Online Parody Videos and the Enactment of Cultural Citizenship

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Abstract

This thesis – Online Parody Videos and the Enactment of Cultural Citizenship – examines the enactment of the practice of cultural citizenship in new media contexts. Through a cultural study approach, it seeks to find how citizens enact the practices of cultural citizenship, participate in public deliberation, engage in politics and construct identities as citizens in an informal way through digital creativity. In this thesis, “JorKawTeun,” an online news parody program, is selected as a case study. The main research question is, “based on the case study of “JorKawTeun,” how are the practices of cultural citizenship and popularization of politics enacted through online parody videos in Thailand? Specifically, how is humor utilized in the videos, and what rhetorical strategies/tactics are used to make political points?” The theoretical framework is comprised of monitorial citizenship and cultural citizenship. In addition, the concept of “parody as genre” is also employed in order to be implemented in the analysis of the techniques used in the videos. The methodology is critical discourse analysis. The findings of the study reveal the complex and paradoxical dimensions of citizenship, the tendency towards individualized political participation, and the subversive potential of parody: a vernacular form of political communication that is remediated in a media convergence environment. Finally, the thesis aims at contributing to an understanding of the relationship between popular culture and politics in contemporary mediated contexts, as well as the rethinking of the notion of citizenship, political participation and civic engagement based on a culturally-oriented perspective.
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1. Introduction

The thesis was initiated from the idea that we need to rethink what politics is, and what civic engagement means in the media convergence environment. To many people, politics might sound serious, difficult, complicated, and something that meets our lives only when there is an election or during the time of evening news. On the other hand, entertainment, popular culture, or other aesthetic experiences seems to be inseparable from everyday life. However, if we take a closer look into the mundane and banal communication activities of daily life, we might find that politics can always find its way into our non-political conversations and activities, unknowingly or knowingly.

The word “politics” is often connected with a sense of seriousness, implying the expectation of rational deliberation, while “popular culture” gives that opposite feeling, as it deals with emotional aspects and accommodates a relaxation space where people can enjoy and feel comfortable. There thus seem to be two different paths that never join. However, why does politics have to be segregated from our aesthetic zone and separated from our emotional life? Are people always rational when it comes to public matters? Do they have to always solve public problems in a rational way? Are there only rational pathways leading to the achievement of civic values?

Nowadays, it is likely that “citizens most encounter politics through popular media texts, not through physical participation in political/spectacle events or even through the organization of civil society—both of which have dominated democratic theory (normatively and empirically) as the proper means and modes of civic engagement” (Jones 2010, 16). Similarly, Jising Wu argues that, in reality, citizens more frequently engage in politics in an indirect way through the use of all kinds of media materials to make sense of political issues by reflecting those textual pieces in their life situations (2011, 35).

Similar to the other new media and politics research, such as those of W. Lance Bennett, Mark Deuze, Stephen Coleman, John Hartley, Peter Dahlgren, and several others, I would like to emphasize the role of new media technologies in providing a wider opportunity for political participation. The Internet, wireless telecommunication technologies, and digital media innovations offer alternative public spheres, new ways of citizens’ empowerment, as well as innovative forms of civic engagement. Video mash-ups, remixes, and other remediated materials are examples of the innovative way in which citizens are empowered to take part in the production of political content by remaking other serious news materials to express their concerns and assert their own political critiques (Jones 2010, 12-13). Further, the user-created content as a form of political participation is of particular interest in this thesis.
In exploring the world of mediated politics, this study takes a cultural approach to examine how citizens enact the practice of cultural citizenship, engage with politics in an informal way through everyday life activities, and how they construct identities as citizens at the juncture of popular culture and politics. The Thai online news parody videos, called the JorKawTeun program, is selected as a case example. The employed method is critical discourse analysis, which is based on the premise that language can reflect realities, enact certain practices, as simultaneously shapes and is shaped by people and society (Gee 2010). As for the theoretical framework, monitorial citizenship and cultural citizenship are the core theories to be implemented, while “parody as genre” is a complementary concept which helps in the analysis of the techniques used in the videos.

1.1 The goal of the research

This thesis is aimed at contributing to the greater understanding of the relationships among new media, popular culture, and politics. It seeks to explore the voices of the vernacular exhibited in the digital cultural public sphere within the particular context of Thailand. The object of study is the online parody video. It is chosen as it is a mode of public deliberation which involves two major concepts of interest: media convergence and popular culture. First, in the production of the online videos, producers are offered an opportunity to fully utilize the facility of the new digital technology in order to make their videos emotionally attractive and informative at the same time. Secondly, political parody, satire or humor can be part of critical popular culture as they represent the demand of the oppressed. It thus can disclose the conflict in the power relations in the society, such as the relation between state and citizen and between different social groups, all of which is helpful in the articulation of two main focuses of the research, which are the practice of citizenship and popular political culture in Thailand.

1.2 Research questions

Based on the case study of “JorKawTeun,” how are the practices of cultural citizenship and popularization of politics enacted through online parody videos in Thailand? Specifically, how is humor utilized in the videos, and what rhetorical strategies/tactics are used to make political points?

1.3 The structure of the thesis

This thesis is comprised of 6 chapters: 1) the introduction, 2) background, 3) theories and literature review, 4) methodology, 5) results and analysis, and 6) the discussion and conclusion.
The first chapter is the introduction, which explains the motivation and objectives of the study, the structure of the paper, overview of the study, as well as its significance and contributions to the academic field.

Next, since the research is conducted in the context of Thailand, which has a unique political, cultural and media system, in order to understand the analysis thoroughly, historical knowledge about the country is necessary. The second chapter, therefore, provides background information about Thailand’s political and social history, media development in Thailand, Thai political satire history, and the overview of the case study of JorKawTeun.

The third chapter is the theories and literature review, which explicates the theoretical framework of the study. It begins with the account of citizenship perspectives based on classical political theory, and then explains how the concept of citizenship has evolved over time. After that, the shift to the cultural study approach is introduced. Following this, the monitorial citizenship and cultural citizenship theory, which are the core of the theoretical framework, are explicated. In addition, the concept of “parody as genre” is elucidated as it is useful in the analysis of the objective of study, and complementary to the implementation of the core theories.

The fourth chapter introduces the methodology of the study. In this chapter, the objective of study, methodological choices, the procedure of the data collection and analytic method, and how the data results are presented are described. In addition, a description of critical discourse analysis is provided to explain what this method is about and how it works. The justification of the choice of methodology section then explains why it should work for this study. Moreover, the advantages, disadvantages, and limitations of the selected method are also discussed in this chapter.

The fifth chapter presents the results and analysis of the study. There are two levels of analysis, and the analysis results are presented in form of a table. However, only the table of the first step of the analysis is provided in this chapter, while the table for the second step of the analysis can be found in the appendix. Additionally, the concluding analysis is provided in a descriptive manner.

The last chapter is the discussion and conclusion. This chapter offers recommendations for future study, and discusses the findings of the research concerning cultural citizens in a media convergence environment, new media literacy as the prerequisite of mediated cultural citizenship, and the political significances of parody. At the end, the conclusion of the entire thesis is given.

1.4 The significance of the research

Studies about politics in new media contexts are prevalent. However, the research, dealing with mediated politics in relation to popular culture and entertainment media, is mostly found in Western
academia. In Thailand, such interdisciplinary research that challenge the normative perception of politics are very rare or nonexistent. Politics and entertainment are still deemed as a dichotomy. Most of Thai media-politics research focuses on the social and political impact of the Internet. The significance of popular culture in politics, and how people engage in politics in entertaining ways are beyond the focus. In addition, in Thailand, while there are already studies on political satire, such as parody newspapers and TV programs, and several on editorial comic strips, there is no research on online multimodal parodies, which represent a new form of communication in the digital era. What is more, JorKawTeun, the case study of this research, is also one of the first online news parody programs in Thailand, beginning around the end of the year 2008, and there has not been any research on this program until now. Moreover, the notion of cultural citizenship, as far as I have found in Thai research, is usually implemented on the issue of politics of identity, even though the concept is also and should be applicable to the practice of citizenship through everyday activities, communications, and popular culture, which will expand the understanding of politics into aspects on which conventional political theory cannot shed light.

Therefore, for Thailand’s academic field, this research can be useful, as it pioneers the exploration of the relation of popular culture and politics in Thailand’s new media contexts. As for the contribution to academic knowledge in general, this research helps testify to the validity of the monitorial and cultural citizenship theory, and demonstrates how to apply the western-born political theories in non-Western contexts or, specifically in the context of the resilient democratic political system of Thailand.
2. Background

2.1 Thailand’s political and social history

Thailand is located in the Southeast Asian region, with a population of around 62 million, the majority of whom are Buddhist. Agriculture and tourism are the main economic sectors, even though there has also been an attempt to industrialize the country since the 1960s (Nationsencyclopedia.com). Currently, the country’s official pattern of government is democracy under a constitutional monarchy, where the King is the symbolic head of the state and the Prime Minister is the head of the parliamentary government.

In the past, Thailand, or Siam as it was previously called, had been governed by an absolute monarchy under the Chakri dynasty. Between the mid 1980s and early 1990s, King Rama V radically modernized the state administration and society under the influence and pressure of the West, for example, reforming the administrative form of government and abolishing the Sakdina system: the system of social hierarchy (Tamthai 1999), in an attempt to escape Western colonization and to prevent “noble feudalistic tendencies” (Connors 2007, 35-36). In 1932, the absolute monarchy was overthrown and the political system was revolutionized bloodlessly into a constitutional monarchy/democracy by a group of military and civilians. After the World War II, there was a rise in military power. The country was then bombarded by nationalist policies, such as anti-Chinese measures and “ratthaniyom:” the state-preference of prescribing standards of behaviors (including daily life activities and dress), in order to promote the common identity of Thais (ibid.). From the late 1940s, although Thailand had general elections and parliamentary government system, the military still held the dominant power. During the 1950s, Thai politics had been plagued by the instability of parliament, coups, and corruption (Connors 2007, 44).

There was a significant moment in Thailand’s history under the Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat’s authoritarian regime between 1957 and 1963. Thailand then adopted the US-designed economic plan, promoting trade liberalization and private investment. Moreover, Sarit rehabilitated and re-legitimized the monarchy as a means to strengthen and legitimize the military power within democracy: that is, to force the authoritarian regimes into national democratic ideology and political discourse, which led to the formation of the notion of the so-called “Thai-style democracy”. His “state hegemonic project” was aimed at “identifying democracy with national ideology and good citizenship.” Citizens’ utmost responsibility was bound to the protection of the three pillars: nation, religion (Buddhism), and monarchy (Connors 2007). Some scholars think that this ideological cultivation, however, was not a mere recession but also a foundation for the modernization of the
country later on (Chaloemtiarana 1979). This instilled royalist ideology, though it has been challenged from time to time, has remained effective in governance until now.

After relentlessly being ruled by military-led governments for almost 40 years, in October 1973, university students and urban middle class rose in revolt against the military dictatorship government and successfully took it down. However, three years after that, in response to the return of exiled dictator Thanom, a mass movement was mobilized again; however, this time it ended with a brutal crackdown on unarmed students on the 6\textsuperscript{th} October 1976. The reason was that the internal conflicts of the government, the fear of communism, as well as the increasing assertiveness of people were rising together to a crisis point. “These developments led to a conservative reaction among sections of Thai establishment, including the palace, and the mobilization of mass right-wing organizations to terrorize the popular movement. Ultimately, such forces crushed the pro-democracy movement in the bloody events of 6 October 1976” (Connors 2007, 62-63).

From the 1980s on, there has been the “capitalization of politics” (Connors 2007, 118) or money politics. Capitalism and the inherent patronage system supported the vote-buying tradition, which paved the way for business groups to participate in the parliament. Business elites started to play more and more important roles in Thai politics. During this period, there was also the rise of NGOs, and intellectuals that acted as a bridge between grassroots people and the government by bringing local problems into the public political discourse. During 17\textsuperscript{th}-20\textsuperscript{th} May, 1992, there was a mass protest against the military-led government to overthrow Prime Minister General Suchinda Kraprayoon. The military crackdown led to a massive loss of people, which made the event dubbed Black May (Whittaker 2004, 55). As a result of the 1992 bloody event, in 1997, there seemed to be another step forward toward democracy as the 16\textsuperscript{th} constitution, “the constitution of people,” was promulgated, which was initially believed to be the most progressive, transparent, and democratic constitution ever since it promoted civic participation to a large extent. The demand for this constitution was driven by the loss of trust in the government in handling economic crises, together with the growing number of businessman and the middle class that felt disgruntled at the government’s performance (Kittayarak 2001, 107).

Unfortunately, instead of the remediation of democracy, the Constitution was exploited by business tycoon-turned-politician Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to establish a supposedly “parliamentary dictatorship,” which created a condition that invited military intervention later on (Kuhonta 2008). However, apart from taking advantage of the constitution, Thaksin himself was able to dramatically gain popularity among Thai people, especially the poor rural people that had always been marginalized, through the application of capitalist and populist policies.
Simultaneously, he has been heavily criticized about mega corruptions, political and economic monopolization, lack of ethics, and violation of lèse majesté law. Since the parliamentary system and constitutional mechanism had become dysfunctional, as they were totally manipulated and interfered with by Thaksin, there was a popular movement on the streets to pressure Thaksin to resign. This persistent demonstration was called “Yellow Shirts” or The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), led by media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul and General Chamlong Srimuang, which was largely made up of royalists, various factions of the military, some businessmen, and urban people. Since then, the King has been invoked more and more often to either legitimize one’s own actions or demonize the opposition by accusing them of lèse majesté.

While the protest became increasingly intense, fueled by the sale of Thaksin’s family's Shin Corporation shares to Singaporean Temasek without paying taxes, his moral legitimacy was rapidly declining. The political conflicts escalated to a deadlock. Eventually, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin staged a coup to instantaneously break the impasse in 2006, causing the recession of the development of democracy once again. After Prime Minister Thaksin was ousted, Red Shirts or The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) was formed in return to protest against the military government and the 2007 military-drafted constitution. The Red Shirts were mainly composed of grass roots people from the north and north-eastern part of the country, some capital working-class people, scholars in different camps, and anti-coup activists. In 2007, after the military stepped down, the People's Power Party, the proxy of Thaksin Shinawatra, won the election again: then, the Yellow Shirts’ uprising came to replace Red Shirts. They seized two international airports—Don Mueang and Suvarnabhumi—in an attempt to put pressure on the government. In 2008, the Thai court ruled to dissolve the People's Power Party because of the accusation of election fraud. This paved the way for Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the democrat party, the opposition party, to become Prime Minister. This made Abhisit’s government allegedly an aristocratic-supported government. Therefore, the Red Shirts began to rally again to oust Abhisit’s government. There was also an attempt to ignite a class war by emphasizing social inequality and the double standard of Thai justice. The Red Shirts’ demonstrations were growing bigger and became rampant. When the Supreme Court ordered to seize Thaksin’s 46.37 billion baht (1.5 USD billion), the Red Shirts mobilized to paralyze important business zones in Bangkok, calling for immediate house

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dissolution. Finally, clashes occurred between Red Shirt protesters and the military force several times. This anti-riot operation from 12 March to 17 May 2010 resulted in around 90 deaths and 2000 injuries in total (Human Rights Watch report 2011). Following this, Prime Minister Abhisit dissolved the parliament in order to hold a new general election in July 2011. This time, the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai party won a landslide election victory and Yingluck Shinawatra, the sister of Thaksin, became the first female Prime Minister of Thailand until now\textsuperscript{4}. Her government has allegedly sought “amnesty” for Thaksin as a priority in order to pave a way for him to return to Thailand without any punishment.

Currently, Thai society has already been ideologically divided by different political views to an unprecedented degree, whereby the King is always called upon to legitimize actions. However, anti-monarchy groups have emerged as well, but they have been silenced and severely punished by the lèse majesté law. As Michael Kelly Connors precisely (2007) remarks, “the institution of the monarchy remained in use as an aspect of political legitimacy and as focus for aristocrats to maintain and advance their position” (44). The lèse majesté law has seemingly become a political tool to attack the opposition other than the protection of the monarchy. Consequently, at the moment, there is a movement of a group of law academicians called the Nitirat group which proposes the amendment of the lèse majesté law to make it less punishable, aiming at preventing the misuse of the law for political endeavors, which will negatively affect the monarchical institution\textsuperscript{5}. Their proposal of the reformation of laws regarding monarchy has been harshly criticized and dissented by a number of people, especially the military, bureaucrats, and Yellow Shirt supporters, as they deemed it insulting to the King. Even the pro-Red Shirt government has been reluctant to respond to this controversial campaign.

In conclusion, as we can see, Thailand is a young democratic country which is still under the shadow of a monarchical military authoritarian regime. Political development has receded from time to time by a series of coups, and there have been “18 successful or attempted military coups”\textsuperscript{6} in total since the 1932 political revolution. The country has enjoyed a democratic moment in very brief periods of its history. Most of the time, it swings between semi-democracy and military-monarchy (Woodier 2008). Moreover, Thai political discourse nowadays still revolves around the


King. The ongoing conflicts show that the national discourse and ideology on kingship that have been indoctrinated since the Saritian regime remains rooted in Thai society, yet, not as firmly as before. Furthermore, as witnessed from the Yellow and Red Shirt protest phenomenon, the long lasting political turbulence which exhibits the conflict between the new and old power—the business-affiliated politicians and aristocrats—is likely to reflect the deeply rooted problem that is caused by, according to Sociologist Theerayuth Boonme (2012), “a century of political centralisation and socio-economic and political disparity between urban and rural areas,” coupled with “an ideological conflict between well-to-do political conservatives who value centralised controls, morality, law and order, and the poor, who want to see respect for the majority of the electorate, better livelihoods and progress.”

There is no doubt that the middle class has played a crucial role in politics and democracy in Thailand; however, the rise of grass roots’ political assertiveness is becoming evident as well. This is perhaps a sign that political discourses are being democratized.

2.2 Media development in Thailand

According to Des Freedman (2008), “Media systems do not emerge spontaneously from the logic of communication technologies, or from the business plans of media corporations, or from the imaginations of creative individuals…Media systems are instead purposefully created, their characters shaped by competing political interests that seek to inscribe their own values and objectives on the possibilities facilitated by a complex, combination of technological, economic and social factors” (1). His argument is also applicable to the Thai media. The mass communications media have been introduced to Thailand primarily as a governance instrument. They have taken part in the development of the Thai nation in the sense that it is exploited by the ruling class to inculcate the domination of certain values, ideologies, and belief systems (Keyes 1989). The Thai government and elite military have attempted to supervise and control the conventional media, such as TV, radio and newspapers, as well as the new media, such as the Internet. Thus, the defining elements of the development of the Thai media were its interplay with authoritarian control, and its manipulation by competing elites” (Woodier 2008, 188).

In addition to internal forces, the Thai media industry is also influenced a great deal by modernization and globalization (Muntarbhorn 1998, 25, cited in Woodier 2008). The high economic growth in the 1980s came along with the rising tide of the middle class, who accessed the globalised digital communication technology, thus increasingly embracing Western ideas of human

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rights and the freedom of expression (ibid., 195-196). The proliferation of the Internet has posed a great challenge to the state control.

The Internet has loosened the government's and authority elite’s control over public discourses by downplaying the role of the mass media in gate-keeping and agenda-setting, and the Internet has technically enabled people to communicate with each other with fewer restrictions in terms of time, space, place, and other social constraints (Gomez 2004, 133). Nevertheless, the government has been constantly attempting to impose control and censorship on Internet use, and to administer surveillance in an online society. Internet filtering practically began in Thailand in 2002, with a focus on issues such as “pornography, negative comments about the monarchy, gambling, terrorism, and separatist movements” (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, Zittrain 2012, 374). Nevertheless, the surveillance, censorship, and control of Internet information and communication have been legalized since 2007 with the enactment of the Computer Crime Act, which has granted vast authority to state officials. Moreover, during the political turbulence in 2010, the government issued a State of Emergency Decree to block a number of websites which were regarded as a danger to national security. In addition to the state censorship, surveillance has been another crucial government’s mechanism for keeping online communities under control. The state-controlled Internet service providers (namely, IIGs and ISPs), web masters, and web moderators have been required to monitor online forums hosted under their networks, and to keep a log file of users for 90 days (Ramasoota 2012, 85-91; Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, Zittrain 2012, 374-376). This has led to the establishment of “an identification and authentication clearance system for users as a condition for accessing the Internet….In other words, a surveillance system operated by service providers” (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, Zittrain 2012, 377). Moreover, not only is there a considerable pressure on Internet service providers, but Internet users also tend to perform self-censorship in order to avoid legal punishment (Ramasoota 2012, 106).

2.2.1 Print media

The printing press, the oldest mass medium, was first introduced to Thailand in 1835 by Christian missionaries under the reign of King Rama IV. The publishing was initially of interest among the royal family, churches, and merchants (Chongkittavorn 2002, 255). The first government publication was the Royal Gazette, edited by King Rama IV, which was implemented to maintain the balance of competing nobles’ power (Chandler 1971, 65, cited in Woodier 2008, 184). In the early 1910s Thai-owned daily newspapers emerged and King Rama V himself was also a newspaper writer, using several pen names (Chongkittavorn 2002, 255).
There was an attempt by the monarchy to control the press through Royal Decree in 1917 concerning defamation and the 1922 Act on Documents and Newspaper, obliging the media to ask for permission to publish and the 1927 Licensing Act, where the rights, duties, and scope of publishing organizations were defined by the King (ibid., 185). However, the media, somehow, could entertain their freedom to a certain extent, as they managed to step around the monarchy. But after the downfall of the absolute monarchy, the military-led government made the press media censorship even more systematic and rampant; it sought to take over media resources to use them as its mouthpiece. Despite the constitution, which guaranteed the freedom of speech and media, free speech was heavily curbed by legal means (Keyes 1989, 193). From the 1950s to the 1970s, the press media freedom was intensely threatened due to the invasion of communist doctrine (Chongkittavorn 2000, 222, cited in Woodier 2008, 186). As a result of the suppression, in the 1980s, there was a growing number of popular newspapers most of which were characterized as sensational, untrustworthy, and partisan (ibid.). However, in the 1970s, as urban Thai people had become more political active, in order to satisfy readers’ needs, the Thai press improved to be more insightful and critical of the government (MaCargo 2000, 9, cited in Woodier 2008). The role of Thai media in this period is also attributed to the success of the overthrow of the dictator Thanom Kittikachorn on 14 October 1973 (Pongsudivak, 1997: ibid.)

Currently, the press media belong to private companies and have a high competition. In general, the press is regarded as partisan, depending on which side media owners and investors support (Chongkittavorn 2002, 256), yet it is more pluralized than before. However, today only a few newspapers are categorized as quality newspapers, such as Matichon and The Nation, while many of them still remain sensational and shallow. In addition, nowadays the Thai press plays a significant role in the news flow in the news industry, as many radio and television talk programs use the major daily newspapers as sources of information (Siriyuvasak 2006, 6).

2.2.2 Broadcasting media

Radio and television were introduced in Thailand in the 1920s and 1950s by the military government, which took advantage of them to propagate certain ideologies and attacked political opposition in order to maintain legitimate authority (Muntarbhorn 1998, 26, cited in Woodier 2008, 189). The Thai broadcasting media enjoyed less freedom than other media, as they had been monopolized by the state for decades.

Regarding television, which is acknowledged to be the most influential medium in the country, the government granted TV concession rights to a few private corporations based on “a privileged patronage relationship;” as a result, television media ownerships were highly concentrated
(Siriyuvasak 2006, 2). Radio, however, is less concentrated and more proliferated. In addition, after the endorsement of the Frequency Allocation for Radio, Television, and Telecommunications Act in 2000, community radio is considered as the most popular citizens’ medium, because it could “inform, organize, and transform” people at the community level more effectively than mainstream media due to its community-oriented operation (using local languages, producing local content, and organized by local people). However, the government has employed “legal, technical and political measures” to shut down some community radio stations that are hostile to the government (Siriyuvasak 2006, 5).

However, the state monopoly was undermined by the endorsement of the 1997 constitution, which guaranteed the liberalization of the broadcasting media structure and resources from total state ownership to public ownership (Siriyuvasak 1999; 2001; 2006, 1). This led to the establishment of two new independent media regulators, the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) and the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), to reallocate the radio frequencies for the public and privates sectors (Siriyuvasak 2006). In September 2011, the new integrated media regulatory body, National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission or “NBTC,” was founded as a replacement for NBC and NTC. It is noteworthy that the struggle in the committee selection process for over a decade perhaps reflects the conflict of interest within state, military, and business elites in gaining control over the media structure; thus it is likely that the state control and its relationship with privileged business sectors still remain influential in the broadcasting media industry.

### 2.2.3 New media

Since the 1990s, when new communication technology emerged, such as cable, satellite television, and the Internet, the media started to be deregulated (Woodier 2008). Among the new media, the Internet can be said to be the most democratized and influential. In the early 1990s, the use of the Internet was still confined to small groups of people (Woodier 2008, 193). Since the commercialization in 1995, the Internet has rapidly gained popularity, among “business community, education institution and student, the media and active citizens” (Siriyuvasak 2007, 1). According to The National Statistical Office of Thailand’s survey in 2011, the Internet users in Thailand accounted for 23.7% of the Thai population, where the majority (40.6%) was in Bangkok, the capital city; meanwhile, the proportions in the north, south, and north eastern part of the country were 23.1%, 21.0%, and 20.3%, respectively.

Nowadays, most newspapers and TV programs go online as alternative channels for audiences to view, give feedback, and discuss with others (Siriyuvasak 2007, 2). In addition, there are online alternative sites, for example, Midnightuniv (www.midnightuniv.org), and on-line press, such as
Prachatai (www.prachatai.com) (ibid.), and Thaipublica (http://thaipublica.org), the Thailand Information Center for Civil Rights and Investigative Journalism, TCIJ (http://www.tcijthai.com), Isra News (http://www.isranews.org/), etc. Moreover, the use of social networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and discussion forum sites, such as Pantip (www.pantip.com), Sanook (www.sanook.com) is pervasive. Those Web 2.0 technologies are utilized by both government and citizens for different purposes.

However, as Siriyuvasak (2007) states, “the interactive mode of communication is fast growing and it entertains a wide spectrum of political views as opposed to the private mainstream media and the state electronic media” (2). The government is, therefore, trying to impose more control on Internet use. In 2007, the post-coup government of General Surayudh Chulanont enforced Thailand’s Computer Crime Act. This law still remains in use and is deemed as a huge threat to the freedom of expression online, as a wide range of offences stated is open to a broad interpretation⁸; thus “vast powers bestowed on the authorities” (Tunsarawuth and Mendel 2010). After this law came into force, an unprecedented number of websites were closed down. However, regardless of the state censorship, online social media are still likely to play more and more of a crucial role in Thailand’s mediascape and politics.

2.3 Thai political satire history

Going back to the early period of the Siamese kingdom, satire was found in the form of poetic song, which ironically criticized the malpractice of the ruling class (Hantra 1999). During the reign of the King Rama V, due to the influx of Western influence, prose became popular instead of poetry: first, it appeared as tales and then developed into short stories (Prasannam 2005, 2). Most satiric writers were among the royal circles, nobles and the privileged; they used satirical written pieces to indirectly attack or criticize each other, for example, “The report of Siamese parliament” (Thai: รายงานการประชุมรัฐสภาสยาม: RaiNganKarnPrachumParliamentSiam), a satirical short story written by King Rama VI in response to the proposal for democracy of the progressive writers, namely Tianwan and KorSorRorKularb (Amaradis, 1990, cited in Prasannam 2005). Furthermore, during the reign of King Rama VI, newspaper political cartoons appeared for the first time. The first

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political cartoonist was Khun-Patiparkpimlikit or Pleng Traipin, who studied drawing technique in Europe.9

After the 1932 revolution, there were more civilian writers, but most of them were the privileged and well educated. During this period, short stories were still popular. A lot of humorist writers turned from whimsical to satirical style, focusing on the moral decay and senselessness of society, as well as the wrongdoing of politicians (Amaradis 1990, cited in Prasannam 2005). Political cartoons were also growing along with the short story despite the suppression of the government. In the mid-1950s, most satires were still centered around political issues, such as the government’s failure and corruption. Some embraced Social issues, for instance, Sridaorueng’s “Chaoyak,” which reflected family problems (ibid., 3). Nineteen seventy-three, the same year as the 14 October popular protest event, can be considered as the period of the flourishing of political cartoons, as newspaper mushroomed: a lot of famous cartoonists today began their career during this period, for example, Chai Ratchawat (Thairath Newspaper), Muen (Daily News), Arun Watcharasawat (Bangkokbiznews) and so on.10 Between 1992 and 2002, coinciding with the increasingly intense political and economic crisis, the humorous satirical short story prospered and became more varied (Prasannam 2005, 3). In 2001, there was a weekly fake news tabloid called “Phoo-Jud-Kuan;” however, since 2004, it has been transformed to a fake news section in the real daily newspaper, “Phoo-Jud-Karn,” and focuses mainly on political issues (Sukasem 2003).

Furthermore, as for the television medium, since the late 1990s, there have emerged comedy satirical news TV programs, such as “SaketKhao” (Channel 7), “KebTok” (Channel 3), and parody puppet news program, such as “RattabanHoon” (Channel 11). Not until the 2000s did comedy political satire movies come into the market, for example, with Bus Lane (2007), The Saturday Killer (2010), and The Dog (2010). In addition, with the proliferation of the digital media technologies, in recent years, there have been a lot of online satirical parody videos created by ordinary Internet users, usually young ones, circulated and shared around the networking community. For example, satirical online newspapers, such as Drama-addict (www.drama-addict.com), parody news online TV programs, such as JorKawTeun: DootookSatiPanya, and satirical parodies of variety show, such as JaideeTV. The most popular platform for publishing


video is YouTube. In addition, YouTube’s video links are also prevalently shared on Facebook and other Thailand’s popular forum discussion sites, such as Pantip and Sanook.

2.4 The overview of the case study: “JorKawTeun”

“Digging shallow news: insulting your intelligence” (Thai: เจาะข่าวดีดูถูกสติปัญญา: JorKawTeun: DootookSatiPanya) or “JorKawTeun,” the Thai online news parody TV program, is taken as an example in this thesis to demonstrate how everyday creativities take on political values, how cultural acts can be classified as political participation, where entertainment meet politics, and at which point a consumer becomes a citizen.

Beginning around the end of 2008, the JorKawTeun team were mainly composed of 4 sections: script writer, actor, camera man, and technical editor. The key production team’s members were family: Janya Wongsurawat (Rosy) as the producer and script writer, Winyu Wongsurawat (John), her younger brother as the main host or actor in the program, and Nattapong Teandi (Am), her husband, as the supporting host (appears as a voodoo man), as well as one of the script writers. The technician staff members were already members in their own company (online TV production company)\textsuperscript{11}.

JorKawTeun was initiated from the producers’ passion and interest in news parody. They did not have a clear objective of the project at the beginning. The target audience was simply anyone that had access to the Internet. As Rosy stated, “We just knew that we wanted to do it. And I wanted to know whether I could do this.” At first, Rosy, Am, and John did not earn money from the program. They made videos as a leisure activity to satisfy their desires and interests. Inspired by the Western political comedy shows, such as David Letterman, Conan O’Brian, and The Daily Show, Rosy said that she saw news parody production as a challenge and as an experiment, since no one had ever done it before in Thailand\textsuperscript{12}.

With regard to the factors in selecting news to present in the program, the JorKawTeun team had two main criteria: firstly, news that they wanted to talk about; and secondly, news that they felt was of interest to the audience. Rosy stated that while she preferred dealing with heavy serious issues, such as history, law, and economics, the audience loved to watch soft news, light-hearted and entertaining material, for example, O-Net examination, Thailand’s soccer team, show biz news, etc. To make a balance, therefore, they tried to change between the contents they liked and those which

\textsuperscript{11} Wongsurawat, Janya. Interview by author. Email. March 12, 2012.

\textsuperscript{12} ibid.
the audience liked from episode to episode. “The pattern of how to select the content was to try to balance between crazy funny relaxing stuff and serious complicated issues,” said Rosy.\(^\text{13}\)

However, Rosy admits that the audiences’ taste was still mysterious for her as the audience’ feedback was always unpredictable. She said that “Some videos, I thought that they are so funny, but I got very least number of viewers. Some videos, I was worried that they were way too serious and no one would want to watch. But they turned out to be a big hit.” Nevertheless, the JorKawTeun team were quite satisfied with the overall feedback. The more popularity they gained, the more motivated they became. On the other hand, the harsh negative criticism also affected the producers’ feeling. Rosy, therefore, tried to avoid reading comments as she always took them personally, which discouraged her from fulfilling her passion.\(^\text{14}\)

As for the impact of JorKawTeun on society, Rosy did not have any grand expectations. She was satisfied only if the program could create some entertainment and successfully made complicated issues easy to understand. “It does not matter how people perceive them. It is their choice…I do not think it will have such a big effect that makes a change in the society. I think, no way,” said Rosy.\(^\text{15}\)

On the contrary, John, her younger brother, appears to have a more ambitious aim. For John, JorKawTeun is a small contribution that he could give to the society. “This is what I could do for the society. To reform the society, I think it is too big for me,” said John. According to him, JorKawTeun benefits the society in that it picks up the news and public issues to satirize through a playful presentation, which helps encourage audiences’ critical thinking in news and information consumption and the awareness of social consequences and impacts.\(^\text{17}\)
3. Theories and literature review

This thesis examines the practices of cultural citizenship and the popularization of politics through parody videos. In this chapter, first, the typology of the citizenship concepts that are derived from the traditional political theory is reviewed, which are liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism. Second, the account of each type of the concept is provided, comprising Michael Schudson’s “good citizen” concept, T.H. Marshall’s idea of social citizenship, and Iris Marion Young’s differentiated citizenship. Next, the new paradigm is introduced, the cultural turn in the study of politics, which is the theoretical ground of this study. Then, the main theories of this study, monitorial citizenship and cultural citizenship, are elaborated. In addition, in order to link the theories to the objective of the study, the relation between cultural citizenship and popular culture, as well as its application in new media contexts are explicated. Last but not least, parody as an approach to the enactment of citizenship with its unique characters and political significances is extensively reviewed in the section on parody as genre.

3.1 The traditional view of citizenship: Liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism

Based on political theory, Peter Dahlgren (2006) classifies the “citizenship” modal into 3 groups: liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism (268). Liberalism emphasizes individual rights, assuming that a citizen is endowed with all of the skills and knowledge necessary for democracy; thus the state will minimally interfere with the political system but rather watch individuals playing their roles within rules. This camp of ideas, however, Dahlgren says, overlooks the process by which citizenship develops and takes for granted the democratic quality of individuals; as he puts it, “citizenship becomes an activity where no experience is necessary” (269). Communitarianism, on the other hand, underlines the importance of common values, culture, and good within the society in “the functioning of political community,” which, however, might be harmful for individuals’ rights (ibid.). Communitarian or “social citizenship,” as Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994) call it, is deemed as passive citizenship because there is no obligation for public participation, only requiring that the state evenly entitle citizens to their rights (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 354-355). The third type of citizenship model, republicanism, straddles both liberal and communitarian traditions as it seeks for individuals’ “active participation and responsibilities” in expressing their citizenship and “civic virtues” and “public spiritedness” to maintain the common good of the whole society in order to efficiently run the political community (Galston 1991, 217, 244; Macedo 1990, 138-39, cited in Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 360). It underscores individuals’ rights, as well as the community orientation; in this way, citizens become active participants in self-governance.
democracy (Dahlgren 2006, 269) and are constrained and cultivated within the civic ethos. However, Kymlicka and Norman contend that republicanism is “an extreme form of participatory democracy” as it overemphasizes “the intrinsic value of political participation;” thus other aspects of life besides politics are devalued (1994, 351-362).

3.2 Evolution of citizenship

This notion of “citizenship” has been reconstructed over time according to the historical context (Hartley 2010). Dahlgren (2000) explains that an identity as a citizen is the result of the project of the self that is constantly shaped by multiple social and cultural forces, as well as personal contexts (cited in Jones 2010, 27). Thus, when social, cultural, and contextual changes occur, one’s identity as a citizen will inevitably be affected. The problematic conceptualization of citizenship is due to its essential abstraction and the quality of being historically and contextually contingent. Moreover, in principle, the term “citizenship” should be applied homogenously among people in the same country but, in fact, the properties of citizenship remain contentious (Hartley 2010).

To begin with the history of the citizenship model in the American context, it is illustrated with Michael Schudson’s work on the typology of citizenship based on an historical analysis of the US. His account involves how the concept of the American “good citizen” has developed over time (Hartley 2010, 236). Four evolving types of citizenship are as follows:

1) Patrician – “citizenship was expressed through male property owners” (ibid.). In other words, only elites were citizens.

2) Partisan – “citizenship was expressed through allegiance to parties, which continued elite control of politics even as they diffused political influence out to popular associations” (ibid.). This means that citizens were not just among the elites but also the people that supported them.

3) Informed – “citizenship is expressed as individualized, private, rational calculus, based on objective information conveyed by dispassionate press to a reading public that is also the Republic” (ibid.). This type of citizenship reinforced the central role of mass news media in providing people with information on political affairs, enabling them to fulfill the requirement for being an informed citizen (Jones 2006, 368). Moreover, it caused a division among citizens—the uninformed and informed. The public sphere was thus dominated by the informed, who normally were experts, scholars, mainstream media, and authorities, while normal people’s voices were by large absent.

4) Right – “the ‘rights revolution’ wanted recognition for ethnic, gender and sexual diversity, rather than assimilation of difference into abstract universality”. The rise in the rights of
citizenship resulted from the empowerment of the uninformed leading to counter hegemony (Hartley 2010, 236).

As for the communitarian model, which is mostly derived from the postwar political theory, citizenship is connected to the “possession of rights.” The most prominent example of this view is that of T.H. Marshall in the “three successive stages of modern citizenship,” which was developed in England’s historical context (Hartley 2010; Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 354). The basic principle is that state has to ensure that every citizen is included as a member of society and given equal rights (Marshal 1950; 2009). The three stages of citizenship are 1) “civic rights” – the “rights of man,” which refer to basic human rights in general, such as freedom of speech and expression, 2) “political rights” – the right to engage in political activities, 3) “social rights” – the “welfare state,” which refers to the right to acquire basic needs for well being (Hartley 2010, 237). According to Kymlicka and Norman (1994), “for Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal-democratic welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political, and social rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy the common life of society” (354). It was Marshall’s attempt to propose the idea of citizenship that reconciled the capitalist with the socialist standpoint (Hartley 2010, 237). However, Marshall’s citizenship proposal was heavily attacked regarding the passivity of citizens. The New Right critique alleges that his social citizenship model will lead to a lack of “responsibilities and virtues, including economic self-reliance, political participation, and even civility;” meanwhile, from the cultural critique, Marshall’s disregards social and cultural pluralism (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 355). Moreover, his idea was criticized as being too progressive, ambitious, and not realistic in the sense that he neglected the possible resistance from the groups whose interest was affected, as well as the resilience of progress (Hartley 2010, 238).

Next is an illustration of the republican conception of citizenship which adopts both liberal and communitarian views in an attempt to find a compromising position between the two. For the communitarianist, rights come first, then responsibilities, while for the liberalist, it is the contrary. The republican aims to maintain a balance between both. One of the examples is Iris Marion Young’s differentiated citizenship (1989), which shifts from the rights-versus-responsibilities debate to the focus on individual identity and the diversity of the community (ibid., 369). She argues that the discussion of the notions of citizenship originally took place among dominant or majority groups. Hence, either liberalism’s or the welfare state’s rights, they do not guarantee that the unique needs of minorities or that “the culturally excluded groups” will be fulfilled; rather, those marginalized groups should be given special treatment from the state (ibid., 370). That is to say,
according to the conception of differentiated citizenship, in order to ensure social equality instead of imposing homogenous policies on different groups of people, particular rules should be applied to certain groups, taking into account peculiar identity and minor cultures, for example, “special representation rights (for disadvantaged groups),” “multicultural rights (for immigrant and religious groups),” and “self-government rights” (for national minorities) (Young 1989, in ibid., 370-372).

3.3 Cultural turn

The above stated three paradigms of citizenship reflect the traditional sense of thinking about politics, which implies the top-down perspective and instrumental orientation aiming at creating the happiness and wellbeing of people. Furthermore, they have the mutual assumption that “politics is a means to private life” and determines how modern citizenship will be conceived (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 362). However, this view is in contrast with what actually happens in reality, as many people do not tend to seek happiness or a good life through the approach of politics (ibid.). The decline in political participation, on the one hand, Kymlicka and Norman prefer to attribute to the richer experiences in private life, which attracts people better than political matters. On the other hand, other scholars, for example, W. Lance Bennett, who also agrees with the focus of personal life on politics, assert the republican sense of reasoning; that is, of the impoverishment of politics. When political systems are incapacitated by bad governments and politicians, people, in turn, seek the meaningfulness of participation from personal life in order to regain the confidence that they can really change something by their participation (Bennett 2008, 1). In his study of youth’s political engagement, Bennett proposes the term “dutiful citizen” (DC), implying state-imposed qualities of the citizen, and advances the term “self-actualizing citizen” (AC), which offers a reverse point of view in defining citizenship. AC is inferred from the empirical research on what people (youth in digital age) actually do to engage in politics (ibid.: 14), even though those activities deviate from the expectations prescribed by conventional political theory. In his study, Bennett added the socio-cultural dimension to the republican model of citizenship.

Therefore, to bring back the discussion to what actually happens among people, it is time, as Peter Dahlgren (2006) argues, to take a “cultural turn” in understanding what shapes citizenship and how it is shaped; that is, to look through a cultural lens into “meaning, practices, communication, and identities” (267). For Dahlgren, a bridge between the normative political and socio-cultural view of citizenship is the republicanism’s notion of “civil society,” which is generally regarded as “the societal terrain between the state and the economy, the realm of free association where citizens can interact to pursue their shared interests, including political ones” (ibid., 271). What links to cultural
study is such social interactions that occur in the civil society, one of the most important notions in the republican tradition.

Socio-cultural theorists are interested in the relationships among social groups, and how social interaction affects people’s self-perception, identity, and cultivates values. To connect the cultural to political standpoint is, therefore, to find out how individuals’ relations, identities, and values, which are relevant and necessary for democracy, are formed through interactions. To put it precisely, the cultural approach invites us to see how individuals’ civic competencies and virtues are developed, to see what is going on, at the micro level, underneath institutionalized democracy. In this sense, citizenship needs skills that can be acquired through everyday life, experience, and practice. Yet people cannot be and are not interested in political affairs all the time. They nevertheless can develop the skills needed for political participation through other social forms of activities. This process of the development of individual subjects creates a place where politics and non-politics meet (Dahlgren 206, 273). Burguss also supports the reallocating of citizenship theory into the culturally-oriented perspective, saying that “contemporary citizenship is not only a matter of an individual’s codified rights and obligations in relation to the state. Rather, the concept of citizenship describes the ways in which individuals participate in practices and collectivities that form around matters of shared interest, identity or concern, in local, national, global and hybrid spaces” (2007, 60).

Jeffrey P. Jones is also another political scientist who takes a cultural approach as a new perspective to the study of politics. He focuses on the role of the media in reforming the relationship between the state and the citizen, arguing that “politics is increasingly a textual practice, both in how it is constructed and presented for publics and how it is consumed or read by audiences” (Jones 2010, 25). In the article – A Cultural Approach to the Study of Mediated Citizenship (2006), he remarks that, as a member of a media audience, one can be a citizen and consumer at the same time through daily media usage. Additionally, political engagement nowadays tends to be more and more mediated and embedded with everyday life activities. The interaction with the obtained information through daily informal interactive communication also does matter in the constitution of political engagement and citizenship (Jones 2006). Emphasizing the role of media in constructing citizenship, Jones suggests four propositions: 1) media are plural; 2) mediums affect meanings; 3) mediation occurs beyond information acquisition; and 4) we live in a culture of political engagement (Jones 2006, 371). That is, to summarize, Jones suggests that we should study media and politics from the perspectives of media users in order to understand their interaction with politics through the pattern of media consumption behavior (ibid., 371). A variety of forms of media choices at their disposal offers them different narratives about politics, leading to differences in the
interpretation and construction of the perception of politics (ibid., 373). In addition, the acquisition of information is not always the aim of media users as citizens but they use the acquired information as material for further communicative acts to achieve certain ends (ibid., 376). Moreover, people mostly engage with politics basically via media text (ibid., 378).

When political engagement has become textual, a lot of communicative elements and other aspects of life inevitably intertwine with politics. In a sense, media draw together the rational/emotional, serious/non-serious, political/entertaining, and so does communication in everyday life. Therefore, there is no conserved place particularly for the realm of politics in people’s learning process. Individuals accumulate experience and social skills through interactions that have become increasingly mediated and textualized. We are surrounded by a “media ensemble,” a vast array of media forms we encounter, which “constitute our mental maps of the political and social world outside our direct experience….they are ritual encounters with public life that help in our understanding of who and what we are as individuals, a community, a public, and a nation” (Jones 2010, 23). Moreover, textual engagement, most of the time, happens in popular culture and everyday communication within the private circle of families, friends, and colleagues (Jones 2010, 25). People, then, can utilize such media and communication experience in their civic practices (Wu 2011, 199).

3.4 Monitorial citizenship

The model of monitorial citizenship proposed by Michael Schudson (1999) in his account of the evolving image of a “good American citizen” can be said to be the entry to the cultural approach theory of citizenship, though is not just quite there yet. The reason why I claim so is because Schudson has switched from the top-down to the bottom-up perspective to see what is actually going on among citizens, not just considering an ideal image of democratic citizen that the political elite demand. However, the monitorial citizenship theory is still instrumentally oriented and based on traditional political theories. Monitorial citizenship is a further development from the “informed citizen,” as he claims “I propose it as a modification of the information-based model and I believe it must and should co-exist with models of citizen engagement based on trust, party, and rights” (Schudson 2009, 16).

A monitorial citizen is the one that “engages in environmental surveillance more than information-gathering” (Schudson 1999, 310). Since the traditionally-informed citizenship sets too high and unrealistic an expectation on citizens to be well informed concerning public and political matters, monitorial citizenship asks for less effort from citizens that are simultaneously occupied by their
own business and personal affairs. In this model, citizens are still required to be informed but only on necessary and relevant issues. They are not obliged to follow everything but can just scan the environment and select only particular issues to read and respond to (Zaller 2010, 118). According to Schudson, monitorial citizens should seek to acquire not all but sufficient information to keep themselves aware of what might threaten their personal and public good. Moreover, when political circumstances become dangerous, they should be ready to become active and more assertive in tackling problems in cooperation with other stakeholders based on trust and the relevant information that they have gathered. Thus, despite less collection of information, the monitorial citizenship “implies that one's peripheral vision should always have a political or civic dimension” (Schudson 2009, 16). What is more, monitorial citizenship also shows that citizens’ decision making and sense making regarding politics should be neither determined from above nor depend too much on access to traditional media (Schudson 1999).

Marc Hooghe and Yves Dejaeghere (2007) have offered four characteristics of monitorial citizenship as follows:

1) Having political interest (they scan information and decide what is worth paying particular attention to)
2) Having political efficacy (they take action when their interests are in danger)
3) Being politically active (they should have some political activities, no matter what form they are)
4) Not needing to rely on conventional forms of political participation (they are able to operate outside formal political institutions) (257).

Therefore, monitorial citizenship may be “characterized as a critical and observational form of citizenship, avoiding any routine-based or institutionalized forms of political participation” (Hooghe and Dejaeghere 2007, 250). However, Hooghe and Dejaeghere’s finding from the examination of citizenship in Nordic countries contradicts the monitorial citizenship theory regarding the fourth point stated above. Based on their study of the Scandinavian example, citizens that possess the first three characteristics still rely on traditional political institutions, such as political parties and trade unions. Regarding this point, while Hooghe and Dejaeghere point out the failure of American traditional institutions themselves in improving and adapting to changing circumstances, many scholars, mostly in the American context, are tempted to believe that it, in part, is the irresistible effect of globalization and the new media.

Mark Deuze (2008), for example, states that people in this “liquid modern society,” in all the time changing environment influenced by media and globalization, feel so uncertain that they are
inclined to pull themselves back into “hyperlocal enclaves” and “hyperindividual personal information spaces”. That means that they prefer living within their social circle and joining the world outside without physical engagement but through online social networks (850). Deuze sees monitorial citizenship as the “individualized enactment of citizenship,” which is more likely to happen in new media contexts where reality is augmented with mediated experience and social networking. In addition, he finds Schudson’s monitorial citizenship to be connected with the act of the consumer; as he puts it, “monitoring is indeed the act of the citizen-consumer, participating in society (whether that ‘society’ equals virtual, topical or geographical community, one’s role within a democratic nation-state, or within a translocal network) conditionally, unpredictably, and voluntarily”. Monitorial citizens scan through available information, select certain pieces to pay particular attention to according to their interest, and decide whether to take action or not using their own discretion. This is comparable to the situation when people go shopping (2008, 852).

As we can see, monitorial citizenship theory is moving closer to the cultural citizenship perspective. It withdraws the image of a good citizen from the notion of elitism to a certain extent. Yet, this model still shows the discrimination between politics and everyday life. Next, cultural citizenship will be elaborated, which will explain why politics cannot be completely cut off from other aspects of life, and politics can be approached through a variety of means which have always been excluded from what has been traditionally considered as political engagement.

3.5 Cultural citizenship

To begin with, Toby Miller (2006) has defined three zones of citizenship: “the political (the right to reside and vote), the economic (the right to work and prosper), and the cultural (the right to know and speak)” (35). In his account of cultural citizenship, citizens and consumers are drawn together.

“The citizen and the consumer have shadowed each other as the national subject versus the rational subject— with politics rendered artificial and consumption natural, a means of legitimizing social arrangements (Marx 1994, 140). Adopting the tenets of the consumer, the citizen becomes a desirous, self-actualizing subject who still conforms to general patterns of controlled behavior. Adopting the tenets of the citizen, the consumer becomes a self-limiting, self-controlling subject who still conforms to general patterns of purchasing behavior” (Miller 2006, 30).

Cultural citizenship is seen in the postmodern types of citizenship that combine the socio-cultural perspective with the construction of the notion of citizenship. Drawing upon Miller’s initiative idea, cultural citizenship focuses on individuals’ right to make their own choices in consumption and in the expression of their identities. This notion emerges from the convergence of being a citizen and consumer, which are experienced by everyone at the same time. It is, in other words, citizenship that is developed through consumerism. Another illumination of cultural citizenship provided by
Burgess is that cultural citizenship can be imagined as the continuum of which one end point is represented by the passive consumer figure, and the other endpoint is represented by the full participation of active consumers (Burgess 2007, 69).

Similarly, Jones (2010) also remarks that citizens tend to adopt a “consumerist approach” to public life, explaining that “citizens increasingly act as bricoleurs in their beliefs and ideological commitments, constructing their own a’ la carte politics through mixing, and individualizing ad hoc social and political positions” (27). However, he argues that it is their own choice to decide where and how to situate their identities comfortably in public. In addition, Stephen Coleman (2007) suggests a naturalizing way of conceiving politics, as he sees citizenship as “a process of reflexive creativity” and politics as an outcome of everyday communication. Cultural citizenship, to him, offers a more accurate lens to see how people render themselves citizens; in a sense, “it adopts a more organic view in pointing to how everyday citizens creatively use the media materials to reflect on their identities and life situations, which can then have real political consequences in their opinion formation and expression” (Coleman 2007, 51, cited in Wu 2011, 26).

Therefore, it can be said that cultural citizenship theory has modified the traditional citizenship theory to be more realistic by, according to Wu, adding two main matters of consideration: “first, the affective aspect of being a citizen; second, the making of an everyday citizen” (2011, 25). It stresses the role of emotion and life experience in actualizing one as a citizen (ibid., 199). In her study of the connection between aesthetics and political public sphere, taking “Super Girl”—the Chinese version of the American Idol TV program—as a case study, Wu argues that aesthetic experience from the entertainment show can lead to broader political and social debates in both informal (online) and formal (on newspaper) public spheres. She sees the aesthetic public sphere as “an extension of the political public sphere” (ibid., 12). Based on the cultural citizenship perspective, she claims that people can actively interpret media texts consumed through their leisure activities—in this case, watching the “Super Girl” TV program—and combine their aesthetically experience-based interpretations with the various aspects in their everyday sense making, including certain politically-sensitive issues (ibid., 200). In her study, Wu takes the notion of public sphere as “civil society,” which serves as an interactional sphere where people can practice and have trial and error experiences; as a result, civic competencies and virtues can potentially be developed. Citing Hermes (2006), Wu argues that “the cultural citizenship theory perspective would grant value to diverse rhetorical styles and sources of material, be it serious news or entertainment, as long as the discourse process helps the participants open up and enjoy the discussion, which then potentially shapes their civic values and stances on Social issues” (2011, 3-4).
Initially, most discussions of cultural citizenship still had a strong sense of republicanism, which usually focused on the politics of identity. As reflected in early pioneers’ work like that of Rosaldo (1994) and Miller (2007), the notion of cultural citizenship embraces certain republican philosophies as it is shown to accentuate the bottom-up political process. That is to say, the sense of being a citizen is not the determination of the ruling elite but the expression of the right of an individual to be different and local cultural identities (Rosaldo 1994; Miller 2007, cited in Burgess 2007, 62). Joke Hermes, however, advances the idea that emphasizes an informal practice of everyday life. Cited in Jean Burgess’s doctoral dissertation – Vernacular Creativity and New Media, “cultural citizenship can be defined as the process of bonding and community building, and reflection on that bonding, that is implied in partaking of the text-related practices of reading, consuming, celebrating, and criticizing offered in the realm of (popular) culture”. Hermes places the emphasis on popular culture, around which the cultural citizenship practices of the ordinary are revolving (Hermes 2005, cited in Burgess 2007, 64).

### 3.5.1 Cultural citizenship and popular culture

Numerous scholars have highlighted the relation between politics and popular culture. As Jones (2010) succinctly puts it: “popular culture has become one of the more open and free-flowing arenas for communication about politics” (5). According to him, “Popular culture is…the means through which we articulate our emotion to the wider world…Popular culture is where we link interests and pleasures to our identities, where we tell stories that are assessable and emotionally meaningful” (2010, 38). Popular culture, in this sense, as Burguss points out, has an extensive meaning other than just commercial or mass produced culture; it reflects people’s thoughts, problems, taste, lifestyle and their position in the society (2007, 64).

Likewise, cited in Thomas Mclaughlin’s Street Smarts and Critical Theory: Listening to the Vernacular (1996, 55-56), Michel de Certeau (1984) has provided the vision of contemporary culture that recognizes both cultural power exerted by dominant institutions, as well as local power produced by individual subjects. To explain how these polar powers work, De Certeau uses the term “strategy,” referring the systematic method deployed by power structures, and the term “tactics,” referring the negotiating approach that individuals use to make their own meaning (cited in Mclaughlin 1996, 17; Manovich 2009, 322). Popular culture on the one hand is a strategy that powerful cultural institutions employ to economically, politically and culturally govern people; on the other hand, popular culture provides individuals with material at their disposal for “poaching.” In this sense, consumers can become citizens by using “tactics” against “strategies.” By using various methods, such as “bricolage, assembly, customization” (Manovich 2009, 322), and in
different manners, such as resistant, appropriating, or re-appropriating, citizens can establish self and collective identities, express opinions, and take actions against or in favor of something through popular culture.

Therefore, popular culture is of great importance in the enactment of cultural citizenship. In Wu’s research on “Super Girl,” mentioned above, the power of popular culture (when combined with citizens’ tactics) is evident. By the removal of “Super Girl” from the television schedule, her study indicates the Chinese government’s awareness of the subversive potential of popular culture in relation to its status quo, and, due to these speculated political implications, Wu concludes that “it is high time that we take the convergence of popular culture and politics seriously” (2010, 210).

Correspondingly, based on Jones’ opinion, people, in some ways, can make sense of popular culture in relation to politics; therefore, popular culture is not only capable of promoting the culture of consumption but a culture of citizenship as well (Jones 2010, 39).

3.5.2 Cultural citizenship in new media contexts

New media are always credited with social and political transformation. In terms of politics, those that Barrie Axford calls “techno-progressive,” believe that new digital media restructure political spaces and identities. For example, James Slevin (2000) asserts that the Internet provides access “to new forms of social intercourse, new patterns of interdependency and new opportunities for political renewal” (cited in Axford 2001, 4). Therefore, in order to implement the cultural citizenship theory in new media contexts, we need to take into account the new conditions and opportunities which the digital new media have created.

First of all, Gunther Kress (2003) points out the influence of the logic of the image over writing, which switches power in communication between text makers and readers. For Kress, the major change of literacy in the digital era is caused by the replacement of the logic of writing with the logic of the image on screen, which “reshapes the possibility of the arrangements of knowledge into idea” (16). He argues that “the logic of image comes to dominate the ordering, shape, appearance, and uses of writing. “Writing will be subordinated to the logic of screen, to the spatial logic of the image” (48). This leads to the relatively open path of reading. As a result, there is a shift in power from text maker to reader (ibid., 165). Moreover, the authority in producing knowledge in a digital culture is also absent to a large extent due to digital media facilitation.

Accordingly, Bennett (2002) also suggests a shift of power from institution to individual; the trend in the digital information age is toward individualism. The role of the institution is downplayed as, with the online distributed network, people no longer need physical assembly and institutionalized
norms in order to accomplish tasks as strongly as before. In addition, common- or public-mediated properties are increasingly personalized. For example, owing to the advanced technologies, there are an increasing number of users that remake a variety of materials from the traditional media to be their own and widely circulate them. This phenomenon can be interpreted in the sense that people do not wish to take what is “fed” by mainstream society directly but individually insert their ideas, views, and values to reflect their personal needs and problems (Deuze 2006, 13). Likewise, Peter Dahlgren (2000) also characterizes contemporary political culture as the decreasing engagement with traditional institutions and the increasing association with issues in everyday life (cited in Jones 2010, 27). He argues that people’s approach to politics tends to be more individualized; instead of institutionally committing oneself to politics, they are inclined to “individualistic forms of expression”. They are associated with others that share common interests and values on general issues that mostly are not involved explicitly with politics (ibid.).

Moreover, in the digital age, there are fewer limits in producing and exhibiting people’s creativities. A number of social networking sites which function as a public sphere for the ordinary that have access to the Internet have emerged. The exchange of information is, then, overwhelming. According to Kay and Goldberg (1977; 2000), digital culture emerges from the overflow of online and offline communicative activities which are saturated by the media convergence (cited in Deuze 2006, 8-9). The characteristics of the digital culture can be described with three complementary concepts: “participation, remediation, and bricolage,” which are facilitated by the convergence and ubiquity of digital devices. People have changed from passive audiences to participants, which makes them engage in remediation through the process of combining their reflexive ideas with the original media texts they intake (bricolage). In other words, they are technologically equipped to remake their “perceptions of reality” out of materials taken from the mass media and are provided with the channels to distribute them (Mark Deuze, 2005: 8-9). As a consequence, on the Internet, the line between the media producers and consumers is being blurred.

Therefore, in order to apply cultural citizenship to new media contexts, Jean Burgess says that “the concept must also explicitly take into account the interweaving of everyday life, creative content production and the publicness of social life that are characteristic of digital culture” (Burgess 2007, 65)". The discussion about cultural citizenship also entails the potential of new media in democratizing political discourse. In this regard, the democratic potential of the new digital media has contributed to “everyday active participation in a networked, highly heterogeneous and open cultural public sphere” (ibid.). According to Burgess, vernacular practice and creativity, seen as part of the construction process of the identity as a citizen, are driven by the consumption by choice in participatory culture and traditional cultural production. It is the new media innovation that enriches
this participatory culture and which accommodates the community of active participation, resulting in actualizing cultural citizenship (Uricchio 2004, cited in ibid.).

Moreover, the idea of cultural citizenship in a digital networked context has also been articulated by Hartley (2010), who similarly argues that the relationship between the state and individuals, which always incorporates the notion of “citizenship,” has been replaced by the relationships among individuals on distributed networks. The new digital technology and media have by large turned from passive to active consumers and, thus individuals’ freedom of speech and expression is promoted. People are provided with technical infrastructures that support self-organizing and self-content creation. This has increased the potential for the self-enactment of cultural citizenship, which Hartley calls “DIY citizenship” or “do-it-yourself citizenship.” In new media contexts, do-it-yourself citizens utilize the new media technologies and online social networking to actively “contribute to the generation of new meanings, new systems and ideas” (240). The “do-it-yourself” citizens reside in a “participatory culture” (Jenkins 2006), which is the production of the interplay between top-down designed technology architecture and user-led innovation. They are affiliated on a voluntary basis to perform political deliberation and participation, and their activities can be carried out either individually or in groups; however, the end purpose is contributing to the community.

One of the glaring examples of how individuals can contribute to the community is Wikipedia, “an online collection of encyclopaedic knowledge,” whose operation is based on a participatory system. The website is collaboratively contributed to by users; anyone is allowed to participate in creating, editing, and extending the content (Krötzsch, Vrandecic, Volkel, Haller, and Studer, 2007, 585). Thus, Wikipedia is a platform for a collection of shared information, which promotes the publicization of individual knowledge and the individualization of public knowledge. In this sense, expert discourses are more democratized. In addition to Wikipedia, another example is Flickr, a photo-sharing service website that “allows users to store, search, sort, and share pictures from digital cameras or camera phones” (Yahoo! 2006, cited in Burgess 2007, 129). Flickr also offers the facility to create networked groups or online “communities of interest and practice.” Group members therefore also use the site for cultural practices, where they share aesthetic experience and exchange photographic techniques and technological information, as well as knowledge, in broader areas (Burgess 2007, 127-185). Moreover, according to Burgess (2007) “the mode of participation in Flickr that most obviously constitutes civic engagement, then, is a convergence of ‘offline’ everyday life in a particular local context with ‘online’ participation in digital culture and with cultural and commodity consumption” (185). Therefore, in a networked society, “sharing” is the core value that sustains all activities operated under this simultaneously individualized and

Furthermore, in the article – “Silly Citizenship,” written by John Hartley (2010), the enactment of cultural citizenship practice among children is elaborated. He particularly chose the term “silly citizenship” as he wants to highlight the immaturity of citizenship practice of children, who are not yet legally citizens. For Hartley, children are active agents in forming “discursive practices of citizenship,” accommodated by online social networks. This is owing to several reasons. First, they are digitally native; thus they, in general, are more proficient in using the new media than adults. As a result, most of them are enabled to playfully participate in a computer-mediated public sphere. Second, they tend to express themselves in a non-sophisticated and informal way and are also associated with popular culture. Third, their speech and expression in making political points are considered spontaneous, straightforward, and with fewer political/diplomatic tactics. In this sense, they are regarded as a “prime agent of change for citizenship” (Hartley 2010, 233).

In accordance with Hartley, in Sanjay Asthana’s investigation of young people’s contemporary literacy practice in India (2010), the potential of the youth as a prime agent in reconceptualization of democratic notions was discovered. Taking the participants of the Cybermohalla—a democratic, educational project—as a case study, Asthana has revealed an interesting result: that those young participants, enabled by globalized and convergent media, have helped “to create ‘new politico-cultural spaces’ and to refashion notions of participation, citizenship, and civil society in particularly important ways” (Asthana 2010, 11). The collective practice of these young people in appropriating new media and the media-text materials in hand to generate and share self-social meanings on distributed networks exhibits one more new characteristic of “the participation, citizenship, and civil society;” it is that of the “conflictual”

“On the one hand, the young people seem to appropriate ICTs as “de’tourment”: that is, mixing and using dominant media forms toward revolutionary ends, and on the other, as producers and story tellers (a’ la Walter Benjamin) of a diverse range of narratives from the banal to the serious. In many respects, these narratives represent what Markus Meissen (2007) has characterized as ‘conflictual’ participation, form of critical engagement, not soaked in deliberative discourse that seeks to produce consensus” (Asthana 2010, 17).

In addition, in Bennett’s account of “self-actualizing citizenship” (AC) presented earlier, young citizens are regarded as pioneers in cultural citizenship practice in new media contexts. The new digital media and communication technologies are acknowledged as playing an important role in the shift from dutiful to actualizing citizenship among younger citizens since the digital new media offers a communication style that works with the AC citizens (Bennett 2008, 17). He suggests that “the underlying sense of citizenship has shifted in societies in which individuals are more
responsible for defining their own identities, using the various tools offered by social networks and communication media” (ibid., 14). Additionally, Kevin Barnhurst (1998), based upon his several research on youth’s media consumption behavior, argues that young people’s understanding of politics is heavily influenced by their interaction with media; therefore, they tend to rely on many genres of media, especially entertainment ones, to construct the perception of political reality. As a consequence, this discursive understanding of politics inclines young people to discursive political participation. That is, “the essence political life for them is the expression of opinions and preference” (Barnhurst 1998, cited in Jones 2010, 29).

Last but not least, to conclude the analysis of cultural citizenship in new media contexts, it is deemed useful to state here the Hartley (2010)’s 6 propositions regarding the understanding of the practice of citizenship in the digital era as follows:

1. “Purposeful play” – Citizenship is not limited to cognitive rational performance but also includes affective and playful experiences in the act of political deliberation and participation.
2. “Discursive practice” – Citizenship is a “bottom-up, self-organized, self-representing practice of constructing, conducting and comprehending ‘associative relations among strangers’”.
3. “Dynamic change” – The features of citizenship is ever-changing as it is always subject to variation, selection, and adoption.
4. “Relational identity” – Citizenship is meant for the whole population, not a single person, and personal identity is also relative to the community.
5. “New conflicts” – “New sites of conflict arise in the formation and expression of relational identities, often in the context of privately owned networks.”
6. “Disciplinary knowledge” – The new media and technologies ease the productive tension between “micro-level corporeal ‘knowing subjects’ and macro-level global knowledge-systems” as they invite “popular productivity” to join the contested terrain of knowledge construction (243-245).

All in all, the cultural comprehensive perspective of citizenship has shed light on civic engagement through people’s practices of everyday life, engendering a resistant force against the hegemonic imposition of certain values, norms, and definitions regarding the notion of citizenship. As can be seen, the enactment of cultural citizenship in the digital era can be achieved in various ways through the creation of content. However, the self-actualizing process largely involves textual rather than physical activities (Jones 2010). Even though citizens are enabled to textually express their sentiments, they are inevitably constrained by invisible structures, rules, and limitations when using
language. The production of media texts is automatically ordered and arranged according to certain systems of language. Moreover, such organizing systems of language also affect how people perceive media texts. It is interesting that classifying labels attached to media texts perhaps has a greater influence on the audience’s perception than its contents (Paltridge 2006). For example, when certain texts are delivered in a news program and classified as news, people tend to take them seriously and might believe that such texts are the representation of the truth (Jones 2010). On the other hand, for some texts that come in an entertainment form, especially when they are meant for creating laughter, people tend to perceive them as non-essential. Popular culture, likewise, as explained earlier, is usually perceived as having marginal roles in politics at a surface level. However, the subversive potentials of the marginalized texts, if they have any, do still exist but it is only that they are in a blind spot. To further explain this point, in the next section, the concept of parody as genre is explicates as one way of many, but perhaps one of the most effective means that one can deploy for the enactment of cultural citizenship.

3.6 Cultural citizenship and parody as genre

In the previous section, cultural citizenship as “the right to know and speak,” as Miller puts it, has been elaborated. However, in every society, such rights, especially the right to speak, are never equal as there is a hierarchy: a structure of power in the society that subtly constrains how we use language and how we perceive messages at both conscious and sub-conscious levels. This is related to the matter of genre, which simultaneously allows and limits people’s expression (Druick 2009, 295). In this section, the concept of genre will be presented, and parody as genre will be explained next.

According to general understanding, genre is “a system for classifying media products” (Branston 2006, 48). With this classifying system, these types of text are distinguished more systematically. In addition, genres are claimed to have a “regime of verisimilitude” (Neale 2000, 32); thus understanding different “regimes” facilitate the understanding of future texts. Genre, therefore, has an effect on our decisions, expectations, and assumptions regarding the chosen texts, and more importantly on the way in which we think about the world (Gray 2005, 226.). In our making sense of media texts, we relate particular texts to other texts elsewhere that are of similar type (Branston 2006, 44). That means that there are always intertextual relations among texts that help us to construct our relative perception of the social world. And “a key process through which intertextuality works is genre” (Gray 2005, 226). Intertextuality, in this sense, does not simply mean using quotation but involves “the reservoir of cultural texts” (Fiske 1987, cited in Druick 2009, 299).
According to John Fiske (1987), “genre is a cultural practice that attempts to structure some order into the wide range of texts and meanings that circulate in our culture for the convenience of both producers and audiences” (cited in Druick 2009, 300). Genre helps audiences to make media choices more easily as they will be broadly suggested about what they are likely to find from a particular media product, and whether that product matches their taste. Simultaneously, genre helps media industries “avoid risk and ensure profitable differences” (Branston 2006, 45). Thus, it involves both economic and culture domains (Druick 2009, 300).

The idea of genre indicates that the common features of a text are inseparable from its historical and ideological context. Genre exists in the intersubjective perceptions among people (Dietel-McLaughlin 2010, 39), as Mikhail Bakhtin says; that is, genres involve “the material production of social modes of communication” (cited in Druick 2009, 295) occurring between the individual and the social world. Media texts, to some extent, are a representation of reality. Genre, then, represents how the social world should be arranged. Thus, it reflects the power structure in society. Through the work of genre, the status quo of some groups is established and maintained while that of others is devalued, marginalized and oppressed. “Every discourse (or genre) is similarly a zone of power relations, however, since different discourses and genres hold different degrees of legitimacy and cultural capital in society” (Bourdieu 1984; Foucault 1981, cited in Gray 2005, 227). In addition, according to Joshua Gunn (2004), genres rather emerge from rhetoric. It is the power of rhetoric that can firmly establish certain dominant ideologies. Genre, therefore, results from a rhetorical act that enables a repeated social pattern collectively acknowledged (cited in Dietel-McLaughlin 2010, 39).

However, while there is an attempt to keep genres stable, and thus predictable, the mechanism of genre is still open for the possibility for anti-genre (Gray 2005, 227). Parody is one of those possibilities. Robert Hariman (2008) simply explains the word parody as “beside the song,” and additionally “para” can mean “beyond” or “against” (251). The key idea is that when something is put beside itself, flaws will show. If we want to see the larger picture, we had better step away from the object; and parody works by adding the gap or distance between us and our perception by default of the parodied objects. Parody makes us distanced enough to be able to see the limits and weak sides that are hidden in the original objects. As an example, he says that “when language is placed beside itself, limits are exposed. What had seemed to be serious is in fact foolish, and likewise the powerful is shown to be vulnerable, the unchangeable contingent, the enchanting dangerous” (2008, 251).
Nevertheless, parody possesses more than duplicating techniques, as it also has an artistic and aesthetic dimension. Parody involves combinations of several copying and converting techniques, for example, “direct quotation, alternation of words, textual rearrangement, substitution of subjects or characters, shifts in diction, shifts in class, shifts in magnitude, etc.” (Hariman 2008, 263). In addition to Hariman’s account, the conceptualization of parody of others concerns to a great extent its social and cultural implications. Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), the widely-cited scholar, refers to parody as a cultural form found in the carnival in late medieval and early modern Europe. The carnival represents a “utopian realm of community, freedom, equality, and abundance” (Bakhtin 1984, 9, cited in Druick 2009, 296). It was a place that exhibited an oppositional culture, the power of ordinary people against authorities whereby laughter was utilized.

Parody allegedly emerges from this “carnivalesque” arena: it can be both symptom and weapon in the cultural and political combat between the vernacular and authority force. It is a method of challenging the status quo, “to debunk official seriousness, and to testify to the relativity of all languages, be they the dialects of authority or the jargons of guilds, castes or priesthoods” (Dentith 2002, 23). In addition to social criticism, parody adds humor and fun to this battle. According to Simon Dentith (2002), parody should be regarded as an array of cultural practices that are relatively parodic (19). He argues that “parody includes any cultural practice which provides a relatively polemical allusive imitation of another cultural production or practice” (ibid., 9). This definition is based on the function of parody, not techniques or means which are used for parodying (ibid., 37). Dentith deliberately proposes such a fairly broad definition, as he does not want to narrow the focus on how to characterize parody, but rather places the emphasis on parody’s context and its evaluative and ideological performance.

Additionally, in the study of literature, Margaret Rose also defined parody based on the use of parody, which was to make parodied material function in a new way that was not originally intended. In Parody: Ancient, Modern, and Post-Modern (1993), Rose defines parody as “the comic ref functioning of preformed linguistic or artistic material” (52). She regards parodic fictions as “metafictions,” as there are layers of fictions in one fiction. In other words, a fiction is made up of the reflection of other fictions. For Dan Harries (2000), parody is about creating a new text by recontextualising the original text through the alteration of the text’s elements. The adaptation that retains some similarities and differences from the source results in “a level of ironic incongruity with an inevitable satiric impulse” (Harries 2000, 6).

As for the importance of the parody, Dentith points out that parody has two paradoxical functions: first, it acts as a “rejoinder, or mocking response to the word of another;” and second, it can be seen
as conservative. On the one hand, as a rejoinder, parody borrows texts of authority to attack, criticize, or satirize the texts itself or just to humorously refer to other things (2002, 9). In this sense, it subverts authority, relativising its sacred languages, ruining the seriousness, mimicking its pretending self-importance and intelligence, and exposing its senselessness (ibid., 9; 20; 28). On the other hand, if parody turns in a polemical direction to attack the formally-innovative texts belonging to emergent groups, it can also result in parody favoring conservative groups of people in monitoring the boundaries of their conventional texts, and reinforcing what is already acknowledged as sayable (ibid., 20; 28). Therefore, in short, parody can be simultaneously deemed as a method to carry out “anti-authoritarian irreverence, and as a means of ridiculing, and stigmatising the socially marginal, and the oppressed” (Dentith 2002, 28). These two conflictive descriptions cannot be unified, and more importantly, social and historical contexts always have to be taken into consideration in order to interpret the social and political meaning attached to parody (ibid.). Dentith asserts that this has resulted in a contested relation between texts and, on another level, between different social powers.

Parody disables the mechanism of genre or “the grammar of a text” (Altman 1999, cited in Gray 2005, 226) in that it exposes underlying ideologies upon which genre and grammar are built, and the strategies used to carry out such ideologies. This leads us to realize that what seems to be natural is not natural anymore. Parody can be seen as a form of critical intertextuality that provides us with a new perspective to understand and interpret the source texts. Moreover, parody encourages us to evaluate, and rethink, not just the targeted texts, but also the larger aspect of social reality they refer to. Therefore, some parodies have the capacity to expand the power of the text and linguistic power to social power (ibid., 227).

The power of parody, however, should not be forgotten; it is largely supported by humor and laughter. According to Bakhtin, laughter destroys the wall of fear, and is thus a good start to explore the world: “laughter demolishes fear and piety before an object, before a world, making of it an object of familiar contact and thus clearing the ground for an absolutely free investigation of it. Laughter is a vital factor in laying down that prerequisite for fearlessness without which it would be impossible to approach the world realistically” (Bakhtin 1981, 23, cited in Hariman 2008, 255). Apart from that, Hariman (2008) claims that laughter is a way in which “great structures of domination can be leveled within consciousness” (257). Satisfactory laughing can be said to be the expression of the moment of freedom, and the celebration of victory of absurdity over rationality (ibid.). Furthermore, humor can also be manifested in a multivoiced discourse, as it involves creativity in joining unlikely terms and, in addition, it surprises us with the unpredictable upcoming, making something usual unusual (Palmer 1987, 61; 46, cited in Druick 2009, 301).
Regarding parody’s political relevance, in Political Parody and Public Culture (2008), Hariman claims that political parody or other humorous forms are crucial elements for maintaining a democratic public culture in the sense that it exposes “the limits of public speech, transforming discursive demands into virtual images, setting those images before a carnivalesque audience, and celebrating social leveling while decentering all discourses within the ‘immense novel’ of the public address system” (247). Parody makes us aware of the fact that there is something that cannot be explicitly said in public, and that there is a suppression of speech and expression in supposedly democratic discourses. What is more, it does more than notify us because it also transfers such suppressed opinions into action, though in an indirect but obvious way. Thus, parody champions the balance in the power in discourse. Hariman suggests that parody has political significance in the sense that it can create “a productive articulation of public identity and agency” through at least four functions: “doubling, carnivalesque spectatorship, leveling, and transforming the world of speech into an agonistic field of proliferating voices” (ibid., 253). Doubling is useful because it might bring an ambiguity into salience: it can lead to a new attitude towards or new meaning of the doubled texts or materials (ibid., 254-255). Next is “carnivalesque spectatorship.” It means that parody raises our awareness of being a spectator among people, reminding us that we are watching a show performed by authorities. What is perceived as real is only a performance which is deliberately designed. In addition, by “leveling,” parody brings everything down to the same level. Regarding the last operation, parody creates a contested environment for diverse voices, which sustains the public debate in a democratic model (Hariman 2008, 257). Parodic operations interfere with discourse’s naturalizing process, and makes speakers of the original texts lose control of the communication effect on the audience; thus the public arena becomes more competitive.

Regarding the limitation of parody, Dentith highlights the idea that parody must be read in relation to its own social and historical context, and its implication is by large focused on the functions in the democratic model. However, this genre appears to have proliferated worldwide, transcending boundaries of culture and history, as well as political systems. In the discussion of news parody in the article – News Parody in Global Perspective: Politics, Power, and Resistance (2012), Geoffrey Baym and Jeffrey P. Jones stress the increasingly important role of news parody all over the world as a political tool in resisting dominant power and undermining the status quo. They claim that “parodic and satirical mode of reaction has become a global phenomenon” (ibid., 3): it is adaptable to different media systems, and language, political, social, and cultural contexts (ibid., 4). In addition, Baym and Jones also give an account of the role of the news parody. They first make the remark that “news is also a product of power” (ibid.). Traditional news media and audiences have an asymmetrical relationship which allows our (political) realities to be unknowingly framed by the
representation of news. In contrast, parody gives an audience a sense of equality so one would not feel obliged to be just a passive listener but would rather feel free to talk back. In this sense, public response is urged. In addition, news parody has the potential to delegitimize news media as it can interrogate the news, provide what absent in real news, and urge people to be skeptical about the feeding of news media (ibid., 6). The constructive and destructive functions of parodies as such highlight the role of the news parody as a watchdog that monitors how real news media work (ibid., 12). News media claim that they are a watchdog of the society; thus the news parody can be claimed as a watchdog on top of news media.

All in all, the cultural and ideological combat between the dominant and dominated, which never ends, can be represented in competing texts or languages. Undoubtedly, parody as genre has proved to have a profound impact on social and power relations. It is seen as a popular or vernacular tool to counter the official powers where a direct attack is impossible, too risky or ineffective. Parodist transformation, then is needed as a strategy that lead to a competing public sphere: it challenges the centripetal force and, in turn, promotes the oppositional voices to strengthen their centrifugal power. Parody, therefore, is acknowledged as a crucial resource in upholding democratic discourses (Hariman 2008).

3.7 Conclusion

This research was conducted through a cultural approach. The major theoretical framework was based on the theory of monitorial citizenship, cultural citizenship, and the concept of parody as genre. Monitorial citizenship refers to the act of citizens that scan through information but collect only information that is relevant to their lives and mobilize only if their interests are threatened. Cultural citizenship suggests the political engagement through informal practices and communication activities in the everyday life of citizens. In the practice of cultural citizenship, popular culture and media texts are deemed important as a bridge that joins private life with public life.

Genres imply the relations, structure of power, and dominant ideologies in a community, which culminate in the constrained use and classifying order of language. Parody, on the other hand, indicates the resistance to those institutionally-established grammatical and forms of texts. Parody, in this sense, is a form of popular culture that links the cultural and political realm. Yet, it is characteristically distinctive with the particular techniques and functions that make parody more than the option of deliberation but an essential element in public culture (Hariman, 2008). Parody mainly engages a sense of humor and critical intertextuality. Some parodies, although seemingly senseless, comical, and entertaining, are actually a serious matter. Similar to other types of popular
In this research, parody is regarded as means by which citizens culturally perform citizenship. The research question asks the following question: “based on the case study of “JorKawTeun,” how are the practices of cultural citizenship and the popularization of politics enacted through online parody videos in Thailand? Specifically, how is humor utilized in the videos, and what rhetorical strategies/tactics are used to make political points?” In the context of Thailand, I seek to understand what messages the parody video makers want to convey to the public, what tactics they employ, what can be considered political engagement or the practice of citizenship, how and by what means their identities as citizens is reflected, and how their practice exemplifies the popularization of politics. The answers to all of these questions can be found through their use in language and texts. That means that the contents in parody videos are the key sources of the research. The content would reveal the text maker’s attitude towards society, political system, the government, and mainstream discourses. In addition, it would also expose the power relations that shape discourses. To serve this purpose, the critical discourse analysis method is employed in this study. The next chapter will explain particularly the methodology of the research.
4. Methodology

The overall aim of the research is to analyze the enactment of cultural citizenship, and how politics is popularized through the multimodal texts in the parody genre in Thailand’s new media contexts. The thesis is guided by the basic research question:

Based on the case study of “JorKawTeun,” how are the practices of cultural citizenship and popularization of politics enacted through online parody videos in Thailand? Specifically, how is humor utilized in the videos, and what rhetorical strategies/tactics are used to make political points?

4.1 The objective of study

There are many kinds of parody videos available online, such as music video parodies, movie parodies, TV commercial parodies, and news parodies. To narrow down the scope of my research project, I focus my attention on news parody videos made by and targeted to Thai people since the news parody most explicitly contains political arguments that are encapsulated in the entertainment form. Thus, news parody might be a good manifestation of the public deliberation which conjoins popular culture and politics. In order to clarify the terms “news parody,” I borrow Baym and Jones’s key criteria in his study of the news parody from a global perspective (2012), which is the programming that “uses humor to engage with, and offer critiques of, contemporary political life and current events” and is “meaningful to audiences”. Since the news parody can be done in various styles, it is better not to impose a restriction on the definition of parody news so that the choice of material to examine is more expansive (Baym and Jones 2012, 4).

Based on the guideline definition above, I have decided to analyze the news parody video program produced by SpokedarkTV. The program is called JorKawTeun: DootookSatiPanya (เจาะข่าวตื้นถูกยึดตัดสิทธิ์ปัญญา), which literally means “Digging shallow news: insulting your intelligence.” Besides their own website (www.spokedark.tv/), the videos have been widely distributed on the Internet, especially on prominent social networking sites, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Pantip.

The justifications of the material choice are first, JorKawTeun meets the criteria of being a news parody program. It engages in parody production and contains political points under the guise of fake news. Secondly, the amount of the videos is large enough, as there has been already over 50 videos. The production team have been regularly making the videos of this program since 2008. Third, among the available Thai news parody videos in the online world, JorKawTeun is, perhaps, the only widely known one that explicitly positions itself as news parody. Besides, it is very
outstanding in terms of the quality of production, presentational, rhetorical stylistics, and critical content. Fourth, the program is very popular, especially among young people. It has a large number of viewers—304,591 on average. The number is estimated by the date of 16th March, 2012, based on the data from their official website, (http://jorkawteun.spokedark.tv/). On the same date, their Facebook page had 25,150 likes and 748 people were talking about it.

4.2 Critical discourse analysis

In examining this topic—the relationships among news parody videos, culture citizenship, and the popularization of politics—the selected method is critical discourse analysis. Discourse analysis treats “talk,” no matter whether spoken or written, as “ways of doing,” not just as a means of expression (Deacon, Pickering, and Golding 2007). Similarly, as James Paul Gee (2010) puts it, “saying things in language never goes without also doing and being thing” (2). Thus, discourse analysis, apart from dealing with texts, always takes into consideration its “own contextual features and situational dynamics” (Deacon, Pickering, and Golding 2007, 308). According to Brian Paltridge (2006), “Discourse analysis focuses on knowledge about language beyond the word, clause, phrase and sentence that is needed for successful communication. It looks at patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used” (2). Discourse analysis is the study of language in use; how people manage to use language to achieve communicative goals, presenting themselves to the society, and establish relationship with others (ibid., 9). The goal is to gain a deeper understanding of how language works and why it works in such a way (Gee 2010, 9).

Moreover, some can use this approach to reach beyond the comprehension of language within the conversational context to reveal a wider picture of the social and cultural forces behind. In this sense, discourse analysis is also an approach to the understanding of the socially-constructed world, the relationships among participants, individuals’ identities, as well as the power structure in the society in which the media text is produced (Paltridge 2006, 9). Here we can see that discourse analysis can be carried out in two ways—descriptive and critical. According to Marie Gillespie and Jason Toynbee (2006), the term “discourse” is mainly used in content analysis study with two different focuses. One sees discourse as the language in use of people’s social interaction, while the other sees it as a constitutive part of intersubjective reality: the discourse is used to determine “what is knowable, sayable and doable in a particular historical context” (ibid., 122). The former is discourse analysis in general and the latter, advanced by Norman Fairclough (1995), is often referred to as “critical discourse analysis” since it deals with linguistics in a critical manner, connecting the use of language in given social settings with the exercise of social power in a larger
social backdrop (ibid.). In addition, it “also focuses on how people do things beyond language, and the ideas and beliefs that they communicate as they use language” (Paltridge 2006, 9).

This research employs the method of critical discourse analysis, as it not merely describes how language works in a particular way but attempts to find larger social and political implications that the discourse in the parody videos might suggest. It aims to uncover the values, belief systems and assumptions that lie beneath what the videos say and connect them to the practice of cultural citizenship and political culture.

In order to present a more concrete framework for this methodology, I would like to state here Fairclough and Wodak’s (1997) underlying principles for the critical discourse analysis, which include: “1) social and political issues are constructed and reflected in discourse; 2) power relations are negotiated and performed through discourse; 3) discourse both reflects and reproduces social relations; 4) ideologies are produced and reflected in the use of discourse (cited in Paltridge 2006, 179)”. Those are key issues that critical discourse analysis addresses and examines. Aside from that, Toynbee and Gillespie also cited another study of Fairclough concerning three sets of questions that critical discourse analysis can lead to answering. Those are comprised of: “1) How is the world (events, relationships, etc.) represented?; 2) What identities are set up for those involved in the programme or story (reporters, audiences, ‘third parties’ referred to or interviewed)?; 3) What relationships are set up between those involved (for example, reporter-audience, expert-audience or politician-audience relationship)?” (Gillespie and Toynbee 2006, 122-123). Since discourse analysis basically operates within the domain of “language in use” theory (Gee 2010, 11), drawing upon these three sets of questions, it can be said that language is used for constructing the common reality in people’s perception, identities, as well as social relations.

In addition to the work of Fairclough, Gee (2010) proposes seven building tasks of language composed of significance, activities, identities, relationships, politics, connections, and sign system and knowledge. In short, he says that through discourse analysis, one can find how certain pieces of language can be used to: 1) make something significant or non-significant; 2) to actualize activities or practice; 3) to enact one’s own identity; 4) to build a social relationship; 5) to make politics, expressing one’s perspective on the distribution of social goods (such as wealthy, status, power); 6) to connect one thing with other things, creating relevance among cross-referenced texts; and 7) to privilege certain sign system or knowledge (Gee 2010, 17-20).

In summary, critical discourse analysis critically examines discourse, the language in use, to unveil the multiple forces and structure underlying the language in order to find implications for social or cultural practices. “Critical discourse analysis takes the view that the relationship between language
and meaning is never arbitrary in that the choice of a particular genre or rhetorical strategy brings with it particular presuppositions, meanings, ideologies and intentions” (Kress 1991, cited in Paltridge 2006, 183). However, discourse analysis mainly deals with spoken or written language; a news parody video, on the other hand, the object of this study, is a complex communicative form that not only uses language as such as a tool to convey messages. It combines several modes of communication, such as texts, sounds, and still and moving images. Such a convergence of media text is often called “multimodal texts” (Gee 2010, 194). Nevertheless, Gee states that the theory of discourse analysis is still applicable as “discourse is about communication and we humans can communicate via other symbol systems (e.g., mathematics) or via systems composed using modalities other than language or one composed by mixing other modalities with language” (194).

Therefore, in this study, visual analysis must be incorporated with linguistics analysis. According to Gee, image functions as language in the sense that it also leaves a blank to be fulfilled by the reader’s knowledge and experience, and that it not only says something but also enacts something (ibid., 195). There is also a visual grammar: similar to a social language, which consists of words, phrases, and structures in a specific arrangement to become a sort of style of language, the image elements can be formed into some particular styles as well (ibid.). Gee, therefore, concludes that multimodal texts can be read and understood in the same way as language. As he puts it, “just as we saw for language, we can also talk about textual mixing, where one text (here an image) mixes elements from different styles or sources” (195).

4.3 Description of the stage of the data collection

I set the 24th of February 2012 as the date of my material collection. On that day, there were 53 videos in total to be found on the SpokedarkTV site. I limited the findings to those 53 videos whose length from 9 to 20 minutes each. As for the coming videos, I disregard them.

4.3.1 The analytic method in content analysis

I conducted a two-level analysis. In the first step, I analyzed all 53 videos to look for the overall presentational and narrative pattern styles, and content, in general. In the second step, based on my preliminary analysis, I took a selection of 10 videos as representative of the whole set of 53 videos in order to conduct an in-depth analysis using the approach of critical discourse analysis to discuss the tactics they used more deeply, to extract the core value messages they intended to express to the public, to unpack the hidden ideologies in relation to the contextual settings, to illustrate how their activities represented through the videos can be explained by the cultural perspective of citizenship theory, and to demonstrate how these media texts popularized politics.
4.3.1.1 The first-step analysis

The analytic method of the preliminary analysis is comprised of a twofold analysis: 1) the kinds of issues or news they presented; and 2) the critiques they offered. In the process of designing the analytic method, I used the inductive and iterative approach. Prior to the actual analysis, I roughly set themes for news topics and likely critiques with the aim that those themes would help me grasp relevant data more easily and to organize the findings. For the first-step analysis, as JorKawTeun is a parody of a news program, the topics discussed on the videos are mainly selected from mainstream news. Therefore, I roughly set up the themes for the topics according to the categorization of news which I observed from news agencies in general. Throughout the first level of analysis, I modified themes or categories in order to make them optimally suitable for the data. In the end, I repeatedly checked and modified once again the pattern of findings that was to be utilized as an analytical scheme for the in-depth analysis in the next step. As a result, 10 categories were used to organize the issues or news topics, which were:

1) Politics,
2) Economics,
3) Education,
4) Social issues and culture,
5) Sport,
6) Entertainment,
7) Crime,
8) Accidents,
9) Natural disasters,
10) International news.

It is noteworthy that some news might overlap with these categories but they were labeled based on their predominant relevance.

Regarding the critiques, I sorted them out according to the target groups at whom the critiques were aimed. In addition, general or broader critiques that were intended for the whole social and cultural system were placed in a separate category. Thus, there were 4 groups of critiques:

1) Critique on the government, and authorities,
2) Critique on people, or the society,
3) Critique on media and news industry,
4) Broader critiques.
4.3.1.2 The second-step analysis

In this step, I selected 10 videos as representative of all in order to do the in-depth analysis. Based on the first level analysis of the 53 videos, in total, there were 132 critiques of government/authorities, 65 for people/society, 14 for the media and news industry, and 50 for broader critiques. The critiques of the government and authorities were found in 46 videos, while those of people and society appeared in 34 videos. In addition, there were 10 videos containing critiques of the media and news industry, and 33 videos containing broader critiques.

As can be seen, there was clearly a domination of critiques on government/authorities, while the commentaries on people/society were the second most common. The number of broader critiques also appeared to be fairly large and very close to that of people/society. However, the number of critiques of the media and news industry was significantly less than others. Therefore, to select the representative videos, I narrowed down my focus on the videos that contained both of the top two critiques, which were those of government/authorities and people/society (but my analysis still took into the consideration of the critiques of the news and media industry and the broader ones which contained in the selected videos). The number of videos was then reduced to 32. After that, in order to select the 10 videos, I ordered the rest chronologically, and took a random sample by selecting every third video. As a result, I had the following 10 videos as the basis for the in-depth analysis:

1. “Don’t be serious. Love you” (Thai: อย่าเครียดรักนะ: YaKreadRakNa),
2. “The career in dream” (Thai: อาชีพในฝัน: AacheepNaiFun),
3. “The river overflows its banks” (Thai: น้ำทะลักเต็มพื้น: JorNamTemTaling),
4. “JorKawTeun in the year of the rabbit” (Thai: เจาะขว้างเต็น: TorKawTuen),
5. “If you want to know about palm oil, ask Lamud” (Thai: อยากรู้เรื่องน้ำมันปาล์มถามละมุด: YakRooRuengNammanPalmTamLamud),
6. “Digging: Golden flower and the blackout (don’t play around with words)” (Thai: เจาะตกทองจอดับ (ห้ามพ่วน): JorDokTongJorDub (HamPuan)),

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18 This sentence is also recognized as part of a Thai tradition song that is usually sung during the “LoiKratong” festival.

19 Rabbit is the animal of the year according to the Chinese zodiac.

20 Lamud is sapodilla, a kind of tropical sweet-tasting fruit.

21 DokTong or golden flower can connote ‘whore.’ And, at that time, there is a famous TV series named the orange’s golden flower (DokSomSecTong) that was warned to be censored for an inappropriate behavior of the leading lady character.

22 If turning around the words “JorDub,” which literally means blacked out screen, it can mean a prick hits on (whore).
7. “Digging: Pu’s government (Love you, Ta)” (Thai: เจริญเวลาพู (รักน้องตี้…นะ(!: JorRattabanPu (RakNongTa…Na!),
8. “Digging: itchy numbers game” (Thai: เจริญหาย: JorKanHuay),
9. “Digging: Abijood” (Thai: เจริญบู้ด: JorAbijood),

In this step, the visual and rhetorical techniques were taken into the consideration in addition to the topics and critiques that were already provided in the first step of the analysis. As mentioned earlier, that the “discourse is about communication and we humans can communicate via other symbol systems (e.g., mathematics) or via systems composed using modalities other than language or one composed by mixing other modalities with language” (Gee 2010, 194), not only language but also visual images, music, and sounds were considered elements of discourse. The non-language elements of the discourse thus were transposed into written language for the analysis. However, unlike the thematic analysis of topics and critiques, the analysis of the visual and rhetorical techniques was descriptive. This is because a variety of the techniques utilized in the videos were incompatible with one definition; they were integral, and had no exactly-repeated patterns. Without a definite frame with which to confine my perception, the descriptive analysis could better grasp the innovative and unusually creative techniques used in the videos.

4.4 The presentation of the data results

The table of the general information of each video including the titles, translation of the titles, release date, and number of viewers is first provided. The results of the two-step analysis are also presented in the table but only the first-step analysis table is included in the results and analysis.

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23 The nick name of the currently-elected Prime Minister of Thailand, Yingluck Shinnawatra

24 Ta is a girl’s nick name

25 There is a notorious song named “Kan Hu,” where “Kan” means “itchy,” and “Hu” means “ears.” Hu is close in sound to “Huey,” meaning “numbers game.” So “Kan Huey” means “itchy numbers game.” It is a way to play with words but does not really mean an understandable meaning.

26 The numbers game is an underground illegal form of lottery which is carried out mostly in poor neighborhoods.

27 This word is translated according to the pronunciation in the Thai language. “Abijood” does not exist, and does not make any sense in the Thai language.

28 54 is the abbreviation of 2554 B.E., which equals the year 2011. It is a year in Buddhist Era (B.E.), which precedes 543 years B.C.
chapter, while the second-step analysis table can be found in the appendix. However, the descriptive conclusion drawn from the second-step analysis table is provided in this chapter instead. After that, the concluding analysis as a whole is descriptively given at the end.

4.5 The advantages, disadvantages, and limitations of the selected method

Critical discourse analysis was chosen as I believe that it was the most suitable and effective means to achieve the research’s goal. To analyze the content has an advantage in that the collection of data was quite convenient and unobtrusive (Paltridge 2006). The videos, the materials of study, were available online, and were be accessible at any time and anywhere; and they could also be repeated as many as times as needed. However, there are also disadvantages because discourse analysis greatly relies on the researcher’s subjectivity in text interpretation, and on the selection process and implementation of the theories. Furthermore, there is a possibility for the researcher to be insensitive to the context of messages (Paltridge 2006). In addition, critical discourse analysts have been criticized in the sense that they might mistake themselves as the target audience of the text, as the active role of the audience in its consumption and interpretation is not taken into consideration (van Noppen 2004, cited in Paltridge 2006, 195). Apart from that, there is a criticism about the lack of a concrete and articulate system in researchers’ analytic process (Schegloff 1997, cited in ibid.). Therefore, the researchers are demanded to have some tools for the analysis, and to be careful about and to have strong evidence for their claims, as well as to be self-critical (Toolan, 1997, cited in ibid.).

In this research, I could be considered as an insider since I shared a cultural, social, and educational background with the producers of the media texts I examined. I, therefore, might be blinded and trapped into the common sense shared between me and the text makers. I, perhaps, could have missed out on something that was deemed too natural to be significant even though it was in fact not really natural but rather naturalized by the ideological work of the discourses. However, being an insider could be considered an advantage simultaneously since I could gain insight in the peculiar Thai context of the discourses examined, as well as a sharing some worldview with the producers.

This research, however, did not take into account the impact on the audience. Focus was mainly placed on the content of the video and how such texts enacted certain practices based on the theory of monitorial citizenship and cultural citizenship. Therefore, the feedback on the videos, how people discussed them, and people’s perception were not be included in the examination. However, certain possible effects on society and media practice in broader aspects were speculated and discussed.
within the theoretical framework. Last, as this research used only one case study to investigate the phenomenon, the findings might not be able to be effectively generalized to the whole populations. Other parody videos may or may not demonstrate the same values or political significances that we can see from this study. Nevertheless, I believe that this research will contribute to the knowledge in the interdisciplinary area of cultural, political, and media study.

4.6 The justification of the choice of methodology

In order to justify the choice of methodology, let me present here the research question once again:

*Based on the case study of “JorKawTeun,” how are the practices of cultural citizenship and popularization of politics enacted through online parody videos in Thailand? Specifically, how is humor utilized in the videos, and what rhetorical strategies/tactics are used to make political points?*

As can be seen from the above question, my underlying assumption is that messages can enact certain practices. In this case, what is expressed in the examined parody videos can be responsible for turning the speakers or the producers into citizens (from a cultural comprehensive perspective) and making politics more intimate with the everyday life practice of ordinary people. This assumption coincides with the principle of discourse analysis that Gee, Paltridge, Hesmondhalgh, and others have claimed. Language can “say,” “do,” “let us do things” and “let us be things” (Gee, 2010). Gee argues that “language is a key way we humans make and break our world, our institutions, and our relationship through how we deal with social goods” (ibid., 9-10).

Language and discourse are connected in the same way as text and practice (Deacon, Pickering, and Golding 2007, 152). There is an intrinsic relation between texts and practices, discourse and language, and discourse and mutually-perceived reality. These contribute and influence each other. Discourse is, therefore, viewed as the construction of reality (Paltridge 2006, 9). Connecting this idea to my research, politics and the notion of citizenship, then, can be viewed as one type of constructed reality. Similarly, citing Gibbons and Reimer (1999, 113), Jones argues that postmodern politics is “recognized to be constructed in language; politics is language” (2010, 27). Hence, to approach to a deeper understanding of politics, I deem it appropriate to use the pathway through language or, in particular, “discourse” that builds and is built by politics.

Critical discourse analysis is claimed to be “helpful in illuminating different facets of the structures of media texts, and in attempting to trace the means by which language use in the media contributes to the ongoing production of social conceptions, values, identities and relations” (Deacon,
Pickering, and Golding 2007, 150). Based on this argument, one thing of particular interest here is the work of media texts in constructing an identity which, in this case, is an identity as a cultural citizen. Paltridge and Gee agree that discourses and socially-situated identities are profoundly intertwined. Discourses are significant for socially-situated identities in that they make more specific who we think we are and who we want others to perceive us as in different circumstances (Paltridge 2006, 11). In addition, discourses entail “culture-specific ways of performing and culture-specific ways of recognizing identities and activities,” which include the characteristic style of language, acting, interacting, feeling, emotional and physical expression, thinking, valuing, and so on ((Paltridge 2006, 11-12). Applying this to this research, such arguments lead to the justification of the critical discourse analysis choice for the question: Specifically, how is humor utilized in the videos, and what rhetorical strategies/tactics are used to make political points?

This research basically deals with citizenship, politics, and popular culture. The concepts as such are, in fact, generated through discourses which operate on the top of complex relationship between the state and its people, and among people in the society. Underneath the contested definitions of citizenship, what a good citizen should be, there lies conflict and negotiation of power between the government and its people, the dominant and the dominated, which discursively form the social structure. The ideologies produced from the dominant are naturalized over discourses; thus they look invisible unless we decompose the language used with concern for the historical, social cultural and situational contexts and critically examine what seems to be common-sense or, in other words, to uncover the subtle partisanship ingrained in texts (Deacon, Pickering, and Golding 2007, 156; Toynbee and Gillespe 2006, 187).

According to the study of JorKawTeun, by making news parody videos, the producers engage with politics in a particular way, which is more acquainted with the vernacular worldview and way of life than with formal political processes. They attack the government and public openly under the guise of “just joking” messages. But why do they bother to do this? Why do they feel like having their political and social remarks spoken out loud and widespread? To answer those questions, however, is not of the interest in this study, yet those questions are raised since they are significant as a point of departure for this research. No matter what actually motivates them to do so, or what they perceive as motivations for their activities, I do not seek to find out but I can say from what is self-evident, based on the cultural perspective of politics study, that this is a public deliberation that underlies democracy. It is one of the core mechanisms which enables and sustains the deliberative democracy system. I am, therefore, interested in the connection of JorKawTeun’s media texts and the enactment of certain practices.
Nevertheless, it might be taken for granted to say that the video producers might not bother doing this unless they do feel a sense of citizenship. However, looking at their production of political points, they are apparently engaging in politics in an informal way, participating in the political process in a non-conventional and creative fashion. This is deliberative, not legally-obliged political participation. What is more, this practice can be explained and supported by the set of theories and concept used as a framework in this study: monitorial citizenship, cultural citizenship, and the concept of parody as genre. I will elaborate on this issue in the next following chapters.

Therefore, the seemingly ludicrous acts and speeches by the JorKawTeun team in the news parody videos might be interpreted as the means to present themselves as citizens. I would like to remind the reader here once again that discourse is not just the expression of reality but also a part of the constitution of reality. Through the JorKawTeun team’s use of language, citizenship practice and identity, as well as political realities are formed, shaped, and displayed, and it is the purpose of this thesis to illuminate how or in what way their media texts enact practices and relationship as such; to be more specific, how discourses make people identify themselves as citizens and how discourses takes politics away from the hegemonic ruling class, to certain extent, and return it to non-politically privileged people.
5. Results and analysis

In this chapter, the results and analysis are presented. First, a table containing general information on the 52 videos is given, which provides the titles of the videos in English and its original language (Thai), the release date, and the number of viewers. The study was conducted through a two-step analysis. The first-step analysis, including all 53 videos, was to identify the main thrust of the videos’ discourse: the issue topics and critiques presented through the videos were the focus. The results of the first-step analysis are illustrated in Table 1. In addition, a descriptive conclusion is provided. Regarding the second-step analysis, the results of the in-depth analysis are presented in the table in the appendix; however, in this chapter, extensive conclusions of each video are given. The analysis in the second step included all key elements of the discourse, including spoken language, on-screen texts, images, as well as sound and music. A summary of events, striking quotations, and a description of other key visual and audio elements is provided. Additionally, analyses of the JorKawTeun hosts and the rhetorical and visual strategies are presented. Moreover, in the last section, how JorKawTeun productions are related to the enactment of monitorial and cultural citizenship and the popularization of politics is analytically illuminated.
5.1 General information on the 53 videos

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Title (in original language)</th>
<th>Title translation</th>
<th>Release date</th>
<th>Viewers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>JohnWinyu 01</td>
<td>จอห์นวินยู 01</td>
<td>John Winyu 01</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>228323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>JorKawTeunKubJohnWinyu GT200</td>
<td>เจาะข่าวคืนกับจอห์นวินยูจีที 200</td>
<td>“JorKawTeun” with John Winyu and GT200</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>259491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>JorKawJarajornKubJohnWinyu/JorKawTeunSanjorn</td>
<td>ข่าวจรจร กับจอห์นวินยู/เจาะข่าวเคลื่อนสัญจร</td>
<td>Traffic news with John Winyu / Roaming “JorKawTeun”</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>306263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>O-Net Oh God *The 1st most watched</td>
<td>โอเน็ตโอ้ก็อต</td>
<td>O-Net Oh God</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>+999999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>JorKilasiLuengDang*the 3rd most watched</td>
<td>เจาะกีฬาสีเหลืองแด่</td>
<td>Digging: Red vs. Yellow sport game</td>
<td>19/3/2010</td>
<td>612065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>YaKreadRakNa</td>
<td>อย่าเครียด รักนะ</td>
<td>Don’t be serious. Love you</td>
<td>8/4/2010</td>
<td>360937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PorKuYaai</td>
<td>พ่อถูกผยองยื้อ</td>
<td>My Dad is powerful.</td>
<td>16/6/2010</td>
<td>357268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>KonMaiSaiSua</td>
<td>คนไม่ใสเสื้อ</td>
<td>Shirtless man</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>366817</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>JorCensor</td>
<td>เจาะเซ็นเซ่อ</td>
<td>Digging: Censorship</td>
<td>12/5/2010</td>
<td>413112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>JorPookumkab</td>
<td>เจาะผู้กำกับ</td>
<td>Digging: The director</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>235790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>YayMeeLeangHoi*The 9th most watched</td>
<td>ยายมีเลี้ยงหอย</td>
<td>Aunt Mee feeds clams</td>
<td>16/7/2010</td>
<td>434849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>JorSmartCard*The 10th most watched</td>
<td>เจาะสมาร์ทการ์ด</td>
<td>Digging: ‘Smart Card’</td>
<td>30/7/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>NitanSamG*The 7th most watched</td>
<td>นิทานสามG</td>
<td>The story about 3G</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>453551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>AacheepNaiFun*The 5th most watched</td>
<td>อาชีพในฝัน</td>
<td>The career in dream</td>
<td>30/8/2010</td>
<td>564537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>LookKraiHaaf*the 4th most watched</td>
<td>ลูกใครฮ่าฟฟว์</td>
<td>Whose dad is this kid?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>600797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 The translations from Thai to English may not be coherent since some words do not exist and do not make any sense in the Thai language, as they were just formed for that particular parody.

30 A number of videos were reloaded so I could not find the original release date of some of them.

31 The data from www.spokedarktv.com on 16th March, 2012

32 GT200 is the remote substance detector that is proved inefficient

33 O-Net is the Ordinary National Educational Test.

34 Smart card is the newly-introduced national identification card
| 16 | Certeau de Prongdong | ชาวตาวเตะประองคง | Certeau de reconciliation | 13/10/2010 | 183725 |
| 17 | JorMeeLood | เจาะหมีหลุด | Digging: A bear got out of the cage | 21/10/2010 | 313246 |
| 8 | JorNamTemTaling | น้าองเต็มหลัง | The river overflows its banks | 5/11/2010 | 313704 |
| 19 | TujaritShimiHaaf | ทุจริต ชิมิฮาวฟฟฟ | Corruption, right? | N/A | 324478 |
| 20 | Winter Festival | Winter Festival | Winter Festival | 9/12/2010 | 244870 |
| 21 | JorHeebNaHaaf | เจาะหีบสะท้านฟฟฟว์ | Digging: Ballot box | 27/12/2010 | 208074 |
| 22 | TorKawTuen | เจาะขัวดื้อ | “JorKawTeun” in the year of the rabbit | 7/1/2011 | 297232 |
| 23 | JorUpdul | เจาะอั๊บดุล | Digging: Ubdul | 22/1/2011 | 123669 |
| 24 | ToogRaekTaekLeawJa | ถุงแตกแล้วจ่า(แรก) | The first bag has broken up. | N/A | 234526 |
| 25 | TaeMooKawPakMaa | เฉลยเข้าปากหมา | Kicking a pig into a dog’s mouth | 5/2/2011 | 374572 |
| 26 | JaTorramanKanPaiTu | จะทะลุกันไปดิ่งเหยียย | How long are you gonna torture me? | 17/2/2011 | 279887 |
| 27 | JorToogTeakBaiTi2 | เจาะถุงแตกใบที่2 | Breaking up the second bag | N/A | 112876 |
| 28 | YakRooRuengNammanPalmTamLamud | อยากรู้เรื่องนำมันปาล์ม ถามละมุด | If you want to know about palm oil, ask Lamud | 3/3/2011 | 349128 |
| 29 | JorKrabokMaipai | เจาะกระบอกไม้ไผ่ | Digging: Bamboo tube | 18/3/2011 | 272341 |
| 30 | JorYang (JukNa) | เจาะยาง38(จุกนะ) | Digging: Rubber (I am suffering in agony) | 8/4/2011 | 313554 |
| 31 | JorDokTongJorDub | เจาะดอกทองจอดับ | Digging: Golden flower to be blacked out (don’t play around with words) | 26/4/2011 | 439057 |
| 32 | Jor Nominee Cloning Candidate | นอมินีโคลนนิ่งแคนดิเดต | Nominee and cloning candidates | 19/5/2011 | 330851 |

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35 This sentence is also recognized as part of a Thai tradition song that is usually sung during the “LoiKra Tong” festival.

36 The animal of the year according to the Chinese zodiac

37 Lamud is sapodilla, a kind of tropical sweet-tasting fruit

38 This word literally means piercing a tire and can also mean the action of kicking at the area around the thigh, which will cause the one who got kicked to suffer from colic.

39 DokTong or golden flower can connote “whore.” And, at that time, there was a famous TV series named the orange’s golden flower (DokSomSeeTong) that was warned to be censored for the inappropriate behavior of the character of the leading lady.

40 If the words “JorDub,” which literally means blacked out screen, are turned around, it can mean a prick hits a (whore).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Views</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>JorHooRoodToodRab obJomNamta</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Shove it up your ass with tears</td>
<td>3/6/2011</td>
<td>285057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>JorHoo (Kan)</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Piercing an earlobe (itchy)</td>
<td>16/6/2011</td>
<td>616892</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>JorKoohaMaHorn</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: voting booth. Dogs howl.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>512300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>JorTongTeakBaiTi 3</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Breaking up the third bag</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>323814</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>JorRattabanPu (RakNongTa…Na!)</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: Pu’s government (Love you, Ta)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>274872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>HoLuakPia</td>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>Wow boss</td>
<td>5/8/2011</td>
<td>203737</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>JorJongFadNa</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: Hitting a face with a fake pussy</td>
<td>23/8/2011</td>
<td>188451</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>JorKumKlingLing KubMa</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: Dog Monkey Funny game show</td>
<td>30/8/2011</td>
<td>206924</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>JorKalaKaYai</td>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>Piercing coconut shell of the mafia</td>
<td>16/9/2011</td>
<td>179994</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>JorKanHuay</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: itchy numbers game</td>
<td>22/9/2011</td>
<td>265568</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>JorNitirat</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: Nitirat</td>
<td>7/10/2011</td>
<td>128875</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>KlaeKreadNam Tuam</td>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>Releasing stress about flooding</td>
<td>15/10/2011</td>
<td>123154</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>JorKeng</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Piercing a basket</td>
<td>21/11/2011</td>
<td>134259</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>JorAbijood</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: Abijood</td>
<td>26/11/2011</td>
<td>232134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>JorKumLi</td>
<td>Je colorful</td>
<td>Digging: Komli</td>
<td>8/12/2011</td>
<td>158430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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41 “Pu” literally means crab. It is the real nickname of the currently-elected Prime Minister of Thailand, Yingluck Shinnawatra.

42 “Ta” is a girl’s nickname.

43 There is a notorious song named “Kan Hu,” which “Kan” means “itchy,” and “Hu” means “ears.” Hu is close in sound to “Huey,” meaning “numbers game.” So “Kan Huey” means “itchy numbers game.” It is a way to play with words but does not really have an understandable meaning.

44 The numbers game is an underground illegal form of lottery which is carried out mostly in poor neighborhoods.

45 A group of law academicians that propose an amendment to the lèse majesté law

46 This word is translated according to the pronunciation in the Thai language. “Abijood” does not exist, and does not make any sense in the Thai language.

47 Komli is a girl’s name.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Views</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>TanuPakKaw</td>
<td>ธนูปักข้าว</td>
<td>Took arrow in the news(^48)</td>
<td>21/12/2011</td>
<td>208622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>SinLok/Dara/54</td>
<td>สินโลก/ดารา/54</td>
<td>The end of the world/The stars/54(^49)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>512300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>ProngdongKanChaiNi</td>
<td>ประกองดองใช้หนี้</td>
<td>Reconciling to pay a debt</td>
<td>13/1/2012</td>
<td>323814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>JorFaiNaiRu</td>
<td>ไฟในรู้</td>
<td>Fire in a hole</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>138953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>KawPangKengRon</td>
<td>ข้าวแพงแกงร่อน</td>
<td>Expensive food</td>
<td>10/2/2012</td>
<td>106483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>BraJowJoke</td>
<td>บรรเจ่าโจ๊ก</td>
<td>God Joke(^50)</td>
<td>24/2/2012</td>
<td>170445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^48\) This title mocks the catchphrase – “I Took an Arrow in the Knee,” which is from the famous video game, The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim.

\(^49\) 54 is the abbreviation of 2554 B.E., which equals the year 2011. It is a year in Buddhist Era (B.E.), which precedes 543 years B.C.

\(^50\) BraJowJoke or God Joke refers to the dubbed name of a Thai singer whose nickname is Joke.
5.2 The first-step analysis

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Issue topic</th>
<th>Critique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government/Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) JohnWinyu 01</td>
<td>-Crime -Social issues and culture -Entertainment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) “JorKawTuen” with John Winyu and GT200</td>
<td>-Politics -Corruption -Government’s poor management</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Traffic news with John Winyu / Roaming “JorKawTuen”</td>
<td>-Accidents -Social issues and culture -The police’s abuse of power</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) O-Net Oh God</td>
<td>-Education</td>
<td>-Policy makers with outdated views -Suppression of people’s freedom of thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Digging: Red vs. Yellow sport game</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Don’t be serious. Love you</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Government’s poor crisis management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Social issues and culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Lack of political concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) My Dad is powerful.</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Self-interest over public interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Shirtless man</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Authorities’ abuse of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Social issues and culture</td>
<td>-Politicians’ untrustworthy words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Violation of people’s basic rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Digging: Censorship</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Violation of people’s basic rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Policy makers with outdated views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Digging: The director</td>
<td>-Entertainment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Social issues and culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Aunt ‘Mee’ feeds clams</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Suppression of freedom of speech and expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Censorship of media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Politicians’ unaccountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Digging: ‘Smart Card’</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Politicians’ unaccountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Social issues and culture</td>
<td>-Government’s poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   | International news | management  
|   |                | -Suppression of freedom of thinking  
|   |                | -Policy makers with outdated view  
| 13) The story about 3G | Politics | -Self interest over public interest  
|   |                | -Lack of concern about environmental issues  
|   |                | -Using formal but illogical language  
|   |                | -Over estimating the society  
|   |                | -Do not accept the unpleasant truth  
|   |                | -Capitalist and materialistic society  
|   |                | -Regression in the country’s development  
| 14) The career in dream | Politics  
|   |                | -Self interest over public interest  
|   | -Social issues and culture | -Government’s poor management  
|   |                | -Politicians’ insufficiency of skills and knowledge about their job  
|   |                | -Authorities’ abuse of power  
|   |                | -Lack of job responsibilities  
|   |                | -Corruption  
|   |                | -Inequity of resource/budget distribution  
|   |                | -Overlooking of one’s own mistakes  
|   |                | -Emotion over reason  
|   |                | -Patronage system  
| 15) Whose dad is this kid? | Entertainment  
|   | -Politics  
|   | -International news | -Conflicts of interest  
|   |                | -No respect for others’ privacy  
|   |                | -Being too judgmental  
|   |                | -Pushing other down to make oneself look  
|   |                | -   
|   |                | -   

<p>| 16) Certeau de reconciliation | -Entertainment  -Social issues and culture  -Politics | -Unfairness in Justice system  -Lack of logics in official language | - | -Untrustworthy news | -Technology threatens privacy. -Absurdity in advertising -Injustice in the society |
| 17) Digging: A bear got out of the cage | -Natural disasters  -Social issues and culture  -Entertainment | -Government agencies’ poor performance | -Self interest over common interests | - | -Loss of trust in government |
| 18) The river overflows its banks | -Natural disasters  -Politics | -Corruption  -Unfairness in Justice system | -Lack of sympathy  -Selfishness  -Lack of political concern | - | -The divided society  -The inequality of society |
| 19) Corruption, right? | -Politics  -Social issues and culture | -Lack of job responsibilities  -Policy makers’ outdated view  -Ineffective policy proposition  -Government’s abuse of power  -Exploitation of public resources to advertise themselves | Lack of political concern | - | - |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20) Winter Festival</th>
<th>-Natural Disasters  -politics  -Crime</th>
<th>-Corruption  -Unfairness in justice system</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-Universal commonality of silliness of authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22) “JorKawTuen” in the year of the rabbit</td>
<td>-Social issues and culture -Politics -Accidents</td>
<td>-Government’s poor performance -Ineffective policy and campaign</td>
<td>-Susceptibility to trend-chasing -Emotion over reason -Susceptibility to majority influence</td>
<td>-Partisanship and bias</td>
<td>-Distrust in justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23) Digging: Abdul</td>
<td>-Politics -Social issues and culture-</td>
<td>-Unfairness in the justice system -In violation of people’s basic rights -Conflict of interests</td>
<td>-Lack of critical thinking and skepticism -Should be open to diverse opinions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-Poll is not an answer to everything. -Failure in educational system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24) The first bag has broken up.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25) Kicking a pig into a dog’s mouth</td>
<td>-Sports -International news -Politics -Social issues and culture</td>
<td>-Government’s poor crisis management -Government’s violent security measure -Unrealistic project proposal -Pointless policy</td>
<td>-Laziness in reading -Provocative clothing of students</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 26) How long are you gonna torture me? | -Politics  
-Crime  
-Accidents | -Using formal but illogical language  
-Government’s hypocrisy  
-Minister’s lack of skills and knowledge about his job  
-Government’s poor management  
-Corruption  
-Politicians’ untrustworthy words  
-Never be self-critical | -Election is only the restarting of political vicious circle.  
-Regression the development of the country |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27) Breaking up the second bag</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 28) If you want to know about palm oil, ask Lamud. | -Economics  
-Politics | -Government’s poor economic management  
-Corruption  
-Military’s abuse of power | -Preferring immediate to long run solution  
-The government reflects how people are. |
| 29) Digging: Bamboo tube | -International news  
-Politics  
-Accidents | -Corruption  
-Government’s poor management  
-Unproductive debate of no confidence | -Emotion over reason  
-Politics is drama |
| 30) Digging: Rubber (I am suffering in agony) | -Social issues and culture  
-Politics | -In violation of people’s basic rights  
-Ridiculousness of government’s campaign | -Selfishness in time of crisis  
-Should be more self-critical  
-The whole society reflects personal character of an individual in that society.  
-Law is not sacred |
| 31) Digging: Golden flower and the culture | -Social issues and culture | -Unfairness in the justice system  
-Do not accept the unpleasant truth | -No security in telecommunications |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>32) Nominee and cloning candidates</th>
<th>-Politics</th>
<th>-Prime Minister candidates are the nominees of others</th>
<th>-Preferring immediate benefits to long-run benefits</th>
<th>system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-International News</td>
<td>-Corruption</td>
<td>-Government’s poor management</td>
<td>-Vote-buying system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Unfairness in the justice system</td>
<td>-Justification of wrongdoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Violation of people’s basic rights</td>
<td>-Politicians’ hypocrisy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Inequality of resource/budget distribution</td>
<td>-Inequality of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33) Shove it up your ass with tears</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Politicians’ hypocrisy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-Shortage of good politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Social issues and culture</td>
<td>-Government’s poor performance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Entertainment</td>
<td>-Justification of wrongdoing</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Unproductive debate among competing politicians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Policy makers with repressive view</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34) Piercing an</td>
<td>-Crime</td>
<td>-Lack of concern</td>
<td>-Entrepreneurs’</td>
<td>-The role of media in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlobe (itchy)</td>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>International News</td>
<td>Towards Environmental Issue</td>
<td>Selfishness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35) Digging: voting booth. Dogs howl</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Authorities’ lack of integrity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36) Breaking up the third bag</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37) Digging: Pu’s government (Love you, Ta)</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Politicians’ hypocrisy</td>
<td>-Lack of critical thinking towards electoral propaganda</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38) Wow boss</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Military’s interference in the political system</td>
<td>-Entrepreneurs’ selfishness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39) Digging: Hitting a face with a fake pussy</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>Politicians’ lack of skills and knowledge</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Politic's lack of concern about environmental issues
- Government’s poor crisis management
- Lack of concern about environmental issues
- Malfunction of check and balance system
- Divided and conflictive society
- Election is only the restarting of political vicious circle.
- Power can bring out the worst in a good man.
- Patronage system
- Failure in educational system
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<td>40) Digging: Dog Monkey Funny game show</td>
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<td>-Unfairness in the justice system</td>
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<td>41) Piercing coconut shell of the mafia</td>
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<td>-Unfairness in the justice system -self interest over public interest -Corruption -Should be self-dependent</td>
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<td>42) Digging: itchy numbers game</td>
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<td>43) Digging: Nitirat</td>
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<td>44) Releasing stress about flooding</td>
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<td>45) Piercing a basket</td>
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<td>46) Digging: Abijood</td>
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<td>47) Digging: Komli</td>
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<td>-Suppression of people’s speech and freedom</td>
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<td>49) The end of the world/The stars/54</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
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<td>-Social issues and culture</td>
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<td>-Entertainment</td>
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<td>50) Reconciling to pay a debt</td>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Self interest over public interest</td>
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<td>-Incomprehensibility of official language</td>
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<td>-Government’s poor performance</td>
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<td>51) Fire in a hole</td>
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<tr>
<td>52) Expensive food</td>
<td>Politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Politics</td>
<td>-Crime</td>
<td>-The police’s poor performance</td>
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<tr>
<th>53) God Joke</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Social issues and culture</th>
<th>-Policy makers with problematic outdated view</th>
<th>-Self interest over public interest</th>
<th>-Politicians’ influence over government agencies’ operation</th>
<th>-Not informative and critical enough</th>
<th>-Failure in educational system</th>
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<tr>
<td>-Education</td>
<td>-Social issues and culture</td>
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5.2.1 The conclusion of the first-step analysis

According to the preliminary analysis, it can be seen that the JorKawTeun team participate in public life through the self-made videos. They mainly engage in public debates on agendas set by mass media. By manipulating the real news through various techniques and reflecting on it, their sentiments are presented as “fake news.” Among 10 categories, the topic of politics is talked about most often (found in 43 videos), while Social issues and culture is the second most often talked topic (found in 25 videos). The topic of entertainment and crime are found in 11 and 9 videos, respectively. The topic of economics, education, sport, crime, accidents, natural disasters, and international news are brought up occasionally. Considering the considerable volume of content on politics, JorKawTeun can thus be characterized as a political parody. Regarding the critiques, government/authorities are targeted most heavily: there are 132 critiques in 46 videos. People/society is the second most common target with 65 critiques in 34 videos. The number of broader critiques is 50 containing in 33 videos, while the critiques of media and news industry are minority, as there are only 14 of them found in 10 videos.

As for the critiques of the government/authorities, JorKawTeun, in the most videos, focuses on the government/authorities’ poor performance and management, corruption, violation of basic human rights, and abuses of power. Most of the critiques of people/society are about the use emotion over reason, selfishness, lack of critical thinking, lack of political concerns and assertiveness. Meanwhile, the broader critiques are centered around four points, including the patronage system, materialistic society, failure in educational system, and failure in justice system. In addition, the media and news industry are criticized for their partisanship and bias, inaccurate information, and untrustworthiness.

In terms of popularity, as presented in Table 1, the number of viewers varies between 200,000 and 400,000 per video. The top five most-watched videos are: 1) “O-Net Oh God” (+999,999); 2) “Piercing an earlobe (itchy)” (616,892); 3) “Digging: Red vs. Yellow sport game” (612,065); 4) “Whose dad is this kid?” (600,797); and 5) “The career in dream” (564,537). Interestingly, the first most-watched video, “O-Net Oh God,” has far more viewers than others, reaching over one million. None of the videos has received such a tremendous amount of viewers. Therefore, I think it is worth paying particular attention to this video here.

In the “O-Net Oh God” video mainly talks about the national university entrance examination, comprising O-Net and A-Net examinations. In this video, the host presents some examples of the real examination questions, and tries to answer them himself. He speaks out loud what he thinks and how he analyzes each of the questions one by one. At the same time, he harshly criticizes Dr.
Uthumporn Jamornmann in particular: the director of National Institute of Educational Testing Service, as well as those who design these examination questions. As for the presentational techniques in this video, the host simply delivers a monologue, and there is no use of special visual techniques except for on-screen texts and images. Then, it leads to the question of what makes this video distinctively famous. First of all, the social context of the video is needed to be examined. By the time the video was launched, this controversial issue had already been debated nationwide among students, their parents, teachers, and academics. Several students who could not accept the standard of the examination questions protested against this test in both online and offline world. When this issue was picked up by mainstream media, it even became rampant, as it caught the attention of people in general as well. Therefore, it can be said that both content and timing of a video are crucial factors in attracting the audience. In this case, there are three possible reasons for the high popularity of this videos: first, the issue affects the interest of a large number of people; second, the video’s content resonates with majority’s sentiments; and third, the power of the message is enhanced with the force of mainstream media that helps to spread the message widely and embody a collective sentiment among public.

5.3 The second-step analysis
In the previous analysis, the issue topics and critiques of all 53 videos were examined. In this second step, based on the first-step analysis, the selection of 10 videos as representative was taken for the in-depth analysis. The critical discourse analysis was re-conducted in a deeper and more thorough manner, and also incorporates visual analysis in order to effectively demonstrate the rhetorical and visual strategies used in political participation, and in the performance of identities as citizens. The concluding descriptions of the in-depth analysis of the 10 videos are provided below and the tables containing the full analysis can be found in the appendix.

1. “Don’t be serious. Love you” (Thai: อย่าเครียดรักนะ: YaKreadRakNa)

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<th>Host’s appearance:</th>
<th>John: Black T-shirt with black sunglasses</th>
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<td>Place:</td>
<td>Studio</td>
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<td>Predominant presentation method:</td>
<td>Delivering a monologue</td>
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In this video clip, the critiques of the government/authorities include the government’s poor management of crisis and corruption, while, people/society are criticized that they are selfish, use emotion over reason, are susceptible to majority influences, and lack political concern. In addition, the broader aspects are that society is materialistic, there is a loss of confidence in the government, society is dominated by patronage system, and society is pluralistic.
In the first scene (0.21-1.10), John expresses his frustration over the government’s losing control of the Red Shirt riot. He uses the word “again” repetitively in his news report in order to stress the failure of the government. As can be seen from the expression of his opinion on the government (“Shall we change the name of our TV station to ‘desperate.TV’? This is so lame!”), instead of a rational-like and official choice of words, he uses simple language with emotion embedded in order to evaluate the government’s performance. In addition, when talking about the declaration of the Severe Emergency Situation, John attempts to transpose the official language into vernacular language (“the ‘SEVERE Emergency Situation,’ which means really truly very urgent.”) to make the audience understand better and have more emotional engagement. He expresses a clear distrust in the government as he criticizes the government sarcastically (“They look so scared. I think they might pee in their pants.”).

During the time that this video was launched, while mainstream news media focused their news report on the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts, John, instead, brings up the topic of one of the parodies of political groups, the Expensive Shirts, which has no striking political significance. This group is claimed to be the well-to-do Bangkokians who are suffering from the lack of shopping places caused by the Red Shirt rally. Even though their argument sounds somewhat like a personal complaint, which is emotional than rational, and deprived of an ideal political rationale, they are exercising their basic rights of free speech and opinion based on democratic rules as well. On the one hand, John admits that he also belongs to this group, and on the other hand, he sarcastically
criticizes their standpoint (“Having no places to go shopping, it seems like their lives are over!”). He also raises his intonation while delivering the Expensive Shirts’ message, making it sound nonsensical.

Through this scene, John shows the paradox within himself; he is frustrated that the shopping centers have to be temporarily closed down; nevertheless, he is well aware that what the Red Shirt protesters call for is much more important than his own convenience. However, he still wants to express his and other Expensive Shirts’ complaints, while he does not want the public to take this complaint seriously. He does so by trivializing his own messages and depreciating himself. He makes people laugh at their own ridiculousness. Therefore, John’s contradictory expression in this scene represents the idea of tolerance of diverse opinions, which is one of the fundamental principles of the democratic model.

Moreover, the movement of John and the Expensive Shirts demonstrates that the roles as a citizen and a consumer are overlapping. One takes on the identity of a consumer and citizen simultaneously. One can assert a political standpoint that might not have a significant political value but that is the way life is: it is the voice of everyday. This is how culture citizenship is enacted; to embrace the principles of the consumer, the citizen becomes “a desirous, self-actualizing subject,” while, as a consumer that holds the ethos of citizenship, one will become “a self-limiting, self-controlling subject.” Yet, above of all, both are to be constrained under the general rules of consumership and citizenship (Miller 2006, 30).

In his critique of the conflictive online world, he suggests that someone should not simply hate others because of the mainstream of the society. He mirrors and exaggerates how some people behave against each other, and again uses the repetitiveness of word “hate” to overstress people’s outrageous emotion. In addition, this scene also indicates the pluralistic society in the online world as shown by the emergence of “(We are) confident that more than one million Thai people…” type of Facebook fan page. John responds to those online Facebook groups with a satirical mild
comment ([making a little cute voice]: “(We are) confident that more than one million Thai pandas are annoyed by people fighting”).

Moreover, in the 3.44-4.12 segment, he urges people to have more concern also for other political and Social issues (I want to remind everyone that there are a lot more important things to worry about), such as education, corruption, and the patronage system that leads to the inequality of opportunity among people. Besides personal interests, they should be interested in protecting their common interest as well. In this scene, John is warning the government that he is always keeping an eye on them and seeks its accountability and responsibility. He is also talking to people and the society, saying that he is protecting the public interest and keeping the society under surveillance. In other words, he is projecting his self-identity as a monitorial citizen to the public through this video.

2. “The career in dream” (Thai: อาชีพในฝัน: AacheepNaiFun)

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<td>Place: Studio</td>
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<td>Predominant presentation method:</td>
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In this video, the critiques of the government/authorities are dominant, comprising self-interest over public interest, the insufficiency of politicians’ skills and knowledge about their jobs, abuse of power, lack of job responsibilities, inequity of resource/budget distribution, and corruption. In addition, he offers two critiques of people/society, which are the overlooking of one’s own mistakes, and their decisions based on emotion over reason, while he gives a general critique about the patronage system.

He starts off by congratulating himself that the government’s 2012 Budget Allocation meeting is over. He conveys his hostility to the government through the funny and extremely happy gesture
that imitates the dancing of cheerleaders when their team win the game. To him, this meeting is not productive for the country as it should be (“We don’t have to watch them fighting on TV anymore”). In his criticism, John addresses his target irreverently (“the uncles and aunts\(^{51}\) (MPs) whom we deliberately elected”), bringing them down to the same level. In a sense, he temporarily demolishes the hierarchical structure of power. This makes the audience feel more equal to the MPs, perceiving them as just ordinary old men and women. This is to break the fear in order to challenge them.

Furthermore, he deliberately relates political matters to people’s private lives in an attempt to raise a common indignation among people, thus promoting enthusiasm in political engagement. He constantly reminds people that the government’s budgets are, in fact, people’s own money (“The thing is all the taxes that we’ve paid, for example, income tax, value added tax, and other fucking taxes, are to be collected together”). He tries to establish the collective sense of citizenship; that is, as the real owner of the country. He reminds that ordinary people like him, like everyone, are financially sponsoring the government. In response to the news about the purchase of 121 armed vehicles, for example, he speaks as if he and his younger audiences were making a sacrifice for the military (“For you (people who younger than him) who wants a new car, you have to wait and pay for their armed vehicles first.”). Through the satirical speech, he makes people realize that the ruling class whom they are supposed to pay respect or feel grateful to are, in fact, taking advantage of them.

To him, the budget allocation process seems to be a negotiation among vested interest groups whereby self-interest is of concern over public interest (“HOW MUCH money will go to WHO.”). He underlines this argument once again when talking about how unfairly the government allocates the budget to provincial organizations (“The thing is that, in order to get money, the provinces...”

\(^{51}\) In Thailand, people usually call the elderly aunt or uncle, but this is not an appropriate way to address someone in a higher position whom we are not intimate with.
should have the right color\textsuperscript{52}). To deliver the criticism, besides the rhetorical techniques, John also uses visual techniques to speak for him. For example, in the scene where he mentions the name of the provinces which are receiving a small budget, the screen’s color tone changes to red temporarily while John is speaking, which implies that the government is pro-Yellow Shirt. Moreover, he highlights the fact that MPs are elected by him and the audience. He reinforces the power of people in choosing their representatives and, at the same time, asks for people’s responsibility in choosing the bad ones. In a sense, he tries to stimulate self-criticism. In doing so, he even ironizes himself sometimes (“The ones who elected them must be either insane or an idiot. Oh! It is me, isn’t it?”).

In the second segment of the video (1.02-1.40), he parodies politicians’ behavior when running for the election. He makes fun of them through exaggeration, and also imitates the manner of a dog pleasing his owner. In saying that “Besides, having a good rhetorical skill, if your kid also has good looks, it is like winning the lottery!,” he implies that besides the talent to get a vote, some politicians do not really have sufficient knowledge or skill to administrate the country and, on the other hand, he denounces people that give their votes just because of the good look (“In this country, good looking people are never wrong. There is no career on earth better than a Thai politician!”).

As for the news about the MPs’ self-pay raise, which is criticized by other news media as somewhat unethical, he in turn compares it to the act of people that always buy off the traffic police (On screen text: “Just like when we hide one-hundred banknote under our car license\textsuperscript{53}”).

\textsuperscript{52} Thailand at the moment is largely divided into two groups; the Red Shirts who are claimed to be PheuThai Party supporter (the opposition party at that time), and the Yellow Shirts, who are claimed to be Democrat party supporters (the government party).

\textsuperscript{53} In Thailand, when drivers who did against the traffic law are asked by a policeman for their car license, they usually hand the police the license with ‘tea money’ underneath. Then, the policeman will take money, give back their license, and let them go without any legal charge.
He demonstrates the similarity between our everyday unethical practices and those of politicians. People usually think that their wrongdoing is minor and acceptable; thus so do the politicians. From the cultural citizenship perspective, politics is seen as an outcome of everyday communication (Coleman 2007, 51, cited in Wu 2011, 26). In this video, John draws together people’s everyday life and politics, and encourages them to reflect upon their own behavior in making sense of politics. In this sense, he shows that the world of politics is, in fact, lies about the world of everyday life.

John does not say that he is a good and responsible man, yet he believes that politicians are not any better than him either (“Besides, giving a raise to yourselves, you also have the same habit as me. Always skipping the job!”). He gives a backhanded compliment to MPs instead of direct harsh criticism (“But the ‘nine to five’ people (referring to civil servants) are not able to give a raise to themselves. But you can do it. You are awesome!”). He also asks a rhetorical question to argue against the new parliament building project (“Sometimes, I don’t understand that since you (MP and senators) rarely go to the office, why do you want a new office building?”). Moreover, John asserts that the patronage system in Thailand is one of the factors holding back Thailand (“Next year might be their year. There is always an opportunity in the future as long as “the big brother system54” still exists in our ‘Sarakan country55’. There are only a few big brothers in this country, though.”).

3. “The river overflows its banks” (Thai: น้ำนองเต็มตลิ่ง: JorNamTemTaling)

| Hosts’ appearance: John: Black t-shirt with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses |
| Place: studio |
| Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man |

This video was launched during the beginning period of the flooding in 2011. Most of the critiques target people/society, which are composed of a lack of sympathy, selfishness, and lack of political concern. Two of the critiques of the government/authorities are the unfairness in the justice system, and corruption; meanwhile, the general others are the divided society and the inequality in society.

54 The big brother system refers to the patronage system

55 “Sarakan country” is usually referred to Thailand. It is often used when someone wants to negatively criticize Thailand but do not want to directly address the real name of the country.
He begins with the news report about the flooding in the provincial areas, and then displays his sympathy towards them, as well as persuading others to contribute to the flood relief. However, he then quickly switches his persuasive message to an offensive one, twisting from a sympathetic to satiric tone (“Because Thailand is our neighbor country. We should show our generosity...Hm? What? Are we the same country?”). By intentionally making a mistake in calling Bangkok a country separately from Thailand’s other parts, he stresses the exclusiveness of Bangkok so as to bring to the forefront Bangkok people’s selfishness and how ignorant they are of the problems encountered by people in the provincial areas. In addition, he makes a remark about the tendency of how people today engage in public affairs; they tend to utilize the new social media to mobilize movements, and individually organize collective activities (“So we have to help them, donating some money and stuff, and sharing the charity ideas via Facebook, Twitter, BB (BlackBerry).”).

John also provokes people’s skepticism of the transparency of the management of the flood relief funds. One of his strategies is self-deprecation (“Not only do we not contribute to any donations, but JorKawTeun also loves to raise stupid questions like how can we check the transparency of the management of the funds for Emergency Situations, as well as the management of the donation funds?”). He also attacks those that distort Buddhism’s principle in order to serve their convenience and interests (“But then we got the answer that we should not think too much when
making merit; otherwise we will not get any merits\textsuperscript{56}. [laughing]”). Combing the visual effect of a shining light above his head, and peaceful background music, he employs the cinematic technique often used in scenes involving god or angels to deliver his ironical commentary on people’s misleading attitudes regarding Buddhism’s teaching (“Other people’s disaster is a great opportunity for us to do merit for our prosperous life in the next life.”).

Moreover, drawing upon how people reacted to the crisis, his speech implies the broader concern of Social issues; namely the divided society and the inequality of the society (“…We will be born to be a good-looking and rich Bangkokian in the following next life. Amen”\textsuperscript{57}). He uses strong words to exaggeratedly portray the insulting behavior of some urban people, and reinforces the ideological conflict between the rich and the poor, the urban and rural (“Being a Bangkokian is excellent as we have a privileged right to choose and change\textsuperscript{58} the government as we wish. We can also look down on people in the rural areas who are brainless and greedy. They always chose a disgusting leader.”).

Regarding the critiques of the government/authorities, he satirizes the politicians’ abuse of power humorously by addressing them as if they are fictional superhuman characters (“It is the story about the magically expanded land...It can be done only by men with extraordinary powers. [laughing]”). He thus identifies politician figures with the help of popular culture. In addition, he comments that, in order to charge the unlawful practice of politicians, the law is unevenly implemented because only the opposition politicians have been arrested so far. He gives a backhanded compliment to the independent organization that is in charge of the case investigation (“These days, PACC works incredibly effectively.”). And he suggests that the PACC also investigate the case involving the ruling party’s politicians ([Imitating a girl’s voice] “But, there is a bit more to do. Only a little bit. It would be nice, if you (PACC) will do it more evenly.”). As can be seen, John is scanning the environment: he selectively collects certain information which he regards as having an important impact on his or the public interest, and responds to it when he thinks it is necessary. He does not physically engage politics, yet he does monitor it. This can be called the practice of monitorial citizenship, as Schudson (1999) suggests.

In the last scene, John reports the news about the 14\textsuperscript{th} International Anti-corruption Conference

\textsuperscript{56} This is based on Buddhism’s belief that if someone makes merit and hesitate at the same time, the merit they made will not yield a benefit in the future.

\textsuperscript{57} Buddhists believe that they will be reincarnated, and if they do good deeds in this life, they will be rewarded from them in the future or in the next life.

\textsuperscript{58} This refers to the Yellow Shirt protest against Thaksin Shinawatra’s government (who is popular among the poor).
2010 in Thailand. He trivializes the event by laughing while reading the news. Treating this conference as a comedy show, this implies that he is quite despaired of Thai politics ("... the Anti-corruption exposition which is the funniest event ever. Indeed, the organizer holds the event in the danger zone. [laughing]").

4. “JorKawTeun in the year of the rabbit” (Thai: เจาะเข้าตี๋น: TorKawTuen)

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John has offered two critiques of people/society, which are the susceptibility to trend-chasing, and the use of emotion over reason, and two critiques also for the government/authorities, which are their poor performance in foreign affairs, and ineffective policies and campaigns. In addition, he also makes a general critique about the distrust in the justice system.

To begin with, after reporting the rapidly-increased sale of rabbits in JJ market at the beginning of the year of the rabbit, according to the Chinese zodiac, John quickly points out one of the unpleasant typical characters of Thai people, which is susceptibility. He criticizes that people are usually susceptible to temporary trends and get bored easily. Moreover, they are not responsible for the consequences that might happen when they give up. John gives a satirical suggestion which, somehow, sounds possibly true, even though quite exaggerated ("(Rabbits) will bring good luck to you, but I am not sure if it is also good for the rabbits. Temples\textsuperscript{59} and suburban areas should be made ready (to accommodate the unwanted rabbits)").

\textsuperscript{59} Temples are perceived as the place to adopt pets or animals without an owner.
In the second scene (2.11-4.03), John expresses his dissatisfaction towards the government’s performance in dealing with the Thai-Cambodian conflict. The video also uses composite pictures (Hun Sen with muscular body and Abhisit with a skinny body) as a visual technique to humorously describe Thailand’s disadvantageous situation. Besides the Prime Minister, he also particularly attacks the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is directly in charge of the matter. He uses an opposite word to create his satirical criticism (“This person, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is also very likeable among foreign countries, especially Cambodia.”). However, even though he criticizes Thai Prime Minister for his weak ability, he portrays Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen as a villain (He (Hun Sen) is like a big bad country bully. Compared with Hun Sen, our oxford-graduated Prime Minister is a bit disadvantageous.”). His response to the border conflict reflects the nationalist-oriented attitude. In spite of the fact that he has always been scolding Thai government and society, John takes side of his own country explicitly when there is the international conflict. Through his video, John constructs and reinforces self-identity relative to others in the society.

Furthermore, regarding the news about the car crash in which a girl from a rich family was involved, John’s argument resonates with the majority’s voice; that is, doubt in the transparency of the authorities’ investigation process. In response to the Prime Minister’s words of assurance that no one is above the law, he raises rhetorical questions to the public, encouraging them to consider the broader aspect regarding this accident (“Why does the oxford-graduated Prime minister have the need to ensure people about a car accident by himself ...You have to think by yourself if this is a matter of a high-class girl or a great loss of trust in Thai justice system. They (police and prosecuting authorities) are not given any social trust, are they?”). Moreover, he asks for justice not only from the authorities but also for people in general. He educates people with strong words not to use emotion over reason in judging the suspected (“(You) should THINK more carefully. Your brain is not just used for separating your ears.”).

At the end, regarding the news about students’ use of plastic bags instead of condoms, he makes a
jokey comment on the failure of the safe sex campaign by pretending to express admiration for its half success ("I must say that the campaign in promoting the use of condoms is 50% successful."). To him, the promotion of condom use was done in the wrong way.

5. “If you want to know about palm oil, ask Lamud” (Thai:อยากรู้เรื่องน้ำมันปาล์มถามผมนะคุณ: YakRooRuengNammanPalmTamLamud)

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John makes three main commentaries on the government/authorities, which are the military’s abuse of power, the government’s poor economic management leading to the shortage of palm oil, and corruption. In addition, he offers one critique of people/society, which is their tendency to rely on an immediate solution rather than a long-term one.

Following his report about the Thai-Cambodian border clash, John turns to offering the short satiric criticism against the prominent role of the military in Thai politics ("This can be a good opportunity for the Thai military to demonstrate their power in a real war with someone that doesn’t belong to his own country").

In the second segment (2.07-5.20), he criticizes the government for the rising price of certain food products, and the scarcity of palm oil. He claims that this situation is a simulation of the state of war. John, voodoo man, and other extra cast members, then perform a sketch to portray the transaction of palm oil on the black market during War. This can be said to be an exaggeration of the current economic situation; yet it is based on some facts, coupled with his interpretation of news and the sense making of his experience. This theatrical technique helps to create the
connection between his world and the public world, as it completes the imagination of the audience. He effectively explains economic news to average people and simultaneously entertains them. Moreover, he suspects that the shortage of palm oil has something to do with the corruption and blames Deputy Minister Suthep for economic maneuvering that led to the shortage of palm oil. He raises a series of questions, pointing out the unaccountability of the government (Why do we suddenly have palm oil right after the government has set an import quota and subsidies? Why does it (palm oil) immediately show up? It is like magic. Has this situation been set up?").

In addition, he expresses his disagreement with the subsidy policy by giving a direct commentary (“So, in order to help the agricultural industries not to improve, and not to develop their capacity to be competitive on the world market..."). In an attempt to gain support from his audience, he arouses public indignation, urging people to be more enthusiastic in protecting their interest (“Everyone, you think the government’s nine-baht per kilo subsidy comes from where? Do you think the government has retrieved it (subsidized money) from a sea somewhere? It is from our taxes!”). This can be deemed as a way to identify his identity with others in the society in the sense that he tries to culturally create a bond between him and the public through politics.

Drawing upon the palm oil shortage incident, he blames Thai people, who are fond of immediate short-term solutions and ignore the possible negative consequences in the long run (“We are all Thai. We are easy. We are fine for anything. Just getting an impression that we can buy cheap stuff makes us grateful without thinking of the consequences.”). Besides, he urges people to first embrace their flaws in order to remediate themselves and the society as a whole (“It is said that palm oil, oops! The government reflects how people are.”).

Moreover, John also provides knowledge about import quotas and price control policy. In his illumination of the intricacy of economic policies, he links expert discourse with vernacular discourse, as his speech contains economic knowledge which is in form of vernacular language. Not only enacting citizenship himself, John also contributes to the improvement of the public sphere, and promotes public deliberation. He equips his audience with the basic knowledge that
will allow them to evaluate such a circumstance and make decisions more efficiently. This can be a way to enhance others’ ability to perform monitorial citizenship.

6. “Digging: Golden flower and the blackout (don’t play around with words)” (Thai: เจาะดอยโพธิ์จอมจัตุบ (หัวพบ): JorDokTongJorDub (HamPuan))

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In this video, regarding the critiques of people/society, John indicates the fact that some people do not like to accept the unpleasant truth, and that they are not sufficiently protective of their own rights. In addition, he also points out the unfairness in the justice system caused by the wrongdoing of the government/authorities. As for general critiques, he suggests that there is a lack of security in the telecommunications system and problematic legislations that grant great power to authority.

In the beginning of the first segment (0.30-2.00), John reports the news about the television blackout caused by Thaicom 5 satellite losing its orbit, which sparked a coup d’état rumor all over the country. Besides the lack of security in the telecommunications system, he also makes a remark that Thai people are sensitive to the rumor about the coup d’état. He exaggerates how people have reacted to this incident ([shouting] “Accc Blackout!. It is a coup d’état for sure. Accc Tank! Tanks will come definitely.”).
Next, following the news about the arrest of three girls on the charge of indecent exposure during the Songkran festival, he particularly rebukes the conservative public figures and critics that publicly condemned these girls in the media for damaging Thailand’s good image and reputation. John, however, thinks that those critics’ attitudes are problematic and based on the obsolete idealistic images of the country and Thai ladies. He conveys his critique by parodying them yet altering his speech, making it more extreme (imitating a woman’s voice and gesture): “Why do girls nowadays have no shame at all? Our country has a well-refined, and pristine culture just like a virgin girl, just like me.” The sentiment he exhibits in this segment implies a conflict between liberal and conservative forces. The video shows that John is forced against the conservative discourses, which are dominated by the idea that the country is culturally civilized. This indicates that the collective identity among groups of individuals in the society can be conflictive as identities are sensitive to contingencies and shaped by social, cultural, and historical contexts which differ among individuals (Dahlgren 2000, cited in Jones 2010).

In his opinion, John does not believe that the country has such a good image in the eye of foreign tourists, as the conservative critics have claimed. By contrasting pictures with his voice, he is able to create powerful rhetoric in convincing people to agree with his argument (imitating a woman’s voice and gesture) “The tourists come to (Thailand) just to ride an elephant, eat Kantok, and learn the beautiful Thai beautiful culture. They don’t come here to have a sex tour!” Picture: a picture of two foreign men talking to two girls in racy underwear). Moreover, through his parody created by exaggerating and altering the rightist critics’ discourse, he implicitly points out that ordinary girls are heavily blamed for the notorious reputation about the sex industry, while the relevant authorities are not held responsible by those critics at all. His words, to a certain extent, reveal the hierarchical power relations in the society.

Songkran festival is the celebration of Thai traditional New Year which is between 12th-15th of May. In this festival, people traditionally throw water to each other.

Kantok is the traditional cuisine of northern Thailand.
In the third segment (3.46-4.45), John solely lambasts Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. To spice up his critique, he refers to a Thai popular media text, which is a famous Thai TV drama, “DokSomSeeTong.” He compares Hun Sen with the leading female character, Fah, who is insincere, self-indulgent, and cunning (“I am sure that Hun Sen must have watched “DokSomSeeTong” so much until he has gone mad.”). In addition, he simplifies the border clash story and puts it in the dialogue adapted from the TV drama script, whereby Hun Sen or Cambodia is portrayed as an evil hypocritical character (“Hun Sen fires the gun Toom! then he screams...[imitating a girl’s voice] Accc...daddy, look! They are bullying me!”) Furthermore, he shows a short segment of a video clip of Hun Sen crying at a press conference but with the voiceover of the leading girl from the DokSomSeeTong series. The voiceover is a dialogue about a girl blaming her mom for humiliating her, as her mom works as a house servant. This is not relevant to his critique of Hun Sen earlier. Somehow, because of the irrelevant and incoherent voiceover, the video clip does its job well at ridiculing Hun Sen, as well as creating humor.

After that, John expresses his concern for the security of people living in the conflict area, and the soldiers that serve the army. Despite the ironic commentary on the military at the beginning, he now turns to offering his support for them (“JorKawTeun wants to send his regards to every soldier. May God bless you with protection. I hope you are safe. And also, for the people living along the border area, who have to escape the bombs which are sometimes fake, sometimes real, [sigh] do not give up yet.”).

Regarding the Prime Minister’s decision to delay the proposal for the amendment of the Computer Crime Act 2007, he gives quite a sincere compliment to the government, which is quite rare (“This is fabulous!”). However, he warns people to keep watching this legal proposal closely. He uses exaggerated words to highlight the danger and the threat of this Computer Crime Act to people’s freedom of speech and expression (If this proposed revision of the Computer Crime Act...becomes a

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62DokSomSeeTong was a famous Thai TV drama during March and April of 2010. It is a story about a dishonest and sinful girl who is willing to do anything to get what she wants and to have a better life.
law, you should strictly tell your kids, if you have one, not to go within 100 meters of a computer.”)

Once again, he enacts the monitorial citizenship, as well as promotes it among the audience.

In addition, he not only arouses the audience’s emotion by using exaggerated words; he also adds a rational dimension to his argumentative speech. He provides the necessary information, the essential problematic issues that are controversial, to allow the audience to evaluate this law proposal on their own. He simplifies the account of the drawback of this proposed law for average citizens to understand the issues better. Moreover, he compares actions that are restricted in the new proposed law with “taking a shit.” As a result, he strikingly sends the complicated issues to the audience, and creates laughter simultaneously (“To put it simply, it is like the state wants to enforce the law prohibiting you not to “take a shit.” It is neither something like “Not taking a shit in a public place” nor “Not taking a shit on others’ heads.” But just “NOT TAKING A SHIT!”).

He suggests the danger, as well as the ridiculousness of this law by pretending to speak for the authorities that are bestowed with the discretion to determine whether certain actions are good or wrong (“I make this law just to punish the ones whose shit I don’t like. Because I already said, “Not taking a shit!””). Compared with “shit,” not only makes the issue comprehensible, and entertaining, but also demolishes the sacredness of the legal institutions and official language. This results in the enhancement of people’s critical awareness of institutionalized discourse.

7. “Digging: Pu’s government (Love you, Ta)” (Thai: เจาะรัฐบาลพู (รักน้องต้า...นะ!: JorRattabanPu (RakNongTa…Na!))

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In this video, John makes four commentaries on the government/authorities concerning: the politicians’ hypocrisy, the Prime Minister’s lack of real power, and the military’s inference in the political system, and the problematic populist policy. Additionally, the critique of people/society concerns the lack of critical thinking towards electoral propaganda, while the general critiques suggest that power can bring out the worst in a good man, and there is a patronage system in society.

From the time of this video on, Thailand had a new government led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinnawatra, who was supported by the red-shirt mass protesters. After reporting about the newly-elected government, he congratulates himself as he will have new more targets to satirize. As witnessed in the video, John sees politics as entertainment. He does not seem to feel that it is a serious issue and totally separates it from his daily life. He makes aesthetic sense of the political experiences. According to the cultural perspective of citizenship theory, John is demonstrating the affective aspect of citizenship.

In the first segment (1.06-2.20), he particularly criticizes ex-Prime Minister Abhisit, who deserves to be the opposition rather than the government. To level the hierarchy, he addresses Abhisit too intimately as “bro Mark.” In making a playful commentary on Abhisit, John refers to the Lord of the Rings trilogy. He compares Abhisit today with Frodo, who is, in his normal nature, a good person but malevolently changes his behavior when possessing the ring (“You are back to the same person, bro Mark. I can see Frodo! The Frodo is back!”). Additionally, he compares Abhisit as the Prime Minister with Gollum, another fictional character from the same movie, who has changed into a monstrous creature as he is ruled by the spell of the ring. Employing a cinematic technique, John parodies the Gollum’s famous scene and its line from the movie. The video shows that John speaks the Gollum’s line ([creepy hoarse voice] “My precious...”), and puts the ring onto his

63 The nickname of Former Prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democrat Party (DP)
finger, then suddenly disappears. In this scene, he lets the intertextual mechanism fulfill his absent words, and relies on the audience’s common aesthetic experience to interpret and understand his message. His parody “refunctions” (Rose 1993) the original text (the movie) to serve his personal end in evaluating politics.

Next, he reports that the Chart Thai Pattana chief adviser Banharn Silapa-archa, who has flown to meet the ousted Prime Minister Thasin Shinawatra, the brother of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, in Dubai, said that the meeting was just personal and had nothing to do negotiation of the cabinet seats. In response to this outright lie, he vents his frustration by using simple and honest words full of emotion (“How boring! Why don’t they all disappear? Just DISAPPEAR please.”). He goes on to satirize Banharn for his obvious duplicity by telling that he and other people are pretending to be stupid instead (“Bro Banharn, next time, you don’t need to speak, ok? We, people, will pretend to be blind.”).

Moreover, he raises a simple question whose answer is against universal understanding, values, and norms. Imitating a foreigner’s Thai accent, he playfully notes that the head of this government does not have real power and autonomy in administrating the country (“[making a foreigner’s Thai accent] So who is the head of the government of Thailand? The Prime Minister? The brother of the Prime Minister?”). He asks for accountability and responsibility from ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. To visually support his argument, while speaking, he shows a lot of pictures that involved corruption and violence under his government, which still have not been solved (“How about your own messiness? Have you ever taken any responsibilities?”).
The next point he advances is the so-called “reconciliation.” As Thai politics is in deep conflict, the “reconciliation” is the most popular word that every key politician uses in his or her speech to build legitimacy. However, John is questioning whether “reconciliation” means reconciliation for the good of the country or for the mutual benefit of vested interest groups. To illustrate this point, John and voodoo man ironically portray the intimate relationship between the government and military in a romantic way by performing a sketch. This shows their irreverence towards these official institutions. Sometimes, when politicians reach an agreement, it means that the benefits are distributed among them satisfactorily. Reconciliation is just for their own benefits, not the good of the country. Thus, he brings to light the awful side of the meaning of this most-invoked term. His play role significantly indicates the dominant role of the military in Thai politics: Thai democracy is sustained on the balance of power and interest between the military and government (“If you want something, just let me know...Just please don’t take tanks around the city. And, I also want my ‘amnesty’...So everyone is satisfied, right? [clapping]. Love you Mwah Mwah [hugging].”). This scene might be interpreted as John not feeling comfortable in such a repressive society anymore. The paternalism that has long been cultivated reveals its crack.

Next, John reports that a lot of people got angry when Prime Minister Yingluck said that some surreal populist policies that she had promised people during the election season would not be implemented. To convey the messages from the enraged people, he pretends to shout angrily, decrying the government as a liar (“[shouting] What? You said like this? You are such a LIAR! You are better at talking than doing.”). Following the voice of the people, he then acts as if he represents the voice of the Prime Minister. However, these are statements that he makes up as part of the ironic critique of the prime minister about her hypocrisy ([speaking for PM] “Are you serious? You really took the election seriously? I thought that it was symbolic.”).

64 Currently, the ex Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra is in exile. Thus, for him to enter to Thailand without any punishment, he needs King’s amnesty under the approval of the Thai government.
He condemns their electoral propagandas and duplicity by asking questions like, ‘‘Excuse me? Did you just knock your head on the floor? Some people chose you because they believed that you could...’’. However, in addition to the government, he also rebukes the people that really believe in the unlikely-to-be-true populist policies. He criticizes people for a lack of critical thinking toward politicians’ statements (“Anyway, I can’t believe that there are people who believe her for real. They have such positive thinking.”).

8. “Digging: itchy numbers game” (Thai: เจาะคด้วยลาย: JorKanHuay)

| Hosts’ appearance: | John: Black suit, red-white shirt, and brown-white ribbon neck tie with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses |
| Predominant presentation methods: | Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man |

In this video, John critiques people/society—that they are prone to chance-taking while he criticizes the government/authorities for the military’s interference in the political system, problematic populist policies, and poor security measures in Bangkok.

In the second segment (0.35-1.10), John expresses his doubts about the suggestion of Tul Sitthisomwong, the coordinator of the Network of Citizen Volunteers to Protect the Land, who has suggested that government not interfere with the Ministry of Defense, and other military assignments in order to prevent a coup d’état. John questions the exceptional grant for the Ministry of Defense. In order to expose the absurdity of politics, and how some elites perceive politics, he asks questions that contradict the reality (Is this ministry outside the system? It is an independent state or something? Or doesn’t it receive financial support just like other ministries?’’). The ridiculousness of the discourse which comes in the form of official and complicated language
cannot be obviously seen, and it often seems more difficult to argue when spoken by the authorities. John examines it critically and argues against them with the language of the ordinary.

In addition, John advances his points against the “first car, first house” policy, saying that it boosts materialism, increases the traffic problem, and prevents sustainable development. Furthermore, he consistently reiterates that the budget to be spent on those populist policies is from the people’s taxes (“They will waste a lot of taxes that we have paid just to have more cars on the street, making it even more congested! Why don’t they spend that money on the development of a transportation system or something else? They always like to do something weird!”). He tries to encourage political assertiveness by reminding the audience that this is not only the government’s issue but also the issue of the people in the entire country, as everything will affect their lives directly and indirectly.

In the last segment (9.47-10.38), in response to the Bangkok governor’s explanation that some fake CCTV cameras have been installed for the purpose of scaring off criminals, John playfully teases him by pretending to believe his claim ([Whisper] “Why did you admit that they (CCTV cameras) are dummies? I am afraid that criminals will hear it and your plan will not work anymore.”)

9. “Digging: Abijood” (Thai: เจออาบิจู้ด: JorAbijood)

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John criticizes the government/authorities regarding two points: unaccountability and corruption. Additionally, there are four critiques of people/society: he implies that people pay too much critical attention to non-essential things, thus leading to unproductive criticism, and they never learn their
lesson from the history. Moreover, they are not interested in serious and important issues, and use emotion over reason. In addition, he critiques the news and media industry for providing untrustworthy news and information.

In the 0.30-1.19 scene, as for his opinion of the news about the Transport Permanent Secretary with his 200 million cash in his closet, John implies that this might involve corruption; however, he does not say it explicitly. He in turn offers satirical criticism by pretending to look down on himself and blame his parents for failing to guide him in the right way to be rich ("If I knew that a government official can earn this much money, I would not be hosting a crappy program like I do now. Why did my parents never tell me?").

In the second segment (1.52-3.00), John rolls the clip of Deputy Ministry Chalerm speaking a Latin proverb with a terrible accent during the parliamentary assembly. After making fun of Chalerm’s accent, John turns to attack those that like to criticize Prime Minister Yingluck’s English accent instead. He parodies how people talk about the Prime Minister’s English accent without essential alteration in the conversation. However, when he imitates a girl’s voice and gesture while speaking, his parody becomes a biting and humorous commentary. It has the quality of self-reflexiveness, which makes people come to realize their own ridiculousness ("[imitating a girl’s voice] What? What did you say? It is so embarrassing. Such a terrible accent! Where did u graduate from? This is what they call ‘inaudible,’ ok? Your pronunciation is humiliating the country"). He speaks the opposite of what he intends to mean in order to urge people to be critical in a more productive way ("Of course! Well, I don’t care about the government’s budget or something like that anymore. It is time to attack their accent.").
In the next segment (4.16-4.58), he reports that Army spokesman Col. Sansern Kaewkumnerd skirted around responsibility for the death of the Red Shirt protesters, and blamed ex-Prime Minister Abhisit and ex-Deputy Prime Minister Suthep for public responsibility instead. John, however, predicts that the protesters would die in vain, and that the authorities that are in charge will find a legal way to escape punishment (“I guess that everyone will be proved guilty, and then, they will clean themselves off with the amnesty”). He calls for justice for the dead and goes on to point out that Thai people seem not to have learned their lesson from history and are not assertive enough in putting pressure on the government despite the fact that bloody massacres have reoccurred over time and that none of the key authorities involved in the incidents was punished (“Whatever we did, we forget about them, ok? No one is wrong. You are not wrong. I am not wrong. Even though some people have died, that is still fine. We can pretend that it didn’t happen. Forget about it and start over again.”).

In addition, when voodoo man suddenly asks John about Nitirat, which is a group of law lecturers and other academics that have proposed the amendment of the lèse majesté law, John complains that it is too complicated, and he has already forgotten about it. In his satirical dialogue, he blames some people that do not even open their mind to try to understand it (“It (Nitirat’s proposal) is too difficult. It is really complicated and made me get a headache... So I didn’t want to put in any effort (to understand it) from the beginning.”).
Moreover, through voodoo man’s dialogue, the video also suggests the negative impacts of the overuse of the new social media. Voodoo man criticizes the news media that sometimes simply pick up the news from the social networking sites, which are not reliable or accurate (Voodoo man: “I am following the Twitter. You know, only if we have the Twitter and Facebook, we can write news”). Further, he also makes a sarcastic remark that people nowadays use too much emotion, and overlook the facts and evidence (“Nowadays, Emotion is trendy! Facts and evidence are not necessary anymore [laughing]”).

10. “The end of the world/The stars/54” (Thai: สิ้นโลก/ดารา/54: SinLok/Dara /54)

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In this video, John gives two critiques of the government/authorities: the Prime minister’s lack of real power, and the unfairness in justice system. Meanwhile, he urges people to be self-examining for the improvement of their lives.

This video was launched by the end of the year 2011. Traditionally, the news media will recap all of the important issues over the past year, as well as give funny and critical comments on key public figures and celebrities. John chose certain nicknames of politicians and political institutions given by Government House reporters and the Political Science Association of Kasetsart University to be presented to the audience and, as usual, to add a greater degree of the satiric impulse.

Regarding the nickname of Prime Minister Yingluck, “clay-pot glass-noodle crab,” he thinks that the Prime Minister deserves a more negatively-dubbed name which he offers as “clay-pot glass-
noodle crab’s soul.” Thus, John agrees with others, that the Prime minister’s created image is decent; however, she downplays herself and lets her circle come to the forefront to tackle all controversies for her (”She suits the nickname better “because I cannot really find a real crab in this dish. It is cheating consumers.”).

Apart from that, John expresses his satisfaction towards the nickname of independent organizations, “Ghostbusters.” He repeats the results of the judgment of a couple of cases in the past, which show that only dead people were found guilty, and, in the end, he adds the ironical concluding remark: “So if you don’t want to be guilty, Don’t DIE!”. This is funny because it sounds like a joke but, in fact, it is awfully true for the justice system in Thailand.

Next, he goes on to satirize Abhisit’s former personal spokesman, Thepthai Senpong regarding his response to Abhisit’s given nicknames. He teasingly calls Thepthai a “hero’s assistant,” for he was overly protective of Abhisit and usually used words which sounded like a TV drama script. John relays Thepthai’s twitter post: “Either “Delayed handsome,” or “Always-ready handsome, he is definitely handsome, right?.” and then joins Thepthai in making a compliment about Abhisit’s handsomeness. However, he uses the word “handsome” over and over again until it sounds ironical rather than a sincere compliment (“Their selling point is so strong, which is HANDSOME!”). This alludes to the inefficiency of the management of Abhisit’s government.

In the fourth segment (5.00-6.00), he attempts to educate people so that they learn their lessons over the past year in order to improve themselves in the future. He begins his speech by addressing the audience with respectful words; however, his expression of respect is exaggerated (“Dear respected audience of JawKawTuen. With all due respect, I would always be respectful towards you.”). He, in fact, parodies the way politicians address each other in the House debate (“Have you noticed that in this country when honorable men are about to fight, they always pay respect to each other way too often?”). Yet, he still tries to set up a rather serious feeling with his sober intonation. In the beginning of his teaching, he attributes his speech to “philosophers” in general, instead of simply speaking on behalf of himself (“It is now almost the end of the year. Philosophers usually preach
that as a human being, one should look back into the past to examine what we have done..."). Nevertheless, he cannot keep the somewhat serious tone towards the end as he slips into curse words from time to time (“I fucking respect ya'all!” or “If nothing will be any better, at least your lives shouldn't be fucked up more than it is!”). The curse words, which are incongruous in the context, somehow, effectively arouse emotion, as well as trigger laughter.

5.4 The concluding analysis

5.4.1 The presentation of JorKawTeun

JorKawTeun is a parody of news-talking TV program. There is one main host, John Winyu, and one co-host, a voodoo man. The program does not gather news or information anew, but usually takes materials from other real news media to satirize, such as newspapers, online newspapers, television, as well as debating issues discussed on online platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, Pantip and so on. Besides news content, the videos contain a lot of comedic asides to take the audience away from a serious atmosphere. One of JorKawTeun’s distinctive features is the video titles. Even though, in general, the titles are created based on the main theme of the video, the current trend of society (even if it is not relevant to the video content), and important festivals, they significantly challenge the journalistic norm of news’ headline writing. Unlike typical news titles, several JorKawTeun’s titles of video do not make any sense, raising the audience’s curiosity rather than offering clarity. The words are oddly formed, break grammar rules, and are not linguistically logical.

Moreover, the program’s narrative and presentational styles are distinctive and different from one another without an exact pattern. This makes the presentation stylistic in that it is unpredictable, incoherent, and always amusing. JorKawTeun’s narratives are at once humorous, critical, and conflictual, with their humoristic and satiric features. With an unpredictable script, it is normal to see that the hosts jump across issues arbitrarily without a clear logical link. Moreover, sometimes it is difficult to tell whether the hosts are joking, lying, or telling the truth. The presentation of
JorKawTeun overall is a combination of several techniques. The primary techniques in delivering the messages are: monologue performed by the main host; and a dialogue between the host and co-host, while other techniques that can also be seen are the sketches, fake interviews, real interviews, and animation. In addition, the videos are mostly made in the studio; however, some are shot on spot.

5.4.2 The main host: John Winyu

The main host of JorKaeTuen is known as John Winyu, a good-looking and half western, half Thai young man. His full name is Winyu Wongsurawat and his nickname is John. John, appears in a casual T-shirt with his black sunglasses until the 25th episode, “Kicking a pig into a dog’s mouth” (Thai: เตะหมูเข้าปากหมา: TaeMooKawPakMaa), when he wears a suit, shirt, and ribbon neck tie, yet still wears black sunglasses as one of his trademarks. In addition, the signature word is “Nahafff,” which is vocally altered from the formal word “Nakrab." Moreover, he usually introduces a newly-created word designed for the particular parody to create a comedic effect.

In the videos, generally, John is captured seated behind a desk in a shot that often shifts between a medium to medium close up. Since his eye and facial expressions are not obviously seen, his body language and intonation are important for the comedic effect and accomplishment of the communication. He usually uses several tones of voice in distinguishing serious and comedy issues. In addition, he sometimes employs over-the-top expressions and interactions with other actors.

John’s persona is relatively contradictory, even though at first glance, he looks playful, lively, and funny. Yet, after watching the videos, one will find that he is a cynic. On the one hand, he acts silly, emotional, and childish, and on the other hand, he presents himself as sophisticated, rational, and mature. In addition, his presentational style changes over time. Initially, he did not overact but in contrast expressed himself quite sincerely. He used to present himself as a normal adult teenager.

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65 It is common for Thai people to be given a nickname by their parents when they were born.

66 When informing someone, “Nakrab” is to be spoken at the end of the speech in order to be polite.
who was eager to share with the public his cynical ideas towards the society and politics. His comedic character and exaggerated expressions, however, developed gradually until they became a unique aspect of the program.

5.4.3 The co-host: voodoo man

The man in a white voodoo-like dress with big funny toy sunglasses is the supporting host whom John always calls “the voodoo man.” In the program, he does not have a name; however, his name, in the real life, is Nattapong Teandi or Am. He first appears in the 5th episode of the videos, “Digging: Red vs. Yellow sport game” (Thai: เจาะก็ฬาสิงห์แดง: JorKilasiLuengDang). Due to the big black toy sunglasses, viewers can see only half of his face so, in addition to verbal language, body expression and intonation are important for communication. He always distorts his voice when speaking, and does not have a long or coherent conversation with John.

At the beginning, he had a very marginal role in the program. It looked as if he were a background prop rather a supporting host, as he rarely spoke or showed up only briefly. His role as a voodoo man initially functioned as a comedic intervention. However, later on, voodoo man began to play a more and more important role. He not only showed up in the background and made some fun as before, but was also seated next to John, taking part in the narrated story. He is consistently presented as a quite ludicrous person through his dress and dialogue. In a recent couple of episodes, voodoo man appears to be more logical. He interacts with John more frequently and has become significant in the narration of the videos. His strange persona is recognizable, thus becoming another trademark of JorKawTeun. He is undeniably an unpredictable character, who excellently fulfills this political comedy even though his image is nothing near the normative expectation of the news program host.

5.4.4 JorKawTeun’s rhetorical and visual strategies

JorKawTeun’s rhetorical and visual strategies engage several techniques; namely, the literary technique, theatrical technique, and compositional technique. Regarding the literary technique,
several kinds of wordplay are utilized in the videos to highlight certain meanings in an amusing way. For example, the word “technicality,” whose pronunciation is close to the phrase “their unique technique” in Thai, is used to refer to the tricky tactics that authorities use to circumvent the responsibilities and avoid legal punishment. It is an unusual word that is created particularly for his parody. “This is a total doctor!” (found in “O-Net Oh God” episode) is used to ironically criticize highly-graduated authorities that do not admit and are not accountable for their mistakes. “Handsome,” another example, also has an obscure meaning in his parodies; it can be a praise, but simultaneously has a negative connotation when the word is overstressed, which alludes to the inefficiency of the person that is referred to.

In addition, theatrical techniques are also prevalent, such as sketches and musical shows. Sketch is employed to demonstrate certain circumstances in order to make viewers get the idea more easily. For example, in “If you want to know about palm oil, ask Lamud” episode, in advancing the idea that the government is simulating a state of war in Thailand, a sketch portraying the time of war is set up. It helps the viewers find a similarity between what is happening right now and what would it be like in a war state. And the sketch comedy show also creates laughter as the actors deliberately dress in a funny way; they wear clothes just enough to suggest their role, and also put on some extra incongruent accessories.

Additionally, as with a musical stage play, there are musical interventions during the dialogue. Usually it comes in the form of a mock music video. Musical shows are employed to exaggerate the emotion of the people in the news and illustrate other affective dimensions of the news. For example, in the video of “JorKawTuen in the year of the rabbit”, after reporting that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand wanted to reconsider the relationship with Cambodia, the host asks “Why? Do you want to have a personal space between you two?” Then, a Thai love song comes up (it is about a girl who wants to separate with her boyfriend for a while), and after that the host and co-host are lip singing and dancing together ridiculously. Therefore, the sketches and musical interventions are comedic elements which function in enriching the aesthetic experience, as well as
facilitating the viewers’ creation of meaning. They, as parts of the parody techniques, recontextualize the news, politicians’ speeches, political events, as well as other serious issues. Such techniques twist the tone of the original messages and deconstruct its complicatedness; thus the parody messages become more enjoyable and understandable among average citizens. This may seem a trivialization of politics; however, it interrupts the naturalization process of institutionalized discourse; thus making the absurdity realized.

Apparently, JorKawTeun employs popular media texts in making sense of political events. Apart from the songs and music mentioned above, they also refer to movies. For example, in the “Traffic news with John Winyu /Roaming ‘JorKawTeun’” episode, in the report of crime news, the host sarcastically compares the fatal fights between two hot-tempered passenger van drivers with that of Spartan warriors from “300,” the fantasy action movie about a battle between 300 Spartans and over one million Persian solders. In the episode of “Digging: Pu’s government (Love you, Ta),” the characters from the Lord of the Rings trilogy are referred to in order to describe the politician’s behavior; ex-Prime minister AbhisitVejjajiva is compared with Frodo Baggins and Gollum. In addition, in the episode of “Digging: Golden flower and the blacked out (don’t play around with words),” the famous Thai soap opera “DokSomSeeTong” is used as a reference point in their comedic critique of the role of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in the Thai-Cambodian border conflict. Further, the use of compositional technique is also predominant, as composite images can be found in every video, appearing frequently along with on-screen texts. They help to reinforce the literal meanings and simultaneously forefront the subtext or hidden meaning of the spoken language.

JorKawTeun’s style of news reporting is out of the structural norm of a news program. As for the news which has already been pervasively covered by mainstream news media, they usually do not give detailed information repetitively but focus on giving their subjective opinions embedded with emotion on the news. Thus, the members of the audience are assumed to share common knowledge in order to follow the content of the videos. On the other hand, JorKawTeun is outstanding in providing the deeper academic and historical knowledge necessary for the understanding of particular issues. This allows the audience to evaluate the reported issues more efficiently. This provision of academic knowledge can be obviously seen in, for instance, the video “If you want to know about palm oil, ask Lamud,” which provides an explanation of price control and import quota policy, and the “Fire in a hole” video, which traces back the very history of the Israel-Lebanon conflict. Such detailed information, however, is always absent in the mainstream news media.
In their rhetoric, for the most part, they try to raise the emotional engagement with politics of the audience by relating political issues to private life, and succinctly pointing out how all people are affected by what is perceived as irrelevant to life through the variety of techniques mentioned above. Furthermore, another form of resistance is also expressed by means of creating a contrast between messages, images, and sounds. For instance, the clapping and Yee Haw sound is often used to praise what is supposed to be denounced, and the hosts usually laugh after reporting unpleasant news. This humorous satire is a way of showing resistance and dissent, and is also a lively approach to taking part in political public debate. Additionally, the tone of voice is a way to separate real and parodic messages. The host always uses high intonation full of emotion as if imitating a girl’s voice when he expresses something which is not intended to be understood literally. To understand such messages, the audience needs a more profound level of analysis of the text to look beyond the face value of the message. In addition, he usually imitates the accent of a foreigner speaking the Thai language, when saying something that is against universal mutual understanding or acceptance, for example, “So who is the head of the government of Thailand? The brother of the Prime minister or the Prime Minister?” (in the Digging: Pu’s government (Love you, Ta) video).

Apart from satirizing with words, the body, gesture, and interaction with external props are also crucial factors for delivering jokes and political points. The body language helps to both reinforce and convert verbal meaning. Sometimes, they leave out verbal words and deliver messages through body expression and symbolic props instead. For instance, in the episode “Digging: Nitirat,” the coconut shell is put noticeably on the desk when the host reports the news about Thai school's Nazi-themed sport march that has offended foreigners. As some Thai people seemed to be indifferent towards the outrageous reactions from the foreigners, John said “If Thai people are still like this,” and he lifts up the coconut shell, then says “my Thailand can only be as it will always be.” In this context, the coconut shell represents the small world, alluding that Thai people have a narrow and self-centered perspective and know little about what is outside Thailand.
With regard to the overall presentation, the program is deliberately designed to be unprofessional. Some scenes with mistakes are intentionally left uncut. The hosts usually go off the topic and share their personal experiences. This implies that what is presented in the series of parody videos is basically the expression of self, not just a news script written under certain conventions of journalism. Therefore, their activities can be considered cultural acts through political communication.

5.4.5 JorKawTeun: the enactment of citizenship and everyday life engagement with politics

Citing Nick Stevenson (2001), Jones argues that “citizenship is more than membership in a society, or the rights and obligations associated with such membership. It is also a component of our identity, and like other aspects of personal and communal identities, is a cultural phenomenon that is conceived, negotiated, assembled, fought over, and so forth, through our everyday interactions within that society” (2010, 210). Applying the cultural perspective of citizenship theory to JorKawTeun, the videos represent the production team’s thoughts, values, and beliefs, which significantly illustrate the cultural dimension of their membership in the society, including self-identity and the relation with other members of the society, as well as with the state. JorKawTeun is neither a legal obligation nor a state-assigned duty, yet it must be considered a postmodern type of civic engagement, as it is the choice they make for themselves in enacting their own citizenship in their own way. This might be considered, as Hartley (1999; 2010) terms it, “do-it-yourself citizenship” or “semiotic self-determination.” According to Susan Zieger (2004) “This kind of citizenship is not enacted through the bodiless, abstracted rituals of voting and debating that are central to democracy classically conceived, but instead through merely becoming visible to others as a self-styled individual consumer” (98).

JorKawTeun is the performance of citizenship that comes in the form of popular culture. The production team use parody as the genre of the self-created media text in order to participate in the political discourses. The videos, which superficially seem to be a comedy central, however, contain blistering commentaries on the government/authorities, and on people/society, as well as the media and news industry. Moreover, as can be seen through their words and expressions, the JorKawTeun team engage in politics emotionally: their personal experiences and emotions are normally combined with political arguments.

JorKawTeun, in addition, partially contributes to the establishment and reshaping of common identity as a Thai citizen as they try to create a sense of belonging among the people in society through their discourse. They constantly show their eagerness to protect the public interest and
attempt to raise common resentment and dissatisfaction against the government and authorities. JorKawTeun is thus not only a way of expression of a group of individuals, but a way to empower citizens to assertively protect their rights and interests. The hosts always address themselves and people as “we,” and the government and authorities as “they.” Therefore, the sense of detachment from the traditional political institutions is reinforced and replaced with the empowerment of ordinary people through online social networks. Their self-political identity, which that is projected in the videos is, therefore, the result of the mediated interactions with politics which are made up of both cognitive and affective experiences. Furthermore, JorKawTeun utilizes humor to make political points and uses laughter as a form of resistance. The program produces a contrasting feeling, as it converges the seemingly incongruous components into one, blurring the discrepancy between rational and affective aspects of a citizen, official and popular discourses, and politics and entertainment. It exemplifies the joining of private and public sphere, and between politics and popular culture. At this point, a nexus between political participation and activities and communication in everyday life is formed.

The convergence of public and private spheres, which resides in the cultural perspective notions of citizenship (Jones 2010, 210), is engendered by the affordance of new digital media and technologies, as they provide a “set of resources through which everyday meanings and practices are constituted which in turn shape identity and difference, participation and culture” (Hartley 2001, cited in ibid.). In addition, according to Burgess, Forth, and Klaebe (2006), “the significance of new media lies in the shift from a ‘common’ cultural public sphere where politics and identity can be dramatized and affect can be politicized, to everyday active participation in networked, highly heterogeneous and open cultural public sphere” (5). In other words, the new digital media have facilitated the popularization of politics, promoting the political significances of certain everyday activities and communications.

In the digital era, while there are still certain formal channels through traditional institutions that act as intermediaries between citizens and the state, the JorKawTeun team prefer to take part in public deliberation individually through online channels, and on the other hand, to attempt to step around what can be classically called political participation. They choose to participate in politics in the semi-private zone, living in what Deuze (2005) calls “hyperlocal enclaves” and “hyperindividual personal information spaces.” They join the world of politics without actual physical engagement through online social networking. Avoiding official or routine-based forms of political participation, their practices, rather, can be seen as a “critical observation” on a political environment, which depending on the degree of self-selective attention to particular issues (Hooghe
and Dejaeghere 2007, 250). They, in other words, individualize the enactment of citizenship (Deuze 2005). Hence, their practices embrace the major principles of the monitorial citizenship.

In conclusion, based on the cultural citizenship and monitorial citizenship theory, the case study of JorKawTeun is the manifestation of how contemporary citizenship can be culturally enacted and how political participation is related to everyday life activities and communications. Their videos are the creative products of cultural practice which combine leisure activity, critical consumption, self-expression, and public deliberation. The JorKawTeun team stand at the mutual juncture of cultural and political communication.
6. Discussion and conclusion

The previous chapter has illustrated how the JorKawTeun team’s practices of cultural citizenship and the popularization of politics are enacted through their news parody videos. The study has focused on the ways in which the producers engage in politics through practices which, in normative perception, might be considered cultural acts rather than political participation. However, the analysis of the videos has revealed that the JorKawTeun team are not average citizens, as they were shown to be intellectual, knowledgeable, and skillful in media production. With a high level of cultural capital, they thus should not be considered as representative of citizens in general. Therefore, I think that, for a greater understanding of the citizenship practices of particular groups, background is worth taking into consideration. Further, it would be valuable to continue the study by looking at the ways in which the audience understand(s) the messages sent. Since this study has examined the producers’ self-enactment of cultural citizenship, it would also be interesting to study how the program (or other online parody programs) might help the audience perform the practices of citizenship. For example, one might ask if online parody videos have impacted audience perceptions of politics. If yes, then, in what way, and to what extent? How is the audience engaged in political deliberation through the videos? To what extent can the audience’s reactions to, and interactions with, the videos be considered political communication?

In this chapter, three issues based upon the results and analysis are addressed: 1) cultural citizens in a media-convergence environment, 2) new media literacy as the prerequisite of mediated-cultural citizenship, and 3) the political significances of parody.

6.1 Discussion of findings

6.1.1 Cultural citizens in a media convergence environment

Politics, nowadays, as Jones suggests, has increasingly become textual and mediated, as it is intertwined with a media ensemble which extends our perception of reality beyond direct experience. Thus, our political reality is, by large, constructed based on media experiences. The point is that a wide range of media texts are ordered in a particular structure which is partially organized according to the generic features of texts largely determined by dominant elites to sustain their status quo. Hence, the structure of power can be simply seen through genre of media texts.

In the traditional media system, the authority of only a few elite, such as professional journalists, experts, academics, and government authorities dominate public discourses. In addition, it is widely acknowledged that the mass media play a prominent role in the agenda setting of social and political issues. That is, it is likely that the more weight certain issues are given by the mass media, the more
important they are to mass audiences’ perception (McCombs and Shaw 1972, cited in Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 12). In this relationship, the public is downplayed to a passive audience that is exposed to limited information; thus their attention and interpretation of issues and events are framed within such a constrained information environment (Delli Carpini and Williams 2001, 172-173).

However, nowadays, the society has entered into the digital era, where a participatory turn has emerged across media industries and in civil society (Burgess 2007). In the new media environment, which is characterized by media convergence, the power over information control is no longer aggregated among traditional elites but is diffused to ordinary people to a certain degree. According to Jenkins, “media convergence is more than simply a technological shift. Convergence alters the relationship between existing technologies, industries, markets, genres and audiences” (2004, 33). He argues that the convergence is simultaneously a top-down and bottom–up process where media corporations and consumers are negotiating. While media companies seek to maximize profit by inventing new technologies to boost the flow of information across extended channels, consumers learn to exploit these technologies to gain control over the flow of media content and to interact with other users (Jenkins 2004, 37). In new media contexts, the media convergence increases the intensity of intertextuality, which affects the way in which people consume media (ibid., 34). To a certain extent, they are encouraged to be more active in “constructing social and political meaning out of the mix of mediated narratives with which they are presented” (Delli Carpini 2001, 167).

Furthermore, in the media convergence environment, politics, public affairs, and popular culture cannot not be precisely fit into the old model of media text categories which privilege dominant gatekeepers and certain genres in constructing political reality (Delli Carpini 2001, 163). Amidst the declining old power structure, people are offered opportunities to find meaningful materials across genres to make sense of public and political events, and to address their identities as citizens, as consumers out of traditional ways. At this point, the old privileged power structure collides with the new rising tide of emergent active consumers, and, what is more, the border between consumption and citizenship becomes blurry (Jenkins 2004).

The study of JorKawTeun has illustrated how active consumers become productive citizens. Their online news parody videos serve as a practical example of Mark Deuze’s the three concepts that characterize digital culture: “participation, remediation, and bricolage.” The JorKawTeun team are active consumers of news mainstream media, which participate in agenda setting and the framing of Social issues. While the mass media establish important issues for the society on the first level,
JorKawTeun selectively relays certain agendas from those media. By filtering the large amount of news and information to be presented on the program according to their subjective values and assessment, they enhance the value of certain news and, at the same time, lessen that of the unselected others. This might affect the level of importance attributed to those issues by people that are both viewers of mass media and JorKawTeun. Hence, it is possible to speculate that they play a role in agenda setting on the second level.

Moreover, the JorKawTeun team do not just simply take news items from mainstream media and re-present them as they are; in contrast, they also do a *bricolage*. The already-constructed realities represented by the mass media are re-interpreted and creatively rebuilt by remixing the available materials at hand within or across modes and genres, as well as by combining them with personal attitudes and ideas. This adds to the level of pluralism by discussing issues on a more personal level, resulting in the diversity of media content. Their practices *remEDIATE* the narratives given by agenda-setting authorities that are incompatible with their tastes, opinions, or common sense understandings. They make use of the technologies to seize an opportunity to “speak back” to the power of media and government by creating their own narratives to set the record straight (Jones 2010, 35). In other words, they engage in resistant-interpretative practices.

At the first level, the JorKawTeun team are informed by traditional news media. As shown throughout the 53 videos, they intensively consume a variety of news and information provided by the supposedly objective press in addition to seeking it from other media sources; therefore, they have fulfilled the requirement of being “informed citizens” based on Michael Schudson’s model where the mass news media play a central role. However, as informed citizens, they do not express themselves as critical rational subjects suitable for the classical practice of citizenship. Yet, with the influence of media convergence, they are able to participate in communal practices related to political and public matters, which build upon the shared interests, concerns, and identities in the digital networked space that transcends spatial and geographical limits. They are culturally self-actualizing as citizens through bottom-up process.

JorKawTeun is considered the discursive practice of citizenship, which Hartley defines as the “bottom-up, self-organized, self-representing practice of constructing, conducting and comprehending ‘associative relations among strangers’” (2010, 244). According to David Thelen (1996), the core of democracy is to ensure that people’s sentiments, interests, and beliefs are entirely represented in the public; and citizenship, therefore, is “an assertion of one’s values that have become threatened and must be reestablished in a public way” (cited in Jones 2010, 32).” The
practice of JorKawTeun is such an assertion, which incorporates both the cognitive and affective dimensions expressed in “purposefully play” performances and interactions with others.

In contexts of media convergence, moreover, a new knowledge community culture has emerged, while the commitment to older forms of social community is becoming loose. “These new communities are defined through voluntary, temporary and tactical affiliations, are reaffirmed through common intellectual enterprises and emotional investments and are held together through the mutual production and reciprocal exchange of knowledge” (Jenkins 2004, 35). JorKawTeun joins a vernacular interpretative community by employing the parodic and other distortional techniques in appropriating mass media texts and cultural products for the pursuit of public concerns in a vernacular mode. Their increasing popularity signifies the empowerment of citizens over social networks, signaling a resistance to certain traditional values and belief systems in politics, society, and news media industry.

6.1.2 New media literacy: The prerequisite of mediated cultural citizenship

It is quite clear that the digital culture and media convergence have helped to reinvigorate public life and that the new digital media and technologies have facilitated the practice of everyday cultural citizenship. In mediated contexts, the empowerment of citizenship could lie in media culture. As Kupiainen and Sintonen indicate, that “media culture must then also be seen as resources of culturally and socially oriented, ethically empowered citizenship” (2010, 65).

However, if the new communication technologies are regarded as the cause of the remediation of democratic participation, then the agents must be those with skills or competencies in technologies. Therefore, there are prerequisites for these forms of participation, for the full performance of everyday cultural citizenship that is enacted in digital media contexts. One of the most essential preconditions required in order to actively engage in cultural and political participation is that of being “media literate”. In other words, one’s cultural and technological competencies should be aligned with each other and meet with “the norms of new media literacy that are co-constructed by technological affordances, user behaviour and the social shaping of participatory culture” (Burgess 2007, 187).

According to Burgess (2007), “socially networked individualism” has become “a normative mode of social organization,” and the network is seen as a conversation rather than as a system of distribution which has developed to be “a normative mode of creative practice” (187). As technologies transform “the way we create knowledge and meaning, communicate and interact” (Erstad 2010, 17), they are something that contemporary cultural citizens should keep up with, as
they need to utilize them in order to participate in the networked community and digital public sphere. Therefore, I deem it useful to clarify here the term “new media literacy”.

First of all, media literacy is a widely-used term and is often found in the western education field, especially regarding children’s media education (Tyner 2010). The term is defined differently by scholars and organizations. Moreover, it seems to be developed in an increasingly broader sense over time. From the traditional perspective, media literacy engages more in an individual-oriented process. Most of the definitions imply instrumental purpose. According to Livingstone (2008), media literacy is initiated in policy discourse as it is aimed to tackle a rapidly-growing diversity of media and communication in the realm of Neo-liberalism, where deregulatory tendency is predominant (cited in Ugur and Harro-loit 2010, 133-134).

For example, the National Telemedia Council (1992) has referred to media literacy as “the ability to choose, to understand within the context of the content, form/style, impact, industry and production-to question, to evaluate, to create and/or produce and to respond thoughtfully to the media we consume” (cited in Silverblatt 1995, 2). According to Ofcom, the communications regulator of the UK, the definition of media literacy is “the ability to access, understand and create communications in a variety of contexts” (Buckingham 2005, 3). The term access includes the skills needed to acquire media content with the use of technologies in hand, and also to be aware of regulatory mechanisms and to take them into consideration when making one’s decisions for the good of self-protection. As for the term understand, it has many meanings, including the ability to make a difference between the representational and real world, to question, and to critically evaluate media content. Additionally, to create communication also embraces the sense of creativity.

However, today media literacy is often regarded as a social practice or sharing rather than the set of individualized competencies (Kotilainen and Arnold-Granlund 2010). Media literacy in new media contexts is better understood from a socio-cultural perspective, as one of the new media’s key transformations of society is expanding the scope of interaction and promoting a participatory culture. New media literacy not solely focuses on individuals’ ability to understand and use media but includes the value of “socialization in a mediatized society” (Erstad 2010, 24). According to Kupiainen and Sintonen, “The characters of media literacy are participation and sharing. Media literacy in the digital era is more collaborative, productive, and distributive than earlier” (2010, 57). They call it “participatory media literacy.” To become media literate nowadays, in addition “to access, understand and create communications,” as Ofcom stated, one must seek “a highly motivated engagement with social practices”. However, they do not need such “tight personal ties”
with others (ibid.) since collaborations are facilitated by the new digital technologies (Kupiainen and Sintonen 2010, 64).

Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that media literacy, though is a vital quality of a postmodern citizen, is considered only as a potential civic competence in the sense that a person with media literacy competency might not want to engage in public deliberation, but the individual that wants to actively participate in public life requires such skills to make use of media effectively (Uusitalo 2010, 71). Moreover, media literacy in the digital age is significantly distinguished from that in the traditional media era, as it is likely to be “demand-led literacy” (Hartley, McWilliam, Burgess and Banks 2008) rather than centrally-planed, as most participants are self-selected and their activities are, by large, carried out on a voluntary basis. If they wish to join in practices of content creation and networked communities, they demand certain levels of media literacy and technological competencies. If the demand-led literacy is true, as Hartley, McWilliam, Burgess, and Banks claim, then the similarity between the practice of digital literacy and cultural citizenship can be seen. While, the former is demand-led, the latter is also self-determined and self-actualizing. They are both a bottom-up driven formation process.

The entry level of active participation requires at least the skills in creating, digitizing, and digitally distributing contents, and more importantly, interacting with other users in communities. Further, to participate in ways that can be considered as the practice of cultural citizenship, rhetorical skills and additional knowledge concerning, for example, public affairs, politics, economics, entertainment, history, or other social matters are to be incorporated. Some competences might appear to be intuitive for participants while some might require an endeavor to achieve them (Burgess 2007).

As for JorKawTeun, it can be seen that the production team possess quite a high level of media literacy. First, as a mass media audience, they appear to be a critical consumer of news and information, as they are always skeptical towards and critically examine the media content presented to them. Second, they are proficient in making use of technologies to do their poaching, remaking, remixing, editing, and compositing of several communicative elements to construct their own discourse out of available materials. They then have more than enough knowledge about the functions of Web 2.0 to help them spread their videos widely: they know which sites at which to distribute the videos, how to promote a link to their own website, and how to properly provide description tags that make the videos displayed in search results. Last but not least, the JorKawTeun team have social interactions with other users via online forum discussions, email, and other social networking platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. Moreover, in order to make their videos visible and recognizable among the vast array of media content in the online world, they also have
to consider additional factors that attract other Internet users, for example, rhetorical and presentational style, the timing of video releases, whether the content resonates with the majority’s opinion. These, however, are beyond the scope of media literacy.

Since the JorKawTeun team are a group of people that have already worked in the media industry, they are well equipped with skills and knowledge, and have professional equipment at hand. It might not be so taken for granted to say that they have an advantage over others that have fewer technological capacities to practice cultural citizenship in mediated contexts, as it can be seen that their messages are heavily dependent on the power of digital media technologies for their effectiveness. However, at the same time, it is completely wrong to assume a correlation between the levels of new media literacy and the performance of citizenship. While “literacy” is often seen as “a route to emancipation” (Livingstone 2008), it can lead to a participation gap (Jenkins 2006, cited in Hartley, McWilliam, Burgess and Banks 2008). If the merit of the new media or digital literacy is overemphasized, it might privilege certain groups and exclude others as illiterate (Livingstone 2008). However, I would like to argue that media literacy is necessary to be possessed by a citizen at a certain level sufficient to accomplish communication in the digital sphere and to participate with others. However, the very heart of citizenship remains to be “active participation and responsibilities,” “civic virtues,” and “public spiritedness” (Galston 1991, 217, 244; Macedo 1990, 138-39, cited in Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 360). The practice of citizenship can be mutually constituted among average, media-literate citizens. Activities can be carried out collectively; for example, they can assign tasks according to the expertise of participants.

However, the preconditions discussed above raise a concern about a potential limitation of the citizenship model caused by the digital divide. In general, young people account for the largest proportion of participants in an online community, and most of them are well-educated and affluent (Norris 2001, 4). In Thailand, according to The National Statistical Office of Thailand’s survey in 2011, there is a disproportionate number of Internet users in Bangkok (40.6%) and other parts of the country. In addition, 51.9% of the Internet users are between 15 and 24 years of age. Since the enactment of cultural citizenship in new media contexts to a great extent relies on the accessibility of digital media technologies and the capacity to utilize them, the model fosters the enactment among those that possess technological competence, most of whom are young people in big cities. However, according to Pippa Norris (2001) regarding the concept of the digital divide, there are three remarkable dimensions of concern: the “global divide;” the “social divide;” and the “democratic divide.” The “global divide” refers to the inequality between developed and developing countries. The “social divide” regards the “gap between information rich and poor” within each of the nations, while the “democratic divide” concerns the different levels of utilization of political
resources for civic engagement (4). In this study, only the “social divide” and “democratic divide” were of concern. Considering these two aspects of the digital divide in relation to the model of cultural citizenship, on the one hand, there is a potential limitation of cultural citizenship in terms of the “social divide,” as it might reinforce the gap between the information rich and poor due to the unequal distribution of technological opportunities. On the other hand, I argue that the cultural citizenship model helps to alleviate the “democratic divide” in the sense that it expands a range of the practices of civic engagement and political participation; thus political discourses are popularized.

6.1.3 The political significances of parody

JorKawTeun’s news parody deals ironically with politics, public affairs, and pop culture by taking news from mainstream media as base materials to construct critical discourse through several techniques that manipulate and refunction the originally-referenced texts and thus create critical intertextuality. Their public deliberation is delivered in parodic mode and is presented in a vernacular style with a lot of swearing and sexually-suggestive words, sometimes in a rude and aggressive manner, and often times with crazy and ridiculous gestures. However, the weirdness of the parody genre is a potential for challenging ideologies. When existing outside the boundary of conventional high culture, one can emancipate oneself from constraints, and thus the opportunity to question the dominant ideologies and power structure is wide open, allowing one to generate a world of discourse independent of conservative rules. This seemingly absurd form of communication has a profoundly subversive potential to challenge and undermine the status quo.

Therefore, political parody has significant multifaceted functions in public culture. Public culture, according to Robert Hariman, is shaped by “the historical struggles that Bakhtin describes as the constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces” (2008, 260). Parody thus is essential for constituting this public culture, as it promotes multiple-contested voices rather than consensus. Parodic operations interfere with the naturalizing process of discourse and makes the speakers of the original texts lose control of the communication effect on the audience, and in this way the public arena becomes more competitive.

Inferring from the study of JorKawTeun, as being the material supply for the JorKawTeun team, news media more or less succeeds its function in raising the awareness of certain Social issues among the public, with its clear and direct style of communication. Yet, when such direct and relatively formal language is mimicked, mocked, or playfully and critically reflected on, the public arena has become contested. Parody might be able to perform even better than direct discourses do in raising and maintaining public consciousness due to its self-reflective character (Hariman 2008,
Moreover, in a conflictual rather than consensual atmosphere, the public sphere is likely to be richer in debate and discussion. To put it differently, parody acquaints people with public discourse. As stated by Hariman, “the long-term effect of a public culture alive with parody is an irreverent democratization of the conventions of public discourse, which in turn keeps public speech closer to its audiences and their experiences of the public world” (2008, 258).

Similarly, R. Mcgeough (2008), in The Voice of the People: Jon Stewart, Public Argument, and Political Satire, suggests that parody can encourage public deliberation. He examined a parody video made by Jon Stewart, whom he considers a representative of ordinary people that have little knowledge about finance and the stock market. The analyzed video was used in Stewart’s debate with a financial expert on TV. In Mcgeough’s analysis, Stewart used the “dialectical vernacular,” together with his redacted video, as a strategy to successfully provoke the audience’s common indignation and to hold the expert accountable for his mistake.

Apart from that, several scholars point out parody’s constructive potential in promoting the audience’s media literacy, which is vital in terms of civic competence. Chuck Tryon (2008), for example, in the examination of the parody videos of The US’s 2008 election campaign, considers parody’s political significance as a source of popular power. He also concludes that the video mockeries offer a new form of media literacy, as they urge people to be skeptical towards the campaign narratives (Tyron 2008, 213). According to him, “parody videos can serve a pedagogical function, helping viewers to become more attentive and critical readers of culture text” (ibids, 210). Likewise, Dietel-McLaughlin (2010) argues that parody “engages the multiple intelligences and literacies of both creator and audience member, creating an enthymematic backdrop for a larger cultural critique at the same time that it serves a polemical function by attacking not only the text that came before it, but also larger cultural characters and contexts familiar to a present-day audience” (35). Regarding this thesis, it is shown that JorKawTeun, with its comical style of presentation, intermingling of real and fake news, facts and opinion, real events and fiction, is likely to cause confusion sometimes, but this, in turn, can possibly encourage the audience’s critical consciousness and skepticism when watching the videos, inviting them to the assess and make a judgment on what is being said.

**6.2 Conclusion**

Entering into the new era of the digital world, where “the new information and communication technologies have both made possible and been a part of the more profound force of (economic and cultural) globalization” (Kress 2003, 18), the structures of relationships within social, cultural, economic, and political systems have become affected and transformed. In examining politics in
contemporary mediated contexts, this thesis takes the cultural study approach to look from a bottom-up perspective in order to observe how people engage with politics or how the practice of citizenship is enacted. The thesis examines this issue through the analysis of citizen-created discourse. The JorKawTeun online news parody program was selected as a case study.

In this study, the enactment of the practice of citizenship through JorKawTeun’s parody videos is understood by the monitorial and cultural citizenship theory. The study has found that these two theories, even though the former is from a traditional political perspective, and the latter is from a cultural comprehensive perspective, are nevertheless complementary to each other. In this study, the JorKawTeun team appeared to monitor the political environment, scan through information, select certain issues to pay particular attention to, and attempt to keep the government under surveillance, all of which constitute the practices of monitorial citizenship. However, what is beyond the extent of this theory and thus has to be understood further by cultural citizenship theory is the JorKawTeun team’s refashioning of the forms of political participation; they enact the practices of monitorial citizenship in entertaining and non-traditional ways in which the role of emotion and private experiences have become integrated into civic engagement and public deliberation. Therefore, the combination of these two theories in this study has expanded the scope of how the performance of citizenship can be perceived and has simultaneously offered a more concrete ground in analyzing those practices. Moreover, applying these two western-born theories to the Thai context, it can be seen that they are applicable to this case study to a great extent. The limitation is that a considerable account of political and social history of Thailand, as well as the cultural and situational contexts of the analyzed texts, have to be included in the interpretation and analysis.

This case study has shown that citizenship has complex dimensions, and citizens are paradoxical subjects whose identities are related to changing contexts. JorkaewTeun’s producers as citizens appear to be semi-rational, semi-emotional, sometimes critical and rebellious, and sometimes complimentary and compliant. In addition, the study’s findings support the argument that political activities nowadays tend to be less physical, more textual, and, more importantly, have become detached from traditional institutions, such as political parties, NGOs, other governmental agencies, etc. The JorKawTeun team’s political participation can be regarded as a “mass self-communication,” which is a “means of interactive communication” for participation in public life (Castells 2009). Their public deliberation can get across directly to the public, bypassing the traditional bureaucratic process. Therefore, based on this case study, the enactment of cultural citizenship appears to be individualized whereby civic engagement takes place in social networks rather than physical places. Aside from the supply of personalized space in networking, the new technologies also enhance the effectiveness of communication, as they enable the integration of a
variety of communicative elements. JorKawTeun’s popularity and success in rhetoric can be, in part, attributed to these technologies, which magically visualize their imagination on screen, transferring abstract ideas into visible objects.

However, it is worth recognizing that technologies are only an enabler or tool for those that access and utilize them. As Kress (2003) asserts, “I do not wish to argue that the technological facility is leading the change, not at all. But the technological facility coincides with social cultural, economic and political changes, all of which together are producing and pushing that change” (9). As for the case study of this thesis, the JorKawTeun team can be regarded as relatively privileged citizens. They possess a great deal of cultural capital before turning on the camera. Not everyone can do the same as they have done, even if one has all of the equipment and access to the Internet. There are preconditions for the enactment of cultural citizenship in new media contexts, as mentioned earlier in the discussion section of “New media literacy: The prerequisite of mediated cultural citizenship.” Thus, new media technologies can be useful only as long as people can allow them to be.

Furthermore, it can be seen that a cultural citizenship practice demonstrates citizens’ appropriation of a consumerist culture in a media-convergence environment in the sense that the JorKawTeun team make use of a number of commercial cultural products in their political endeavors. However, there in turn appears to be a re-appropriation of this cultural citizenship by the consumer culture as well because there are some commercial advertisements on the JorKawTeun program. This means that JorKawTeun is partially supported by a capitalist system, and thus it is possible that the program is also shaped by the market force. This evidence is in line with Hartley’s argument about citizenship in new media contexts: that is, “the era of the Internet has made the extension of citizenship into the market more visible, and has also given a technological boost to the phenomenon of consumer productivity” (2010 240). The interplay between a citizen and consumer culture inevitably impacts how the cultural citizenship practices are carried out. However, I argue that this does not necessarily always lead to a poorer performance of citizenship. Consumerism’s penetration of citizenship is not considered a limitation of the cultural citizenship model; rather, it is one of the main characteristics of postmodern citizenship, which emphasizes the fusing role of the citizen and consumer, blurring the boundary between cultural acts and political engagement.

Moreover, from this research, it can be seen there is a convergence of popular culture and politics. Political matters permeate everyday aspects of life, and vice versa. As “popular culture is spoken by those who want reinforce and refine its central role in subjectivity and by those who resist by analysis its psychic and social dominance” (Mclaughlin 1996, 52), there is no reason not to include the popular or the so-called low culture forms of expression in the range of political
communications. According to Jones, “Political communication and popular culture are now thoroughly integrated and intertwined, and at times, mutually constituting” (2010, 13). JorkawTeun is a glaring example of hybrid culture, where politics is popularized and popular culture is politicized. Moreover, the study of JorKawTeun has proved that humor is useful in making political points, and the power of parodic effects in political rhetoric should not be undervalued. Comedic parody, at its very face value, easily attracts people with a humorous nature; meanwhile, in its deep value, as I quoted Simon Dentith’s statement earlier, it “provides a relatively polemical allusive imitation of another cultural production or practice” (2002, 9). Moreover, the parodic mode of criticism increases the possibility of breaking through cultural and legal constraints.

All in all, this thesis contributes to an understanding of the ways in which popular creative practices are situated in the realm of politics, and articulates how citizens culturally engage with politics, whereby media literacy as a form of civic competence is a precondition. In addition, it illustrates the political applications of entertainment media, and points out that serious public affairs can get along with aesthetic experiences while political values are reserved. Additionally, in digital culture the relations of production and consumption, and citizens and the state, are reconfigured. Last but not least, it is hoped that this thesis will be useful for further discussion about how politics can be viewed and how democracy is likely to be remediated in new media contexts.
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**Online sources**


Appendix: Full analysis of the 10 videos

1. “Don’t be serious. Love you” (Thai: อย่าเครียดรักนะ: YaKreadRakNa)

Host’s appearance: John: Black T-shirt with black sunglasses

Place: Studio

Predominant presentation method: Delivering a monologue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Key images</th>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>On screen text</th>
<th>Music and sound effect</th>
<th>Critiques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.21-1.10</td>
<td>“Expensive Shirt” group</td>
<td></td>
<td>John reports that there is a lot of tension in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok’s business zone. However, besides the Red-Shirts, there is also another group that we should pay particular attention to. It is the “Expensive Shirt” group who are having a difficult time due to a lack of shopping places in the city center. Since the red shirts rallied, all the department stores, and shopping malls in Siam Square have been closed. The Expensive Shirt activists complain that they do not have places to hang out and go shopping. John: “Having no places to go shopping, it seems like their lives are over!”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Lack of political concern (people) -Selfishness (people) -Materialistic Society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, John admits that he belongs to the Expensive Shirt group also. In addition, He says that now there are three Expensive Shirts’ Facebook fan pages. He claims that other members like him have pointed out that all of these pages are fake accounts using the Expensive Shirt name.

John: “We are not involved in these Facebook groups at all. They are fake Expensive Shirts. I don’t even know if they are really rich!”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.50-2.05</th>
<th>Parliament is intruded.</th>
<th>John reports that the Red Shirt protesters break into the government house again. John reports that the Red Shirt protesters break into the government house again. John: “The government house is intruded AGAIN. The respected cabinet and MPs (Members of Parliament) must cross over the back gate to run away AGAIN. Plus, our brothers, police and Thai army are ‘tomato and watermelon’ AGAIN. [Laughing] Shall we change the name of our TV station to ‘desperate.TV’?” This is so lame!”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.12-2.49</td>
<td>The government declares a Severe Emergency</td>
<td>John says that the handsome Prime Minister (PM), who is the Expensive Shirt group’s heart-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67 “Tomato and watermelon” is a nickname for the police and army who are Red Shirt supporters, thus, reluctant to disperse the Red Shirt rally and arrest their leaders.
Situation, and established the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES)

John is standing up and pretending that he wants to pee badly.

throb, declares a Severe Emergency Situation in some districts in Bangkok and some other provinces.

John: “The government upgrades the normal emergency situation to the ‘SEVERE emergency situation,’ which means really truly very urgent. And because of this most serious situation ever, PM, then,(.) sets up the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation.”

John: “They look so scared. I think they might pee in their pants.”

2.50-3.20

“(We are) confident that more than one million Thai people …” type of Facebook fan page has become prevalent.

John reports that the online world is also alert as there are several activist groups asserting their political position.

John: “These people are the type of people who are like [imitating a girl’s voice] I don’t know you. I never met you. I don’t wanna to get to know you. But I hate you. I hate you. You are a stupid idiot. You are like a buffalo⁶⁸. You are so backwards. You are bastard. I hate your dad. I hate your mom. I hate everything of you. I hate the ground where you stand on. I hate the air you breathe. I

⁶⁸ Buffalo refers to someone stupid.
The profile picture of “No Dissolution of Parliament”/the profile picture of “20 million Thai People Dissolve UDD.”/ the picture of panda cartoon appears hate hate hate you very very much.”
John: “This is like an evil girl in TV drama on channel 7.”
Besides, He says there are a lot of “Confident” Facebook group pages, for example, “(We are) confident that more than one million Thai people are against dissolution of parliament,”
“(We are) confident that more than one million Thai people want to dissolve UDD.”
John: [making a little cute voice] “(We are) confident that more than one million Thai pandas are annoyed by people fighting”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.44-4.12</th>
<th>There are more important things to concern about.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John: “With my concern over your physical and mental health, I want to remind everyone that there are a lot more important things to worry about. More important than the trouble of having no shopping malls to go.” John reminds people about other political and Social issues of concern. For example, whether the neighbor’s kid has a school to attend? Does the 350-million airship (Zeppelin) work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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69 The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, or Red Shirt group

- Lack of political concern (people)
- Corruption (government/authorities)
- Patronage system
well?; How will the legalization process of the online numbers game ended up?; “Narasuan” that is directed by a royal blooded director, received a huge sponsorship from the government of 433 million bath. (The government’s unfair distribution of funding for culturally promoting movies)

70 The numbers game is an underground illegal form of lottery which is carried out mostly in poor neighborhoods.

71 Narasuan was a film about the history of the King in the past.
2. “The career in dream” (Thai: อาชีพในฝัน: AacheepNaiFun)

Host’s appearance: John: Black t-shirt with black sunglasses

Place: Studio

Predominant presentation method: Delivering a monologue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Key images</th>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>On screen text</th>
<th>Music and sound effect</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.24-1.00</td>
<td>The government’s Annual Budget Allocation meeting 2012</td>
<td>John looks extremely happy. He is raising his hands above his head and shaking them, imitating cheerleaders’ dancing.</td>
<td>John says that he was sick last week, but finally this week he got recovered mentally because the Annual Budget Allocation meeting 2012 has ended. John: “We don’t have to watch them fighting on TV anymore” John: “The thing is that all the taxes that we’ve paid, for example, income tax, value added tax, and other fucking taxes, are to be collected together. Then, the uncles and aunts (MPs) whom we deliberately elected would fight with each other in deciding that HOW MUCH money will</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clapping and Yee-haw sound</td>
<td>-Self interest over public interest (government/authorities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.02-1.40</td>
<td>Politicians’ behaviors</td>
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</table>
| John with a yellow wreath around his neck is pretending to greet [Thai: ่หวี: Wai] people in a Thai traditional way. He is showing an “American I love you” sign, and then, imitating a dog, sticking out his tongue while breathing and pretending to lick his microphone. | John has discovered that he has chosen the wrong career. So he suggests his audiences that there is no need to give their kids a normal education. Instead, they should just teach them how to greet people respectfully and how to introduce themselves and their number (for election) charmingly. |  |  | -Politicians’ insufficiency of skills and knowledge about their jobs
-Emotion over reason (people) |
| 1.42-2.24 | MPs, senators, members of independently organizations receive a pay raise. | John reports that MPs decided a raise of 15% to themselves, senators, and members of independent organizations. He says that, according to the news, this legislation was tagged along with the proposal for the 5% pay raise for government officials all over the country that the government has promised people before. John gives the information about the amount of MPs’ salary and allowance. To him, they are not worthy of this money. | “Just like when we hide one-hundred banknote under our car license.” | -Self interest over public interest (government/authorities) -Corruption (government/authorities) |
| 2.24-2.39 | Parliament adjourns due to the lack of quorum | John: “Besides, giving a raise to yourselves, you also have the same habit as me. Always skipping the job! Just come to sign your name and go away. Is this what is called ‘nine to five’ (Thai: ต้องมาทำงานทุกวัน: ChaoCharmYenCharm) type of people? But the ‘nine to five’ people (referring to civil servants) are not able to give a raise to | “In 2552, house meetings has been adjourned for 10 times, we will see how many times for this year.” | -Abuse of power (government/authorities) -Politicians’ lack of job responsibilities |

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72 In Thailand, when drivers who did against the traffic law are asked by a policeman for their car license, they usually hand the police the license with ‘teamoney’ underneath. Then, the policeman will take money, give back their license, and let them go without any legal charge.

73 “Nine to five” is often referred to civil servants in general.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Range</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.47-3.10</td>
<td>The proposal for the new government house building</td>
<td>John says that apart from giving themselves a raise and constantly skipping regular meetings, the MPs also propose for the new office building worth 20,000 million Baht. John: “The new office for our honored MPs and senators is all our financial contribution which is worth around 20,000 million Baht WOW!” John: “Sometimes, I don’t understand that since you (MP and senators) rarely go to the office, why do you want a new office building?” “It is your money”</td>
<td>-Politicians’ lack of job responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11-3.48</td>
<td>The 9000 baht budget for the purchase of armored cars is approved.</td>
<td>John reports that MPs also grant 9,000 million Baht budget to the ministry of defense to purchase new armed vehicles. But he notes that the last order of 96 armed vehicles have not been delivered yet. John: “Three years ago, we made a purchase of 93 armed vehicles, and have already paid for them. But the vehicles have not arrived yet. So this year, they (the Minister of defense) came up with the smart idea of ordering 121 more armed vehicles. We will see whether we will finally get them or not.”</td>
<td>-Corruption (government/authorities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.30-6.49</td>
<td>The government’s local Budget allocation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A number of pictures of tanks appear one by one on the screen until they occupy overall screen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John: “In total, we gotta help them pay for around 9000 million Baht. For you (people who younger than him) who wants a new car, you have to wait and pay for their armed vehicles first.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Nine thousand million Baht”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Game losing sound</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Thailand at the moment is largely divided into two groups; the Red Shirts who are claimed to be PheuThai Party supporter (the opposition party at that time), and the Yellow Shirts, who are claimed to be Democrat party supporters (the government party).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

John gives the information about the amount of budget allocated to provincial administration organizations. He notes that the allocation is apparently unfair as the provinces that have elected the Democrat Party (the government party) receive much more budget than the provinces whose majority supports the opposition party (PheuThai party). 

John: “The thing is that, in order to get money, the provinces should have the right color.” 

John: “This is all what our representatives did for us.” 

John: “The ones who elected them must be either insane or an idiot. Oh! It is me, isn’t it?” 

Clapping and Yee-haw sound
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.35-9.57</td>
<td>Thai Children reportedly have low IQ level.</td>
<td>John says Thai children reportedly have a low IQ level, and lacks analytic skills, problem management skills, emotion management skills, and creativity. John: “Are those the only problems of children?” Voodoo man: [singing] “We might be stupid but we know it. (But you) does not even bother trying to fix (problems of yourselves)? ( )”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.03-10.30</td>
<td>The inequity of the budget distribution to Provincial Administration</td>
<td>John says no one wants to work for the provincial administrations which belong to the opposition-party-supporting provinces as they will receive a small amount of money from the government. John: “They got only a trashy budget to spend (on useless stuffs). So this year, (they) should try to stick to a tight budget. Next year might be their year. There is always an opportunity in the future as long as “the big brother system” still exists in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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75 This dialogue is not linguistically logical even in the original language. In this context, by saying this, voodoo man means that some people, particularly adults, do not even know they are stupid and don’t even bother trying to improve themselves.

76 The big brother system Refers to the patronage system.
our “Sarakan country”77. There are only a few big brothers in this country, though.”

77 “Sarakan country” is usually referred to Thailand. It is often used when someone wants to negatively criticize Thailand but do not want to directly address the real name of the country.
3. “The river overflows its banks” (Thai: น้ำเหนี่ยงเดียวกัน: JorNamTemTaling)

Hosts’ appearance: John: Black t-shirt with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses

Place: studio

Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Key images</th>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>On screen text</th>
<th>Music and sound effect</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.28-1.29</td>
<td>Flooding and mud slide in provincial area caused 122 deaths and a damage to agricultural production.</td>
<td>John is talking to the audiences while a voodoo man sitting next to him seems to be obsessed with himself, and does not listen to John. The pictures of the disaster appear on screen.</td>
<td>John reports that people in the provincial areas are heavily suffering from flooding which caused a lot of damages to their crop production, properties, and even their lives. However, people in Bangkok are still ignorant to these problems. He persuades people to donate money or property for the affected people. John: “Thai people are so poor. We are people of the “Bangkok country.” So we have to help them, donating some money and stuffs, and sharing the charity ideas via Facebook, Twitter, BB (BlackBerry). Because Thailand is our neighbor country. We should show our generosity….Hm? What? Are we the same...</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Lack of sympathy (people) -Selfishness (people)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Puzzling Sound</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.35-2.10</td>
<td>John wants people to have concern about how government officials manage the relief fund for Emergency Situations Management, and the donation fund. But he says that someone does not think that we should not question where the money goes when we do charity. John: “Not only do we not contribute to any donations, but JorKawTuen also loves to raise stupid questions like How we can check the transparency of the management of the funds for Emergency Situations as well as the management of the donation funds? But then we got the answer that we should not think too much when making merit; otherwise we will not get any merit.” [laughing]” John: “Other people’s disaster is a great opportunity for us to do merit for our prosperous life in the next life. We will be born to be a good-looking and rich Bangkokian in the following next life. Amen”</td>
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79 This is based on the Buddhism’s belief that if someone makes a merit and hesitates at the same time, the merit they made will not yield the benefit in the future.

80 Buddhists believe that they will be reincarnated, and if they do good deeds in this life, they will be rewarded from them in the future or in the next life.
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.17-4.27</td>
<td>As a consequence of the government’s attempt to protect Bangkok from flooding, the situations in other provinces have become worse.</td>
<td>John describes how people in Bangkok always have privileged rights over provincial people. “Being a Bangkokian is excellent as we have a privileged right to choose and change the government as we wish. We can also look down on people in the rural areas, who are brainless, and greedy. They always chose the disgusting leader. When there is a flooding, our government that they did not choose would try every possible way to protect our civilized city. [unnatural voice] Otherwise, our “Louboutin” shoes could be damaged. If K-village, and J-Avenue are underwater, where else can we hang out, then? [imitating a girl’s voice] This is totally unacceptable.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.30-5.51</td>
<td>PACC will file charge against the opposition</td>
<td>John reports that news about PACC would file charge against the opposition politicians for the Unfairness in justice system (government/authorities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81 This refers to the Yellow Shirt protest against Thaksin Shinawatra’s government (who is popular among the poor).

82 Louboutin is a luxury French shoe brand.

83 Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission
politicians for the unlawful occupation of land.

unlawful occupation of land. But he notes that they do only the cases involving oppositional politicians.

John: “Well, I think this is the same old story. It is the story about the magically expanded land... It can be done only by men with extraordinary powers. [laughing] They can make the public land become their own."

John: “These days, PACC works incredibly effectively.”

John: [Imitating a girl’s voice] “But, there is a bit more to do. Only a little bit. It would be nice, if you (PACC) will do it more evenly.”

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6.46-7.35 Thailand will host the 14th International Anti-corruption Conference

John and voodoo man are laughing while john is reading news about John reports the press release about the 14th International Anti-corruption Conference 2010 in Thailand.

Amusing sound

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85 Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission

84 A Japanese fictional hero having superhuman powers.
John: “JorKawTuen people! Is this a sign of something? It is a sign that we should have a meeting there at the Anti-corruption exposition which is the funniest event ever. Indeed, the organizer holds the event in the dangerous zone. [laughing] They must think that they should take a risk in order to gain something. [laughing]”
4. “JorKawTeun in the year of the rabbit”^86^ (Thai: เกาะขาวต้น: TorKawTuen)

Hosts’ appearance: John: Black T-shirt with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses
Place: Studio
Predominant presentation method: Delivering a monologue

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<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
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<th>Music and sound effect</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.44-1.18</td>
<td>The sale of rabbit in JJ market doubles.</td>
<td>The pictures of bunny girls</td>
<td>John reports that entering in the year of the rabbit, the sale of rabbit in JJ market doubles as people believe that the rabbit would bring them good luck. John: “(Rabbits) will bring good luck to you, but I am not sure if it is also good for the rabbits. Temples and suburban areas should be ready (to accommodate the unwanted rabbits)”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Susceptibility to trend-chasing (people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11-4.03</td>
<td>Seven Thai people are imprisoned on charges of illegal entry into Cambodia and its military base.</td>
<td></td>
<td>John reports that seven Thai people are arrested for their intrusion into Cambodia and its military zone. Following this, the Network of Thai People to Protect our Nation would hold a protest rally by the bordering province to pressure the Cambodian government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Government’s poor performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^86^ Rabbit is the animal of the year according to the Chinese zodiac.

^87^ Temples are perceived as the place to adopt pets or animals without an owner.
Comparing with Cambodian PM, John thinks Thai PM is disadvantageous. He also criticizes the poor performance of the Minister of foreign affairs in dealing with the Thailand-Cambodia conflict.

John: “When having a conflict with Hun Sen, Thai government is always naive. Hun Sen has got a cowboy look. He is like a big bad country bully. Compared with Hun Sen, our oxford-graduated Prime Minister is a bit disadvantageous.”

John: “This person, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is also very likeable among foreign countries, especially Cambodia. Whenever, they try to make an agreement, it has never been successful.”

He goes on reporting that recently the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand just wants to reconsider the relationship with Cambodia.

John: “Why? Do you want to have a personal
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.12-8.00</td>
<td>PM ensures the justice in the investigation of car accident.</td>
<td>John reports that the fatal crash between Honda Civic car and the passenger van which killed eight of the people in the van, angers the online community. People question the justice system when they knew that the driver of the Honda Civic was from a powerful and rich family.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John: “Why does the oxford-graduated Prime minister have the need to ensure people about a car accident by himself”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John: “You have to think by yourself if this is a matter of a high-class girl or a great loss of trust in the Thai justice system. They (police and prosecuting authorities) are not given any social trust, are they?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.50-9.15</td>
<td>Emotional judgment</td>
<td>John warns people not to be too emotional and judgmental. They should not be pleased for the</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Emotion over reason (people)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
extrajudicial killings, or be happy when the suspect is railroaded towards being guilty which has not been proven.
John: “(You) should THINK more carefully. Your brain is not just used for separating your ears.”

| 9.18-11.19 | Junior high school boys reportedly use plastic bag instead of condom. | John says, according to the recent research, junior high school boys in North Eastern part of Thailand reportedly like to use plastic bags for safe sex. He criticizes that the government’s campaigns for safe sex are ineffective.

John: “I must say that the campaign in promoting the use of condom is 50% successful. We need to think positively. POSITIVELY. At least, half of the message has infiltrated into the target group’s brain. Just a half is left.”

John continues to report that the researcher also claims that the condom campaign targets only students in big cities. Provincial students still lack knowledge about safe sex.

John: “This is because they have been promoting in the wrong way.” | -Ineffective policy and campaign (government/authorities) |
5. “If you want to know about palm oil, ask Lamud” (Thai: อยากถึงเรื่องน้ำมันปาล์มนั้นถามมาดู: YakRooRuengNammanPalmTamLamud)

Hosts’ appearance: John: Black t-shirt with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses

Place: studio

Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue

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<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.43-1.20</td>
<td>Thailand-Cambodia military border conflict escalates</td>
<td>John is holding a rifle while speaking.</td>
<td>John reports that the military conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border has intensified. John: “This can be a good opportunity for the Thai military to demonstrate their power in a real war with someone that doesn’t belong to his own country.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Military’s abuse of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.07-5.20</td>
<td>The shortage of palm oil</td>
<td>John is holding a palm oil bucket in one hand, and hitting it with the other hand. The bucket’s label says “Vegetable oil before 1 Liter per 560</td>
<td>Following the border tension, John says that some politicians even makes the situation worse by spreading, and exaggerating the panic all over the country. This leads to the rise in the price of food products, and especially the scarcity of palm oil.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Government’s poor economic management -Corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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88 Lamud is sapodilla, a kind of tropical sweet-tasting fruit.

89 Hitting an oil bucket (Thai: ติปป: TiPeep) is a metaphor which means spreading some messages widespread.
He says that what the government does make the simulation of the state of war. Then, there is a sketch, portraying the trade of palm oil in the black market during the War.

John continues to report that, to solve the palm oil problem, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, chairman of the National Palm Oil Policy Committee, decides to approve an import quota as well as to offer subsidies for local refineries in order to control the price. However, John suspects that the palm oil shortage could involve corruption.
John: “So was there enough palm oil or not? Why do we suddenly have palm oil right after the government has set an import quota and subsidies? Why does it (palm oil) immediately show up? It is like magic. Has this situation been set up?”

Besides, John also points out the drawback of this short-term solution.
John: “Everyone, do you think the government’s nine-baht per kilo subsidy comes from where? Do you think the government has retrieved it (subsidized money) from a sea somewhere? It is from our taxes! ”
John: “Whoever is being satisfied with the 47 baht price for oil. You have to think twice. It is 47+9, not 47”

In this scene, John is explaining why there is an import quota and price control for the palm oil. He says that these policies are imposed on the agricultural products that can be domestically produced. The import quota is to protect the...
domestic industry while the price control is to protect consumers. However, he does not agree with the policy as he thinks it is not good in the long run.

John: “So, in order to help the agricultural industries not to improve, and not to develop their capacity to be competitive on the world market which is more and more globalized, we, Thai people, led by our government, of course, including our governments in the past, are obliged to pay them (agricultural industries) subsidies (in form of tax), which help resist the market mechanism.

We are all Thai. We are easy. We are fine for anything. Just getting an impression that we can buy cheap stuff makes us grateful without thinking of the consequences.”

John: “It is said that palm oil, oops! The government reflects how people are.”
6. “Digging: Golden flower⁹⁰ and the blackout (don’t play around with words⁹¹)” (Thai: เจาะดงก้องจอดับ (ห้ามผ่าน): JorDokTongJorDub (HamPuan))

Hosts’ appearance: John: Black t-shirt with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses
Place: Studio

Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man

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<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.30-2.00</td>
<td>Television blackout</td>
<td>The screen turns dark. John and voodoo man are screaming and shouting while, the image of a tank is</td>
<td>John reports that the nationwide television blackout on April 21st for several hours causes a widespread panic over coup d’etat rumor. However, this accident is caused by the Thaicom 5 satellite out of orbit. John [shouting] “Accc Blackout! It is a coup d’état for sure. Accc Tank! Tanks will come definitely.”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Helicopter sound</td>
<td>-No security in telecommunications system</td>
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</table>

⁹⁰DokTong or golden flower can connote ‘whore.’ And, at that time, there is a famous TV series named the orange’s golden flower (DokSomSeeTong) that was warned to be censored for an inappropriate behavior of the leading lady character.

⁹¹ If turning around the words “JorDub,” which literally means blacked out screen, it can mean a prick hits on (whore).
| 2.26-3.40 | Three girls are arrested on charge of indecent exposure. | The picture of three girls in provocative clothes with black stripe on their eyes.  
The pictures of women in sexually suggestive clothes in Songkran festival appear.  
The pictures of an elephant trying to have sex with the other one while tourists are on top of their backs / the picture of Kantok / the picture of two | John mentions about the news regarding the arrest of three girls in Songkarn festival as they were dancing topless in a public place. However, John also attacks the conservative public figures who came out to give insulting opinions about these girls.  
John: [imitating a woman’s voice and gestures]  
“Why do girls nowadays have no shame at all? Our country has well-refined, and pristine culture just like a virgin girl, just like me.”  
John: [imitating a woman’s voice and gesture]  
“Songkran is the grand tradition which suggests the uniqueness of Thailand. It should not be tainted because of these three dirty girls. I CANNOT accept this! The scary thing is that tourists might misunderstand that our country has something dirty like this prevalently.  
The tourists come to (Thailand) just to ride an elephant, eat Kantok, and learn about the | “a virgin” | Scream sound | -Do not accept the unpleasant truth (people) |

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92 Songkarn festival is the celebration of Thai traditional New Year which is between 12th - 15th of May. In this festival, people traditionally throw water to each other.

93 Kantok is the traditional cuisine of northern Thailand.
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.46-4.45</td>
<td>Thai-Cambodian border clashes.</td>
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</table>

The DokSomSeeTong series title picture appears.

The composite picture of Hun Sen’s face on the shirtless strong muscled body and a weapon in his hands appears.

Then, the man’s body changes to the big-breast female body in a tiny cloth.

John reports that Thai and Cambodian troops exchange fire at the border again. He specifically rebukes Hun Sen.

John: “This is, as they call, “media is a poison.” I am sure that Hun Sen must have watched “DokSomSeeTong” so much until he has gone mad.”

John: “Hun Sen fires the gun Toom! then he screams…

[imitating a girl’s voice] Acc…daddy, look! They are bullying me!”

---

94 DokSomSeeTong was a famous Thai TV drama during March and April of 2010. It is a story about a dishonest and sinful girl who is willing to do anything to get what she wants and to have a better life.
The news clip video is showed depicting Hun Sen is crying in a press conference (with the voiceover from a scene in Thai TV drama by a female character). [Voice of the leading lady from DokSomSeeTong TV drama] "Why did you (mom) choose to be a servant? Why did you not do another job that doesn’t shame me? Why did you not work as a teacher, nurse, clerk..."

Besides, John also expresses his concern for people in the border area. John: "JorKawTuen wants to send his regards to every soldier. May God bless you with protection. I hope you are safe. And also, for the people living along the border, who have to escape the bombs which are sometimes fake, sometimes real, [sigh] do not give up yet."

John happily reports that PM Abhisit decides to delay the legislation to amend the 2007 computer crime act which is already restrictive. And, he still suggests people to always keep the government in check. John: "This is fabulous!"

John: "But you must never forget (to follow this"

| 5.30-7.39 PM | Abhisit agrees to postpone the legislation to revise the 2007 computer crime act which is already restrictive. And, he still suggests people to always keep the government in check. John: "This is fabulous!"

- Some legislations are problematic and grant a grand power to authority.
- Insufficient protection of one's own rights
- Unfairness in the justice system
issue). If this proposed revision of the computer crime act, (I really want to know who draft it. They must be genius), becomes a law, you should strictly tell your kids, if you have one, not to go within 100 meters of a computer.”

He, then, explains why this computer crime law proposal is a threat to people. In summary, there are the four major concerns that he mentions. Firstly, authorities are granted a huge power. Secondly, internet service providers are assigned too much responsibility, as they are liable for every single content on their websites even though they did not create it themselves. Thirdly, the law is open to a broad interpretation. And the last point is the harsh punishment.

John: “To put it simply, it is like the state wants to enforce the law prohibiting you not to “take a shit”. It is neither something like “Not taking a shit in a public place” nor “Not taking a shit on others’ heads.” But just “NOT TAKING A SHIT!” They know that “taking a shit” is a natural thing. Everyone has got to shit”

John: “I make this law just to punish the ones whose shit that I don’t like. Because I already said “Not taking a shit!” no shit! no shit! no shit! no shit! no shit! no shit! no shit!”
A lot of pictures of the prohibition sign of “No shit” appear by one by until they occupy all
7. “Digging: Pu’s government (Love you, Ta)” (Thai: เจ้าชีตาญญ์รักน้องเก่ง...นะ!: JorRattabanPu (RakNongTa…Na!)

Hosts’ appearance: John: Black suit, white shirt, and white-red ribbon neck tie with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses

Place: Studio

Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man, and performing sketches

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<tr>
<td>1.06-2.20</td>
<td>Pheu Thai party is elected as a new government</td>
<td>John reports that Pheu Thai Party forms a new coalition government occupying 300 out of 500 seats. He congratulates himself on having more new materials to play with. Even though, he is not satisfied with the Abhisit’s government, he does not hope that the new government, led by the Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, will be any better. John: “When I saw your thank-you sign after election, I could see some changes in your eyes, bro Mark.” [laughing] What have changed? (.)</td>
<td>- Power can bring out the worst in a good man.</td>
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</table>

95 The nick name of the currently-elected Prime Minister of Thailand, Yingluck Shinnawatra

96 Ta is a girl’s nick name
switches to the picture of Frodo Baggins. The picture of Gollum replaces the Frodo’s.

John is holding a ring, talking to himself. When he put the ring in his finger, he suddenly disappears. Then, he reappears in 1 second when taking off the ring.

| shouting | I know! bro Mark, you are back! You are back to the same person, bro Mark. I can see Frodo! The Frodo is back!” |
| John: “When you were a Prime Minister, you looked different.” |
| John: [creepy hoarse voice] “My precious…” |

| 3.27-4.10 | Banharn insists meeting with Thaksin in Dubai is personal. The pictures of Banharn and Thaksin appear together. Voodoo man is licking John’s shoulder like a dog. |
| John reports that Chart Thai Pattana chief adviser Banharn Silapa-archa, insists that his meeting with Thaksin Shinawatra, the brother of the Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, in Dubai, is just a personal meeting, and no negotiation on the cabinet seats. John does not believe his denial, though. John: “Ahh, how boring! Why don’t they all…-Politicians’ hypocrisy |

---

99 Mark is the nickname of the Former Prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of Democrat Party (DP).

97 Frodo is the leading character in the Lord of the rings, who takes a great responsibility to take the magic ring to destroy in the fire of Mount Doom.

98 Gollum is one of the main supporting characters in the Lord of the rings trilogy, who became a monstrous creature as ruled by the ring’s spell.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.43-7.01</td>
<td>Thaksin and Pheu Thai Party promise not to interfere in military decision.</td>
<td>John reports that Thaksin, the brother of PM Yingluck, and a news source from Pheu Thai Party says that the government would allow the military to appoint the minister of defense on their own, but they also have to be responsible for any troubles that might happen. John: “[making a foreigner’s Thai accent] So who is the head of the government of Thailand? The Prime Minister? The brother of the Prime Minister? And you (Thaksin) also warn them to be responsible for problems.” John: “You (Thaksin) urge them to be responsible, but how about your own messiness? Have you ever taken any responsibilities? Or this is the beginning of the reconciliation?” John: “[gentle voice] It is alright. You can do whatever you want. If you want something, just let me know. You want the ministry of defense? Sure, just take it! I told you I can give whatever you want. You want to appoint the Minister of...”</td>
</tr>
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</table>

- Prime Minister’s lack of real power
- Military’s inference in the political system
- Patronage system
intimately to the voodoo man who has a riffle in his hand. They hug each other sometimes. It seems like they are a couple. Defense by yourself? Yes Yes Yes Absolutely…..Tell me whatever you want, alright? I will do it for you. [hugging] Just please don’t take tanks around the city. And, I also want my ‘amnesty.' So everyone is satisfied, right? [clapping] Love you Mwah Mwah [hugging].”

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7.14-8.25 PM will not implement some impractical populist policies.

John reports that, in an interview with Reuters, PM Yingluck said that if some campaign policies (that she promised people during the election season) could not be practically done, she will not do it. John said that her speech triggers anger among people. He, however, critiques both the government who is a chameleon and people who are so susceptible.

John: “[shouting] What? You said like this? You are such a LIAR! You are better at talking than doing.”

John: [speaking for PM] “Are you serious? You really took the election seriously? I thought that it was symbolic”.

---

100 Currently, the ex Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is in exile. Thus, for him to enter to Thailand without any punishment, he needs King’s amnesty under the approval of the Thai government.
The Voodoo man is slipping over on the floor in the background.

The picture of the elderly appears

John: “Excuse me? Did you just knock your head on the floor? Some people chose you because they believed that you could really guarantee the 300-baht minimal wage, 15,000-baht entry-level salary for undergraduates, 1000-baht elderly allowance, and 50 line train station in Bangkok. Anyway, I can’t believe that there are people who believe her for real. They have such a positive thinking. Very positive. Such lovely people.”

Toom sound

“300”

“15,000”
8. “Digging: itchy numbers game” (Thai: เจาะค้นหวย: JorKanHuay)

Hosts’ appearance: John: Black suit, red-white shirt, and brown-white ribbon neck tie with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses

Place: Studio

Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man

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<tr>
<td>0.35-1.10</td>
<td>John won the numbers game</td>
<td>John announces that he won the numbers game, and teaches the audience how to guess the next lucky number. John: “I hate to brag, but I won the lottery! The floating yogi predicts that the next lucky number is the length between the Prime Minister’s tip of the nose and the left earlobe, multiplied by 3, divided by 2, and plus 7. And whatever number you got, don’t forget to shuffle the order of numbers.”</td>
<td>Clapping sound</td>
<td>-Prone to chance taking</td>
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101 There is a notorious song named “Kan Hu,” where “Kan” means “itchy,” and “Hu” means “ears.” Hu is close in sound to “Huey,” meaning “numbers game.” So “Kan Huey” means “itchy numbers game.” It is a way to play with words but does not really have an understandable meaning.

102 The numbers game is an underground illegal form of lottery which is carried out mostly in poor neighborhoods.
| 1.22-2.58 | The way to prevent Coup D’état | John reports that Tul Sithisomwong, the coordinator of the Network of Citizen Volunteers to Protect the Land, has suggested the way to prevent Coup D’état. Tul said that, instead of reforming the constitution which was not at all the solution, the government would rather let alone the military organize the Ministry of Defense themselves, and should not intervene in military affairs. However, John thinks that this is quite irrational. John: “Is this Ministry outside the system? It is an independent state or something else? Or doesn’t it receive the financial support just like other Ministries?” |  |
| --- | --- | --- |  |
| 5.08-6.40 | First populist policy is to be imposed. | John says that, finally, the first populist policy that the government has promised is implemented, which is the “first car, first house” policy. He explains that the government offer tax rebates on first-time cars at the maximum of 100,000 baht, limiting to 500,000 cars. In addition, for the first-time house, buyers will be offered the maximum of 10 per cent tax reduction for the properties that cost no more than five million baht. John disagrees with this policy, as the first-car tax rebate is likely to increase the traffic problems, “first car, first house” | -Military’s interference in political system -Problematic populist policies |
The pictures of congested bus, train, and other public transportations appear. Voodoo man is talking to John arrogantly.

and the first house tax cut policy tends to benefit the rich rather than the poor.
John: “They will waste a lot of tax that we have paid just to have more cars on the street, making it even more congested! Why don’t they spend that money on the development of a transportation system or something else?

They always like to do something weird!”

Voodoo man: “I earn 300 baht a day. I have got the Bangkokian credit card. I have got a tablet PC. I have got everything. I am an urban middle class man. They gotta indulge me so that I will elect them! Got it? Asshole”

9.47-10.38 Dummy CCTV cameras in Bangkok

John reports the hot debate about the Dummy CCTV cameras in Bangkok. The issue has begun from the online discussion in Pantip.com, when an internet user had discovered that some of the

-Poor security measure in Bangkok
The Bangkok governor explains that some of the CCTV cameras installed around Bangkok are dummy as intended to scare off criminals.

John: [Whisper] “Why did you admit that they (CCTV cameras) are dummies? I am afraid that criminals will hear it and your plan will not work anymore.”
9. “Digging: Abijood” (Thai: เจาะอาญจร์ด: Jor Abijood)

Hosts’ appearance: John: Black suit, black-white shirt, and red-black ribbon neck tie with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses
Place: Studio
Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man

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<th>Scene</th>
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<th>Key images</th>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>On screen text</th>
<th>Music and sound effect</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.30-1.19</td>
<td>Transport Permanent Secretary was found 200 million baht cash in his closet</td>
<td>The picture of the Transport Permanent Secretary appears on the left and the closet filled with money on the right.</td>
<td>John reports that 200 million baht cash is found in the Transport Permanent Secretary’s closet. John: “If I knew that a government official can earn this much money, I would not be hosting a crappy program like I do now. Why did my parents never tell me?”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.52-3.00</td>
<td>English accent becomes the central focus of criticism of politicians.</td>
<td>The video clip is played, depicting Chalerm is giving a speech in the video.</td>
<td>After replaying the video clip of Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung, who mentioned a Latin proverb during his speech, John and voodoo man parody and criticize his accent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unproductive criticism: paying attention too much on non-essential things</td>
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</table>

103 This word is translated according to the pronunciation in the Thai language. “Abijood” does not exist, and does not make any sense in the Thai language.
John and Voo doo man are talking to each other. But their criticism of Chalerm implicitly refers to people’s criticism of the PM’s English accent. John: “[imitating a girl’s voice] What? What did you say? It is so embarrassing. Such a terrible accent! Where did u graduate from? This is what they call ‘inaudible,’ ok? Your pronunciation is humiliating the country.”

Voo doo man: “You (John) look so intelligent!”

John: “Of course! Well, I don’t care about the government’s budget or something like that anymore. It is time to attack their accent.”

John reports that Army spokesman Col Sansern Kaewkumnerd claims that Thai army did not decide to use snipers and tanks in the crackdown against the redshirts by themselves, but the Ex-Premiere Abhisit, and the Ex-deputy PM Suthep did order them to do so.

However, John speculates that neither of them will be punished.

John: “I guess that everyone will be proved guilty, and then, they will clean themselves off with the amnesty”

John: “Whatever we did, we forget about them, ok? No one is wrong. You are not wrong. I am not wrong. Even though, some people have died, that is still fine. We can pretend that it didn’t happen.”

Thai army denies an involvement in the killing of red-shirt protesters.

The composite picture of Sansern with the doll’s eyes appear, together with the pictures of tanks and a soldier.

4.16-4.58

-In-Ta-Li-Jen

-inaudible

-Unaccountability (government/authorities)

-People never learn their lesson
<table>
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<tr>
<td>5.00-6.00</td>
<td>People are not interested in serious and complicated issues.</td>
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John is talking to the voodoo man who is playing with his smartphone.

Voodoo man asks John about “Nitirat”. But John refuses to explain anything about it because it is too complicated.

John: “It (Nitirat’s proposal) is too difficult. It is really complicated and made me get a headache.”

John: [imitating girl’s voice] “Can you ask me something easier? I got so confused. I am sure that this must be a difficult issue, and I will not be able to understand it for sure. So I didn’t want to put in any effort (to understand it) from the beginning.”

Besides, John and Voodoo man also discuss about how useful social networks, especially, are.

Voodoo man: “I am following Twitter. You know, only if we have the Twitter and Facebook, we can write news.”

Voodoo man: “Nowadays, Emotion is trendy! Facts, and evidences are not necessary anymore [laughing]”

- Emotion over reason (people)
- Untrustworthy news (media and news industry)
10. “The end of the world/The stars/54” (Thai: สิ้นโลก/ดารา/54: SinLok/Dara /54)

Hosts’ appearance: John: White suit, black shirt, and brown-white ribbon neck tie with black sunglasses, Voodoo man: White Thai voodoo-like dress with prayer beads and big toy sunglasses

Place: Studio

Predominant presentation methods: Delivering a monologue, interaction and dialogue between John and voodoo man

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<td>2.08-4.40</td>
<td>The nickname of PM Yingluck</td>
<td>The picture of “clay-pot glass-noodle crab” dish with the face of PM Yingluck on it.</td>
<td>At the end of the year, it is the tradition that the government, politicians as well as independent organizations will be given a nickname by news media and certain organizations. In John’s report, PM Yingluck Shinawatra, whose nickname is Pu, is given a nickname “clay-pot glass-noodle crab” by The Political Science Association of Kasetsart University. PM Yingluck can be compared to an expensive crab that hides underneath cheap glass noodle (her surroundings).</td>
<td>-PM’s lack of the real power</td>
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104 54 is the abbreviation of 2554 B.E., which equals the year 2011. It is a year in Buddhist Era (B.E.), which precedes 543 years B.C.

105 Pu literally means crab.

106 The clay-pot glass-noodle crab is a kind of food which is mainly made from crab and glass noodle.
John: “She suits better the nickname “clay-pot glass-noodle crab’s soul” because I cannot really find the real crab in this dish. It is cheating consumers.”

| 2.35-3.20 | The nickname of Independent organizations | Independent organizations that provide a check and balance system, such as NACC\(^{107}\), EC\(^{108}\), and OAG\(^{109}\), have received the nickname “Ghostbusters” as they usually wait until one of the alleged is no longer alive, and quickly judge that one guilty. He presents the examples of corruption cases in the past probed by such organizations. It is apparently that only passed away politicians have been found guilty. Otherwise, the cases have passed the statute of limitations. John: “So if you don’t want to be guilty, Don’t DIE!” | -Unfairness in justice system (government/authorities) |

| 3.25-4.35 | Former Abhisit’s personal spokesman’s response to In addition, the opposition leader Abhisit has also been given nicknames, for example, “Delayed Politicians’ poor performance” |  |

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\(^{107}\) The office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission

\(^{108}\) The office of the Election Commission of Thailand

\(^{109}\) The office to the Office of the Auditor General of Thailand
Abhisit’s given nicknames

The captured screen of Twitter@Thepthai

handsome,” by Government House reporters, and “Always-ready handsome,” by The Political Science Association of Kasetsart University.

Moreover, the former personal spokesman of Abhisit, Thephai Senpong, whom John always dubs as “the hero’s assistant” also gives an opinion about Abhisit’s nicknames on his Twitter page.

John: “And you bet, in this scene, the hero’s assistant must show off again”

Twitter@Thepthai says “either “Delayed handsome,” or “Always-ready handsome, he is definitely handsome, right?”

John: “Yes, absolutely. He is handsome no matter what. This party’s members are all handsome… Their selling point is so strong, which is HANDSOME!”

5.00-6.00 John teaches people to be self-examining.

While John is speaking, voodoo man is parodying his lip movement, and

John: “Dear respected audiences of JawKawTuen. With all due respect, I would always be respectful towards you. Have you noticed that in this country when

Be self-examining (people and society)
greeting. Honorable men are about to fight, they always pay respect to each other way too often? But I am not going to fight with you, anyway. I fucking respect ya'all! It is now almost to the end of the year. Philosophers usually preach that as a human being, one should look back into the past to examine what we have done. At least we should look to what we have done in the past year. Were we good or bad? What mistakes did we make? What should be done in order to fix it? This helps us plan what to do in the future.” “If nothing will be any better, at least your lives shouldn’t be fucked up more than as it is!”