn and the English Department at Penn State for help and hospitality.
2.2 Research on Burke and Attitude

Research on Kenneth Burke and his works is rather extensive, so a complete review is neither possible nor necessary or even useful for the purpose of this thesis. Rather, a short description of the research that this thesis is built on and inspired by may be useful in order to help clarify the text. Broadly the works can be placed in two categories: research more about Burke and his ideas and research using Burke's ideas to achieve analytical insights. In the first category, there are Stephen Bygrave's *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric and Ideology*, Michael Denning's *The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century*, Ann George & Jack Seltzer's *Kenneth Burke in the 1930s* and Debra Hawhee's *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language*. In the second category, there are Dana Anderson's "Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action: Burke and Bourdieu on Practice", Floyd D. Anderson & Mathew T. Althause's "Five Fingers or Six? Pentad or Hexad?", Sarah E. Mahan-Hays & Roger C. Aden's "Kenneth Burke's 'Attitude' at the Crossroads of Rhetorical and Cultural Studies: A Proposal and Case Study Illustration", Brigitte Mral's "'Attitude matters' – Attitydtyttringar som retoriska medel" ("'Attitude matters' – attitudinal markers as rhetoric means") and finally Clarke Rountree's "Charles Haddon Spurgeon’s Calvinist Rhetoric of Election: Constituting an Elect."

In his *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric and Ideology*, Bygrave looks at Burke's works, taking a special interest in the relation of language and ideology. He spends a chapter on *attitude* and after a reading spanning Burke's productive career, Bygrave arrives at the conclusion that *attitude* is another word for *ideology*.

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Michael Denning's *The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century*, is an introduction to and description of the cultural climate and its changes in the American 1930s. While it has been an important provider of background knowledge, there is also more specific knowledge concerning Burke and the place his symbolic theory occupied in the intersection of socialistic and communication theory. In the section on Burke, Denning arrives at the conclusion that Burke was the major cultural theorist of the Popular Front. Of particular interest to this thesis, is Denning's description of Burke's rewriting of his earlier works in the 1950s.

For a more thorough and specific view on Burke and and his life in the 1930s, there is Ann George & Jack Selzer's *Kenneth Burke in the 1930s*. Impressively detailed, it has been an invaluable companion to the reading of Burke's earlier works including *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose*, *Attitudes toward History* and *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. The contained readings of Burke's critical works as well as their connection to surrounding thinkers and movements have influenced the readings in this thesis significantly.

Debra Hawhee, in her *Moving Bodies*, explores Burke's ideas on the relation of language and body. In her thorough review of Burke's thoughts, *attitude* is given an important place as something often expressed in words, but that is at base a non-verbal and physical. Of particular note for this thesis, is her description of Burke's use and treatment of Paget's language theories.

In ”Kenneth Burke’s 'Attitude' at the Crossroads of Rhetorical and Cultural Studies: A Proposal and Case Study Illustration”, Mahan-Hays & Aden argue for that Burke's ideas lie somewhere in the intersection of traditional rhetoric and cultural studies, that rhetoric is dynamic in the sense that it can circulate between rhetor and audience, and that *attitude* can be used to mould a number of Burke's ideas to a critical whole. Of particular interest to this thesis is their reading of *attitude* in Burke's work to be more or less completely cognitive in nature.

Floyd D. Anderson & Mathew T. Althause, in their “Five Fingers or Six? Pentad or Hexad?”, perform a review of arguments for and against including *attitude* in the Pentad. They arrive at the conclusion that it may not be theoretically necessary, but may at times be practical. Of particular

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interest to this thesis is their structured line-up of arguments, especially on how to account for attitude with the pentadic terms and the lack of philosophical school connected to attitude.

Clarke Rountree with his “Charles Haddon Spurgeon’s Calvinist Rhetoric of Election: Constituting an Elect,” is a bit of a special case in this thesis. The work itself is only mentioned in passing and then as an example of successfully performed hexadic analysis. However, Rountree's work as a whole, including his “Coming to terms with Kenneth Burke's Pentad,” was instrumental in starting this journey of attitude-exploration.

Dana Anderson's ”Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action: Burke and Bourdieu on Practice” is a very interesting exploration of the workings of practice, habituated action, in that it connects Bourdieu's and Burke's thoughts. Anderson arrives at the conclusion that practice can be interpreted as a sort of attitude-act ratio in order to better capture the nature of practice that according to him is both physiological and symbolic. The article provides an example of what this thesis argues for are possible and fruitful implementations of Burke's attitude in practice.

Finally there is Brigitte Mral's “‘Attitude matters’ – Attitydtyttringar som retoriska medel”. In her article, Mral makes an important distinction between attitude and its manifestations, performs a thorough review of both concepts and then analyses a public questioning using attitudinal markers. Of particular interest to this thesis, is the article's example of attitude in analytical practice.

This concludes the description of research on Burke and attitude and leaves the material provided by Burke himself to the next section.

### 2.3 Material and methodology

Since this thesis explores the term attitude as used by Kenneth Burke, the material consists of that author’s works. Mostly, published material is used, but some letters and notes found in the Burke Archives of the Penn State Special Collections is included.

The amount of materials in the Burke Archives is substantial, so I had to limit my selection to a few promising areas. In the 1962 Meridian paperback version of *A Grammar of Motives*, a

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double volume that also included *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke added a page about attitude, so I studied notes and drafts about *A Grammar of Motives* found in the Burke Archives as well as Burke’s correspondence with the editor. This includes the first draft of the book as well as Burke’s associated Epilegomena. In addition, I studied notes and letters from the late 70s to the 80s in order to explore Burke’s later relation to attitude.

When it comes to Burkes published books, this thesis refers to the University of California Press editions for availability and convenience sake. These editions are widely available and contain the additions Burke made to his works over the years. It should be mentioned that Burke revised *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose* as well as *Attitudes toward History* during the 50s. The changes, however, mainly deal with the relation of Burkes critical stance to Marxism and are mostly of little concern to the subject at hand. The exception is the extensive outtake of material related to Paget and his thoughts about the origins of human speech as vocal imitations of body movements from *Attitudes toward History*. As far as this thesis is concerned, however, there are more than enough passages left in the revised volume that explore the aspects of *attitude* that the excised material highlighted. In her *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language*, Debra Hawhee gives a good account of the removed material on Paget.

*Attitude* is studied in the context of Burke’s Dramatism and consequently this thesis includes a short overview of that theory, focusing on the elements relevant to the understanding of the term *attitude*.

Burke was a prodigious writer, which presents some problems for a thesis of this kind. I cannot claim to have read everything published by Burke, let alone the enormous amount of unpublished works he left behind. Consequently there is a problem of selection. Hopefully relevant sections about *attitude* in Burke’s published works has been found with help of the reviewed secondary literature, but the archival forays into unpublished materials is less well served by existing research. It is a foregone conclusion that there are writings about *attitude* in the Penn State Special Collection, as well as in other archives with Burke materials, that I did not find. However, since the aim of this thesis is to present a composite picture of what Burke meant by *attitude*, further research is likely not to disprove, but to enrich the drawn conclusions.

Nevertheless, before continuing on to a short description of Burke's theory of symbolic action and some theoretical terms used in this thesis, it is in order to write a few words about the Burke papers at Penn State Special Collections and also about the use of quotes in the text.

2.3.1 On the Special Collections at Penn State

The Burke materials at the Penn State Special Collections can be divided into two categories: assorted Burke papers and letters.

**Assorted Burke papers**

Before his death, Burke, with the help of his son Anthony, ordered a lot of his papers, including manuscripts, notes, correspondence, reviews, annotated news clippings and more. These materials are left in more or less the same order they arrived. Everything is sorted in folders with alpha-numerical designations created by Kenneth Burke's son Anthony Burke. Burke helped his son identify materials and some of the titles are written by him.

Some of the materials are type-written, but a lot of it is hand-written. A complicating issue is that the papers were stored in Burke's house for a number of years and this storage was not always kind to the materials. Some of it is very hard to read because of the nature of the hand-writing, damages, or both.

When referring to materials from these papers in this thesis, I include the alpha-numerical designation of the relevant folder.

**Letters**

Penn State Special Collections has successfully been acquiring letters to and from Burke for years and now has an impressive collection. The letters are arranged chronologically and then alphabetically by correspondents' last name. Generally, they are type-written. The available, alphabetically arranged card index makes it easy to find specific letters.

When referring to letters in this thesis, I include date and correspondent.
2.3.2 On the use of quotes in this thesis

As this thesis is an exploration of Burke's works, it contains a lot of quotes. Burke frequently added emphasis to parts of his texts, published or not, by the use of italics, underlining or capitals. Throughout this thesis, the quotes are kept as close to the originals as possible, i.e. all manners of emphases are carried over from the original texts and none have been added.

3 On Burke's theory of symbolic action

At the centre of Burke's work stands his theory of symbolic action. It is a theory that he continued to develop through most of his career. First mentioned in *Permanence and Change*, further developed in *Attitudes toward History* and given a first complete form in *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, he then reworked it to his dramatistic theory of language starting with *A Grammar of Motives*. To give a complete account of the theory, or theories depending on how you look at the similarity of the different versions, is a vast work that contains a lot more than needed – or there is space for – in this thesis. Instead, and more suited to the task at hand, this thesis includes a short overview of the theory, emphasizing the lines that are similar across versions, and further explains some important terms used within the theory, that are needed to understand the arguments and conclusions provided later in the thesis. For readers wanting to take a closer look at Burke's theory of symbolic action and its development, I can recommend William Rueckert's *Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations 2ed*.

3.1 Symbolic action and its implications

In *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, where the first more or less complete form of Burke's theory of symbolic action can be found, Burke writes that any verbal act is a symbolic action. He does, however, never properly define symbolic action. As Rueckert points out, Burke seems to use *symbolic action* in three slightly different ways. Words are always symbolic actions since they by definition stand for something else, actions that represent the essential self, what you consider yourself to be, are symbolic actions and finally acts that are purifications in order to achieve redemption are symbolic acts. Considering Nietzsche and his convincing argument in

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Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn\textsuperscript{26} that language is metaphorical, the first can hardly be seen as controversial. The second is something deeply rooted in human behaviour, we do things because they tell others who we are, or at least who we wish to be seen as. And the last is deeply connected to Burke's view of the human condition that essentially stays the same through his works. Life is drama and drama is the form according to which human action is analysed. As humans we are driven by guilt. The guilt of not being able to conform to all the social conventions and covenants of society. A guilt that must be redeemed by purification.\textsuperscript{27} Considering the performing of purification in order to attain redemption a symbolic action, does not seem much of a stretch in that context.

Ross Wolin, in his \textit{The Rhetorical Imagination of Burke}\textsuperscript{28}, argues that the lack of clear definition of \textit{symbolic action} is not much of a problem, since it is only a beginning point and that Burke is really after a methodology, the workings of how, when and where to find \textit{symbolic action}.\textsuperscript{29} Interestingly enough, Burke's earlier works, \textit{Permanence and Change} and \textit{Attitudes toward History}, are better characterized by a lack of clearly thought through and presented methodology, which rendered him quite a bit of critique.\textsuperscript{30} Possibly influenced by this critique, Burke presented the methodology of the earlier works in \textit{The Philosophy of Literary Form} in retrospect, but he did not clearly define the object of his study. However that may be, in his later works, starting with \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, the nature of \textit{symbolic action} received a more thorough treatment. Here \textit{symbolic action} is juxtaposed with non-symbolic motion. Action is motion with a purpose.\textsuperscript{31} As long as there is a purpose to an action it is a \textit{symbolic action}. Since \textit{symbolic action} is the subject of Burke's Dramatism, this juxtaposition is of central importance and, as will be seen later in the thesis, provides a place for \textit{attitude}.

The rather slight change of meaning of \textit{symbolic action} that can be seen above, does not really change the overall aim of Burke's theory of \textit{symbolic action}. Burke is, as he writes in the very beginning of \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, interested in "What is involved when we say what people

\textsuperscript{27} Rueckert (1982), p. 131.
\textsuperscript{28} Wolin, Ross (2001), \textit{The Rhetorical Imagination of Kenneth Burke}. University of South Carolina Press.
\textsuperscript{29} Wolin (2001), p. 123.
\textsuperscript{30} George&Selzer (2007), pp. 158-161.
are doing and why they are doing it?"\textsuperscript{32} And as he explains in *The Philosophy of literary Form*, drama is the form according to which all human action is modelled.\textsuperscript{33} Burke's interest lies with the human drama and its motivations. Considering this, his turn toward language in his later dramatism should not be a surprise. For, as Kneupper has observed, language, by its very nature as a system of symbols, provides motive for action.\textsuperscript{34} The core stays the same between his earlier form of symbolical analysis and his later dramatism, what changes are the tools used to perform the analysis. For the purpose of this thesis, there are four tools of special interest. The first two, *perspective by incongruity* and the *comic frame*, are from Burke's early symbolic analysis, the other two, the *pentad* and *identification*, from his later dramatism.

### 3.1.1 Perspective by incongruity and comic frame

A *perspective by incongruity* is the oxymoronic process of putting two words together that do not fit. Burke calls it "verbal 'atom cracking'"\textsuperscript{35} and it is performed in order to gain a new perspective with the help of the two perspectives brought into conflict through the two incongruent words put together. As Debra Hawhee points out in "Burke and Nietzsche", Burke is indebted to Nietzsche and the two share their interests for perspectivalism, their fascination for the changes brought by clashing perspectives and their explorations of the effects of language.\textsuperscript{36} In short perspective by incongruity is a kind of perspectivistic language game by way of metaphor, performed in order to get new insights through the combining of two known but incompatible perspectives.

Burke often uses a *perspective by incongruity* and of particular interest to this thesis is what he calls *bureaucratization of the imaginative*. In the juxtaposition of bureaucratization and imaginative, Burke had something very specific in mind and it is one of the central ideas of *Attitudes toward History*. Creative approaches that may work well in the beginning, lose in effectiveness as they are implemented in a more organized fashion in business and politics.\textsuperscript{37} "Perhaps it merely names the process of dying" Burke writes in *Attitudes toward History* when

\textsuperscript{33} Burke (1941|1957|1967|1973), *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{35} Burke (1937|1959|1961|1984), *Attitudes toward History*, p. 308.
defining the term.\textsuperscript{38} In the process of institutionalizing an idea, the \textit{bureaucratization of the imaginative}, the idea is by necessity the target for compromise and eventually the combined weight of compromise makes it into something else and so it 'dies'.\textsuperscript{39}

The \textit{comic frame} can be seen as a \textit{perspective by incongruity}, but, the other way around, a \textit{perspective by incongruity} is an implementation of the \textit{comic frame}. The \textit{comic frame} is opposed to the tragic frame in that it seeks a sort of synthesis between two opposing ideas instead of elevating one idea over the other. As in much else, Burke here takes his terminology from drama. Loosely speaking, a tragedy is characterized by the tragic end of the protagonist, while a comedy is characterized by a happy end. Both forms of drama feature opposing forces, but whereas in the tragedy, one is doomed to defeat, in the comedy both can coexist. The tragic frame is tragic because ultimately it demands the defeat of one of two ideas. The \textit{comic frame} is comic because it allows for the existence and continuation of both ideas, ending up in a sort of synthesis.

As Wolin points out, Burke wanted to create a perspective on perspective taking.\textsuperscript{40} The \textit{comic frame}, or the \textit{comic corrective} as Burke sometimes calls it in connection with its function in society, can in a fashion be seen as a guideline for what to do with \textit{perspectives of incongruity}. As George & Selzer point out in \textit{Kenneth Burke in the 1930s}, the \textit{comic frame} is the guiding principle of his symbolic analysis. It is the embodiment of a synthesizing attitude – a comic attitude.\textsuperscript{41} In bringing together two ideas, two perspectives, the \textit{comic frame} prescribes an accepting synthesis between the two and thereby creates an idea on top of the others, a perspective containing both of the starting ideas. The \textit{comic frame} is in other words a perspective of perspectives. As will be seen later on in this thesis, there is a considerable overlap between Burke's use of the concept of \textit{ideas, strategies and attitudes}. \textit{Attitude}, it turns out, can be seen as a \textit{strategy}, an \textit{idea} of how to conduct oneself in the world that can be reasoned and rationalized. Altogether, this makes it less than surprising that he names the \textit{comic frame} an \textit{attitude of attitudes} in the introduction to \textit{Attitudes toward History}.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{38} Burke (1937|1959|1961|1984), \textit{Attitudes toward History}, p. 308.
\textsuperscript{40} Wolin (2001), p. 95.
\textsuperscript{42} Burke (1937|1959|1961|1984), \textit{Attitudes toward History}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} page of Introduction.
3.1.2 The Pentad

The major analytical tools of Burke's later Dramatism are the five key terms of the pentad: act, scene, agent, agency and purpose. As he poses it in *A Grammar of Motives*, "...any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where was it done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose)." As a starting point, this only provides for a very rudimentary analysis, but by considering them in pairs a far more complex and encompassing analysis can be performed. It is by considering the relation of the terms that a motive to the action described can be discerned, the point to the whole exercise. With five terms there are ten unique pairings, but since the order of a pair matters, there are effectively twenty different pairs to consider.

The order of a pair is determined by which governs or dominates the other. For example, someone shearing a hedge suggest the ratio act-scene, since the act (shearing) changes and thereby dominates the scene (including a hedge). If, on the other hand, someone unfolds an umbrella since it is raining, a scene-act ratio seems a better fit, since the scene (including the rain) is what provokes the act (unfolding the umbrella). Depending on situation different orders may be relevant, but in any given situation and for every pair of terms, one dominates the other.

Burke also associates the domination of a term to a corresponding philosophical terminology. A dominating act is coupled to realism, scene to materialism, agent to idealism, agency to pragmatism and purpose to mysticism. Burke also names nominalism and rationalism as philosophical terminologies that are connected to his pentad and can be relevant for any term dominating. For the purpose of this thesis, the existence and general nature of the connections of terms to the philosophical schools is of interest, but not the closer workings. As a general explanation, the term connected to a philosophical school is its main focus, i.e. realism stresses the act as the shaper of reality, materialism sees scene as the origin of everything, idealism focuses on the qualities of the agent, pragmatism preferences the agency (the means), and mysticism seeks the unity of purpose. Burke's in-depth explanation of the philosophical schools...
and their connections to the pentadic terms can be found in "The Philosophic Schools" in *A Grammar of Motives*.

As a perspective and connection to Burke's earlier version of symbolic theory, one might note that the considering of a *ratio*, a pair of pentadic terms in relation, is a sort of application of a *perspective of incongruity*. In trying to determine which term dominates the other, the analyst has to consider them opposites. Opposite ideas taken together and given a new perspective, which in this case results in a motive, is the basic process of the *perspective by incongruity*.

### 3.1.3 Identification

*Identification* is one of Burke's best known additions to rhetorical theory and is a strict requirement for persuasion. In an oft-used quote from *A Rhetoric of Motives*, he writes that "You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his."  

Identification happens when a person perceives that it and another person shares a common interest. Of note is that it is the perception of common interest that matters, not the actual sharing. When two people identify like this they attain what Burke calls *consubstantiality*. They are still two distinct persons, but on some level regarding something, they share a perspective, an *attitude* towards something.

However, with the concept of *identification* comes automatically the concept of difference, division. If there were no differences, the idea of *identification* would not make sense. As Crusius points out in "A Case for Kenneth Burke's Dialectic and Rhetoric", the whole idea of *identification* rests on the existence of divisions. Identification makes sense in a divided world where we are not all exactly alike and where we all do not always want the same thing. In this way, *identification* is connected to a *perspective by incongruity*; the need for *identification* implies that there is on some level something incongruous in the relation of perspectives of the persons that seek *identification*. This implied and necessary plurality can, as will be shown later in the thesis, be connected to *attitude*. As seen above, Burke named *attitude* as a possible part, and thereby target, of *identification*.

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This ends the short overview of Burke's symbolic theory and prepares the way for the main part of the thesis: the review of Burke's use of attitude.

4 Attitude

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first covers Burke’s early take on symbolical analysis, centres around Attitudes toward History and features some of the content from Counter-Statement50, Permanence and Change51 and The Philosophy of Literary Form. The second covers his pentadic version of symbolic analysis, centres on A Grammar of Motives and also features some content from A Rhetoric of Motives as well as unpublished materials associated to A Grammar of Motives. The third mainly covers his later view on the subject, featuring letters written in the 70s and 80s as well as some of the forewords Burke added to earlier volumes in the 1980s. The first part explores Burke’s early conception of attitude, while the following two build on that and provide a description of the development of the term. In order to clarify the meaning and function of attitude, the relation of attitude to the wider theory of dramatism is shown in all three parts. Some attention is also spent on Burke's methodology as it helps explain the developments.

The path through Burke's texts is somewhat winding, so here follows a rough idea of what the analysis arrives at. Burke's early take on attitude is rather complex with both mental and bodily dimensions. At this point attitude has on the one hand a body-oriented behaviouristic touch that will eventually lead to persuasion in the form of identification and on the other hand a more mentally oriented central place in his symbolic analysis. Attitude, with its central place, is a history-driving force. At this stage Burke was not that clear when describing his methodology, which rendered him quite a bit of critique. This may have influenced him when developing and describing his pentadic analysis. Here the methodology is clear, but attitude has lost its elevated position and been subsumed into the five pentadic terms. Attitude now belongs in the realm of the mind to a much higher degree, but still performs an important function as a connective between action and motion. It is also an important target for persuasion. Later Burke would form a sort of synthesis of the two earlier positions, reinstating attitude to its central place.

regains some of its bodily aspects and is taken up among the pentadic terms as an equal. Burke also seems to see *attitude* as a pragmatic means of helping pentadic, or more properly hexadic, analysis to greater parsimony.

### 4.1 Driving history

Burke uses the word *attitude* quite often in his writings and frequently not in a way that differs from ordinary usage. In Burke’s first critical volume, *Counter Statement* (1931), this is mostly the case as the use of the word does not stand out particularly much. In light of later development, you can in some instances get an inkling of what *attitude* will become in his writing. In the chapter “The Status of the Art”, where Burke expounds on the incommensurability of cultures, *attitude* is used in a way that suggests its importance not just for what we feel about something, but also for what we understand:

> Consider, for instance, the difference in content between “man” as one of a race that stole the fire from heaven and “man” as a link in the evolutionary chain. It is not hard to imagine how a work of art arising out of the one attitude could be “alien” to a reader in whom the other attitude was ingrained.\(^{52}\)

It is, however, nothing more than a hint of a meaning of *attitude* beyond ordinary usage.

In the two companion volumes *Permanence and Change* (1935) and *Attitudes toward History* (1937), however, Burke uses *attitude* in a new fashion in some instances. As Ann George and Jack Selzer notes in *Kenneth Burke in the 1930s*, Burke often uses *attitude* as a word meaning “mood” or “state of mind”\(^{53}\), but on several occasions in these volumes he goes beyond that. In *Permanence and Change*, in the section about recalcitrance in the chapter “The Poetry of Action”, Burke uses *attitude* as something more concrete and applicable to a specific situation:

> A statement is a completed pseudo-statement – which is to say that a statement is an attitude rephrased in accordance with the strategy of revision made necessary by the recalcitrance of the materials employed for embodying this attitude. “I can safely jump from this high place” may be a pseudo-statement. “I can safely jump from this high place with the aid of a parachute” might be

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the statement as revised after one had taken the recalcitrance of his material adequately into account. But both might spring from the same attitude.\textsuperscript{54}

A pseudo-statement is here a statement that lacks a needed part. Burke would say a part that is necessitated by the recalcitrance of the situation. Jumping from a high place is not something that can be done safely, but using a parachute may make it so – or at least safer. In the right context it may be obvious that the aid of a parachute is implied, but the statement as such is not a complete statement, but a pseudo-statement, until the necessary qualifier is included.

*Attitude* as a mood or state of mind can certainly be argued to give the above citation meaning, but the reader is also given a kind of explanation of what *attitude* is, or, to be more precise, an explanation of what a statement is in terms of *attitude* which implicitly states the importance and extends the meaning of the word. A statement springs from an *attitude*, but is also a rephrased *attitude*. The whole point of a statement – or consequently a pseudo-statement – is to embody an *attitude*. *Attitude* is here no longer just a mood or state of mind, not just something that influences how a certain action is performed, but instead something that provokes the action in the first place. The symbolic action of the statement may be nothing but the manifestation of *attitude*. A connection of this kind between *attitude* and action is explicitly stated in *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, where Burke writes that “an attitude contains an implicit program of action.”\textsuperscript{55} Although the book was published 1941, the essay containing the above quotation, “Semantic and Poetic Meaning”, was first published in 1938,\textsuperscript{56} three years after *Permanence and Change* and just a year after *Attitudes toward History* was published.

The differences of *attitude* and *mood* are described by Burke in *Attitudes toward History*:

In a shift from one mood to another, there is no “conflict,” there is simply “change.” But if a mood has broadened to the extent of becoming an *attitude*, and if that attitude has attained full rationalization, the shift to another attitude, requiring a different rationalization, does involve “conflict.”\textsuperscript{57}

While a mood is a fleeting thing that can be exchanged for another without any greater trouble, *attitude* is a sort of extended mood, a more general form of mood that is more stable. This

\textsuperscript{55} Burke (1941|1957|1967|1973), *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, p. 143.
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*attitude*, this broadened mood, can furthermore be rationalized into something even more solid, something requiring “considerable enterprise”\(^{58}\) to exchange. *Attitude* has here taken on a meaning that implies that it lies in the realm of the mind. It is an idea of how to conduct oneself in the world that can be reasoned and rationalized. This meaning makes the title of the book, *Attitudes toward History*, seem very appropriate.

Burke remarks in his 1955 introduction to the book that *attitude* is the word in the title that should be considered important and that by *history* he means “primarily man’s life in political communities.”\(^{59}\) In his 1983 afterword, he stresses the importance and prevalence of what he in *Attitudes toward History* called the “bureaucratization of the imaginative”\(^{60}\), loosely speaking the process of institutionalizing an idea in society, and further on explains that the term is analogous to “history of the attitude”.\(^{61}\) While care should be shown not to be overly influenced by the later Burke when reading texts by the earlier Burke, this seems like a reasonable reading of the book. In the “Dictionary of Pivotal Terms”, the second chapter of the third part of *Attitudes toward History*, the bureaucratization of the imaginative is defined as follows:

This formula is a “perspective by incongruity” for naming a basic process of history. […] An imaginative possibility (usually at the start Utopian) is bureaucratized when it is embodied in the realities of a social texture, in all the complexity of language and habits, in the property relationships, the methods of government, production and distribution, and in the development of rituals that re-enforce the same emphasis.\(^{62}\)

In terms of that reading, this is a description of the process of rationalizing the attitude, of letting the imaginative seep into every crevice of society. This is society embodying the *attitude*, just as statements embodied *attitude* above. The curve of history drawn in *Attitudes toward History* is a line of *attitudes* that describe and determine their respective periods of time. Hellenism declines and Christian evangelism emerges, feudalism develops and declines giving way to Protestantism that in turn leads to naïve capitalism that gives rise to an emergent collectivism.\(^{63}\) As Burke makes clear in the section about the bureaucratization of the imaginative, each such

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60 Burke (1937|1959|1961|1984), *Attitudes toward History*, p. 381.
bureaucratization carries within its own downfall – when the process has gone on long enough, the constraints of reality makes it implode under the weight of accumulated compromise. The line about *attitude* containing an “implicit program of action” from *The Philosophy of Literary Form* presents an idea that is here manifested as the driving force of history. The reigning *attitude* of an age shapes the strategic choices we do to attain the embodiment of the *attitude*. “Another word for strategies,” Burke tells us in *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, “might be *attitudes*.” And this strategy for dealing with the constraints of reality, this *attitude* shaping and motivating our response to the events we encounter as a society carries within its own seed of destruction as well as the seed out of which the next historical *attitude* will grow. The parallels to the Marxist view of societal change is striking, though Burke’s seems less deterministic.

In *The Philosophy of Literary Form* he writes that the poetic ideal of moralistic interpretation “would attempt to *attain a full moral act* by attaining a perspective atop all the conflicts of *attitude*.“ The poetic ideal is not to simply elevate one or the other of two competing attitudes, but to take a wider perspective including them both. George & Selzer notes that *attitude* has “affinities” with ideology and Stephen Bygrave, in his *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric and Ideology*, goes further in claiming that “‘attitude’ is another term for ideology.” The poetic ideal is then an *attitude of attitudes*, an *attitude* that calls for the synthesis of *attitudes*. This is the kind of synthesis we find in the final chapter in the part “The Curve of History,” “The Comic Corrective”, where Burke sees comedy and the comic frame as a way to reach a synthesis of views, views here identified as *attitudes*. This would make comedy just such an *attitude of attitudes* which is what Burke names it in his 1955 foreword to *Attitudes toward History*. It also speaks volumes on the place of *attitude* in the dramatistic theory.

The place of *attitude* in dramatistic theory is one thing, how you actually use it in analysis is, however, not quite the same thing. As Denning notes, the centre of the three volumes

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66 For readers not entirely familiar with the Marxist view of societal change, the general idea is that the means of production determine the organization and evolution of society. Society organizes itself according to the means of production, but the societal evolution changes the means of production in turn, prompting renewed societal change.
69 Bygrave (1993), p. 84.
Permanence and Change, Attitudes toward History and The Philosophy of Literary Form is the theory of symbolic action and its development. And George & Selzer writes that “But Attitudes itself does more than simply fumble its way toward Burke’s most famous methodology for doing symbolic analysis. Much of Attitudes is itself an enactment of that methodology.” Within that framework, the comic frame provides a methodology for doing symbolical analysis. In a fashion, then, there is here already a theory of symbolic action and a methodology for analysing it. However, that the basic ideas are there does not guarantee that they are utilized or developed into maturity. Indeed, George & Selzer also notes that in Attitudes toward History, Burke seemed not to use any distinct methodology, but instead tried to describe history with only a method, i.e. his symbolic analysis was in this case just how he happened to work and not a deliberate, properly though through methodology. Just as the ideas and general framework of Burke’s symbolic analysis, but not a whole worked-through theory and a clear methodology, are found in Attitudes toward History, so ideas of the nature and place of attitude within Burke’s theory of symbolic action can be found in Attitudes toward History, but not a developed theory of meaning and function. Burke obviously uses attitude as a sort of organizing principle – hence the title – and that it has importance for motivation is clear. The exact workings is not spelled out.

In these early works, the clearest outline for Burke’s theory of symbolic action can be found in “Literature as Equipment for Living”, an essay included in The Philosophy of Literary Form, where cultural texts are described as strategies for dealing with situations – keeping in mind that attitude is another term for strategy. The idea is that for typical situations, typical strategies – frames of acceptance or attitudes – are developed. As opposed to the dramatism of A Grammar of Motives, the centre here is a more flexible view on strategy – attitude – and situation.

Attitude is, however, not quite as unambiguously just a state of mind or an abstract strategy for handling a class of situations. From time to time a more basic physical connection emerges in Burke’s early works. These physical connections, as we shall see, provide an early basis for Burke's later concept of identification. Part of the physical connection is his view on the relation of speech and body. Here Burke was heavily indebted to Sir Richard Paget and his theories on

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the origins of human language as developed out of unconscious vocal imitation of body movement. In the conclusion to *Attitudes toward History*, Burke writes:

One embodies the act in manipulating the “superstructure” of values arising from “the original economic plant,” the human body. (Thus the body, as an “economic enterprise,” may on occasion prepare itself by the increase secretion of adrenalin, which induces an increase in muscular tension, an may in turn be correlated, in the “superstructure” of emotions, as fear or rage. Or the body, as predacious, may require acts of grasping – and these acts have their counterparts in attitudes of grasping – hence, if one in the act of grasping tends to compress the lips, the poet may dance the act of grasping when, in expressing some attitude of contact, he alliterates with the letter “m” – or he may “dance rejection” in another situation by the selection of words featuring the letter “p,” etc.)

There is here a much closer relationship between body and attitude. While attitude and bodily action are described as counterparts, which makes an interpretation of bodily act as manifested attitude possible, the order of Burke’s description goes in the other direction: acts of grasping are counterparts to attitudes of grasping, but the “predacious” body, “the original economic plant”, may require acts of grasping. Were attitudes purely mental things, and acts just physical manifestations of these, the body would not require anything in relation to attitude, but instead just act in accord with the dictates of attitude. Evidently, there is the possibility of an important bodily dimension of attitude. A specific bodily act is tied rather tightly to a specific attitude. You can express an attitude by dancing – a word Burke would return to in *The Philosophy of Literary Form* – the corresponding act of that attitude. Dancing is a rather revealing metaphor in that it is something you do with your body and is something you can choose how to do, but that is often required to fit to the dictates of the contextual situation – the music. Certainly, Burke goes on to explain that there is a structure of social accretion over such basic correspondences – making more abstract language possible – but this does not remove the bodily fundament of attitude.

As mentioned and as can be seen in the quotation, Burke draws a lot from Paget. Illustratively, in the first edition of *Attitudes toward History*, there is a lengthy section in “Dictionary of Pivotal Terms” – under “Cues” – dedicated to exploring the ramifications of Paget’s theories on Burke’s critical theory of language. As Hawhee notes in her *Moving Bodies*, Burke here goes quite far in

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his interpretation of Paget.\footnote{Hawhee (2009), Moving Bodies, p. 115.} The section was essentially excised in the 1959 edition\footnote{Hawhee (2009), Moving Bodies, p. 121.}, but Burke added a comment to the effect that he still regarded Paget’s theories convincing and relevant.\footnote{Burke (1937|1959|1961|1984), Attitudes toward History, pp. 237-238.}

As the earlier quote from the conclusion reveals, Paget’s thoughts are still very much present in *Attitudes toward History* – the quote immediately brings his discussion of words as physical acts to mind.

The bodily aspect of *attitudes* is confirmed and lead to some interesting results in *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. There, in the essay “Freud and the Analysis of Poetry,” Burke confirms the Pagetan tie between attitude and body:

> Indeed, there are only a few fundamental bodily idioms – and why should it not be likely that an attitude, no matter how complex its ideational expression, could only be completed by a channelization within its corresponding gestures? That is, the details of experience behind A’s dejection may be vastly different from the details of experience behind B’s dejection, yet both A and B may fall into the same bodily posture in expressing their dejection.\footnote{Burke (1941|1957|1967|1973), The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 264-265.}

The physical manifestation of dejection is the same regardless of the specific circumstances surrounding that dejection. The tie between *attitude* and bodily idiom remains close. In the opening essay, “Philosophy of Literary Form”, Burke reinforces the connection:

> The symbolic act is the *dancing of an attitude* (a point that Richards has brought out, though I should want to revise his position to the extent of noting that in Richards’ doctrines the attitude is pictured as too sparse in realistic content). In this attitudinizing of the poem, the whole body may finally become involved, in ways suggested by the doctrines of behaviourism.\footnote{Burke (1941|1957|1967|1973), The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 9.}

In a return to the language of *Attitudes toward History*, the symbolic act is described as the “dancing of an attitude.” Burke here criticizes I. A. Richards take on *attitude* as being “too sparse in realistic content.” Richards view on *attitude*, which can be found in his *Principles of Literary Criticism*\footnote{Richards, I. A. (2001), Principles of Literary Criticism, London: Routledge.} from 1924, differs from Burke’s in that it is completely abstract and entirely of the mind.\footnote{Richards (2001), pp. 98-103.} The marking of distance to Richard’s *attitude* and the connecting of his own *attitude* to
behaviourism, is another sign of the bodily dimension of his attitude. With the physical side of the attitude, Burke also introduces the possibility of multiple conflicting manifestations of attitude in the same subject, at the same time. He tells the story of a man, who during a visit to the dentist tries to dance a calm attitude – and does so – but is betrayed by the attitude his body dances in form of thickening saliva. His calm is a “social façade” and his sticky saliva the dancing of his “true” attitude, but nevertheless, both are danced. Again we have the metaphor of dancing; the body performing to the tune of the mind. Of course, here, the body has its own idea and performs a second dance to a second tune.

With this plurality of attitudes, with these attitudes that are not as hard to exchange for another as the more mind-oriented “rationalized” attitudes, there opens up a possibility for the type of communicative function Burke would later call identification. It may therefore be not totally surprising when Hawhee observes that Burke writes about identification for the first time when discussing Paget’s idea of words as physical acts in the first edition of Attitudes toward History. As Hawhee puts it: “At least in its early formation, Burkean identification is as much postural and somatic as it is social and psychological.” With the bodily dimension of attitude, the foundation for identification has been laid. While he does not name it identification, Burke describes the workings of a communicative function in The Philosophy of Literary Form, in the essay “Freud and the Analysis of Poetry”, that comes close:

- We might say that, whereas the expressionistic emphasis reveals the ways in which the poet, with an attitude, embodies it in appropriate gesture, communication deals with the choice of gesture for the inducement of corresponding attitudes. Sensory imagery has this same communicative function, inviting the reader, within the limits of fiction at least, to make himself over in the image of the imagery.

In terms of attitude it would then mean that the display – the dancing - of an attitude invites readers to adopt that attitude. The similarity to the ideas of persuasion to attitude and persuasion as identification from A Rhetoric of Motives is striking.

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87 Burke (1941|1957|1967|1973), The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 11.
88 Hawhee (2009), Moving Bodies, p. 116.
89 Hawhee (2009), Moving Bodies, p. 117.
All taken together, then, it seems like the early Burkean concept of *attitude* and its relation to symbolic analysis is rather complex. *Attitude* clearly has a both mental and bodily dimensions. On the one hand, *attitude* is central in symbolic analysis as one member in the attitude-situation pair. On the other hand, the body-oriented *attitude* with its behaviouristic touch paves the way for persuasion in the form of identification.

### 4.2 Subsumed

During the early 1940s something happens to Burke’s view on *attitude* and its relation to symbolic analysis. *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, published 1941 and mostly consisting of essays written in the 1930s, was written with the attitude-situation view of symbolic analysis in mind, but in *A Grammar of Motives*, published only four years later in 1945, *attitude* had been dethroned in favour of the now more familiar pentad. If the lack of properly worked out and presented methodology was a problem in *Attitudes toward History*, Burke now set out to correct the situation with a vengeance. In the introduction, where the five key terms, the pentad, of dramatism are presented, he motivates his choice of them as follows:

> If you ask why, with a whole world of terms to choose from, we select these rather than some others as basic, our book itself is offered as the answer. For, to explain our position, we shall show how it can be applied.\(^{92}\)

In other words, he is motivating his terms by demonstrating that they lead to a working methodology, not just by deriving them from his dramatistic theory. This introduction heralds a shift in Burke’s thinking on the theory of symbolic action: as Denning observes, in *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives* Burke turned away from the earlier more flexible model to the more rigid pentadic model, dramatism.\(^{93}\) The place of the earlier pervasive *attitude* in the new pentadic model is explained in the first chapter:

> Where would attitude fall within our pattern? Often it is the *preparation* for an act, which would make it a kind of symbolic act, or incipient act. But in its character as a state of *mind* that may or may not lead to an act, it is quite clearly to be classed under the head of *agent*.\(^{94}\)

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Here, *attitude* is subsumed by the pentadic terms. It is reduced from its position as driving force of history and central term in symbolic analysis to being a part of the agent.

Of course, *attitude* is not wholly absent in the rest of the volume. It does get its own section under act in the second part of *A Grammar of Motives*, “The Philosophical Schools.” In line with the quote above, *attitude* is described as an incipient, or delayed, act. This view of *attitude* is heavily influenced by I A Richards’ thoughts on the matter in his *Principles of Literary Criticism*, that is referenced, but in contrast to Burke’s marking of distance to Richards’ very abstract view in *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, such is not forthcoming, here. Paget is entirely absent. Burke does reference and utilize the thoughts of George Herbert Mead in his discussion of *attitude*, but the Pagetan stronger bodily connection is absent. There are some hints of bodily *attitudes* in *A Grammar of Motives*, such as when Burke maintains that the “mental *attitude* of arrest must have some corresponding bodily posture”\(^95\) and it also feature to some extent in *A Rhetoric of Motives* when he writes:

> However if, going beyond it[discord], the nervous system could fall into a state of radical passivity whereby all nervous impulses ”attitudinally glowed” at once (remaining in a halfway stage of incipience, the *status nascendi* of the pursuit figured on Keat’s Grecian Urn) there could be total activation without the overt acts that require repressive processes. Hence “contradictory” moments could exist simultaneously.\(^96\)

The parallels to that first embryonic identification found in the first edition of *Attitudes toward History* are plainly visible. Once again the body’s ability to simultaneously have multiple and conflicting *attitudes*, the ability to produce unity out of discord, paves the way for identification.

The lack of Pagetian influence in the section on *attitude* in *A Grammar of Motives* does, however, not mean that it lacks information on the role *attitude* plays in dramatism as a whole. From Meade, Burke takes the notion of distinction between action and motion and then places *attitude* in the middle.

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Such a conception, somewhat analogous to Santayana’s view of the “field of action,” would give us a concept halfway between motion and action. Perhaps, as with our previous improvisation to do with agent, we might call it action-minus. Or rather, “attitude-minus.” 97

Motion is an act of the body, action an act of the mind and attitude connects the two. The action is a motion with a will or intent and what separates an act from another might be nothing more than the attitude toward that motion. As Burke explains later in the book: “Two men, performing the same motions side by side, might be said to be performing different acts, in proportion as they differed in their attitudes toward their work.” 98 This relation of motion and action is, as Hawhee observes, of utmost importance to the ambiguous and changeable relations between the terms of the pentad. 99

Seen in this light, Burke’s description of the attitude as an incipient action carries a range of implications. Burke asks his readers to take special note of the ambiguity inherent in this incipience:

Note, however, that the concept of incipient acts is ambiguous. As an attitude can be a substitute for an act, it can likewise be the first step towards an act. Thus, if we arouse in someone an attitude of sympathy towards something, we may be starting him on the road towards sympathetic action with regard to it… 100

This is precisely the attitude as state of mind and part of the agent that Burke writes about in the introduction. The inherent ambiguity of the attitude makes it, in line with Aristotle’s reasoning on actuality and potentiality, “‘potentially’ two different kinds of act.” 101 – as an act or as a substitute for an act. Burke sometimes pondered and characterized situations in light of the dichotomous pair act and state, which he called actus and status. In line with the Aristotelian reasoning, he, at times, used them in a slightly different fashion, so that status is potentiality, while actus is the actualization of that potentiality. 102 In connection to this, there is Burke's take on the entelechial principle of Aristotle, involving the striving of all things to reach their potential. 103 Altogether, this suggests that attitude is a sort of connective between agent and act –

99 Hawhee (2009), Moving Bodies, p. 123.  
somewhat analogous to its function in the relation between motion and action. *Attitude* as state of mind, and hence part of the agent, is a potentiality in that it may lead to an act and thereby actualization. According to Burke’s view of the entelechial principle, actuality is prior to potentiality in the sense that potentiality only exists because of the actuality. Furthermore, as the actuality is the reason for the existence of the potentiality, the latter moves toward the former. Perfection is reached when the potentiality is realized into actuality.104 In terms of *attitude*, the *attitude* of an agent is a potentiality that can be realized – perfected in the entelechial sense – into the actuality of the corresponding act. Of course, not everything reaches perfection and in that lies the attitudinal ambiguity of act and its substitute.

Ambiguity as a trait is something *attitude* shares with the terms of the pentad. It is not just an accident, but an expressed requirement: “Accordingly, what we want is *not terms that avoid ambiguity*, but *terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise*.”105 Interestingly enough, ambiguity also characterizes the relation of two pentadic terms in a ratio:

A ratio is a formula indicating a transition from one term to another. Such a relation necessarily possesses the ambiguities of the potential, in that the second term is a medium different from the first. For the nature of the mediated necessarily differs from the nature of the immediate, as translation must differ from its original, the embodiment of an ideal must differ from the ideal, and a god incarnate would differ from that god as pure spirit 106

This might as well be a description of the relation of *attitude* to act as explained by Burke when expounding on the ambiguity inherent in the *attitude* as incipient act itself. Indeed, Burke explains that “the realm of the incipient, or attitudinal, is the realm of ‘symbolic action’ par excellence; for symbolic action has the same ambiguous potentialities of action.”107 It seems, then, that *attitude*, though not one of them, shares the qualifications of the pentadic terms. It is a term that “reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise” and that can form ratios with the other terms in order to answer the opening question of *A Grammar of Motives*, “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?”108

That \textit{attitude} shares these qualifications with the terms of the pentad does of course not necessitate – and did indeed not prompt – an inclusion of it in the system that is the pentad. Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising given the importance Burke placed on \textit{attitude} in symbolic analysis as he developed it in his earlier works. Furthermore, when it comes to rhetoric the exclusion is not without its draw-backs. In \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, when discussing the ambiguity of \textit{attitude} as incipient act, Burke makes a comment with implications for the very reason of existence for rhetoric, persuasion:

Thus, if we arouse in someone an attitude of sympathy towards something, we may be starting him on the road towards overtly sympathetic action with regard to it – hence the rhetoric of advertisers and propagandists who would induce action in behalf of their commodities or their causes by the formation of appropriate attitudes.\footnote{109}

What Burke describes here is nothing but persuasion to an \textit{attitude} – a concept he would return to in his 1950 volume, \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives}. There, Burke states that “rhetorical language is inducement to action (or attitude, attitude being an incipient act)\footnote{110} and later on in the book that “Yet often we could with more accuracy speak of persuasion ‘to attitude,’ rather than persuasion to out-and-out action.”\footnote{111} Evidently, inducing a shift in \textit{attitude} is often the aim of rhetorical activity. The induced \textit{attitude} is then a potentiality that may or may not be realized into a corresponding actuality. Persuading to an \textit{attitude} is in other words a way of providing a motive for a possible later action. He also finds it to broaden the usefulness of rhetorical terms, “the notion of persuasion to \textit{attitude} would permit the application of rhetorical terms to purely poetic structures.”\footnote{112} Realistically, then, the exclusion of \textit{attitude} from the key terms of dramatism makes analysis of such persuasions somewhat less parsimonious.

Going by the above, the reasons for subsuming \textit{attitude} into the terms of the pentad are not obvious. What is clear, however, is that the position of \textit{attitude} in the Dramatism of \textit{A Grammar of Motives} and \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives} is not the result of any inadvertent, last-minute omission on Burke’s part. When comparing the former volume with the somewhat different first draft of it\footnote{113}, the treatment of \textit{attitude} is more or less identical. Specifically, the influence of Paget is not to be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{109} Burke (1945|1947|1962|1969), \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, p. 236.
  \item \footnote{110} Burke (1950|1955|1962|1969), \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives}, p. 42.
  \item \footnote{111} Burke (1950|1955|1962|1969), \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives}, p. 50.
  \item \footnote{112} Burke (1950|1955|1962|1969), \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives}, p. 50.
  \item \footnote{113} Burke, \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, unpublished first draft Q3.
\end{itemize}
found and, more generally, the content, and structure of the sections of the book dealing with
*attitude*, most notably "'Incipient' and 'Delayed' Action", are the same in the two versions. At
least a part of the answer might be the reception of his earlier works. As mentioned before, there
was no clear description of methodology in *Attitudes toward History* and its companion works
and this was reflected in the criticism he received\(^{114}\). Criticism that according to George & Selzer
spurred Burke to develop an explicit methodology.\(^{115}\) A thoroughly worked out methodology
with a more rigid structure in form of the pentad, a structure in which the earlier pervasive nature
of *attitude* did not quite fit.

Burke himself was not silent on the issue, but, perhaps characteristically, he was not quite certain
himself. In an interview he theorized that he may have chosen the number five for his key terms
because he had five children,\(^ {116}\) but in an earlier article he indicates that it may have been because
of his unfamiliarity with a passage in the Nichomachean Ethics at the time of the conception of
the pentad.\(^ {117}\) However it was, he sent a very Burkean comment in a 1978 letter to his life-long
friend Malcolm Cowley:

> The Grammar shoulda been a Hexad; but though the section on ATTITUDE is there, the magic of
> numbers kept it from being right up front like with SCENE, AGENT, ACT, AGENCY,
> PURPOSE. However, in mine olden Daze I can actually profit by gossiping about the whole
> matter and thereby being better able, from another of my several angles, to document *ab intra* my
> thesis that, "If you're in our biz, you don't use words; also words use you." To which I add:
> "sometimes to your profit, often to your loss, and maybe always in different proportions to both."\(^ {118}\)

It is rather hard to find a more fitting illustration of the power of words than this uncertainty
surrounding Burke’s pentad.

Taking *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives* together, the shape of Burke’s theory of
symbolic action and the place of *attitude* within it has changed markedly from his earlier version
from *Permanence and Change*, *Attitudes toward History* and *The Philosophy of Literary Form*.

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\(^{116}\) Bonadonna, Angelo & Rueckert, William H. Eds (2003), “Counter-Gridlock: An Interview with Kenneth Burke,

\(^{117}\) Burke, Kenneth (1978), "Questions and Answers About the Pentad", *College Composition and Communication*
29.4, pp. 330-335.

\(^{118}\) Burke, Kenneth (1978-12-09), Letter to Malcolm Cowley.
Perhaps prompted by the criticism of his earlier works, he here presents a dramatism with a thoroughly worked out methodology, where attitude has lost its elevated position and been subsumed into his five key terms. The Pagetan bodily overtones of attitude are gone and instead attitude lies to a much higher degree in the realm of the mind. Still, attitude carries out important functions in the dramatistic world-view – it provides a vital connection between action and motion and is an important target for persuasion.

4.3 Reinstated

The new nature of the attitude as a thing wholly of the mind that was established in A Grammar of Motives and upheld in A Rhetoric of Motives would not last long. In a 1952 article in Quarterly Journal of Speech, just two years after the publishing of the latter volume, Burke writes that “Dramatistically, we watch always for ways in which bodily attitudes can affect the development of linguistic expression.” and then adds a parenthetical comment on Paget. The bodily aspect of the attitude is back and so is Paget. It may be a small comment, but as Hawhee remarks, Burke’s interest in the Pagetan side of the attitude would persist for a long time, even if it not always obviously so.

It is also evident that Burke took an active interest in the place of attitude in his Dramatism. In the decade after the publishing of A Rhetoric of Motives, he worked on the revision of his early critical works and a new one-volume version of Attitudes of History was published 1959. This version featured a new six-page introduction, written 1955, that stresses the importance of attitude. As mentioned in the first part of this analysis, Burke starts his introduction by explaining that the “accent” of meaning of the title should be placed on the word attitudes and then goes on to point out the pervasiveness of attitude. The terms in his employed terminology are “attitudinal”, history constantly repeats itself in the sense that different times are “attitudinally united” and he stresses that all the terms featured in the chapter “Dictionary of Pivotal Terms” are of a “strongly attitudinal sort.” Continuing, he emphasizes the importance of the comic frame, his attitude of attitudes: “And saturating the lot is the attitude of attitudes which we call the ‘comic frame,’ the methodic view of human antics as a comedy, albeit as a comedy.

120 Hawhee (2009), Moving Bodies, p. 124.
ever on the verge of the most disastrous tragedy.” 121 This is the basis for the explanation of the curve of history found in *Attitudes toward History* and as such inherently tied to the bureaucratization of the imaginative:

If “comedy” is our attitude of attitudes, then the process of processes which the comedy meditates upon is what we call the “bureaucratization of the imaginative.” This formula is designed to name the vexing things that happen when men try to translate some pure aim or vision in terms of its corresponding material embodiment, thus necessarily involving elements alien to the original, “spiritual” (“imaginative”) motive. 122

As George & Selzer point out, the comic frame is what provides the early version of symbolic analysis with a methodology 123 and here Burke spells out the relation of that attitude of attitudes to the driving process of history that is the bureaucratization of the imaginative, a process that ensures the destruction through synthesis of the very attitudes it uses to organize society. The attitude, in other words, is here back in full force. What remains is the incorporation of it in Dramatism and its somewhat more rigid pentadic structure. An incorporation that would come in the form of a new edition, almost identical to the old, of the same *A Grammar of Motives* that effected the subsumption of attitude.

Burke had never really stopped working on *A Grammar of Motives*. After its publishing, he occupied himself with his Epilegomena to the volume, which Burke described as “further extensions of my theories, modifications, answers to critics, etc.” 124 It is a fascinating body of work, even though its nature as collection of notes makes it rather hard to get a grip on. In places, it is also hard to read the notes. 125 As evidenced by the Epilegomena, Burke experimented quite a bit with his symbolic analysis and the pentadic ratios. He seemed, for example, toy around with the idea of an agent-passion ratio, exemplified by a quote from Milton's *Samson Agonistes*, a tragic closet drama based on the biblical Samson, “Servile mind/ rewarded well with servile punishment!” 126 Samson is saying that his servility towards Delilah is punished with forced servility toward the philistines. When the World Publishing Company wanted to publish a

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124 Burke, Kenneth (1961-05-18), Letter to Aaron Asher.
125 Many thanks go to the most accommodating staff at the Penn State Special Collections Library and, on one occasion, Dr Jack Selzer for helping me decipher some of the more difficult notes.
paperback combining *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives* in one volume, Burke therefore offered to add a lengthy postscript based on the Epilegomena to the book.127 Aaron Asher, the editor, was not entirely disinterested in the postscript, but printing technicalities made him sceptical towards any lengthy addition – the paperback would have 896 pages and since 32-page signatures were desirable, adding even one extra page would make the printing more expensive.128 Not to be deterred, Burke scrapped the idea of a section of “observations pro and con that had been made by other writers on the subject of these books” and instead wrote two shorter passages, one for each book, that could be inserted into the volume.129 The page added to the *A Grammar of Motives* section featured a short comment on attitude in ratios as well as some lines about the order of the terms in the ratios.130 That short comment established attitude as a key term in Burkes symbolic analysis:

> With regard to the dramatistic pentad (act, scene, agent, agency, purpose), I have found one modification useful for certain kinds of analysis. In accordance with my discussion on “attitudes” (in the section on 'Incipient' and 'Delayed' action pp. 235-47), I have sometimes added the term “attitude” to the above list of five major terms. Thus, one could also speak of a “scene-attitude ratio” or of an “agent-attitude ratio,” etc. “Agency” would more strictly designate the “means” (*quibus auxiliis*) employed in an act. And “attitude” would designate the manner (*quo modo*). To build something with a hammer would involve an instrument, or “agency”; to build with diligence would involve an “attitude,” a “how.”131

With this, *attitude* became a term on the same level with the terms of the pentad and the pentad had effectively been made into a hexad.

It is perhaps also somewhat interesting to note that whereas thus far, Burke had discussed *attitude* as an incipient act and part of the agent, effectively placing *attitude* between act and agent, here he ties *attitude* to *quo modo*, which he earlier had declared part of the agency.132 To further illustrate the pervasiveness of *attitude*, there is also a passage in *A Grammar of Motives*...
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discussing Aristotle’s view of tragedy in terms of the pentad, where Burke ties *quo modo* to scene or a sort of scenic agency:

The sixth element, Spectacle, he assigns to “manner” (presumably the *quo modo* of the Latin hexameter quoted above), a kind of modality that we should want to class under *scene*, though Aristotle’s view of it as accessory would seem to make it rather a kind of *scenic agency*.

In a certain sense, the inclusion of *attitude* among the pentadic terms is a function and acknowledgment of its pervasive nature in Dramatism. Burke is careful in his wording, though. He “sometimes” adds *attitude* to the pentadic terms in “certain kinds of analysis.” This suggests a somewhat less rigid view of the pentadic terms and their being the core of Dramatism – especially in the light of Burke’s above mentioned experimenting with new ratios in the Epilegomena to his *A Grammar of Motives*.

While ratios containing *attitude* are not discussed at length anywhere, as other ratios are in *A Grammar of Motives*, such are mentioned in a few places in Burke’s published works. In *The Rhetoric of Religion* from 1961 an attitude-act ratio is discussed briefly: “But insofar as the act derives from an attitude of the agent, the agent-act ratio can be narrowed down to an attitude-act ratio, as when a friendly agent does a friendly act.” The *attitude* in the ratio is described as a narrowing down from the agent, but it still provides a clear example of Burke’s thinking when it comes to implementing *attitude* in a ratio. It is also in all probability one of the earlier, if not the earliest, example that saw print, as *The Rhetoric of Religion* was published the year before the meridian paperback of *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives* with the aforementioned addition on *attitude* in the pentad.

Another example can be found in Burke’s published comments on his poem *Eye-Crossing – From Brooklyn to Manhattan*:

Henry knew, as his students could not know, the damnable personal situation at the roots of my being in Brooklyn that season when the poem was written. So he could more easily approach the

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Henry Sams, a friend of Burke's, had noted that he and his students analysed the poem differently. Henry with a preference for attitude-agent and his students with preferences leaning more toward scene-attitude. Burke attributed this difference to knowledge of his personal situation. The personal situation Burke refers to in the quote is his wife being close to death in a terminal disease. The difference in applied context, in \textit{circumference} to use Burke’s terminology, is the reason for the different readings. When Henry Sams analyses the poem, knowing of Burke’s plight, he sees a poetic persona, the agent, dominated by an \textit{attitude} shaped by the fear of impending loss and sense of a rotten world. His students on the other hand, unburdened by the knowledge of Burke’s situation, see an interaction of \textit{attitude} and scene.

As far as Burke is concerned, the analysis of poetry is well served by \textit{attitude}. The pentadic structure of his Dramatism as put forth in the \textit{Motives} volumes did not stop him from maintaining in \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives} that: “the persuasion to \textit{attitude} would permit the application of rhetorical terms to purely \textit{poetic} structures.”\footnote{Burke (1950|1955|1962|1969), \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives}, p. 50.} This way of utilizing \textit{attitude} in dramatistic analysis is in other words rather natural and it is also an example of how \textit{attitude} as part of ratios interact and depend on the circumference. While \textit{attitude} in Burke’s early works was a force driving history and its realm in \textit{A Grammar of Motives “the realm of ‘symbolic action’ par excellence,”}\footnote{Burke (1945|1947|1962|1969), \textit{A Grammar of Motives}, p. 243.} it is here used quite mundanely as a pentadic, or better hexadic, term. \textit{Attitude} has truly become the diligence to the agency’s hammer.

In his later period, Burke added an element of practicality to the \textit{attitude} when it came to the application of the key terms on an object to be analysed. In a 1978 letter to James S. Mullican he writes that \textit{attitude} is the term he uses when “on occasion” he has “hexed” his pentad.\footnote{Burke (1978-02-12), Letter to James Mullican.} A bit further along in the letter, Burke explains an advantage of using \textit{attitude} as a hexadic term in analysis:
One advantage would be that the featuring of ATTITUDE with regard to the lyric could incite towards a mild kind of parsimony; namely: Instead of looking for ways of plastering the godam pentadic labels on everything, one could feature the ones that were central.\textsuperscript{139}

While greater parsimony should be expected when analysing lyrics, considering Burke’s above mentioned remark in \textit{A Rhetoric of Motives} concerning persuasion to \textit{attitude} allowing poetic structures to be viewed as rhetoric, the parsimony he writes about here is not only dependent on the theoretical good fit of \textit{attitude} to lyrics, but also its ability to prevent misapplication or overuse of the original pentadic terms. It is a very practical reason for including \textit{attitude} among the key terms of dramatistic analysis.

While the practical aspect of the inclusion of \textit{attitude} among the pentadic terms seem not to be inconsiderable importance, the theoretically more fundamental reasons for a central place for attitude in Dramatism are not forgotten by Burke. The same year, 1978, he published an article in \textit{Critical Inquiry}, “(Nonsymbolic) Motion / (Symbolic) Action”, where the function of \textit{attitude} as mediator between motion and action is made clear.\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Attitudes} are present in theoretical instances, but it is connected to the body, “Though any attitude, even in purely theoretical matters, has a summarizing, unifying aspect, it must prevail only insofar as in someway it is grounded in purely physiological behavior.”\textsuperscript{141} Even an \textit{attitude} that is the quintessential incipient or delayed act, a preparation for a future act, “must be by some means grounded in the set of body now.” Considering the importance of the duality of motion and action in Dramatism, it is evident that \textit{attitude} has not lost its pervasive nature or been reduced to a functional vehicle for methodological ease of use.

In the 1983 afterword, “In Retrospective Prospect”, to a new edition of \textit{Attitudes toward History} Burke had the opportunity to comment his earlier pervasive and history-driving \textit{attitude}. Far from reducing the importance of \textit{attitude}, he instead choose to explain important features of the volume in terms of \textit{attitude}. As already mentioned in the section on Burke’s early period, he emphasized the importance of the \textit{bureaucratization of the imaginative} in the book and further on identified \textit{imaginative} with \textit{attitude} and \textit{bureaucratization} with \textit{history}, thereby equating the

\textsuperscript{139} Burke (1978-02-12), Letter to James Mullican.  
\textsuperscript{140} Bygrave (1993), \textit{Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric and Ideology}, p. 87.  
\textsuperscript{141} Bonadonna & Rueckert (2003), p. 147.
Burke does, however, not end his description of the role of attitude in Dramatism there. He explains his creation of the pentad as a work of deriving the terms from a, by him, oft quoted verse: “quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quo modo, quando” (who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when). “But,” Burke writes, “even then (in my Grammar of Motives) the term ‘attitude’ for quo modo did not come quite clear. If it had, my Pentad would have been a Hexad from the start.”\[142\] Attitude has been added to the Pentad.

Continuing the list of functions, Burke explains that attitude “designates the point of personal mediation between the realms of nonsymbolic motion and symbolic action,” placing attitude in the dramatistically central distinction of motion and action. Attitude is what connects the two.

The dual nature of attitude, being of both motion and action, body and mind, is made abundantly clear as well as its defining nature in regards to man: “Its ‘how’ refers to the role of the human individual as a physiological organism, with correspondingly centrality of the nervous system, ATTITUDINIZING in the light of experience as marked by the powers of symbolicity.”\[143\] Attitude, being of body and mind, rests in the centre of Dramatism.

To summarize, the later Burke combined the early Burke’s history-driving and pervasive attitude with the pentadic methodology of the intermediate Burke, thereby making clear the dependence of attitude on both body and mind and providing the Pentad with a practical addition.

At this point three different versions of attitude has become clear: the early force of history, the intermediate subsumptive and the later synthesis. What remains is to explore the implications of the views of attitude.

5 Discussion

Considering the above overview of uses of attitude in Burke’s works, it is not surprising that scholars are of different opinions on exactly what constitutes attitude. The differences are not always small, but instead sometimes take on huge proportions. In their article “Kenneth Burke’s ‘Attitude’ at the Crossroads of Rhetorical and Cultural Studies: A Proposal and Case Study

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Illustration” Mahan-Hays & Aden maintains that Burke “emphasizes that attitude is a strategy of interpretation and thus more of a cognitive activity that is reflected in one’s symbol usage.”\(^{144}\) Hawhee disagrees in her *Moving Bodies* and elsewhere characterizes attitude in a radically different way: “Attitude, though often manifest in words, is at base a nonverbal, even bodily orientation, made visible in snarls or fists, in the determined refusal of crossed arms or the heavy limpness of ‘passive’ resisters.”\(^{145}\) Bygrave, for his part, sees in Burke’s “(Nonsymbolic) Motion / (Symbolic) Action” an attitude “so extended as to designate any kind of response to a stimulus”\(^{146}\) leading to an attitude that loses its “distinctiveness.” Depending on scholar attitude can evidently be of the mind, of the body or occupy some sort of amorphous, indistinctive middle ground.

This difference of opinion is not just a result of reading works from different periods. Hawhee does criticize Mahan-Hays & Aden for overemphasizing *A Grammar of Motives* when constructing their version of a Burkean attitude,\(^{147}\) but it is indeed a question of emphasis since Mahan-Hays & Aden do delve into the earlier works – e.g. *The Philosophy of Literary Form*.\(^{148}\) When Bygrave charges attitude with indistinctiveness, he does so in a chapter spanning the early, intermediate and late Burke.\(^{149}\) Analogous to Hawhee’s critique of Mahan-Hays & Aden, you could see Bygrave as too influenced by the rather body-less attitude of *A Grammar of Motives*, but viewed from another perspective it is more complicated in both cases.

As Anderson & Althause point out in *Five Fingers or Six? Pentad or Hexad?*, Burke’s thoughts on attitude in relation to the pentad is never systematically developed in print.\(^{150}\) Dramatism and everything in it is certainly not only approachable by way of pentadic analysis, but however you want to look at it, the terms of the Pentad are, in terms of being thoroughly and systematically described, the premier analytic tool in Burke’s Dramatism. Act, agent, agency, scene and purpose are extensively explored in *A Grammar of Motives* and Burke there expounds on their practical, methodological function as well as their theoretical place within Dramatism. This systematic

\(^{144}\) Mahan-Hays & Aden (2003), p. 35.
\(^{146}\) Bygrave (1993), p. 87.
\(^{147}\) Hawhee (2009), *Moving Bodies*, p. 108.
\(^{149}\) Bygrave (1993), pp. 77-106.
\(^{150}\) Anderson & Althause, Mathew T. (2010).
exploration creates a strong connection between two realms, theory and practice, as far as these terms are concerned. The general place of attitude within Dramatism, or at least a place, is possible to determine through compiling information about attitude from a number of Burke’s critical works, but there is scant information on the more practical side of it as an analytical tool. This lack of explication and the resulting lack of connection between theory and practice is in all probability felt more keenly when juxtaposing attitude with the pentadic terms. From a methodological perspective it might in other words make sense to emphasize A Grammar of Motives. If you are looking for a clearly described methodology, the pentadic analysis of A Grammar of Motives is what you can find.

It is somewhat similar when it comes to Bygrave’s comment on the loss of distinctiveness of attitude in “(Nonsymbolic) Motion / (Symbolic) Action”. It is not that Bygrave does not have a point, it is just that, going by A Grammar of Motives, the same charge could be directed at the original pentadic terms as well. Burke establishing, in the chapter on act, that form, and indeed existence, is an act can serve as an example here. If one is serious about including attitude in the pentad, which, judging by the letters and published materials referred to in this thesis, Burke certainly was, this sort of behaviour when explaining the theoretical basis of the term, is to be expected. There is not just a small overlap of pentadic terms; when exploring the world seen through a term, with the term dominating the others, everything takes on a tint of the term:

In our introduction we noted that the areas covered by our five terms overlap upon one another. And because of this overlap, it is possible for a thinker to make his way continuously from any one of them to any of the others. Or he may use terms in which several of the areas are merged. For any of the terms may be seen in terms of any of the others. And we may even treat all five in terms of one, by “reducing” them all to the one or (what amounts to the same thing) “deducing” them all from the one as their common ancestor. This relation we could express in terms by saying that the term selected as ancestor “came first”; and in timeless or logical terms we could say that the term selected is “essential,” “basic,” “logically prior” or “ultimate” term, or the “term of terms,” etc.  

The pentadic terms are not disjoint and were never intended to be. They overlap by design and every one of them can be viewed as a part of the others, or, if viewed completely from the

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perspective of one term, all of them can be seen as a part of that one term. The loss of “distinctiveness” Bygrave finds in “(Nonsymbolic) Motion / (Symbolic) Action” is in other words a natural result of viewing the world through an attitudinal perspective. And in line with the here demonstrated role of attitude as a connective between motion and action, using an attitudinal perspective is in turn a natural result of exploring the nature of the motion-action duality. Going in the other direction, all the pentadic terms can be reduced to the others, just as attitude was subsumed by the pentadic terms in *A Grammar of Motives*. That a term can be accounted for by the others is a function of the nature of the pentad with its overlapping terms and in-built ambiguities. As a result, examples of how attitude can be accounted for by other pentadic terms, such as those Anderson & Althouse provide, do not constitute adequate arguments against including attitude in the Pentad. A dramatistic key term is not present in the Pentad because it cannot be accounted for by the others, but because it adds another, useful, perspective.

Burke designed his Dramatism, with its pentadic construction, to consist of and reveal ambiguities. The problem of the widely differing views of Hawhee and Mahan-Hays & Aden, Bygrave’s charge of loss of distinctiveness or Anderson & Althaus’ accounting of attitude by the other terms are all precisely what should be expected of views of a poorly explicated element within such a system. As long as attitude remains theoretically compatible with Dramatism on a general level, which should not be a point of contention considering the above review of its presence in Burke’s works, arguments concerning exact place within or symmetry of the theory will remain less than convincing. Because of the stress on ambiguity, even the well explicated terms shift around in the theory depending on perspective and therefore so do symmetries. When Anderson & Althaus observe that including attitude in the pentad produces an inconsistency because it does not correspond to a philosophical school as the other terms, it is an observation based on a symmetry that depends on how you look at the matter. While the pentadic terms all correspond to a particular philosophic school, all the philosophic schools do not correspond to a particular term. The symmetry is marred from the start. Possibly a philosophical school could be found that corresponds to attitude, but including a term that can feature all the philosophical

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schools would be symmetrical in the sense that it corresponds to how nominalism and rationalism behave in relation to the terms. Negative arguments in this form will ultimately rest on the lack of explication, which may make methodological sense since there are practical concerns regarding how to utilize attitude in analysis, but from a theoretical standpoint they leave something to be desired.

The problem should be looked at from another direction. Pentadic analysis is a working system and as such the onus should be on analysts wishing to add to it to show that the expansion is a good idea. This would also be in line with how Burke presented his Pentad in A Grammar of Motives. His idea of defending his choice of terms was in showing their application and when adding attitude to the mix in the addendum, his argument was not one of theoretical necessity or symmetry, but of usefulness.

Knowing a general place for attitude in Dramatism, determining how it works in ratios is a logical next step. In the review of Burke’s shifting attitudes toward attitude in this thesis, it can be seen that he at different times saw attitude in terms of act, agent, agency or scene. If attitude is to be seen as part of a hexad, they could be seen as ratios featuring attitude as subordinate term. Since the terms in a ratio are analogous to each other, these could easily be reversed to show the effect of attitude as a dominant. Taking the act-attitude ratio as an example, the dominance of the act is based on it being logically prior to the attitude – the attitude, the incipient act, exists only because it can be fulfilled as an actual act. The reversal of the ratio would then instead feature attitude as dominant because attitude precedes the act in time – the act only exists because of the instigating attitude. To illustrate with an example, commercials often seek to persuade people toward an attitude, but the makers of the commercials do so because the attitude may lead to an act – to buy the intended merchandise. The attitude is only of interest so far that it leads to the act. In that perspective act is logically prior to attitude. The buyers of the merchandise, on the other hand, act as they do because of the adopted attitude. Attitude precedes the act in time and is what instigates it. In this perspective attitude is the dominating term. Since attitude has not been described in terms of purpose, the workings of the corresponding ratios cannot be directly taken out of Burke’s texts the same way, but it lies inherent in the description of the two terms – in a given circumstance, a purpose demands a corresponding attitude and an attitude dictates a purpose. As an example, a desire to destroy an
enemy, metaphorically or literally, fosters an attitude of rejection toward that enemy and an attitude of rejection fosters the view that someone is an enemy to destroy.

Successful hexadic analyses utilizing attitude has been performed, Clarke Rountree’s “Charles Haddon Spurgeon’s Calvinist Rhetoric of Election: Constituting an Elect” being a good example, and as such its usefulness has, at least to some measure, been shown. The review of concepts of attitudes in Burke’s works performed in this thesis, does however form a good basis for exploring some aspects of the nature of that usefulness. As identified earlier, the practice of persuading to attitude makes the exploration of attitude in rhetorical analysis of interest. With the help of outlines of attitudinal analyses of a situation featuring such persuasion, done in the styles of the three different stages of Burke’s symbolic analysis, the early situation-attitude focused, the pentadic and the hexadic, the analytical strengths and differences of the analytical methodologies can now be shown.

Following the tragic event at Utøya and Regjeringskvartale in Norway July the 22nd, when 77 people lost their lives, prime minister Jens Stoltenberg gave a memorial address at the Oslo cathedral. In the short and well received speech he spoke about the feelings and reactions of the Norwegians as a people, as can be seen from a key passage: “We are a small country, but a proud people. We are still shocked by what has happened, but we will never give up our values. Our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity. But never naivety.” The address is a good object for the demonstration of how attitude interacts with the different analytical context Burke has provided.

Using the early Burke as model for the analysis, the extraordinary situation of a terrorist attack against the very basis of democracy is met with an attitude of democracy. Norway is a democracy and the democratic attitude exhibited by Stoltenberg can so be seen as rationalized, ingrained into the Norwegian society. Introducing another would, as seen earlier in this thesis, promote conflict. Stoltenberg’s choice of holding fast and emphasizing the rationalized attitude is thereby promoting unity. This would be the core of an early Burkean analysis and in proceeding an analyst is left with a lot of choices. The deed was done by a Norwegian not enamoured of the

155 Clarke Rountree (1994).
democratic situation in Norway, which may be an indication of a societal rationalized attitude in dissolution. On the one hand, by characterizing the Norwegian people as of democratic disposition, Stoltenberg rejects the perpetrator’s ‘norwegianess,’ meaning it is possible to continuing the analysis considering a frame of rejection. On the other hand, Stoltenberg not actively denying the ‘norwegianess’ of the perpetrator is a sort of acceptance of the act as possible in a thoroughly democratic society, creating a possibility for an analysis considering a frame of acceptance – and possibly a use for the comic frame. The naivety part points to a possibility of a utilizing a perspective by incongruity by associating the remark to the ongoing debate about counter-terrorist measures. Does the remark pave the way for a repressive democracy or democratic repression? Does it open up for a state that represses its citizens in name of democracy or will it perhaps instigate a hard, but democratically decided and upheld, repression of the different? The core of the analysis is easily attained, but the wealth of tools leaves many options and little guidance.

Using traditional pentadic analysis, the dominating term is easily identified as agent, Norwegians, but the subordinate term in the dominant ratio is not so easily determined. Norwegians are open, democratic and humanitarian, meaning these are properties of the agent. The properties, however, can lead to acts, behaving openly, acting democratically and with humanity. These acts are in turn also the tools, the agency, of democracy. Following Burke’s reasoning regarding democracy on the relation between scene and act and act and agent, it can also be said that the Norwegians, as an essentially democratic people, are creating the scene that is the democratic Norway.\textsuperscript{157} A pentadic analysis will have to spend quite some time belabouring which term is to feature as subordinate in the ratio. The speech will, due to the featuring of agent, be seen as idealistic and the motive found through consideration of the dominating ratio will, regardless of which term is chosen as subordinate, again be that of unity, promoted by shared action or tools. Here the analytic framework provided by Burke guides the analyst quite a bit more, but also forces a discussion of which term to apply that has little impact on the final result.

Using the extended Pentad, the Hexad, the analysis looks rather similar to the pentadic with the difference that the discussion on which term to apply is considerably shortened. The dominant term is still clearly agent, thereby keeping the idealistic slant, and the subordinate term is clearly

attitude. Following Burke’s equating the attitude with ‘how’ and asking the question “how will the Norwegians respond?” will result in the answer of “democratically”, “openly” and “with humanity.” The speech promotes unity by the sharing of an attitude. By identification with the democratic attitude, Stoltenberg persuades toward the virtues he makes the focus of the identification. This analytical frame still guides the analyst and it avoids the necessity of “plastering the godam pentadic labels on everything.”

The example that is the base of these analytical outlines is of course specifically chosen in order to demonstrate the parsimonious effect of including attitude into the pentad and obviously the gain of including the attitude diminishes greatly when it is not substantially featured in the dominating ratio. As can be inferred from some of Burke’s comments referred to in this thesis, this is, however, rather in line with how Burke himself probably saw it. When he introduced attitude in the addendum to A Grammar of Motives, he only argued for including it “sometimes”. In later comments he said that the pentad should have been a hexad from the start, as has been mentioned, but there is not necessarily a contradiction or even much of a development between the stances. Judging by the quoted comments, Burke seemed to dislike the routine application of terms and prefer to use an internal use of the pentad, the considering of the featured ratios. However you look at it though, attitude can help improve pentadic analysis when persuasion to attitude is involved.

Attitude as a part of regular hexadic analysis, interesting as it is, however, is not the end of it. The nature of attitude as a connective between action and motion, the conscious and the below-conscious, suggests a usefulness beyond that. Judging by its place in the dramatic theory, attitude seems to be well suited to analyse fully and partly unconscious expressions. The interaction of attitude and persuasion is bidirectional. You can persuade toward an attitude but attitude also forms a basis for the possibility of persuasion. Expressing an attitude may help persuade by way of identification, but adopting that attitude also opens up for new persuasion of the adopter. This is analogous to the problematization of text and context that exploded in the 20th century history of ideas and is perhaps best represented by Derrida and his famous words, ”il n'y a pas de hors-texte.” From a theoretical point of view, then, attitude has possible

159 “There is nothing outside the text” in English.
connections to concepts such as Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus*, habitual structures that governs and are governed by our actions, and Judith Butler's ideas on the performativity of identity. Indeed, Dana Anderson, in his article ”Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action: Burke and Bourdieu on Practice”, connects a Burke to Bourdieu, influenced by Butler's reading of the latter, and argues that practice can be interpreted as a sort of attitude-act ratio in order to better capture the nature of practice that according to him is both physiological and symbolic.\(^{160}\)

On a more practical note, Brigitte Mral uses attitudinal expressions to perform a rhetorical analysis in her article ”'Attitude matters' – Attityd yttringar som retoriska medel.”\(^{161}\) Apart from Burke she also draws on Michael Billig's take on latitudes of attitude and makes an important distinction between *attitude* and its expressions. Mral uses attitudinal expressions to explain why an argument persuades or not. As a model for analysis it is not complete, but it points to the exciting possibility of engaging *attitude* and attitudinal expressions as rhetorical tools for analysing an only partly conscious level of persuasive discourse.

Finally, then, the diggings into Burke's world of *attitudes* performed in this thesis combined with the works of other authors on Burke and the concept of habituated action as well as Burke-influenced methods utilizing *attitudes* and attitudinal expression for rhetorical analysis, show the breadth of application of Burke's concept of *attitude*. *Attitude* seems to be useful both on an abstract level, explaining the inner workings of suasive discourse, and on a practical level, providing the tools for analysing particular conversations.

### 6 Conclusion

In Burke’s earlier works, *attitude* plays a central role and has a broad range. Here *attitude* has both mental and bodily dimensions, is central in symbolic analysis as one member of the attitude-situation pair and also has a strong behavioural streak that enables the concept that would later become persuasion to *attitude*.

In the 1940s Burke reworked his symbolic analysis to the now more familiar Pentad-based structure. The workings of his methodology is thoroughly explained while the importance of *attitude* has been toned down – manifested in the subsumption of *attitude* into the pentadic terms.

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Traces of the attitude's bodily connection are still there, but this dimension is almost gone. While its importance has been diminished, attitude is still important as a connective between motion and action and as an important target of persuasion.

In later years Burke reinstated attitude as one of the most important terms of his theory of symbolical analysis. Essentially he combined the earlier pervasive attitude with the pentadic methodology of A Grammar of Motives, thereby making clear the dependence of attitude on both body and mind as well as providing the Pentad with a very practical and parsimony-inducing addition.

The change Burke's treatment of attitude underwent between the early and intermediate periods, may have been prompted by the critique of the lack of methodological explication in the early period, but however that may be, it seems clear that it is part of an overall progression of thought concerning attitude. The earlier, very broad and rather amorphous, concept of attitude is diminished, but put to a more immediate practical use as a target for persuasion in the intermediate, methodologically more explicated, period. In the later period, where attitude regains some of its glory from the early works, the exploration of its practical aspects in the intermediate period is incorporated into the concept of attitude. As such, the resulting attitude depends on and inherits traits from both earlier periods. Moreover, the better developed concept carries with it implications for further uses of attitudes.

The practice of persuasion – identification – to an attitude makes the attitude an important target for rhetorical analysis. The transformation of the Pentad into a Hexad, using the attitude, eases this analysis as far as the dramatistic key terms are concerned. As a connective between motion and action, the attitude furthermore shows promise in being able to help analyse expressions not wholly in the realm of the conscious, be they in the form of a Bourdieu social practice or barely conscious rhetorical markers in conversation.
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