Decision-making in the Security Council, States

Conduct and its consequences

A theory developing study aimed to explain the behaviour of states in the

UN Security Council

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Abstract

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The chief purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical framework which can contribute to a broader theoretical understanding of the actions of the U.N. Security Council and its members. The framework rests upon a rationalistic foundation and it is set up with two different models of explanation; a first with focus on power and security and the second which is an institutional explanation. The framework is then applied on a case study in which the behavior of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Security Council are explained. The outcome of the paper is worth mentioning that the member nations have find the Security Council to be an important institution and that there is an apprehension of the precedential power of the institution. The study also points out that a permanent member is more likely to use its veto when there are strong national reasons of so doing. In general the developed theoretical framework seems to be well appropriate to explain states behavior in the Security Council and may provide a foundation for further theoretical studies on the subject.

**Key Words:** U. N. Security Council, Foreign Policy Analysis, Institutionalism, International security and power
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1. Introduction

It can often be seen in the contemporary debate a deep disappointment at the United Nations (UN) ineffectiveness in dealing with difficult conflicts and the council’s inability to maintain some kind of global law and order.

This aggravation is mainly pointed towards matters of the UN Security Council. The council often has to stand as a symbol for as well as the United Nations as for the international community, and their attempts to prevent human sufferings and conflicts in the world. One issue that is frequently in question is why the Security Council does not take any actions to stop these conflicts. The Security Council who is also an institutionalized cooperation, which aims to promote international peace and security, the question in a sense, can be seen as being authorized and justified. But since the Security Council which is also an inter-governmental cooperation, it should be a more vital question, that why states are acting like they do in the Security Council? Why the UN did not intervene in Rwanda or Srebrenica was because of how the member states conduct, it was the Security Council members who sanctioned the US-led intervention in Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1991, while its member’s behavior twelve years later meant that the intervention in Iraq in 2003 was not sanctioned by the Security Council members’ nations.

Therefore, this paper aims to seek explanations for the Security Council members' behavior by studying the U.S.A and United Kingdom’s behavior in the Security Council. Security Council's mission is to promote international peace and security and the UN member states have been given the authority to make internationally binding decisions and are committed to comply with Security Council decisions and implement them. Security Council's 15 members, five of those members have veto power, and therefore have the ability to impose sanctions against a state, authorizing troops to preserve peace in another, and establish an international tribunal in a third. In extreme cases, they can decide if a military intervention on the nation is necessary. How the member states, especially the permanent acts, thus is influencing the international politics.

Therefore the aim of the paper is to find explanations to Security Council member states operate by studying United Kingdom and United States of America’s actions in the Security Council.
1.1.1 Brief introduction to the Security Council

After the League of Nations failed there was among the leading states a common liability to an international institution that demanded more focus on power politics and reality than on charity and wishful thinking (Hatch 2006:11). World War II victorious powers USA, China, USSR and Great Britain were seen as potential "world police", Franklin D. Roosevelt illustrated his vision when he was on Christmas Eve in 1943 explained that these four nations with their allies, representing more than three-quarters of the world's population, the risk of a utopian new world war is quite evident- if those nations with the dominant military force acted together to maintain peace (Hatch 2006:11). The five permanent members now even France which had been incorporated among the permanent agreed on the importance of consensus between them and the veto was incorporated, after very lengthy negotiations, the UN Charter (Art. 27 (3)) adopted on 26 June 1945. Security Council's primary responsibility on the UN members' behalf is to main international peace and security (UN Charter Art. 24 (a)). Under Article 25 the UN members agrees to accept and carry out Security Council decisions? Thus, Security Council decisions become binding under the international law.

This is different from for example the General Assembly, whose resolutions only are recommendations. To maintain international peace and security, the Security Council under Chapter VI shall primarily seek a peaceful settlement between the two parties (art. 33, art. 34). Under Chapter VII of the Security Council’s charter the council has the right to decide with enforcement actions under Article 41(sanctions, the establishment of international tribunals and embargoes) or as a last option under Article 42 (through military means) to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Security Council is thus the only global organization with international legal assistance to take action to implement the decisions that has been made. The Council consists since 1963 of 15 members, instead of the initial 11th besides the five permanent members of the Council consists of ten non-permanent members elected for two years with 2 / 3 majority in the General Assembly. The temporary seats are divided among the different regional groups in the United Nations. The temporary members will not be re-elected with immediate effect.

1.2 PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

The purpose of this paper is to give an explanation of how the Security Council and its member nations conduct in different situations. Without the ambition to contribute the paper therefore aims primarily at creating a framework for explaining the behavior of states in the
The prepared framework is based on two models of explanation for the states behavior: the first explanatory model is addressed to states, the pursuit of security and power in the international system while the second model has a more institutional focus. The framework will then be used in a case study in which Great Britain and America's response to each of two resolutions will be analyzed. This means that in the case study there will be made four observations.

The paper is not intended to create a framework that can fully explain the states actions in Security Council, the reason being the study's access to time, space and material is limited. The study should therefore be seen as a small attempt and a contribution to a better theoretical understanding of states behavior in the Security Council. There is also a secondary goal that the frameworks design also works as an explanatory base as used to describe how states act in other institutions, but even this possibility is limited by the circumstances mentioned above.

To achieve the purpose of the study, I will answer the following questions:

- How can the UK and U.S. actions in the Security Council be explained by the states quest for power and security in the international system, and institutionalism?
- How can the states' actions in the Security Council be explained through the paper’s theoretical framework?

As both the purposes, as well as the questions, are complementary the questions have several additional questions that have implications for the paper’s final evaluation of the framework. As the framework will be applied to several different resolutions with different outcomes and on two different countries, it is quite evident to wonder if the framework is better suited to analyze either the selected state or outcome. It is also natural to ask whether explanations within the framework differ depending on the state, outcome and the type of question, as to say whether any explanatory model seems to better explain certain events.

1.3 METHOD AND MATERIAL

A research paper is characterized largely by the choice and thus also by the importance of making choices. The necessity to make choices should be considered in light of James Rosenaus claim that "It is sheer craziness to Dare to Understand world affairs" (in Ericson
The choices made are the result of - maybe sometimes a compromise between - will to be able to explain everything and facilitate a scientific work.

All phenomena in world politics can not be explained in a study, it is too obvious. To be able to give a satisfactory explanation to a particular event or phenomena is a performance in itself. Therefore several choices are made, and these choices affect the work, the design, the result of the analysis, and what inferences can be drawn. It is therefore the duty of the author to explain the choices made and why they have been made. Some central choices of the paper that have been made will be discussed below

The paper is based on Hudson's and Vores (1995) definition, and considered as a contribution to the IR as it is called Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), or foreign policy analysis. Within FPA there are countless and different starting points, but the lowest common denominator is an FPA examination of how foreign policy decisions are made. Within FPA explanations are sought for the states behavior by being seen as individual entities in the international system. The view as a homogeneous state breaks down and explanations are sought at several levels, including within the state (Hudson and Were, 1995:209 f, Gustavsson 1998:16).

1.3.1 Case Studies

That the study consists of a case study has already been discussed, not least as part of the discussion around the thesis purpose. However, the topic deserves further discussion in which, among other things the case study’s advantages and disadvantages are discussed, as well as there should be reasoning about the choice of cases. Qualitative case studies are one of the more common methods of social science studies and applied either in one or more cases. (Burnham et al. 2004:53). The advantage of only focusing on one single case is that the researcher is provided with an opportunity to a more comprehensive analysis of the case and thus gets a more comprehensive picture of an event (Gustavsson, 1998:7). Multiple case studies, in turn, provide a better opportunity to generalize and if any examination of theories, the explanatory power becomes more rigorous (Burnham et al 2004:55). As consequently, individual case studies are used primarily to achieve specific knowledge, while several cases are used to reach general knowledge (Ericson 2000:23).

This study is designed as a qualitative case study where the framework is applied to an individual case - the Security Council. At the same time the case study contains of different observations in the form of various resolutions. To use only one case has been criticized for
giving answers that are vague and indefinite, since factors that generally have a decisive importance can be overlooked in the individual case. The study can also be said to be susceptible to misinterpretation of the material and reduce possibility of generalizations (Hopkins 2002:249, Tallberg 1999:17 ff). Individual case studies can, according to Magnus Ericson, only contribute to general knowledge if they are governed by theory and is structured in a way that enables compass ratio (Ericson 2000:24). Used general theoretical variables for the description and explanation of the case, while there are several observations in the case, says Jonas Tallberg that the ability to generalizations increases further (Tallberg 1999:19). Tallberg also believes that the study comparative element to be made explicit to allow generalizations from individual case studies. Based on the above line of reasoning, I am arguing that the choice of using a single case study is in agreement with the study's end. Depending on that in the case study there are several cases, or observations, you can also make multiple comparisons in the case, for example, between the two states and between different resolutions. This should enable also limited generalizations about the conduct of states in the Security Council. Together with the existing general variables in the form of the two explanatory models that should be applied to other similar cases, allowing very limited generalizations about the states behavior in other institutions. It is, however, as mentioned earlier subordinate aim to draw conclusions about the States actions in the Security Council. Finally, it must be emphasized, like Ericson do, that generalizations in the social sciences are conditional and that a generalization can not be assumed to be forever true (Ericson 2000:23).

**Why the Security Council?**

The Security Council as an institution has been previously shown to have played a relatively minor role within the study of international relations. Among realists, the Security Council has been considered an arena in which powerful states can implement their policies. Among institutionalisms lard and integration theorists, the Council has been overshadowed by the more economically oriented institutions such as the WTO, IMF and EU. Therefore, the justification of the choice to study the Security Council is quite appropriate.

For me it is quite clear that the Security Council plays a great role in international politics. It is evident not least by the commitment and the hard work that the Council members actually put out on the Security Council. This can be exemplified by Colin Powell's presentation before the Iraq war in 2003; on the work of states have spent at the member's candidature tours or the energy to several states attaches to bring about a reform of the Council that would
impose new permanent members. It can also be exemplified by how all Council members for
ten hours, without interruption for food, discussed a non-binding press statement on the
British seamen who were taken into custody by Iranian border police in spring 2007.
Although the Security Council's composition must consider somewhat anachronistic, it is
nevertheless a fact that the world's military powers come together daily for consultations on
international peace and security. Finally, you can not deviate from the mass media and public
interest that exists for the Security Council and the (from and to the unrealistic) hopes placed
on the UN Security Council.

Why United Kingdom and the USA?

United Kingdom and U.S. are two countries that may be considered central to the Security
Council's ability to reach agreements, not only through their veto power, but also due to the
several questions that keeps them close to each other. This applies particularly to questions of
sovereignty and external interference in internal affairs. The two states also differ
constitutionally (one-party / multi-party system) and the degree of international involvement
(relative little / much). Choosing two permanent members also expands the analysis of
potential temporal span, which may be deemed to benefit the thesis purpose.

1.3.2 Theoretical Discussion and Output

All forms of scientific work has to consider the view of ontology (the science of things
present) and epistemology (theory of knowledge), and these points control to a large extent
the forms and results of the paper. According to David Marsh and Paul Furlong a researcher’s
view on these concepts is immutable as they reflect the researcher's view on science. They are
to use their words, not a sweater to put on and off (Marsh and Furlong 2002:21). As I have
chosen a method which facilitates the explanatory models with similar epistemological basis,
the paper’s ontological and epistemological starting points is a sequence of that. Therefore,
the paper’s ontological and epistemological starting points do not necessarily have to reflect
the author's in all respects. This could be regarded as a weakness; however, I mean as Ericson
that no description can make the world completely fair and no explanation can capture its true
essence (Ericson 2000:20). Unlike Marsh and Furlong, Ericson says, and I, that all
methodological choices have advantages and disadvantages a scientist should be pragmatic
and adopt a position that best serves the paper’s purpose (Ericson 2000:21). Thus it is
emphasized once again that the paper is not intended to provide a comprehensive explanation,
but must be seen as an attempt to provide a partial explanation for the states actions in the Security Council. In this light, I believe that the chosen method is best suited to the intended study.

The paper is based on a man's quest for utility maximization, and may be considered rationalistic. However, rationality is considered to be subject to contexts, rules or standards within which players act (the international anarchy, the intra-state and the institutional) which means that the paper’s ontological basis is not strictly positivist. The ontological starting point can instead be denominated as realistic\(^1\), as it is the consequences, not the formation, of the structures that is studied. However the paper’s epistemological starting point is well in accordance with the traditional positivism, the study assumes that the world can be analyzed and generalizing explanations for social phenomena as a result of that can be given (Marsh and Furlong 2002:20, Ericson 2000:68). Patterns and thus the possibility of generalization in international relations are certainly not as clear as in science. However, I agree with Gustavsson that in the social sciences there is sufficient with regular patterns to make contingent generalizations and create theories (Gustavsson 1998:5).

1.3.3 Theory Choice

As mentioned earlier, it is due to the results of the paper’s limitations, impossible to attain an absolutely comprehensive explanation to the behaviour of states; therefore some limitations are necessary and must be made. Some potential explanations must be considered more important, broader or more possible and therefore also be more emphasized over others (Keohane and Nye 1989:58). The realistic conceptual sphere, which also is the basis for the first explanation model (a), dominated a long time the International Relations (IR) debate and is to some extent the traditional theory that other theories have to relate to.

As the states are acting within an institution, then the institution's existence is a prerequisite for the study, it is quite obvious to search explanations from institutionalism, i.e. the institution's impact on the states' actions.

A further aspect in the choice of theories, of course, is the paper’s rationalistic basis. Therefore, some theories are automatically excluded so that it could contribute to a more complete explanation, for example, there are among constructivist theorists such as Martha Finnemore with great interest for the institutions (see, for example, Finnemore 1996, Barret

\(^1\) A realistic view on ontology should not be exchanged with the traditional IR-theory called Realism. The latter will be explained in the theory chapter
I am aware that the choice to develop a framework based on rationalistic grounds can be criticized for example, for the emergence of norms, ideas and the identity’s role is neglected. These are factors that were likely to contribute to further understanding. Despite the realization that this study will not give a comprehensive explanation for the behavior of states, including as a result of what has been outlined above, I consider that the profit of being able to make limited generalizations using several theoretically shaped observations extends over time and addresses both the topics that states overcome the possible my losses somewhat strict methodological basis bring with them. Hopefully, the study can help to fill a small part of the void I think I have found in my initial literature search of both the states acting as the Security Council.

1.3.4 Materials

The theoretical framework's architecture is based primarily on books and scientific papers of theorist whose books served as the basis for the different explanatory models. This material has been used to as well as possible adapted to this study. The theoretical work that mainly contributed to the paper's methodology and therefore the basis for the theoretical framework’s design is Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s "Power and Interdependence" (1989). Several of Keohane other works have also been central to the framework's content, as well Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal’s "Why States Act through Formal International Institutions "(1998)

The empirical data comes from three sources. Much of the empirical material is the primary material in the form of resolutions, voting explanations and from meetings of the Security Council. In addition to the basic data are empirical material directly related to the observed resolutions taken by the media. The use of media in an academic study can certainly be criticized in some quarters, but I maintain that, like Gustavsson journalistic texts can indeed be methodologically naive, but that as a result of Journalists working skills and proximity to the events contain credible empirical (Gustavsson 1998:11). Since I largely am using the New York Times, which arguably is a daily newspaper with among the best reporting of the Security Council's daily work, it may be considered a credible source. Some resolution-specific empirical work has also drawn from academic articles and books and should be considered as a reliable source. In addition to the resolution of specific empirical data, I have also used the general type of literature to get a broader understanding of both analyzed states
foreign policy affairs. The main sources of a general understanding of American foreign policy has been considerably more and some primary sources are difficult to point out, but Sarah Sewall and Carl Kaysen’s (red) "The United States and the International Criminal Court" (2000) and Peter Woodward's "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa" (2007) have been quite useful.

1.3.5 Disposition

After the introductory chapter, where the main purpose of the thesis and the methodological aspects are discussed the second section follows, where the thesis theoretical framework is shaped. This section is only an examination of the two explanatory models where the fundamental concepts relevant to the study are presented. The paper's third section consists of the analysis. The analysis is based on a single section, based on the voting outcome from the resolutions. The paragraph in turn consists of two observations of the states action – two observations per state. Each observation is divided into two parts where the two explanatory models are applied. It should be emphasized that they were not pitted against each other but designed to complement each other. The setup is rather the result of a desire to make visible the different explanatory models different focus and ambition to perform a structured analysis. The fourth and final section of the paper is the conclusion which results from the analysis presented, from which conclusions are drawn. In addition, an evaluation of the framework's usefulness and explanatory power; while the study's overall relevance to the study of international relations is discussed.

2. Theory

2.1. INTERNATIONAL POWER AND SECURITY

In this first explanatory model explanations are sought for the behavior of states, mostly in their quest for maintaining a position of power and the maintenance of national security in the international anarchy. Without any doubt, it is realism, with the theory tradition that is most clearly focusing on states quest for power and security, which is why most of the following is taken from realistic theorists such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Joseph Grieco.
The state is considered in this declaration to be the main player in the international anarchy which primarily affects the actions of the state. The anarchy is seen as a self-help system in which if the states fail to protect its vital interests quickly are punished. As a result, the states acts as homogeneous and rational actors based on their self-interest, defined on the basis of power and security. The states actions can at times be driven by greed or moral ambitions, it is considered to be irrational and therefore can not be considered other than in descriptive studies (Grieco 1988:498). State's primary goal is not wealth, but survival. Which means that each possible interaction between states is calculated along comparative advantage (Grieco 1988:488, 498; Mearsheimer 1995:12)? The main goal of a state’s action is to avoid the relative terms, increased military power of rival states. The state is also seen as positional, which means that it primarily is inclined to maintain the current balance of power and its position of power in the international system. The state seeks primarily not to maximize its power and is therefore primarily defensive oriented (Grieco 1988:498, Waltz 1979:126). The mistrust that characterizes states relations with each other, however, the state can never ensure that competing state's intention, and then it is often perceived as aggressive along security dilemma’s premises (Hertz 1959:234, Mearsheimer 1995:11). Although power and Security is primarily defined in terms of military power, states are constantly looking for even relative economic benefits as the economy has clear implications on a state's military power and security (Mearsheimer 1995:20).

**Security and power in the institutions**

The states constantly defining the interest on the basis of power and security get immense implications for the international institutions. That the state is positional is reflected in the state’s fear that competing states shall with the help of the institution entrench their comparative advantages which will alter its position in the international system. In such a scenario it is unlikely that the deprived state wishes to remain in the institutionalized cooperation (Grieco 1988:499). Existing institutions are also considered to be a reflection of powerful states calculations and is primarily a means for powerful states to achieve or maintain power and exercise power politics (Mearsheimer 1995:13). International institutions serve as Waltz said national rather than international, interests, and their possible impact on the states behavior depends on how the state choose to use it. Waltz argues that powerful states tend to use the institutions as they interpret the laws, in a way that benefits them (Waltz 2000:9 f).
Thus, realists believe that institutions, as a result of states’ quest for power, have very little independent effect on the states actions and the international system. Mearsheimer writes for example that "what is most impressive about the institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect that seems to have had on states behavior " (Mearsheimer 1995:25). He also points out that institutions may indeed seem to be relevant, such as the EC’s sanctions against Argentina in the Falklands War. However, this was under Mearsheimer a result of any other EC member had to do any authentic sacrifice, while the issue was far from their core interests. The department's impact was therefore very small (Mearsheimer 1995:25).

2.2 INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS

With the help of the institution legalistic explanation model explanations will be sought based on institutions 'impact on the states' conduct, to say is institutionalism. The basis for this explanatory model is retrieved from theorists such as when a categorization would be made and they would end up in the neo-liberal institutionalisms, or regime theorists. Robert O. Keohane, with inter alia “After Hegemony” (1984) and "Power and Interdependence" (1989), may be considered the primarily symbolized in the crowd of theorists who have sought explanations for the states cooperation with each other, and of which the second explanatory model of the paper is inspired from. The section will not immerse themselves in the various divisions that exist between academics in the field, but rather point out certain aspects relevant to the purpose of the thesis. Like the first explanatory model assumes does also the institution legalistic explanation model from man's utility-maximizing effort, which results in that states in the international anarchy also are looking to maximize their interests. States strives to maximize its absolute advantages rather than its comparative advantages and cooperation seems to be considered mutually beneficial. It is thus considered to be a positive sum game in which both parties prefer, and assumes to gain profit on, by a mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, the risk and fear of deviating among the states still remains high. By institutionalized cooperation the uncertainty can be reduced, thereby also increase opportunities for a more effective cooperation (Hascenclever et al 1996:185)? The reduction of uncertainty is a result of what Keohane and Axelrod call by using the term “future shadow,” which means that calculations of the act's impact are not only made by the immediate gains but is done with the knowledge that the parties will meet again (Axelrod and Keohane 1985:232). In the case that one party deviates today, it is likely that the other party will deviate in a future issue. The more important an issue for the future is considered, the
more likely it is that one party is willing to compromise in an earlier issue (Axelrod and Keohane 1985:232).

Institutionalism

Central to the explanatory model is that the state’s action is influenced by the regimes where expectations of the state behavior have been formalized (Burchill 2001:40). Definitions of regimes are many, and the difference between the regime and the institution is often marginal, as witnessed by the various definitions below. Perhaps the most common definition of regime is Stephen Krasner’s, which Andreas Hasenclever describes as a consensus definition. Krasner argues that regimes are "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and procedures for decision making around which actors' expectations coincide within a certain area of international relations "(Hasenclever et al 1996:179 [author’s translation]). Keohane has a definition that aims to avoid all the divergent interpretations of the concept, and thus make it more analytically manageable, described the regimes that institutions in the form of agreed rules in specific areas of international relationships (Hasenclever et al 1996:180). An international institution is defined by Simmons and Martin as a set of rules designed to govern and regulate international behavior and the term international institution has in some cases come to replace the concept of regime(2002:194).

Apparently, the definitions of the regime and the institution are very similar in many cases; therefore any real distinction between the regime and the institution will not be made in the paper. In the forthcoming analysis, the notion of institution, defined here as rules and standards will be used to regulate how states conduct. Norms are defined here as guidelines for behavior based on rights and responsibilities while rules are considered to be specific regulations for states possible actions within the department (Hasenclever 1996:179). The choice to use the term institution is a natural result of the ambition of the explanatory model to explain institutionalization of influence on states behavior. The concept of institutionalism is used according to Hasenclever to explain the institutions' impact on international politics (Hasenclever et al 1996:178).

2.3 FRAMEWORK IN THE ANALYSIS
As noted, the two explanatory models most central aspects are in common. Meanwhile, the explanatory models' differences provide the framework of its broader explanatory power, the explanatory models are to complement each other rather than compete with each other. Central to this explanation on the basis of international power and security is the states efforts to maintain their position of power in the international anarchy. To achieve this goal, the state primarily has to struggle over competing states to establish it with comparative advantages, which also applies to the institutional cooperation. Be deemed to be the fight between the state actors with potentially separate foreign policy interests, whereby the adoption of the state as a unified actor contradicted. The state is therefore looking to the institutional partnerships meet the state interests in the interaction with other states. Although they differ mainly in the level of analysis, the framework's adoption is not in any way that it is either one or the other explanation that could explain the behavior of states. Both explanations are presumed to contribute to the understanding of state behavior in institutionalized cooperation, but also for states acting outside the same. Institution legalistic explanation is also based on the belief in the utility-maximizing man / State. However, assumed that the state's rational, utility-maximizing behavior changes depending on whether the interaction takes place in an institution or not. Thus looking framework by means of institutionalism explain States' actions in institutions, because in both the government quest for power in the international anarchy that of government efforts.

As a result a number of theoretical assumptions are made in the theoretical framework’s design;

• The state and its rulers seek power and utility maximization.
• The government is acting in an international anarchy.
• Government action is in some degree subject to institutionalism.

It is this framework that will guide the analysis and eventually lead to conclusions about how United Kingdom and the U.S. behavior in the Security Council can be explained, from which limiting generalizations about states' action in the Security Council can be drawn.

3. ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION TO VETO.

United Nations Security Council and the Veto Power
The United Nations Security Council "power of veto" refers to the veto power wielded solely by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), enabling them to prevent the adoption of any "substantive" draft Council resolution, regardless of the level of international support for the draft. The veto does not apply to procedural votes, which is significant in that the Security Council's permanent membership can vote against a "procedural" draft resolution, without necessarily blocking its adoption by the Council (Global Policy Forum, 2008).

The veto is exercised when any permanent member the so-called "P5" casts a "negative" vote on a "substantive" draft resolution. Abstention or absence from the vote by a permanent member does not prevent a draft resolution from being adopted by origins of the veto provision (Hunt, C., 2006).

Almost half the vetoes in the history of the Security Council were cast by the Soviet Union, with the vast majority of those being before 1965. Since using its first veto in 1946, Russia has been the most frequent user of the veto. (United Nations General Assembly Document 856)

Between 1946 and 2007, vetoes were issued on 384 occasions. For that period, usage breaks down as follows:

United States has used the veto on 82 occasions between 1946 and 2007. (ICISS.ca, December 2001). Russia/the Soviet Union has used the veto on 123 occasions, more than any other of the five permanent members of the Security Council. (A/58/47 Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council", July 2004)

3.1.1. USA: Resolution taken on Iraq war resolution 1441

UNSC resolution 1441 was passed unanimously on November 8, 2002 to give Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous resolutions (resolution 660, resolution 661, resolution 678 etc.).

The resolution strengthened the mandate of the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), giving them authority to go anywhere, at any time and talk to anyone in order to verify Iraq’s disarmament." (United States Department of State: 2003)
On the day of the vote the US ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, assured the Security Council that there were no "hidden triggers" with respect to the use of force, and that in the event of a "further breach" by Iraq, resolution 1441 would require that "the matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in paragraph 12." However, he then added: "If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security." (United Nations Security Council Verbatim Report meeting 4644, (2002).

**Doubts in the British government**

Then UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw sent a secret letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair in April 2002 warning Blair that the case for military action against Iraq was of "dubious legality." The letter goes on to state that “regime change per se is no justification for military action” and that “the weight of legal advice here is that a fresh [UN] mandate may well be required.” Such a new UN mandate was never given. The letter also expresses doubts regarding the outcome of military action. ([Wilmshurst Resignation Letter](#), 2005)

In March 2003, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, then deputy legal adviser to the British Foreign Office, resigned in protest of Britain's decision to invade Iraq without Security Council authorization. Wilmshurst also insinuated that the British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith also believed the war was illegal, but changed his opinion several weeks before the invasion. ([Iraq Resolution 1441, 2003](#)) and ([BBC News, 18 November 2008](#))

In 2010, the deputy prime minister Nick Clegg, during prime minister's questions in Parliament, asserted that the Iraq war was illegal. Statements issued later suggested that this was a personal view and not a formal view of the coalition government.

**International power and security**

The 2003 invasion of Iraq has become the largest, longest, and most costly use of armed force by the United States since the Vietnam War. It is the first major post-Cold war U.S. military action taken apart from an international organization and the first U.S. experience as an occupying power in a Middle Eastern country. Although the invasion decision is in some respects unprecedented, particularly concerning extensive U.S. military involvement in an Arab or Muslim country, the contention here is that the Iraq invasion is not sui generis and can be usefully understood with reference to established theories of war causes (Lieberfeld, Daniel, 2005: 1).
Realism helps to explain aspects of foreign policy that remain consistent over time. From a realist perspective, decisions by governments (or “states”) to go to war are the product of all states’ involuntary participation in eternal quests for power and security due to an international political environment in which each state fears the actual or potential hostility of other states. Leaders rationally calculate war’s costs and benefits in terms of their state’s power and security. States’ international behavior thus reflects the constraints imposed on their actions by their relative power position (ibid: 2ff).

The Bush administration has been forthright about its goal of global hegemony, a power so complete that challenging it becomes nearly inconceivable. Bush’s (2002a) West Point speech declared, “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.” Given this strategic objective, overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s government can be understood as an effort to enhance U.S. reputational and symbolic power beyond challenge, particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks that might have made the U.S. appear vulnerable (ibid: 3). President Bush, once publicly declared that the first priority of the U.S. is to change the Iraq regime. This was a matter of reputation for the U.S. to willingly use force for the regime change. Bush made war nearly inevitable due to the national security interest in protecting that reputation. This reputational motive can be an explanation to why the Bush administration targeted Iraq, the other countries as North Korea, Iran, or Libya whom at that time had a much more advanced WMD program, and these countries were a larger threat to the U.S. security than Iraq was known to be.

Another motive to why Iraq in particular was targeted can be Iraq’s geostrategic location, which impinged on multiple security concerns of the U.S., and to Iraq’s nearly unsurpassed oil resources, which it could potentially deploy against U.S. interests. Military bases in Iraq would enable the U.S. to project its power further into the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, and could replace the less secure bases that the U.S. established in Saudi Arabia after the 1999 Gulf war (United States Department of Defense, 2003).

The invasion was a rational means for the U.S. to achieve its primary goal of demonstrating its power to allies and competitors alike, and of avoiding the appearance of post-9/11 decline. As well, it was intended to prevent Iraq’s actual or potential use of WMD and oil resources to threaten the U.S. or its allies, and to prevent Iraq’s potential collaboration with anti-U.S. terrorist groups. The U.S. national interest in guaranteeing its oil supply at a time of diminishing domestic reserves and increased worldwide demand could also be achieved by military control of Iraq’s petroleum reserves, which, in a Baathist controlled Iraq, would have been exploited instead by America’s competitors (Mayer, 2004; Klare, 2004).
Institutionalism

Bush, lacking the legitimacy of an untainted electoral victory, seized on the political opportunity presented by the 9/11 attacks to wrap himself in the legitimizing mantle of “war president” during the brief conflict in Afghanistan, and then invaded Iraq to prolong the politically favorable domestic climate that war engendered. Building on the assumption that leaders prize their own political survival more highly than a reified “national interest,” Bueno de Mesquita (2002) concludes, “international relations is, simply put, a venue for politicians to gain or lose domestic political advantage.” Since citizens’ commitment to the well-being of the state is heightened by their nationalistic responses to perceived threats, nationalist sentiments from war redound to the advantage of the party in power insofar as the state is embodied in the sitting administration. Since leaders in democracies presumably fear electoral punishment for engaging in long, costly, and losing wars, they choose war mainly when they believe they face very weak foes. The war was thus the product of administration officials’ expectations that the Republican party would benefit from a “rally-‘round-the flag” effect during a war against Iraq, as Bush’s father’s administration had in 1991, and that U.S. forces would again achieve a relatively easy victory.

The interests of the state are further disaggregated by bureaucratic-politics explanations that assume that governments consist of factions, one or more of which may promote war in order to advance its interests in the intra-elite competition for power. Such explanations highlight incentives for war stemming from the advantages that the war is expected to confer on bureaucratic and organizational interests.

Bureaucratic incentives for war may also stem from the preference of military leaders for offensive strategies over defensive ones, and from the rigidity of military planning. During the long lead-up to the Iraq war, and the months-long positioning of U.S. troops in the region, it is possible that “war plans and the process of war planning become policy by their own momentum” (Woodward, 2004, 3, 10-11).

The goal of regime change in Iraq also responded to the military’s interest in abandoning the containment policy that the first President Bush established toward Iraq.

3.1.2. USA: Situation in Middle East including the Palestinian issue

During the turbulent summer of 2006 in Middle East, a draft resolution by Qatar was presented in front of the Security Council where Israel's military assaults in Gaza were
condemned. They also urged Israel to immediate release the detained Palestinian politicians and officials. The Palestinian Authority was invited in turn to prevent further violence, including rocket fire by Israeli territory.

In the vote, Denmark, Peru, Slovakia and Britain abstained. U.S. the veto and the resolution was approved not. In its explanation of vote, said the United States to the resolution was unbalanced and mainly put demands on Israel. It was further claimed that Israel's attacks were a response to Palestinian rocket fire and the arrest of two Israeli soldiers. Finally, the American UN ambassador John Bolton to the importance of Security Council was not acting it was acting in a way that brought the parties closer to a peace agreement (UN S/PV.5488).

**International security and power**

Based on the power and security of America's veto primarily can be understood as a result of its relationship to Israel. U.S. has traditionally been Israel as an ally in a region where the U.S. had several enemies, but at the same big oil interests. Above all, the United States and Israel is considered to have common enemies in Iran and Syria, but also a shared interest in the war against terrorism (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006:4-6). These are players who were considered to be real threat American security and the U.S., like Israel wished to fight (Bush 2006, Ehud Olmert, 2006). For example, regarded the Israeli attacks in Gaza in response to terrorist attacks by Palestinian terrorists and George Bush had repeatedly reiterated the Israeli right to defend itself against terrorism (UN S/PV.5488, Israel Foreign Ministry in 2004, Knowlton 2003). The American veto can be seen as part of the struggle for power and influence in Middle East. U.S. showed through his veto also its support for Israel and that "attacks" against Israel was considered unacceptable in any form. Similarly, the U.S. defence of Israel is seen as a result of the American desire to spread democracy in the region, which in turn can be considered as an attempt to further increase the U.S. influence in the region.

**Institutionalism**

Along an institution legalistic explanation can the American veto be understood as the negative impact America's dissenting from the majority could possibly have on the country's future relations with the other members were considered to be small (Keohane and Nye1987 : 743-744). This would could be a result of the United States traditionally had used its veto against Israelis critical resolutions and still able to function in the Security Council. New costs would therefore not to come. This gives a scenario where the U.S. would go against his usual line in Israel- Palestinian issue be considered to have major negative implications for the
relationship with Israel and intra-state interest groups than a veto would have relations with members of the Council, then the U.S. position has long been known. U.S. advocacy of the right to defend itself against terrorism can also be assumed to have played a role. As a result of respect for the Security Council precedent, a binding resolution that condemned such defense would be likely to weaken that right. The legitimacy for U.S. war against terrorism would be weakened.

3.1.3 UK: Resolution made on apartheid regime in South Africa

In 1960 the worldwide view changed as a result of the Sharpeville Incident. As from this point many Western countries no longer held the view that apartheid fell within internal affairs and they began to openly criticize South Africa. On 1 April 1960 the Security Council also discussed the issue, and recognized that it might be a threat to world peace and security. They called upon the government to introduce measures to bring about racial harmony. The South African government instead reacted with banning the Pan African Conference (PAC). From this point the UN decided to follow steps to try and ensure the following of the UN Charter inside South Africa. (Terre Blanche, H., et al., 1999)

In 1961 United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld visited South Africa, but reported back that he could not come to an acceptable agreement with the Prime Minister. In the same year H.F. Verwoerd announced South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Nations as a result of criticism from this organization, and the Foreign Minister was criticized for his speech in the General Assembly. In 1966, the first of many UN seminars on apartheid was held in Brazil, and later in the same year the General Assembly proclaimed 21 March to be International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in remembrance of the Sharpeville Incident. A 1971 General Assembly resolution condemned the establishment of homelands. In 1974 there was a resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations as a result of human rights violations, but it was not accepted as France, the UK and the USA did not support it. (Muller, CFJ., 1993)

The one possible form of action against South Africa was the introduction of economic sanctions and the isolation of South Africa. Sanctions were often discussed and supported in the UN, and many recognized them as an effective and peaceful means of pressure. However, the main trading partners of South Africa continually voted against the introduction of
mandatory sanctions in the Security Council. In 1962 the General Assembly asked that member states break diplomatic, trade and transport relations in an attempt to convince South Africa to abandon apartheid, and again in 1968 they asked for the suspension of all cultural, educational and sporting exchanges. In 1963 the Security Council called upon states to stop the sale of arms to South Africa, and repeated the call in 1970 (when only France, the UK and the USA abstained from voting) and again in 1972. It was however only in 1977 that the arms embargo became mandatory, and other sanctions were still not in place. The year 1982 was decaled International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa by the General Assembly, with a new program of action being introduced the following year. In 1985 the Security Council called on members to introduce more far reaching economic measures against South Africa, but a draft resolution of selective sanctions was vetoed by the UK and USA in 1988. (Beinart, W., 1994)

**International power and security**

Central to an understanding with a focus on international security should be Britain’s approach to South Africa. Britain, in its sole position as the past colonial power and the major investing country in South Africa, had been one of the main targets of Black South Africans’ diplomatic efforts since the establishment of the Union in 1910. By the end of World War II and the following election of the Nationalist Party in 1948, most of the hopes for British support of the predicament of Black South Africans had shifted to the United Nations (UN) and the recently independent African states. Nevertheless, because of its economic and historical links Britain and London in particular, sustained to hold a special relationship with South Africa. From the 1950’s, British support did eventually start to come, not from the British Government though, but from church groups and anti apartheid, and sections of the Liberal Parties and the Labour Party.

Moreover, ever since the 1940’s, a growing number of South Africans had been arriving in London, which, after Sharpeville and the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), became a centre for the exiled liberation movements to continue their struggle from abroad. (Baber, J, 1983, s, 2).

Because of its strategic and economic interests, which gave Britain a stake in the preservation of the status quo in South Africa, Britain treated South Africa "half-ally and half-untouchable at the same time"(Sir J. Maud to Lord Home, Cape Town, 14 May 1963) . The British Government, though, also had to be careful that its policy would not upset African countries,
where British interests were also involved. The implications of these irreconcilable interests for British policy towards South Africa will be addressed.

The West regarded the apartheid administration as a significant friend in the Cold War of ideologies. Economically, such nations as Britain and America had numerous concerns in South Africa, and, although they did not endorse apartheid, these concerns led them to a more moderate stance on the country and to vote against financial sanctions against her at UN conferences.

**Institutionalism**

When South Africa was pulled out of the Commonwealth in 1961, some members felt that the only way to sort her out was to enforce monetary sanctions and forbid the sale of armaments to her. Other members, most notably Britain, resisted this. It had many key trade links and, in particular, needed South Africa's gold and other valuable minerals that the soil had to offer. There were also tactical motives for not severing all ties with the apartheid government. As the southernmost nation in Africa, and the juncture at which the Indian and Atlantic Oceans collided, South Africa was still a vital point in sea-trade routes. In 1969, the Commandant General of the South African Defence Force (SADF) confirmed that, "in the entire ocean expanse from Australia to South America, South Africa is the only fixed point offering modern naval bases, harbours and airfield facilities, a modern developed industry and stable government." South Africa was also a pivotal partner to the West in the years of the Cold War. If the West ever required martial, maritime or air-force services on the African continent, it would have to rely on South Africa's assistance.

From 1960 to 1961, the relationship between South Africa and Britain started to change. In his "Winds of Change" speech in Cape Town, Harold Macmillan spoke of the changes in Africa and how South Africa's racist policies were swimming upstream. Even as more countries added to the call for sanctions, Britain remained unwilling to sever her ties with the apartheid administration. Possible reasons were her copious assets in the state, an unwillingness to hazard turbulence brought on by intercontinental meddling, and the fact that many British people had kith and kin living in South Africa or, indeed, were living there themselves. Along with America, Britain would persistently vote against certain sanctions against South Africa.

Finally, the perennial "kith and kin" feeling was a further factor bringing Britain and South Africa together. British policy accordingly had to balance Britain’s short against its long-term
interests. Britain’s economic stake, strategic interests, and its position in the High Commission Territories meant that it could not afford to break off relations with South Africa. (Lissoni, Arianna, 2000:10). "

3.1.4 UK: Resolution on South Rhodesia

In 1965, when Great Britain was contemplating the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia under a one-person-one-vote dispensation, the minority white government of Prime Minister Ian Smith declared the country independent under a constitution that reserved political rights for whites only. The UN condemned the unilateral declaration of independence and in Security Council Resolution 221 (1966) decided that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a threat to the peace. Security Council Resolution 232 (1966) imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia with a view to bringing the racist regime of Smith to a speedy end. Following a bloody war between the Smith regime and internal resistance movements (with South Africa affording military support to the government forces of Rhodesia), the Lancaster House Agreement was concluded between Great Britain and the main political factions of Rhodesia. It culminated in the establishment of Zimbabwe as an independent state in 1980 (Alexander, Neville, 2002).

Although racial discrimination as practiced in the United States, Rhodesia, and elsewhere resembled apartheid, the policy as it existed in South Africa contained unique elements that one does not find in the history of any other country. It is perhaps fair to conclude that apartheid, as a special instance of racial discrimination that entails the exploitation of persons of a disadvantaged racial group for the purpose of retaining the privileged status of another, and requiring particularly stringent enforcement measure for its preservation, such as it existed in South Africa, has never found its equal in any other country (Ames, Frances, 2002).

International Power and Security

The day after the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 216 condemning it as a declaration of independence "made by a racist minority." The United Kingdom moved to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on what they now regarded as a rebel colony. In addition, the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, John Baines Johnston was withdrawn and the Rhodesian High Commissioner — Brigadier Andrew Skeen was declared persona non
grata and ordered to leave Britain. Rhodesia House (Rhodesia's High Commission in the UK) lost its diplomatic status and simply became an information office for Smith's administration. Under instructions from the British Government, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, formally dismissed Smith and his cabinet for what was deemed "an act of treason against the United Kingdom". This action was the only internationally recognized action by an official in Rhodesia at the time. Smith's government however ignored the dismissal, stating that as Rhodesia was no longer a colony and governed under a new constitution that made Gibbs' office obsolete, the dismissal no longer had (in their view) any legality. Gibbs remained ensconced in Government House for the next four years, resigning his office only after the republic referendum passed in late 1969.

Even after the United Nations followed Britain's lead in imposing sanctions, the apartheid regime in South Africa continued to give economic support to Rhodesia, but did not extend official recognition to the new state, sending only an 'Accredited Diplomatic Representative' to Salisbury. Portugal, then the colonial power in neighbouring Mozambique, gave economic support, including access to Mozambique's sea ports; but following the change of regime in Lisbon, Mozambique became independent under the Marxist Frelimo regime of Samora Machel. This was a severe blow to the Smith regime, militarily as well as economically, as Machel was an ally of Robert Mugabe and allowed ZANU a base there to mount incursions into Rhodesia.

**Institutionalism**

The British Government considered the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) unconstitutional and illegal but made clear that it would not use force to oppose it. On November 12, 1965, the United Nations also determined the Rhodesian Government and UDI to be illegal and called on member states to refrain from assisting or recognizing the Smith regime. The British Government imposed sanctions on Rhodesia and requested other nations to do the same.

On December 16, 1966, the UN Security Council, for the first time in history, imposed mandatory economic sanctions on a state. Rhodesia's primary exports including ferrochrome and tobacco, were placed on the selective sanctions list, as were shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles, petroleum, and petroleum products to Rhodesia. On May 29, 1968, the Security Council unanimously voted to broaden the sanctions by imposing an almost total
embargo on all trade with, investments in, or transfers of funds to Rhodesia and imposed restrictions on air transport to the territory (www.state.gov).

The countries' representation in an African context is a difficult question. Britain has had a similar policy for all colonies. Political proposals formulated by the exploitation of African labor and land primary goal. With the White majority in the governing institutions, could the white population institutionalize class oppression in Southern Rhodesia (Arrighi, 1966:39).

The colonial government developed a relative autonomy vis-à-vis Britain enabled reforms that opposed the British colonial policy (Institute of International Affairs, 2010a).

In Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, armed struggle for liberation was slower to develop, but despite the essential differences in the problems presented by these territories, the General Assembly—partly in response to a growing collaboration between South Africa, Portugal, and the white-minority regime in Southern Rhodesia—had come to view them as aspects of a single consuming issue of white-minority rule versus black-majority rights.

The strategy advocated by the Afro-Asian Group, supported by the Soviet-bloc countries and many others, for rectifying the situation in these territories was essentially to obtain recognition and support for their African national liberation movements and to seek the application, through a Security Council decision made under Chapter VII of the charter, of mandatory enforcement measures, including full economic sanctions and military force as circumstances warranted. However, in each case, except partially in that of Southern Rhodesia, the use of mandatory enforcement measures was decisively resisted by two permanent members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and the United States, which, together with several other Western nations, felt that they could not afford to embark upon a policy of confrontation with the economically wealthy white-minority regimes of southern Africa (encyclopedia of the nations).

3.1.5 Short summary of Veto

U.S. vetoes were different from Britain. The explanations of the American veto regarding the current draft resolution on the condemnation of Israeli military activities in Gaza are mainly in the state. Although it may be argued that the explanations are also in the international power and security, and institutionalism, it is considered unlikely that those without the domestic political reasons were enough for a veto. It should be borne in mind that the U.S. has had a habit of stopping Israel critical resolutions, and then the cost of the deviant behavior
may be considered small. It risked at least not to applying any new costs. 
In the U.S. veto of the Iraq invasion proved to Council formal rules to be above the informal norms. Despite this, the U.S. chose to use the formal rules to more or less impose a solution acceptable to the administration. Similarly, the United States had reason both from domestic politics as its position as sole superpower to prevent the resolution was adopted and considered the costs of adoption of the resolution to be greater than the costs of the deviant behavior. The U.S. veto can be considered as a cost-reduction action. 
Great Britain’s vetoes were more likely based on economic, strategic and colonial interests. Great Britain later on had the U.S.A with her and both the countries used their vetoes together for their national interests

**4. CONCLUSION**

**4.1. Conclusion of analysis**

A comprehensive and general conclusion about the explanation of the United Kingdom and the U.S.A behaviour in the analyzed resolutions is that there are several partial explanations to the states actions in the Security Council. Not at any stage have one of the explanatory models alone been able to give a satisfactory explanation for the states actions, even if the explanation on some occasions, such as the U.S. veto in defence of Israel and U.K's veto on the economical sanctions against South Africa, clearly are leaning to that the intrastate factors have been decisive. Also on these occasions, however, have the other explanatory model contribute to give a wider explanation and also helped to understand why the states put in the veto. Below some of the more interesting conclusions to be drawn from the analysis are highlighted.

At the voting sessions whether vetoes or abstention, the two states have in their voting explanations referred to, that a resolution could set a dangerous precedent for what constitutes a Security Council mandate. This respect for precedent reflects the view which seems to prevail among the states that Security Council actually has meaning and implications. Thus, it is also associated with large costs if disobeying the Security Council resolutions. Based on this reasoning it appears that the costs for divergent behaviour at the Security Council votings
are less than the costs that deviate from the decisions already taken. This should be interpreted as the public international law has a restrictive effect on the state action.

As a result of the previously discussed respect for the Security Council decision, the U.S. has interest in letting issues be addressed in the Security Council, despite the limitations that it brings to the U.S. in form of compromises. A decision taken by a unanimous Security Council is considered to strengthen the resolution's legitimacy and thus have a capacity for effective implementation and desired results. At the same time the American reputation as a cooperating state improves and the relationship with key allies are strengthened. Thus, the resolutions which the Security Council have agreed to unanimously, although with initial differences to the standpoints, is seen as evidence of the states' capacity to ensure long-term and as for both the U.S. and U.K benefits from collaboration within the Security Council. While the states' ability to make long-term projections affect their behaviour, there is indications that members' expectations based on a historical context influences the state possible behaviour. A state's past behaviour seems to create expectations from other states about how the state will act in a particular issue. This means that the state is not "judged" by the usual criteria. When the states act in line with the other members’ expectations the behaviour of the state becomes more acceptable and no new costs will be due.

The analysis has also shown that economic factors often play main part in the states actions and the calculations of how their interests are promoted. This is true on the basis of both international power and security and on the intra-state interests, which very well explains the crucial role that economic gains have in states' quest for maintaining their position of power in the international system.

This can be seen in the case of the U.S.A were it veto the resolution 1441. It is economic interests that make the country invade Iraq and take other countries along it. United Kingdom has her special interests in the both the countries and use her veto. The South Rhodesian soil is gold for the mine industry, not only did the Brittan’s come to have their share even other European countries as the Germans and Portuguese colonised the African continent. The wealth was a great economic factor to put in the veto for the special interest.

The UN has acted even at resolutions where member state has used a veto; however, the United Nations actions had not a decisive impact on the states actions. This reinforces the thesis that the institutionalized effect on the impact of either the reason has been less at
resolutions stopped by the veto. Security rules have the veto played a central role and may
generally be considered to have a greater impact on the states' behaviour than the standards.

The framework's explanatory power in relation to the two states shall be considered to be the
same, as it is difficult to emphasize any explanation as is better suited to explain either of the
two states actions.

Finally, after the analysis it can be established that the Security Council actually does matter.
Member states seems to be sincerely concerned about the resolutions consequences and each
voice can be derived to a calculation of the consequences of adoption of the resolution and the
consequence to encounter with other states. In the occasion that the Security Council had no
impact on international politics it is possible that the Security Council as soon as had been an
interest of forum where the symbolism of a state voice had been more important than the
consequence of it. If the content the resolutions have not had any significance the states rather
would have acted for the sake of a show and cared too little about the content of the
resolution and the consequences. As the analysis has shown is not the case.

4.2. Assessment of the theoretical Design

As a whole, the developed framework is well thought-out to and has proved to be very well
suited to explain the states actions in the Security Council and with the help of the framework
a good explanation for the behavior of the states actions was given. As written in the purpose
of the paper, the goal was not set to create a framework that fully could explain the behavior
of the states, because of the time and space limitations. The above conclusion, however,
shows that by using the framework it has been possible to draw several interesting
conclusions, and I arguably suggest that the framework's two explanatory models together
gave a broader, more informed and hence a better explanation, than it had given if the
explanatory models had been used separately. The two explanatory models could, however,
highlight most of the main aspects of the paper, and none of the two models can be considered
superfluous. Hereby the choice of the explanatory models can be successfully considered.
By using the two explanatory models, the analysis showed the aspects that were worth to
very limited generalizations for the states performing in institutions - as the state is not
uniform, the organization can play an important role in the departments and there are many
partial explanations to each decision. It turned out that the explanations in several ways complemented each other, the explanation, international power and security was understood even better after the institution legalistic explanation was added to the analysis. Likewise, it is difficult to understand the institution legalistic explanation without first viewing the first explanation of international power and security. As a whole the first completes the other model.

The framework shall be considered appropriate to explain the behavior of the states in the Security Council and facilitates limited generalizations about the states behavior in the Security Council. To further examine the existing framework's explanatory power, additional case studies are required. It would be interesting to study the behavior of temporary members of the council as well. For example, a comparison with the permanent members could create a further understanding to the role of veto and what importance it has to the states' actions, but also if the behavior is affected by the Security Council's non-permanent members who are elected for only two years, and if the power that the permanent members presumes has been lessen, and if it has a decisive importance to their actions. After such study it would be interesting to study whether a reform of the Security Council can be assumed to alter the states actions. There are several ready-made suggestions for a reformed Security Council, for example, several permanent members and restrictions on use of the veto, which could be used as the basis for such analysis.

Although the framework greatly contributed to meet the study's empirical view, it also signified the study’s theory developed purposes with satisfaction, it is obvious that the framework did not give a comprehensive explanation to the behavior of states in the Security Council, which actually never was the purpose of the paper. However, it is quite appropriate with a discussion of how the framework can be further improved; thereby further contributing to the theoretical understanding of state action in the Security Council.

A first, very obvious reflection is that more information had made the framework more useful. Additional information had facilitated more specific and detailed explanatory models, making the framework even sharper. For example, it could in the state explanatory model have been made more detailed and more explicitly studied the intra-state power struggle. However, it should be borne in mind that this would only give further weight to declaration also information about States' domestic policies have been more detailed, which especially in the case of United Kingdom may be difficult with the paper’s limitations in mind.

It emerged during the analysis that with the help of the framework is also possible to obtain indications about explanations for state action that ended up on the edge of the framework can
be explained. For example, it appeared that a lot of governments to maintain their position of power in the international system could be linked to the pursuit of economic advantage, upon which the first explanatory model, and thus framework as a whole, had been further explanatory power on economic aspects received more space in the explanatory model. Similarly, analysis indicated that the state action is influenced by what the members based on a knowledge about the historical context expects the behavior of another. Therefore, further detail about the historical context relevant for institutional partnerships to improve the institution legalistic explanation model. Framework's explanatory power would also be improved by inclusion of a negotiation theory element. Although to some extent accommodated in the institution legalistic explanatory model, there is a good deal written about at the negotiating game and it seems clearly, negotiation is a central part of the way to the U.S. vote. In such an explanation would veto power and be interesting, but also to analyze the whether diplomats at UN missions over time creates an environment that fosters cooperation, which is reflected in the negotiations (see e.g. Peck 1979).

As a result of the paper’s rationalist approach can be argued that discussions around standards sometimes simplistic. Paper’s rationalist approach spelled out in introductory chapter, and it can be concluded that further focus on what constitutes a norm, how it is created and when it influences state behavior would provide a further understanding of the States action in the Security Council, as adopted in the introductory chapter. Further understanding of standards would help increase understanding of what the Security Council's social really is and how it arose. Similarly, it would be interesting to study whether States self-perceived identity affects their behavior in the Security Council. All of these studies would be considered constructivist, which in my opinion does not mean that they are Contrary to the performed study, but could further supplement essay framework.

A secondary objective was to create a framework that could be applied also in the states action in other institutions. As mentioned above, it is only from this study do much limited generalizations about the States' conduct in the institutions. Without having applied the framework of other institutions, it is naturally difficult to draw any real conclusions, but my opinion is still the framework's criteria would be used to make a heuristic case study for other institutions, where indications of the framework's explanatory power is provided. The result would probably be different depending on the institution's geographical range and depending on the specific issues. Thus, also framework-specific design may look different, not least in the various explanatory models. For example, it is likely that the study of states' behavior in an institution with a significantly higher degree of interdependence, like the
European Union, more would need to focus on intra-state factors. It is also likely that the framework for the study of several other institutions would have to additional focus on the economy.

In summary, the framework's design allowed for a rich, relevant and in generally satisfactory analysis of state action in the Security Council and that the analysis leading up the relevant conclusions. Nevertheless, the explanation provided only as a partial explanation States to act in the Security Council and the further development of the framework could include both further development of existing models proposed addition of new ones. The study may therefore be considered to have contributed to an increased theoretical understanding of the states behavior in the UN Security Council and thus to a better understanding of the Security Council's decision.

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