The State of Violence:

A Qualitative study of the Types of Violence committed against the Kurds by the Turkish State

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Abstract
This study examines and analyzes the types of violence committed by the Turkish state against the Kurds. Using a comprehensive typology of violence and qualitative analysis of news and NGO reports, the researcher asks what types and forms of violence does the Turkish state and their affiliates commit against the Kurds? While answering this research question a rubric was formulated (actor, motivation, form of violence) to utilize with a typology of violence that fills gaps of State Repression theory (the leading theory used in this subject matter) analysis. The results of this analysis show that the Turkish state (and affiliates) have used all types of violence in a multitude of forms against the Kurds. Furthermore, the theoretical contribution is the recognition that types of violence overlap and should be analyzed in this manner to better understand the complexity and layers of violence to provide tailored solutions. Word Count: 19869.
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Introduction

On the 20\textsuperscript{th} of July 2015, a suicide bomber who had been trained by the Islamic State (ISIS) detonated their explosive device in the middle of a gathering of Kurdish youth in Suruc, Southeastern Turkey. The bombing killed at least 33 people and injured more than 100 others. Following the bombing in Suruc, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which had been largely dormant since 2013 due to a ceasefire brokered with then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, located two police officers they claimed had been collaborating with ISIS and killed them. The Turkish government retaliated, ending their side of the ceasefire, with aerial bombardments of PKK bases and initiating ‘curfews’ in Kurdish cities in the Southeast. The Turkish government declared their actions as a ‘war on terror’, targeting both Kurds (specifically cited were the PKK) and ISIS as terrorists. The PKK kept their half of the ceasefire, only engaging in retaliation for attacks against their camps in Turkey and Iraq, until after the November 2015 election. The reason for ending the ceasefire according to one of the leaders of the PKK, Cemil Bayik, is the November 2015 elections were hastily called to return the Erdogan’s Justice and Development party (AKP) back to power due to the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) winning seats in the June 2015 election. The HDP entering parliament left the AKP without enough seats to form a government. The PKK saw this election as a pseudo-coup “designed to sideline the HDP, and aided by collaboration between the AKP and IS, designed to cause instability and target the ruling party’s opponents” (Beck, 2016). The evidence Bayik provides is the attacks on HDP rallies after the June 2015 election intensified, with the largest loss of life occurring on October 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2015 at a peace rally largely organized by the HDP in Ankara. The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire until after the November 2015 election in order to secure a peaceful environment for the election. The HDP were subsequently forced to abandon any campaigning after the 10\textsuperscript{th} of October as it was deemed by the party it was not safe for their candidates, let alone their supporters to go out and
campaign or gather in large groups. This culminated in diminished electoral returns in the November 2015 election for the HDP, still passing the ten percent threshold, but greater electoral returns for the AKP who secured a majority in parliament to form another government. Following the November 2015 election Bayik feels the Kurds have been pushed into a corner with only two options: surrender or fight (Beck, 2016).

The example above demonstrates that violence could have various forms and the aim is to study which types of violence were committed by the Turkish state against the Kurds. The reason for why the Turkish state and the Kurds were chosen is that they share a long history of violence, where it is likely one can find all the major types of violence. The main research question of this thesis is: What are the types of violence the Turkish state utilizes in its conflict with Kurds? The alternate research questions include: What forms or modes do these types of violence take? In what ways does a violence typology explain more than SRT?

The short, initial timeline provided above demonstrates that understanding different types of violence caused by different actors, with different motivations, using different forms/modes of violence weave a comprehensive understanding of the conflict.

The study of violence has become more and more segmented in recent decades. For example, the violence perpetrated by states and their affiliates has largely been studied under State Repression theory (SRT) (e.g., Davenport 2007, Hathaway 2002, Earl 2003), which examines multiple forms of violence (e.g., tear gassing protesters, extrajudicial killings, etc.), but only a couple types of violence (e.g., political and institutional violence). Since SRT focuses almost solely on overt types of violence (e.g., shootings), one cannot recognize or understand covert types and forms of violence (e.g., economic inequality); what is required to fully understand not only violence committed by states but by other entities is a comprehensive typology of violence. Only
by focusing on all the types of violence can one then discuss strategies for conflict resolution by understanding how victims and perpetrators interact (or react) with the violence.

It is also important to note a type of violence and a mode or form of violence are not the same; mode or form is how the type of violence takes place, but modes or forms are not particular to a specific type of violence as they can overlap. Other theorists (e.g., Bourgois 1989, Bourdieu 2001) sometimes restrict forms to certain types of violence since they limit both the types of violence they examine and their operationalization of said types of violence; a complete typology of violence with broader categorizations does not fall into this trap.

This thesis includes different types of violence for building a framework which allows distinguishing different forms of violence and then applies it on the recent conflict between Turkey and its Kurdish population. It is a classical qualitative study, partly aimed to develop typological categories of violence. Using news media reports, social media (for supplementary data), public statements by the Turkish state and Kurdish organizations, and human rights groups’ reports for sources of data. Time line of empirical events of the paper is from June 2015 until July 2016. Analysis shows how the Turkish state utilizes all possible types of violence listed - political, institutional, structural, symbolic, everyday or normalized, and developmental violence. The forms vary and intersect across types of violence, and a typology of violence gives more detail and explanation of the types of violence than SRT can provide. By analyzing the different types of violence being committed, this allows for a disaggregation Christian Davenport was pleading for from SRT theorists, thus this research may actually aid SRT if it were to accept this rubric and utilize it in future studies of state repression (Davenport, 2007: 18).

The outline for the rest of the sections in this paper is as follows: First, the background information section presents a summarized history of the Kurds in Turkey. Second, the theoretical
section will explore the literature on violence, define, and operationalize the different types of violence. Third, a methods section detailing the methods utilized for this study, why these methods were chosen, and an explanation of any biases from sources and if so why they were included. Fourth, the analysis section presents examples of all types of violence listed in the theoretical sections and the areas of crossover. The paper ends with a conclusion, which will contain a reflection, a summary, and implications for future research.

**Background Information**

Throughout Kurdish history there has been violence. Whether perpetrated by the Kurds or by the Turkish state, their history has been marred by violence. The predominant source used for this section is by Kerem Oktem who wrote a comprehensive history of the modern Turkish state (up to 2011). The reason for utilizing Oktem’s account of Turkish history is that it does not shy away from the controversial past of the Turkish state, especially surrounding the Kurdish minority. The purpose of the background section is to introduce how the Turkish state has utilized the types of violence in the past and introduce the history of conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds so as to show the underpinnings of the current conflict.

**Early 20th Century Kurdish Revolts**

The first Kurdish revolt in Turkey occurred in February 1925 and was due to a myriad of factors, including: the fall of the Ottoman Sultanate (which had given Kurds semi-autonomy), closing Kurdish Madrassas (that taught Kurdish), and the outlawing of the Kurdish language and Kurdish identity. All of this occurred due to the nationalists in charge of the new Turkish state initiating Turkification projects including the introduction of the Turkish language, the changing of the names of villages and towns to Turkish ones, and suppression of any non-Muslims or non-Turks who rejected Turkification. Revolts in the Kurdish region of Turkey continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1934 a new law was passed, called the Settlement Law, which sent Kurds
out of Kurdistan into Western Turkey, and Turks into Kurdistan. This law alone did not stop the uprisings, but the military’s massacre in Dersim in 1937 sent a clear message to those who would not be Turkified: submit or be destroyed. After the Dersim genocide (although often labeled as ethnocide) the Kurds understood the message and “muffled their claims for identity and territory” until the 1980s (Oktem, 2011: 28-37).

1980s and 1990s of Kurdish Uprisings and Guardian State Terror

After the ‘September regime’, the name for the Turkish generals who initiated the coup in September of 1980, took power using the Kurds (and leftists) as scapegoats for the coup, they initiated a brutal campaign of violence, humiliation and imprisonment against the Kurdish population. Kurdish prisoners in the southeast were made to sing the Turkish national anthem, declare themselves as Turks while being tortured. The prison regime in the Kurdish provinces were different in comparison to the other provinces, “as it directly targeted and sought to crush the inmates’ Kurdish identity” (Oktem, 2011: 65). Kurdish provinces were subject to curfews, where people could not be outside their homes for large periods of the day and night, and military attacks on villages. The State also began to call Kurds “Mountain Turks” and banned the Kurdish language being spoken inside Turkey in 1983 by banning “the use of ‘languages spoken in countries that Turkey has no diplomatic relations with’;” they did this to ban the Kurdish language without even having to refer to it (Oktem, 2011: 62, 63, 64-66).

By 1984, the acts committed by the Turkish state radicalized a large segment of Kurdish men and women into starting an open guerilla war for Kurdish autonomy, spearheaded by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The State’s answer to the uprising was increasing the level of terror by creating special units: the ‘Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism Centre’ (JITEM) for the military, the Special Team (Ozel Tim) for the police, and tribal paramilitaries
called the ‘Village Guards’. All were created to deal with the PKK and any assumed sympathizers using both legal and extralegal means. The State also enlisted the help from a non-state actor, the Kurdish ‘Hizbullah’, a violent Islamist group funded and given logistical support by the State. JITEM, the Ozel Tim, the Kurdish ‘Hizbullah’ and the ‘Village Guards’ assassinated suspected Kurdish activists, Kurdish intellectuals, PKK sympathisers, and attacked any woman not abiding by Islamic dress code (Hizbullah only) (Oktem, 2011: 66, 74-75, 86).

In the 1990s, President Ozal introduced the “State of Emergency and Regional Governorate” in the Kurdish provinces that cut off those provinces from laws and rights granted to the rest of Turkey (Oktem, 2011: 74-75). The 1990s were marred with extrajudicial killings of Kurds, targeted assassinations of high and low level Kurdish activists, curfews of cities, indiscriminate artillery shelling of Kurdish cities, forced disappearances, overburdening cities by internally displacing Kurds from rural areas, “the wholesale destruction of villages, the burning of forests, and human rights abuses [which] reached a level not seen in Turkey since the atrocities of the early twentieth century” (Oktem, 2011: 86). Those Kurds who fled the southeast during this period arrived in western Turkey without any substantial capital (since it was looted or burned to the ground by security and paramilitary forces), possessed very little skills for the urban landscape, and only some speaking a very basic form of Turkish. Thus, urban poverty in the western cities of Turkey was largely a Kurdish issue. Before the 1990s ended, over “three thousand villages in the south-east were destroyed and their inhabitants evicted….Close to three million Kurds fled their homes…the rural economies based on agricultural production and cattle-breeding were destroyed” (Oktem, 2011: 66, 74-75, 86, 90-93)
Tempering of War on Kurds

Two factors aided in tempering of hostilities between the Turkish state and the Kurds: Abdullah Ocalan’s (leader of the PKK) imprisonment and the Copenhagen criteria. On the 15th of February 1999, the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) in Kenya captured Ocalan. Throughout Ocalan’s trial he continually called for a peace between Kurds and the State, and greater democratic participation for the Kurds. Ocalan’s order was obeyed after the death penalty was abolished in 2002, with the “National Liberation Front of Kurdistan, the PKK’s armed wing,” ending all major engagements with the military (Oktem, 2011: 110-112). The other major development was the Copenhagen criteria for ascension into the European Union in 2002, which required “stability of institutions to ensure democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Oktem, 2011: 124). One of the policies implemented, in line with the criteria, was the reversal of the ban on teaching (and speaking) the Kurdish language. Although the Kurdish language was still partially restricted and heavily regulated, it was now effectively recognized as a language in Turkey for the first time in Turkey’s history (Oktem, 2011: 124, 135-136).

2000s: Kurdish Semi-Peace and the New Kurdish War

A ‘form of peace’ had settled in the Kurdish provinces in the early 2000s (low level fighting still occurred in the mountains). Life in the cities of the southeast returned to pre-1980s normality, with the removal of the “‘State of Emergency Regional Governorate…in November 2002’” (Oktem, 2011: 1401-141). The relinquishment of authoritarian, oppressive rule of the Kurdish provinces allowed the Kurdish culture to flourish; this period is known as the Kurdish Spring (Oktem, 2011: 140-141).

The Kurdish Spring started to turn into the ‘Kurdish Summer’ in the mid-2000s as the Kurdish population became agitated by the Turkish State. The Semdinli Affair was one incident
where JITEM personnel attempted to frame a bombing on the PKK, which would have allowed for the state to retaliate. However, Kurdish passersby caught the JITEM personnel as they tried to flee the scene. This incident not only angered the Kurds, who retaliated with protests and uncoordinated mob attacks against security personnel, but ended the Kurdish spring as outrage poured into the Kurdish public sphere as the three men responsible for the bombing were set free (Oktem, 2011: 141-142).

The security forces responded to the protests by Kurds in the southeast with an escalation of violence; dozens of Kurds died, hundreds wounded, thousands detained (including children). Approximately 200 children were detained following the protests in April, 90 charged with crimes including “participation in illegal protests and ‘aiding and abetting’ the PKK, a charge carrying a maximum jail sentence of twenty-four years” (Oktem, 2011: 142-143). Laws were changed to reflect the re-introduction of securitization of the southeast, with freedoms and liberties being curtailed, including a law penalizing those who propagated terrorist group goals. The ambiguous nature of the law even allowed the state to charge journalists and Kurds participating in legal political actions (Oktem, 2011: 142-143).

Kurdish Opening

The ‘Kurdish Opening’ began in 2009 with discussions among cabinet members of the government about liberalizing the Kurdish provinces. The proposed policies included more access to Kurdish language on TV and radio, reintroduction of “Kurdish village names, removal of inscriptions on [Kurdish] hills celebrating the supremacy of Turkishness…[,] launch of Kurdish language institutes at universities and some sort of amnesty for PKK fighters” (Oktem, 2011: 166-168). However, during this time the AKP was opening up to the Kurds, they were also fighting them in the political, democratic arena. The AKP remained silent whilst the Constitutional Court
banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in December 2009 for “‘undermining national unity and cooperating with the PKK,’” and then the government allowed the police to arrest DTP politicians and parade them in front of the courthouse in Diyarbakir as a form of humiliation (Oktem, 2011: 166-168). The AKP still went ahead with allowing the teaching of the Kurdish language in universities, however, on a smaller scale and said universities were located on the periphery of the Kurdish south-east (Oktem, 2011: 166-168).

**Kurdish Temporary Peace**

The ‘Kurdish Opening’ failed in 2009, but was restarted in 2012. The reason for the failure of the Kurdish Opening in 2009 was largely due to the perception of the Turkish public who saw the return of PKK militants (as a sign of good faith from the PKK) from their bases in Iraq to southeastern Turkey as a defeat of the Turkish state (Kardas & Balci, 2016: 173). This feeling of defeat at the hands of the PKK was spun by secular and nationalist media outlets, and subsequent “reactions coming from the AKP’s own constituencies terminated the political Islamists’ desire to support the opening” (Kardas & Balci, 2016: 174). Tensions rose in western Turkey between Turks and Kurds in areas where there were sizeable Kurdish minorities; actions ranged from everyday racism to violent pogroms directed towards Kurds (instigated by the Gendarmerie) (Oktem, 2011: 169). Thus, the AKP government suspended the peace process, as they could not be seen capitulating to the PKK (Kardas & Balci, 2016: 174-175). However, the peace talks resumed after the Guardian State was diminished by the Ergenekon trials, with the peace process starting once again in December of 2012 (Kardas & Balci, 2016: 176). By the 21st of March 2013, Ocalan declared a ceasefire on behalf of the PKK and promised to move PKK militants from Turkey’s southeast into neighbouring Iraq, where the PKK has bases in the Qandil mountains (Letsch, 21.03.2013). The announcement came after meetings with government officials had proved fruitful, with promises the constitution and penal codes would be changed to guarantee
“Turkey’s Kurdish population all cultural rights and give more power to local authorities” (Letsch, 21.03.2013). Later steps of the peace process required the PKK to lay down their arms and the government allow the “reintegration of PKK guerillas” (Letsch, 21.03.2013).

The peace process stalled in September 2013, with the PKK blaming the AKP government and the AKP blaming the PKK (Hamsici, 2013). The PKK complained that up until September 2013 there had been no reforms implemented to the constitution in reference to Kurdish identity or language, no change in the ten percent minimum required for parties to make it into Parliament, and no change in the ambiguous anti-terror laws (Hamsici, 2013). The AKP government complained that the PKK were holding back many of their fighters and only twenty percent of the withdrawal had been completed, most being children, the elderly and women according to the AKP government (Hamsici, 2013). The PKK kept their half of the ceasefire during this time, even during the Kobane crisis of 2014 when Kurds protested at the inaction of Turkey when ISIS was encircling Kobane (Hamsici, 2013; Yildiz, 12.11.2014). In response to the violent protests by Kurds in the southeast, which the Turkish state believes to be instigated by PKK members, the Turkish air force bombed PKK targets, a serious breach of the two year-long ceasefire between the two sides (Yildiz, 12.11.2014). However, the PKK did not breach their half of the ceasefire until July 2015 when they killed two police officers they believed were colluding with ISIS in the bombing of Kurdish civilian targets in Suruc, Turkey (Beck, 2016).

Theoretical Section

The following section explains the theoretical portion of the paper, explaining the different types of violence and how they are categorized. As has been revealed in the previous pages, violence comes in many shapes and sizes. Violence is not always visible, but the aftermath can be. Thus, many points of analysis later on in this paper will look at the aftermath of violence to
understand and characterize the forms of violence perpetrated. This is because catching violence in its active form is very difficult, especially when it is of a covert nature. This will all be explained at a deeper level in the following section on theory.

How has Violence been studied?

According to Johan Galtung (1969: 174): “tradition has been to think about violence as personal violence only,” with small subdivisions including threat of violence, psychological violence, and unintended violence, etc. However, there are many types of violence, and within those types there are many forms of violent actions and inactions. Violence has largely been studied individually, either focusing on political (e.g., Rosebraugh 2004), institutional (e.g., Garver 1968), structural (e.g., Galtung 1969), symbolic (e.g., Bourdieu 1989), developmental (e.g., Kothari & Harcourt 2004), or everyday violence (e.g., Schepert-Hughes 1996). Previous studies have not used a typology of violence to study violence, especially one that includes all the aforementioned types of violence. As one of the few, Philippe Bourgois (2001) operationalized several forms of violence (e.g., structural, symbolic, everyday) but did not expressly create a full, semi-rigid typology format. Without the larger typology it is more likely one is to miss the overlaps between types of violence.

Violence has also been studied in theories that use violence to explain oppression and repression, such as SRT (Bourgois, 2001: 8; Davenport, 2007: 2). SRT focuses on the study of state repression, namely “why and how political authorities use coercive power domestically amid potential and existing challenges and challengers” (Davenport, 2007: 1-2). SRT takes a human rights focus of analysis, only concentrating on political and primary human rights (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion) violations as forms of repression and violence (Davenport, 2007: 2-3). Thus, SRT limits the types of violence analyzed to political or
institutional and neglects other types of violence, covert and indirect forms of violence, and violations of social, economic and cultural human rights (Davenport, 2007: 2-3). Other reasons why SRT is problematic is due to it being based largely on general or common assumptions about democracies being less repressive than autocracies, it neglects important questions surrounding repression (e.g. why does it occur?), and its level of analysis and data collection is so highly aggregated it mischaracterizes causal relationships (e.g., not recognizing substate variation) (Davenport, 2007: 10-18). For these reasons along with the primary limitation of SRT (i.e., narrow focus of what is repression and violence), that there are many different types of violence being utilized by the Turkish state that overlap (e.g., Structural violence and covert Institutional violence), the typology of violence utilized in this paper is a better fit in being able to define, analyze, and understand the violence being perpetrated against the Kurds.

This paper will be using an inclusive, semi-rigid typology of violence that includes six types to provide a comprehensive analysis of the types of violence present in this case study. Whilst conducting the literature review for this paper no complete typology of violence was found. Most of the past research conducted on the different types of violence were examined individually or with no more than two other types of violence. The following sections will outline the subsequent types of violence included in this typology.

Towards a Detailed Categorization of Violence

When focusing on different types of violence, it is important to examine which actors are using violence, what is their motivation and which specific action or forms of violence are used.

1. Political Violence

Political violence is often defined as violent acts being committed against humans that causes harm, for the purpose of political motives or goals (Rosebraugh, 2004: 242). This definition includes when nation-states use violence against other nation-states, when nation-states use
violence on civilians, when nation-states use violence on non-state actors (e.g. terrorists, militants, cults), non-state actor violence committed against other non-state actors, and even at “the individual level, persons taking action against one another, populations, groups, and governments” (Rosebraugh, 2004: 242). Furthermore, political violence may be both physical and psychological, with the latter often coming from the former in the form of traumatic events ranging from the severest forms of brutality (torture, mutilation, rape, etc.) to witnessing violent acts perpetrated on others (beatings, executions, assassinations, etc.) (O’Neill, 2010: 135-136).

As for what motivates political violence, there are many “possible motives and factors provoking a violent pursuit of political goals” (Rosebraugh, 2004: 245). However, many theorists in the field have found in their research a list of factors that keep popping up, such as “a state of frustration, deprivation, repression and oppression is often present” when violent action takes place for political goals (Rosebraugh, 2004: 245). One may say oppression is inherently linked with politics, but it does not have to be, as one can imagine oppression coming from multiple sources including one’s family, religious community, peer group etc. Thus, it is important to link both the political motive with the violent acts if one is defining political violence.

To summarize this subsection, the definition of political violence utilized in this paper is when violence is utilized by an actor such as the state, a quasi-state group (i.e., a semi-autonomous group taking orders from the state), state-sponsored group (i.e., an autonomous group that does not take any orders from the state but is funded by them), or individual, where the motivation behind such violence is of a political nature (e.g. suppressing dissent, seeking political autonomy, crushing political rivals), and harms an entity either physically or psychologically (e.g., torture, killings, bombings, threats, constant fear of bodily harm).
2. Institutional Violence

Newton Garver is one academic who recognizes both the overt and covert aspects of institutional violence while also being one of the first in the field of Political Science to define institutional violence in 1968 (Betz, 1977: 339). Garver defines violence (in general) as requiring violation of a person’s rights, which he believes all humans have (Betz, 1977: 340). Violation of rights fall into two categories for Garver: violation of person’s body and violation of a person’s dignity (Betz, 1977: 340). Thus, when referring to overt and covert forms of violence, the former is tied to physical violence while the latter is tied to psychological violence (Betz, 1977: 340). Furthermore, the use of Garver’s definition of institutional violence in this paper is to refer to the original definition of institutional violence that cannot be conflated with political or structural violence.

Institutional violence can be both covert and overt, with Garver defining it as violence “perpetrated either by an individual or a group by virtue of the power vested in them by the group” (Betz, 1977: 340). This broad definition by Garver seems deliberate so as to include not only the institutions of a state but private organizations or non-state actor groups. Garver’s examples of overt institutional violence include all forms of war and riots, where a member of a group will violate another person, but the member is not held entirely accountable for their actions as they were following what the group deemed acceptable (Betz, 1977: 340-341). For example, when police disperse crowds of protesters at riots, who utilize tear gas, riot gear, and rubber bullets to inflict harm on other persons but it is the institution of the police department that gives them this power to do so.

Covert forms of institutional violence include “slavery, colonial oppression, [and] ghetto life” (Betz, 1977: 341). Using the slavery example, by putting free people into slavery one does so
by using both threats and rebuffs (Betz, 1977: 350). The rebuffs are used to make a person accept their position as a slave by “being constantly put down, not taken seriously as a person, not allowed freedom of choice” (Betz, 1977: 350). The threats are used when the rebuffs are not working and the person does not believe they are a slave, thus they become a beligerent slave who accepts their position by fear of the threats (Betz, 1977: 350). Thus, institutionalized covert violence is heavily dependent on psychological violence with threats and rebuffs so as to have “effectively rebuffed or threatened slaves [then] aid in rebuffing and threatening other slaves,” which in turn institutionalizes the violence within slavery and slaves (Betz, 1977: 350-351).

Critics have criticized Garver’s institutional violence typology, deeming it too broad and that violence cannot be included in the psychological dimension (Betz, 1977: 342). Critics, such as John Dewey believe focusing on rights of a person and violation of said rights obscures what violence truly is, an overt use of force that is destructive and harmful to a person or persons (Betz, 1977: 343). Furthermore, Dewey claims for violence to be violence it must affect ones body, and while “ridicule can defeat one’s aim to be happy, and fraud can violate one’s right to hold property…neither involves forces which impinge on its victim’s body, and so neither is violent” (Betz, 1977: 345). The idea that threats of violence do not cause psychological harm equal to or greater than physical violence is purely a definitional disagreement due to a lack of empirical research presented by Dewey and Joseph Betz that threats are always less severe than physical violence (Betz, 1977: 350). The important point of Dewey’s critique is that covert institutional violence at times overlaps the border between it and structural violence. Thus, by limiting institutional violence to the overt, structural violence may not be confused with Garver’s covert institutional violence. This makes a great deal of sense when one considers one of Garver’s examples of covert institutional violence, living in a ghetto in the United States (Garver, 1968:
819-822). There is everyday, personal violence taking place in these ghettos, but Garver is highlighting the quiet form of violence, the covert (Garver, 1968: 819-822). This covert violence comes from the system of oppression that has been put in place or come about and has been accepted as the norm or is not recognized as violence (Garver, 1968: 819-822). Garver elaborates further, “relatively little overt violence is needed to keep the institution going, and yet the institution violates the human beings involved because they are systematically denied the options which are open to the vast majority in the society” (Garver, 1968: 819-822).

Although there seems to be a slight difference between covert institutional violence and structural violence, with the former sometimes occurring after overt institutional violence has taken place, this thesis will not be utilizing covert institutional violence. The reason for excluding covert institutional violence is because it is too similar to structural violence, it may confuse readers of this thesis, and the overlap is so great to include it would jeopardize the distinction between the two violences. Thus, the definition of institutional violence for this paper shall utilize Garver’s definition of overt institutional violence: a violent act perpetrated by an actor(s) (e.g., Turkish security forces, Turkish state officials, Turkish government officials), motivated by the power vested in them by the state, institution, or group that makes them feel unaccountable (or above) their actions (Betz, 1977: 340).

3. Structural Violence

The concept of structural violence was first coined by Johan Galtung, an academic in the field of conflict and peace research. According to Galtung, structural violence is pervasive and somewhat invisible in contrast to overt forms of violence as it is built into the “structures, institutions, ideologies, and histories” of societies (Dilts, 2012: 191). Galtung’s motive was not to “dilute our ability to hold individuals responsible for their actions, but rather to enhance our ability
to identify more clearly the ways in which stability and tranquility...mask a deeper and more pervasive violence" (Dilts, 2012: 192). This is made clear by Galtung: “‘violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations’” (Galtung qtd in Dilts, 2012: 192). In simpler terms, when the available options to live a normal life are blocked or taken away, then structural violence is being committed. As for some examples of structural violence, they may include: “poverty and steep grades of inequality, including racism[, lack of medical aid for curable ailments,] and gender inequality” (Farmer, 2004: 307). It should be noted poverty alone is not an example of structural violence, rather Galtung uses the term misery to describe a level of poverty where one is “having so little that it hurts and harms, or having the wrong things that may distort the body, mind and spirit” (Galtung, 1994: 8). Poverty may be temporary and voluntary, such is the case for many university students in the U.S. and other countries, but “misery...is neither wanted nor temporary” (Galtung, 1994: 8). Structural violence seems to be strongly based in economic forms, but there are other forms of structural violence, including denied or limited services such as health care.

According to Paul Farmer, an anthropologist who has utilized structural violence as a basis for his research, he understands structural violence as oppression that is “exerted systematically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order” (Farmer, 2004: 307). Thus, the outcomes of structural violence for Farmer include: “death, injury, illness, subjugation, stigmatization, and even psychological terror” (Farmer, 2004: 308). Farmer focuses on multiple aspects of structural violence, but focuses on inadequate healthcare services in particular (Farmer, 2004: 313-314). During his stint as a medical director in Haiti, Farmer saw structural violence occurring at the micro level with HIV and Tuberculosis running rampant in the
late 1990s, while the government had the tools and policies to increase access to healthcare and save lives (Farmer, 2004: 314).

An important aspect of structural violence is the invisibility of structures. Structures are patterns “of collective social action that has achieved a degree of permanence” that are not usually questioned (Taylor, 2016). Due to structures being social actions or activities that occur regularly they are observably invisible; they have “become so firmly entrenched (in habits, social relations, economic arrangements, institutional practices, law, policy, and so forth) as to have taken on thing-like qualities” (Taylor, 2016). Thus, a structure can not be grasped within one’s hands, however, structures “do have material manifestations, in the form of roads, buildings, power and sewer systems, and so forth” (Taylor, 2016). For the most part structures are invisible, but how they come to be invisible is up for debate. Yves Winter delves into this aspect of structural violence, clarifying how it becomes invisible (Dilts, 2012: 192). According to Winter, “structural violence’s invisibility is more likely because of violence’s ceaseless repetition in the open rather than because it has been hidden away in a dark or subterranean place” (Dilts, 2012: 192). Winter’s understanding of the invisibility of structural violence is a reversal of Galtung’s (i.e., because it is invisible, structural violence can occur with constant, systematic repetition) (Dilts, 2012: 193).

In the hopes of operationalizing structural violence, covert institutional violence will not be included in this paper as it is too similar to structural violence. Another aspect of refining the definition of structural violence is determining if Winter’s or Galtung’s concept of structural violence conflicts with other forms of violence used in this paper. Winter’s understanding of the invisibility of structural violence is at odds when one considers everyday violence, which remains invisible for the same reason Winter believes structural violence does, because of the “violence’s ceaseless repetition in the open rather than because it has been hidden away in a dark or
subterranean place” (Dilts, 2012: 192; Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 889-891). Thus, to be as inclusive as possible of all the interpretations of structural violence, while still keeping it distinct from other forms of violence utilized in this paper, Galtung’s conception of invisibility will be utilized. The definition of structural violence for this paper shall be: when misery, suffering, and/or death befalls people(s) caused by the invisible (unequal social and economic) structures (i.e., form of violence) within society and the state that limits life for the inadvertent purposes (i.e., motivation) of oppression by the dominant group (i.e., actor).

4. Symbolic Violence
Symbolic violence was first constructed by Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, to illuminate “how domination operates on an intimate level via the misrecognition of power structures on the part of the dominated who collude in their own oppression to the extent that every time they perceive and judge the social order through categories that make it appear natural and self-evident” (Bourgois, 2001: 8). Symbolic violence is thereby “‘exercised through cognition and misrecognition, knowledge and sentiment, with the unwitting consent of the dominated’” (Bourdieu qtd in Bourgois, 2001: 8). However, Bourdieu does not limit symbolic violence to those who are unknowingly (or unwittingly) consenting to a form of domination, but also those belligerently and consciously consenting to domination (Bourdieu, 1991: 50-51). Bourdieu includes the conscious and belligerent consenters of symbolic violence because “legitimation of the social order is not…the product of a deliberate and purposive action of propaganda or symbolic imposition; it results, rather, from the fact agents apply to the objective structures of the social world structures of perception and appreciation which are issued out of these very structures and which tend to picture the world as evident” (Bourdieu, 1989: 21). This differs from Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony since it requires an active participation by dominating agents of
the hegemony through propaganda and other means (Gramsci, 2003: 197-198). This can be further clarified with Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus.

To clarify, the habitus (according to Bourdieu) is “a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways;” while dispositions create “practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule’” (Bourdieu, 1991: 12). Furthermore, the dispositions are acquired by learning how to act and talk (usually learnt at an early age) in social situations, are structural in the sense they are in-grained in the “social conditions within which they were acquired,” and are durable to change as they are “pre-conscious” (Bourdieu, 1991: 12-13). In other words, dispositions are generalizable across fields or situations. Due to the dispositions being part of the habitus, this means the habitus commands how people act in every aspect of their social lives (Bourdieu, 1991: 12-13). This application of the habitus in everyday life is termed by Bourdieu as practical sense, which is a pre-conscious state where one does not think of their actions before doing them but simply does them in accordance with their habitus and the situation they find themselves in (Bourdieu, 1991: 13). Not only do these actions and responses of the habitus come from being taught how to act, but they are reproduced and reviewed constantly by interacting socially, thus reinforcing the habitus one has acquired within society (Bourdieu, 1991: 13).

To return to Bourdieu’s point about how “deliberate and purposive action” is not required to produce symbolic violence, one example he uses is spoken language, which differ in each class or strata of society (Bourdieu, 1991: 50-51). When one changes what words they use or how they pronounce their language due to another speaker of the same language entering the room (but of a higher class or a “legitimate speaker” than the first speaker), this is a form of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991: 50-51). This form of symbolic violence is considered by Bourdieu as intimidation.
that “can only be exerted on a person predisposed (in his habitus) to feel it, whereas others will ignore it” (Bourdieu, 1991: 50-51). Thus, as has been mentioned previously by Bourdieu, symbolic violence occurs when the victim unconsciously or consciously accepts the system that oppresses them and makes them believe they are acting in their own interest when they are actually being dominated (Bourdieu, 1991: 50-51).

Examples of research into symbolic violence include work done by Philippe Bourgois, by Raquel Recuero, and by Natividad Gutierrez Chong. In Philippe Bourgois’s (2001) study, symbolic violence is an important portion of his analysis that demonstrates how “mutual recrimination and shame…obfuscates the role of an oppressive power structure” (Bourgois, 2001: 5). One example Bourgois cites is of Carmen, whose brother had a love affair with a woman who left him for “the local FMLN [(Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front)] commander” (Bourgois, 2001: 21). The local FMLN commander, fearing a reprisal from Carmen’s brother either against the commander or against the rebels by revealing important information, had him assassinated (Bourgois, 2001: 21). Symbolic violence comes into play with how Carmen describes the events fifteen years later; “Carmen was still pondering whether or not her brother had been a risk to the guerilla(s)” (Bourgois, 2001: 22). Carmen partly believes the killing of her brother was justified, blaming the death not on the local FMLN commander, but “on the promiscuity and machinations of [her brother’s] girlfriend” (Bourgois, 2001: 22). Even after the killing of her brother, “Carmen’s family continued to support the revolution...[with] four of Carmen’s other brothers and one of her sister remain[ing] guerilla fighters” (Bourgois, 2001: 22). Carmen’s family continued to support the FMLN all the while the FMLN marginalized her family and were “still distrusted six years after the armistice when [Bourgois] made [his] last visit to the former war zone” (Bourgois, 2001: 22).
Another example is the recent article on social media and symbolic violence, written by Raquel Recuero, which revolves more around the symbolic violence described by Bourdieu that surrounds language (Recuero, 2015: 1-2). In Recuero’s study, she reveals how social media has become a place where symbolic violence and messages supporting violence are common (Recuero, 2015: 1-2).

The final example is a study by Natividad Gutierrez Chong where he examines how the making of Mexican identity is linked to the Mestizo myth and symbolic violence (Chong, 2008: 524-526). Chong finds symbolic violence helped to create the national identity of Mexico by institutionalizing “several types of exclusion towards Indigenous peoples and immigrants” (Chong, 2008: 525).

As has been shown, symbolic violence is violence that is relatively new in being studied but has gained prominence throughout the decades since it was developed by Bourdieu. What comes next is defining symbolic violence for this paper. Since symbolic violence is somewhat invisible as is structural violence, there is some overlap that must be discussed. Since the effects symbolic violence has on a person(s) vary from humiliation, degradation, and limitation of possible avenues for living life, this greatly overlaps with structural violence, especially since structures can enable or support discourses that empower symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991: 12-13; Bourgois, 2001: 8; Garver, 1968: 819-822; Dilts, 2012: 192). Structural violence originates from structures within society, while symbolic violence originates from accepting discourses and dispositions (thereby building one’s habitus) of society that entail the domination and subordination of one’s self (Taylor, 2016; Bourdieu, 1989: 21; Bourdieu, 1991: 12-13). Furthermore, both structural and symbolic violence are invisible, with both either being so apparent and recurrent they are not recognized or invisible because one is not directly experiencing
it (Bourdieu, 1991: 24; Dilts, 2012: 192-193). It is fairly clear both structural and symbolic violence originate from a similar area (social structures) and are relatively invisible, however, where they differ is in support for oppression, subjugation and marginalization. Structural violence does not take into account of whether or not those who are being marginalized or oppressed accept (or support) the system they are subjected to. Bourdieu clarifies that symbolic violence only occurs when those subject to it internalize humiliation and legitimate the “inequality and hierarchy ranging from sexism and racism to intimate expressions of class power” (Bourgois, 2001: 8). The definition for this paper shall not stray from Bourdieu’s original (flexible) definition: symbolic violence occurs whenever domination (i.e., motivation) is perpetrated by an actor (e.g., state, group, or individual) and those being dominated (i.e., form/action) accept this either knowingly, supportively, or unwittingly, with effects including limiting avenues of choice, humiliation, degradation, and/or marginalization (Bourdieu, 1991: 24, 50-51; Bourgois, 2001: 8). This does not mean symbolic violence will not overlap; structural and symbolic violence can both be identified in a single form of violence since those subject to structural violence may not oppose the violence. This would imply even though they are suffering from structural violence, person(s) may be subject to symbolic violence as well if they are tacitly accepting this violence. On the other hand, structural violence can still be differentiated from symbolic violence when in an example people openly recognize their domination or oppression and/or make clear their opposition to it. This then limits symbolic violence and allows for cases where structural violence may be apparent and pertinent without symbolic violence.

5. Developmental Violence

Development is not simply a beneficial process that brings prosperity and services to underdeveloped areas, it also brings with it violence (Escobar, 2004: 15-16). It has always been acknowledged development “entailed a certain level of dislocation and destruction of traditions,
[but] in the long run development was seen as inevitable and [ultimately] beneficial” (Escobar, 2004: 15-16). However, the violence and damage done by development projects are not after-effects nor are they “temporary but actually long lasting and structural” (Escobar, 2004: 16). The effects of developmental violence include: displacing persons, creating underclasses who become poor due to their traditional sources of employment being destroyed or moved, and creating violent competition over natural resources (Escobar, 2004: 15-17; Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4).

Arturo Escobar argues violence (in general) is inherent in development, it “is not only endemic but constitutive of development” (Escobar, 2004: 16). Escobar demonstrates this by examining the effect of displacement on those in areas where development has been planned in the Colombian countryside (Escobar, 2004: 15-16). Many Afro-Colombians who live in the untouched Pacific rainforest are being steadily displaced by the Colombian state, right-wing paramilitaries, and left-wing militants in the name of development (Escobar, 2004: 19). The paramilitaries are being “paid by rich African oil palm growers” to clear areas of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations so as to construct palm oil plantations, all the while being funded by the Colombian state (Escobar, 2004: 19). The left-wing militants have forced “many river communities…to plant coca [(the base plant use to make cocaine)] or move out” for the cause of a socialist revolution (which would bring development to the rural areas) (Escobar, 2004: 19). These actions, along with other development projects under the Colombian government’s “Plan Colombia” initiative has led to the internal displacement of “about three million…people…[with] a disproportionate percentage of the displaced [being] Afro-Colombians and indigenous people” (Escobar, 2004: 19). This only compounds the suffering of those being displaced as the poverty rates in the rural regions of Colombia are hovering around 80 percent (Escobar, 2004: 19). With little to no alternatives (living off the land they once inhabited being no longer an option) many seek solace in the urban
centres to find they are trapped in absolute poverty, becoming disposable peoples in shanty towns on the outskirts of urban centres (Escobar, 2004: 19).

Two academics who agree with Escobar’s view are Smitu Kothari and Wendy Harcourt. Kothari and Harcourt go further than Escobar in stating it is “not just those who exist below what economists label ‘the poverty line’” that are victims of developmental violence (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4). Kothari and Harcourt reveal there are at least five different aspects or forms of developmental violence.

First, due to development being centered on industrialization and urbanization in cities, the rural areas are thereby neglected “in favour of centralized urban industrial development” that can be more readily regulated and controlled (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4). By focusing on industrialization and urbanization this relegates the rural areas to fend for themselves with a burgeoning urban sector enticing more rural people to migrate to the cities (even when there is little hope for employment) and thus in turn slowly eradicating rural lifestyles and cultures (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4). Development then leads to greater insecurity at both the global and nation-state level since “for the majority it has led to growing inequalities and disparities of economic wealth – and violence is deeply embedded in the consequent increase of social and economic insecurity” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4).

The second form of violence caused by development is “the disruption and destruction of the sources of life on our fragile planet - the lands, forests, air and water systems we depend on” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4). Development has largely come at a cost for Earth’s environment, whether it be for extraction of fossil fuels, cutting down forests to plant palm oil plantations, “pesticide-intensive agriculture, the massive dumping of toxic wastes, [and] dams” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4). An example of this ecological aspect of developmental violence is the effect
of pesticides in the two “Indian states of Punjab and Haryana…[which has caused degradation of] soils, the critical lowering of groundwater and its pollution by the leaching of pesticides and fertilizers” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 4).

Third, developmental violence can have a negligible effect on culture (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 5). Developmental violence steadily amalgamates and destroys “the world’s cultural pluralism…with an alarming loss of ethnicities, knowledge systems, languages and traditional cultural forms of expression” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 5). This can be seen in the discourses of global media and globalized norms invading societies across the globe with the “inherent assumption of the superiority of one set of cultural and economic priorities with the implicit, if not explicit, inferiority of another” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 5). The globalization of norms and media projecting these norms leads to violence by promulgating only one path, western or European-style modernization, which then “breeds violence, intolerance, bigotry and prejudice against those groups who are perceived as ‘the other’” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 5).

Fourth, developmental violence does not just affect the poor as the issue is not that it creates poverty directly (it does inadvertently) but “it is a problem of wealth creation” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 5). It is due to wealth creation, the worshipping of materialism, and the current “privileging…[of] dominant patterns of achieving economic growth as the only road to development [that] creates poverty, threatens and destroys livelihoods, creates mass insecurities, breaking down homes and communities, forcing [people from their lands and homes]…into criminality” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 5).

Fifth, a centralized process of development which imposes “standardized, homogenizing solutions on plural, cultural social and economic contexts” causes developmental violence by not taking into account the complexity of said contexts (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 6). Kothari and
Harcourt use the example of policy areas of “agriculture, water, energy and forests” that are not connected at the centralized bureaucracy level but are deeply connected for “the life of a community dependent on natural resource systems” (Kothari & Harcourt, 2004: 6).

Developmental violence will be defined in this paper as such: developmental violence occurs when actors (e.g., state, private companies given permission by the state) are motivated by economic development and subject people to violent actions either directly (e.g. displacement of persons, destruction of environment, destroying established sources of employment) or indirectly (e.g. increasing inequalities between wealthy few and everyone else, destruction of culture, violent competition over resources). The reason why it shall be limited to the economic realm is because there is not enough research yet of democratic development that explains the consequences and violence of such development processes. In the future, when more research has been accumulated, this could be included.

6. Everyday Violence

Everyday violence or normalized violence is the term used for violence at the micro-level of analysis that has become normalized and invisible. The anthropologist who developed everyday violence and made it into an important dimension of analysis for violence was Nancy Scheper-Hughes.

Scheper-Hughes derived and developed everyday violence from her work in studying the death and demise of a “peasant community in western Ireland on the Dingle Peninsula” as well as from Franco Basaglia’s work with “state mental patients in Italy after the [Second World] war” (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 889-890). Basaglia, a state psychiatrist, saw first hand the deplorable treatment of patients deemed suitable, but was a “regime of violence, torture, and terror that masqueraded as therapy” (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 890). Basaglia termed these actions peace-time
crimes, in reference to war crimes, whereby people who carry out such everyday violence and silent genocides do so with efficiency, indifference, and “sometimes with gusto” against those deemed “‘deficient’ in their humanity and personhood, and therefore in all likelihood as ‘better off dead’” (Basaglia qtd in Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 890). It is this aspect of everyday violence (those subjected to it seen as less than one’s self) and the constant repetition of the actions that make it normalized in society, which then allows for more violence to be perpetrated with little to no backlash or outcry that is taken seriously (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 889-890).

Scheper-hughes provides two differing examples of everyday violence, the first being one where violence is being perpetrated by way of inaction and indifference, the second being perpetrated by action and indifference. The first example is of the “normalization and institutionalized social indifference to staggering infant and child mortality in shantytown favelas” in Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 891). How this became everyday violence was by tranquilizing malnourished babies, the catholic church deeming them angel babies, state dispensing free coffins but not more food, and passive euthanasia by mothers baring or reducing the food intake of their babies (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 891). It was the indifference and inaction (in saving the children) by the state towards angel babies that first led to the indifference and subsequent violence perpetrated by the angel babies’ very own mothers (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 891). With little outcry coming from mothers anymore or from a non-state actor (such as the Catholic Church), “the death of poor children was quite simply the most natural, routine, ordinary and expected of events” (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 891-892). The other example, one where it is indifference to violent action instead of inaction, is the case of invisible genocide against “children and young men who are perceived as ‘dangerous’” by adults (Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 892). Scheper-Hughes cites empirical cases from both the favelas of Brazil and shanty towns of South Africa, where children
of lower classes (often street children) are at the very least “illegally detained in jails alongside common adult offenders” and at the very worst assassinated by “police-infiltrated local death squads” or regular police (Schepers-Hughes, 1996: 892). The targeting of poor male youth in these two cases is due to the discourse in these societies that deem them as dangerous individuals currently and will become more dangerous if they grow up to become career criminals (Schepers-Hughes, 1996: 892-893). Furthermore, the targeting of male youths is indiscriminate, as those executed “are not suspected subversives but ordinary people, most of them poor and illiterate—in particular, young black men” (Schepers-Hughes, 1996: 892). Specific to these examples, the violence directed towards male-youths has been due to long-standing authoritarian-state actions against youths; “a crisis of security among the privileged classes who had over the years come to rely on the authoritarian state to keep the poor…and the ‘dangerous’ (especially ‘criminalized’ youths) at bay and in the shanty towns…‘where they belong’” (Schepers-Hughes, 1996: 892-893). Furthermore, any defence of the youths is given a negative skew as giving “‘special favors’ for criminals[, which is then] superimposed on a narrow definition of crime that does not recognize the violent acts of the state” and thus allows for this violence to become routine and accepted as good, even by the poor within the shanty towns who accept the ‘dangerous poor youth’ paradigm (Schepers-Hughes, 1996: 894).

As has been shown in Schepers-Hughes’ two examples, everyday violence can come in two forms: inaction and action. The main factor in both examples is an indifference or acceptance of the violence as routine or common enough as car accidents or cancer. Everyday violence will overlap most other types of violence analyzed in this paper as everyday violence is the micro or interpersonal level analysis of violence that coincides with or is integral to other types of violence (e.g. structural, symbolic, institutional). Two obvious overlaps that must be noted are the
invisibility aspect of everyday and structural violence, as well as the acceptance of violence by those subject to it in symbolic violence. To demarcate the boundaries between structural and symbolic violence from everyday violence is difficult; it has been noted by Bourgois that Scheper-Hughes usage of everyday violence “tends to conflate [it] with structural and institutional violence” (Bourgois, 2001: 8). Thus, this paper will define everyday violence more succinctly as violent actions (physical and psychological) that are normalized and reoccur at a systematic amount (i.e., motivation), which are perpetrated by actors (e.g., state, groups, individuals). The most important part of this definition is the motivation where everyday violence is characterized by its routine nature, invisibility, and indifference toward it due to its routine occurrence and/or acceptance of the target of said violence.

All presented types of violence are summarized in table 1.

*It should be noted the cases of violence could overlap as they may include different forms of violence or include a form of violence that overlaps, and thus can be categorized as multiple types of violence.

Table 1. Types of violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Violence</th>
<th>Types of Actors (using violence)</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Action/ Form of Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Violence</td>
<td>State, Quasi-State Group, Sponsored Group, Individuals</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Physical (e.g. torture, bombings) &amp; Psychological (threats to use of terror)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Violence</td>
<td>State agencies and personnel (e.g., soldiers)</td>
<td>Commits violence because of the power they wield that is given to them by the group or institution</td>
<td>Overt violence (soldier killing civilians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>State and Society</td>
<td>Oppression of other groups by the dominant group</td>
<td>Limiting avenues of living life by way of inequalities in the structures of society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Violence</td>
<td>State, Group, or individual (and then – self-perpetuated by the individual affected by it)</td>
<td>To dominate a class or group of persons with the collusion of the oppressed as they judge their oppression to be the way the world works</td>
<td>Invisible Power Structures, laws, articles or news stories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental Violence</td>
<td>State (State Agencies and Companies) and private corporations given permission by State</td>
<td>Development concerning economic development</td>
<td>Displacing persons, destroying traditional sources of employment and food and water, amalgamating cultures by economic means, creating wealth inequality and violent competition over natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday Violence</td>
<td>State, Groups, Individuals</td>
<td>The normalization of violence towards a group or persons</td>
<td>All forms of Physical and Psychological Violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methods**

The theory section set up the types of violence, the methods section will now explain the case study and how it will be analyzed. This case of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict was chosen because it illustrates all types of violence categorized previously, it is current, it is very publicized on social media and data sources, and this case has not yet been covered by a comprehensive violence typology analysis.

**Data Collection**

Data collection was based on the traditional, qualitative style of the analysis presented in this paper. The data collection started in earnest in October of 2015, searching the web using the
Google News engine, on a daily basis, with three terms: Turkey, Kurd, and Kurds. The first three pages of Google News was examined under sorting by date and by relevance.

The selection criteria included news articles from any English news source concerning the Kurds in Turkey or in Northern Syria, with mention of the Turkish state or affiliates, was chosen and saved to a hard drive. Events concerning Syrian Kurds were included due to the shared political movements between them, their shared area, and shared history and culture (Yackley, 25.02.2016). The selection included news stories about physically violent events (e.g., bombings, protests, killings), non-physically violent events (e.g., passing of laws restricting Kurdish language or political participation, acts of discrimination), and news stories (e.g., stories explaining how Kurds or Turks feel about the ongoing conflict and other related issues they face). News reports are an important aspect to this analysis as many of the reports tell of the background or recent history of the conflict, while stories provide evidence of symbolic violence, which is invisible until recognized in the way people talk about the violence they suffer and whether they internalize it.

Those events occurring prior to October 2015 (events occurring during and after June 2015) were searched specifically when mentioned in news sources or articles obtained during the data collection phase beginning in October 2015. Thus, a full timeline of events was accumulated in the searches, comprising the dates in between June 2015 and July 2016. Weekly searches were conducted on the website for the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, and non-consecutive searches were conducted on the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch websites. News articles or journal articles deemed purely biased or propaganda pieces, with little to no substance of empirical facts surrounding events, were not included in the study. However, so as to be inclusive as possible and to ascertain as much information about the ongoing conflict in Southeastern Turkey as possible, since reporters and human rights investigators were largely
barred from the area, news sources and articles that were biased but had some factual information were included. Those biased news sources, reports and articles that were included were reviewed (as were all the saved news reports and stories) to locate the factual details that were poignant for the study. It should be noted, some opinion pieces that contained factual information alongside their opinion were included in the study so as to have a greater grasp of how both Turkish and Kurdish persons felt about the conflict and towards the opposing side(s).

As for why surveys were not used for this research study is because it was not possible at the time to conduct surveys and they are not needed for examining most types of violence (except for symbolic violence). The researcher could not conduct surveys in Turkey due to three factors: lack of funds available, not being able to understand Kurdish nor Turkish, and not being able to travel to the Southeast of Turkey as it was a war zone.

Utilizing news sources and NGO reports are beneficial and can be used solely without survey data, however, there use is not without criticism. News sources can be biased, can suffer from the threshold effect (i.e. popular stories) and the fatigue effect (i.e. chopping up large reports into small facts) (Davenport, 2007: 5). NGOs suffer from focusing too much on state actions and put little focus on non-state actors when they are not aligned with the state (Davenport, 2007: 5). Thus, both news sources and NGO reports are required to form a complete picture, with NGOs providing detailed information on state repressive or violent activity and news sources providing information on the background or history, views of regular people, and actions by non-state actors (Davenport, 2007: 5-6).
Sources

Sources include news websites, academic journal articles, and NGO websites. Sources deemed not overtly biased include: BBC News, Aljazeera, the Guardian, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.

Sources deemed overtly biased but had articles or opinion pieces that were either important or uncovered new information include: Anadolu Agency (Turkish state broadcaster), ARA News (Syrian Kurdish), Daily Sabah (AKP bias), NRT TV (Iraqi Kurdish), Today’s Zaman (Turkish state controlled), Press TV (Iran), Rudaw (Iraqi Kurdish), yenisafak.com (conservative, AKP supporting), Assyrian International News Agency (Assyrian, anti-Turkish state), Kurdistan24 (Kurdish), gulf-times.com (Qatar). Appendix 4 cites why these sources were deemed biased.

Method of Analysis

The method of analysis will be of a qualitative variety, where each of the different types of violence will be given a subsection. The general rubric of actor, motivation, and form/mode of violence will be outlined at the end of each theme to provide a structured rubric for those looking for a quick synopsis of the nuanced analysis above.

The themes referred to earlier can range from Turkish military actions towards the PKK (Political Violence) to re-developing destroyed cities and putting in new residents to de-Kurdify Kurdish majority cities (Developmental Violence). The selection process for the examples used in the themes are based on both how available information was for reported events (i.e. other corroborating news reports) and whether they fit the criteria of the type of violence (i.e., Actor, Motivation, Form). Furthermore, since there were so many incidents or events that occurred, the examples used in this paper were selected on the basis of whether they were a significant event (i.e., most covered by news sources) or best exemplified a type(s) of violence. At the end of each
theme there will be a few sentences or paragraphs on which events or examples overlap into other types of violence.

**Description of Events**  
**Summarized Timeline from June 2015 to August 2015**

Throughout the collection of news media and NGO reports, none have provided a fairly comprehensive timeline of the recently renewed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds. As such, this summarized timeline will utilize the sources gathered as well as partial timelines from news sources. These partial timelines are deemed partial as they do no encapsulate the entire period of time nor do they encapsulate the entire conflict, usually providing selective timelines about attacks by the PKK, TAK, Turkish politics and Turkish state violence. Not all events will be included in this timeline as this would take too much space and would be unnecessary as a more concise timeline can provide for a more succinct analysis of the pivotal events that shaped the conflict. A more extensive timeline can be found in Appendix 3.

Continuing from where the introduction left off, things began to escalate quickly in the Kurdish provinces of Turkey. After the November 2015 elections, Erdogan continued his ‘War on Terror’ against the PKK but intensified the campaign and broadened its scope. A lockdown of the Kurdish provinces went into effect, with cities being surrounded and curfews being put in place, a militarization of the southeast began in earnest (Yeginsu, 2015). However, the Kurds in both Turkey and Syria had other problems to contend with, namely militant groups such as Al-Nusra and Islamic State. An interesting development during November 2015 was the jailing of two Turkish journalists “on charges of ‘spying’ and ‘revealing state secrets’ after they published a story alleging members of the state intelligence agency [(MIT)] were sending weapons into Syria” (Aljazeera, 27.11.2015). It had been alleged before “by experts, Kurds, and even [US Vice President] Joe Biden” that the Turkish state had been supplying militant groups in Syria to fight
the regime of Bashar al-Assad, turning a blind eye to fighters crossing their border into Syria, and the selling of oil by ISIS inside Turkey (Bertrand, 28.07.2015). The latter was corroborated in July 2015 when a raid that killed Abu Sayyaf (an ISIS commander) also obtained evidence on flash drives that implicated the Turkish state of giving ISIS “free rein” inside Turkey (Bertrand, 28.07.2015). These revelations came after the bombing in Suruc on July 20\textsuperscript{th} and most likely enflamed the tensions even higher between the security forces, Gendarmerie, and the Kurds. As of July 2016, multiple forms of violence are still occurring in Turkey’s southeast, with security forces focusing their attention now on the rural areas as the urban populations centres have nothing left to destroy or are sufficiently ‘pacified’ (Reuters, 14.07.2016; Selvi, 5.06.2016). This is not to say curfews do not still occur in the cities, rather the rural areas surrounding the cities are being put under curfew (Reuters, 14.07.2016).

To reiterate what was mentioned in the methods section, the analysis will be conducted by examining and analyzing each theme, which has multiple incidents or events within them. At the end of each subsection will be a discussion of what forms of violence may have crossed over into other types of violence as well as a summary of the findings in the framework based off the typology of violence table 1 (actor, motivation, form of violence).

**Analysis**

A summary of the types, forms, and motivations of violence can be found in Table 1 in Appendix 2.

1. Political Violence:

The actors of political violence include: State, Quasi-State Group, Sponsored Group, Individuals. The motivation for political violence is political. The general forms of violence for political violence is physical and psychological.
Physical and Psychological Political Violence towards PKK and affiliates

Turkish state violence directed toward the PKK is a quintessential example of political violence and it comes in many forms. Direct clashes are one of the most common forms of political violence the Turkish state utilizes, which includes airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting PKK camps, street to street fighting in cities, and rural firefight (Aljazeera, 18.12.2015). However, the Turkish state is not just targeting the PKK but anyone associated with the PKK and thus all Kurds are subject to this political violence, as can be seen by the deaths of civilian Kurds within the curfews of the southeast (Associated Press, 2.03.2016). Amnesty International has investigated and found the violence being committed against the Kurds in the southeast amounts to “collective punishment” due to security forces using an “abusive use of force, including firing heavy weaponry in residential neighbourhoods” (Amnesty International, 2016). Between August 2015 and January 2016, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey recorded “162 [civilians]…have been killed during the curfews, including 29 women, 32 children, and 24 people over 60 years of age,” while the Turkish Interior Ministry stated at the beginning of January only 18 civilians had been killed (Amnesty International, 2016). Where the physical political violence overlaps into institutional violence is with Turkish security forces being given freedom to act with impunity when concerning Kurds in the southeast, as is made clear in a document sent to the “Cizre/Sirnak 3rd Tank Battalion Command…on 30 July 2015” (ANF News, 4.01.2016). The document instructs soldiers not to feel ambivalent in using their weapons, even towards civilians, as the soldiers will have immunity from prosecution if civilians are harmed (ANF News, 4.01.2016; Bulut, 28.01.2016). This document was found by Dicle News Agency (DIHA) in January and the day after displaying the document on their website the whole site was blocked by Turkish Telecommunications Authority (TIB) (Bulut, 28.01.2016). This document is indicative of institutionalized violence against the Kurds.
The curfews alone are another form of political violence (as well as institutional and structural violence) since it causes a psychological harm on those under the curfews by barring them from leaving their homes while fighting rages on outside between Turkish security forces and PKK affiliates (e.g. YPS) (Amnesty International, 2016). Residents in curfew areas not knowing whether they may be killed by Turkish security forces directly by house raid, by a rocket or artillery shell landing in their home, starving to death in their homes, or survive with psychological trauma for those Kurds withstanding curfew (Amnesty International, 2016). Curfews will be discussed in greater detail in the institutional and structural violence subsections.

As for the political violence being perpetrated against the affiliates of the PKK, specifically the YPG and PYD in Syria, President Erdogan and his AKP government have taken a two pronged approach. First, the Turkish Armed Forces on numerous occasions used heavy artillery and small arms fire to attack YPG and PYD targets across the southern Turkish border (Aljazeera, 18.02.2016; Pamuk, 27.10.2015; BBC News 14.02.2016; Daily Mail, 14.02.2016). This has killed both civilians in YPG held territory as well as YPG fighters (Aljazeera, 18.02.2016; Pamuk, 27.10.2015; Daily Mail, 14.02.2016). The second approach is by aiding (directly and indirectly) Islamist Rebels in the Syrian Civil War, which includes collaboration with the al-Nusra Front and ISIS, who are fighting the YPG in northern Syria and Aleppo (ARA News, 13.05.2016; Aljazeera, 27.11.2015; Guiton, 2014). It has been widely accepted and reported that the Turkish state has been sending arms and supplies to Islamist Rebel groups such as al-Nusra Front and others near Aleppo who have been fighting both Syrian government forces, the YPG, and killing civilians in the Kurdish area of Sheikh Maqsood (ARA News, 13.05.2016). As for Islamic State, ISIS members past and present have revealed to news outlets they have been collaborating with Turkish military officials in order to fight against the Kurds in Syria by largely allowing ISIS fighters and
supplies to travel easily through Turkey’s border (Guiton, 2014). Senior US officials have concluded after a US raid on the house of the head of finance for ISIS that the documents found implicated Turkish state collusion with ISIS beyond any reasonable doubt (Bertrand, 28.07.2015). There has even been a report of ISIS fighters getting medical treatment from the Turkish state when they cross over the border (Solomon, 2014). More recently though, the Turkish government has been supporting ISIS (whether intentionally or unintentionally) by stalling the YPG from taking ISIS strongholds (such as Jarablus and Manbiji) that would cut supply routes of weapons, medicine, fighters and trade routes for ISIS (Tanis, 3.04.2016). By letting the supply routes from Turkey to ISIS strongholds stay open it allows ISIS to keep accumulating wealth, personnel and weapons so as to use against the Kurds in Syria, who have become their fiercest rival in Syria. Whether Turkish government policy had a collaborative or even a non-impeding strategy towards ISIS and their advances in Syria, following the June 29th 2016 Istanbul Airport ISIS attack and the attempted coup by a faction of the military in July 2016, Turkish government policy has been forced down the path to being more confrontational with ISIS (Cagaptay, 2016).

The actors involved were the Turkish state and militant groups from Syria attacking the PKK and affiliates (e.g., YPG, PYD, YPS). The motivation behind the violence is political, specifically to suppress Kurdish militant groups due to their call for autonomy in Syria and Kurdish rights in Turkey. The forms of violence came in both physical and psychological forms, including: collective punishment of Kurds during curfews in cities, bombings, airstrikes, shelling, supporting (openly, secretly, and inadvertently) militant groups in Syria and Turkey that attack Kurds.

**Political Violence committed against the HDP by the State and its affiliates**

The targeting of the HDP by the Turkish state for exclusion and/or destruction also constitutes as political violence against the Kurds. The reasons why this constitutes political
violence towards the Kurds is two-fold: first, the HDP (as well as the BDP) are the largest voice and representative bloc of the Kurds in Turkish democracy, and second, the direct actions (e.g., revoking immunity for MPs) and indirect actions (e.g., supporting ISIS who have attacked the Kurds and HDP) constitute political violence. The revoking of immunity from prosecution by the Turkish state for MPs is the most direct form of political violence the Turkish government has taken against the HDP (Morning Star, 21.05.2016; Aljazeera, 20.05.2016). On the 20th of May, AKP parliamentarians (with help from some members of the CHP) stripped 138 MPs of their immunity temporarily by adding a “clause to remove immunity...[from those] who are currently facing criminal investigations” (Aljazeera, 20.05.2016). Those facing criminal investigations overwhelmingly come from the HDP (405 investigations for HDP, 100 for CHP), who have actively advocated for a ceasefire and a return to peace talks between the government and the PKK (Morning Star, 21.05.2016). By using State prosecutors to prosecute the Kurdish opposition to the AKP, the same opposition which ‘stole’ the majority in Parliament from the AKP in the June 2015, this can be conceived as political violence as it is politically motivated.

Furthermore, before and after the November Election of 2015, President Erdogan has been telling the Turkish public the HDP is the political arm of the PKK or has been supporting them and are no better than criminals (Morning Star, 21.05.2016; Aljazeera, 20.05.2016). President Erdogan does this by publicly associating the HDP with the PKK, which Erdogan has made clear to the larger Turkish public are not representative of the Kurds but terrorists who hinder Turkish efforts to build roads, airports and develop the southeast (YeniSafak, 21.05.2016). Also of note, running up to the November 2015 election the State television broadcaster (which is run by the government) only provided the HDP with 18 minutes of air time compared to the AKP’s 30 hours of air time; effectively silencing the HDP in many homes of Turkey which only have state
broadcaster channels (The Economist, 31.10.2015). However, revoking MP immunity temporarily, associating the HDP with the PKK, and providing very little air time on State television does not solely constitute political violence as the action does not cause physical or psychological harm (that one can surmise) but is politically motivated (e.g., AKP squashing dissent and removing opponents). Rather, these types of violence are more constitutive of institutional and structural violence, due to the use of laws, power structures and institutional authority (State TV, State Prosecutors, the Presidency) to silence, denigrate, and restrict the HDP from representing their constituents. However, these actions are politically motivated as the perpetrators are the AKP and President Erdogan, and the motivation is to silence their political rivals, the HDP (Aljazeera, 20.05.2016; Işıkara, Kayseriilioğlu, & Zirngast, 2015). What is certainly political violence is the violence being orchestrated in the southeast by the Turkish government and possible collusion with ISIS in order to bomb Kurdish and HDP targets in order for the AKP to win the November 2015 election.

As has been mentioned previously in this subsection, the link between ISIS and Turkey is undeniable, and thus, the likelihood of Turkish state complicity in the bombings against the HDP in Turkey leading up to the 2015 elections is plausible (Guiton, 2014; Bertrand, 28.07.2015; Solomon, 2014; Beck, 2016). After the first bombing targeting a rally in Diyarbakir before the June 2015 election, the HDP did not end their campaigning and gained enough of the vote to gain seats in the Grand National Assembly as a party and not individual candidates; this blocked the AKP of having an absolute majority in Parliament (Beck, 2016; BBC News, 6.06.2015). The perpetrator of the Diyarbakir bombing in June was never apprehended or determined (BBC News, 6.06.2015). The attacks and bombings then continued against the HDP with the largest occurring on the 10th of October in Ankara, less than a month before the second election of 2015, where over
100 people were killed and many more wounded (BBC News, 14.10.2015; Beck, 2016). Immediately following the attack, ambulances that had rushed to the scene were pushed back by Turkish security forces, which also “obstructed the quick evacuation of the wounded from the square” utilizing physical force and even tear gas (Letzsch & Khojami, 11.10.2015; Dearden, 10.10.2015). One of the bombers was the brother of the man who conducted the bombing in Suruc in July 2015, which is suspicious that the brother of the Suruc bomber was not questioned or detained after July (BBC, 14.10.2015). Both brothers came from the same Turkish ISIS cell but “ISIS never officially took credit for the attack,” all the while Turkish intelligence services had been reportedly following the Ankara-October bombers with close surveillance teams (Işıkara, Kayserilioğlu, & Zirngast, 2015). All of this suspicious activity seems to point in the direction of the AKP and President Erdogan colluding with ISIS in its attacks on the HDP, perhaps not directly (although the evidence points this way) but by standing by while ISIS attacked HDP targets so as to gain from the chaos as well as striking fear into HDP candidates and supporters. Following the October bombing the HDP ended their campaigning for the safety of their own candidates, which two were killed in the bombing, as well as their supporters (Beck, 2016). By being forced to end their campaigning, while the AKP continued their own campaigning, the HDP lost a portion of the vote that was regained by the AKP who then formed a government without any need of coalition partners (The Economist, 2.11.2015; Beck, 2016). Furthermore, prior to the election the curfews were in effect in the southeast and the AKP instigated mobs of ultra-nationalists to attack “hundreds of HDP buildings…all over Turkey” in the beginning of September (The Economist, 31.10.2015; Işıkara, Kayserilioğlu, & Zirngast, 2015). All of this violence geared towards the HDP prior to the elections constitutes political violence since the motive was to reduce the vote for the HDP by stopping the HDP from campaigning or at the very least restrict or make hesitant their
campaigners. The political violence orchestrated by the Turkish government seemed to have worked when in November the HDP was reduced from 80 to 59 seats in the Grand National Assembly (The Economist, 2.11.2015).

The actors involved were the AKP, ISIS and President Erdogan who attacked the HDP. The motivation was political, with the purpose of degrading the HDP’s ability to campaign and be seen as a legitimate representative of Kurds in the southeast. The forms of violence include: bombing of HDP rallies, using institutional authority to label the HDP as colluders with the PKK (political and institutional violence mix), restricting ability for HDP to get their message out through media (political and institutional violence mix), and stripping immunity from HDP MPs so as to prosecute them (political and institutional violence mix).

2. Institutional Violence:

The actors for institutional violence include: state agencies and personnel. The motivation is that actors commit violence due to the power vested in them by the group or institution. The general form of violence is overt (e.g., soldiers killing civilians with impunity).

Curfews

The curfews in the southeast of the country have taken a heavy toll on the entire Kurdish population due to the Turkish state imposing what Amnesty International describes as “collective punishment” (Amnesty International, 2016). All types of buildings, especially residential ones, are being damaged, destroyed and/or levelled by Turkish security forces during their security operations to rid areas of YPS and PKK presence (Amnesty International, 2016; Rudaw, 21.05.2016). The complete disregard for violence in residential areas where civilians are hiding while clashes are ongoing is constitutive of overt institutional violence since their actions show they have little regard for civilians, their property, or their homes (Rudaw, 21.05.2016; Burc, 14.03.2016). There has been instances where Turkish security forces have summarily and “forcibly
evicted residents, bulldozing their homes and then [the state purchases] them to ensure residents do not return home” (Rudaw, 21.05.2016). Both the disregard for damaging homes as well as the purposeful damage caused to residential areas with shelling and bulldozers is characteristic of institutional violence’s vested power dynamic, where security forces feel unaccountable for their actions. However, when the state buys the properties or lands that were once Kurdish owned, this crosses over into the category of developmental violence as the plans to rebuild these areas are economically based (Burc, 14.03.2016). It is the destruction and levelling of Kurdish homes that constitutes institutional violence; the effects of said violence are largely psychological as one is left helpless as they see their home made unlivable or flattened (Bowen, 23.05.2016). Another reason for why Turkish security forces are levelling Kurdish homes is to hide the violent crimes they have committed against Kurdish civilians, as is most likely the case with 100 civilians sheltered in three basements on Bostanci street in Cizre (Bowen, 23.05.2016). All 100 were killed, but it is not known exactly how due to Turkish security forces bulldozing the damaged residential buildings after the curfew had officially ended (Bowen, 23.05.2016).

Another case of institutional violence occurring within the curfews is when civilians have been shot at with both small arms (sniper rifles, assault rifles, mortars, RPGs, etc.) and heavy weapons (tanks and artillery) with impunity by Turkish security forces (Amnesty International, 2016). As cited before in the orders sent to “Cizre/Sirkak 3rd Tank Battalion Command…on 30 July 2015,” Turkish security forces have been given express permission since the beginning of the new Kurdish conflict to use excessive amounts of force against anyone in their zones of operation (ANF News, 4.01.2016; Amnesty International, 2016). This order is a quintessential example of overt institutional violence where Turkish security forces are not held accountable for their actions and commit violent acts due to the power vested in them by their institutions. An example of the
effect institutional power has on Turkish security personnel can be seen in the overly violent actions towards civilians, including the use of snipers to target women, children and elderly people in areas far from where clashes were ongoing (Amnesty International, 2016). A sniper has an intimate knowledge of who their target is and what they are doing before they pull the trigger compared to security personnel without high-powered scopes. Thus, the violence being committed, injuring and killing women and children is a testament to how powerful institutional power is when it is vested in an individual (Amnesty International, 2016).

The actors are state security personnel. The motivation is they attack Kurds with impunity due to the power vested in them by the state (which will not prosecute them for crimes they commit). The forms of violence include: security personnel killing and injuring civilians with both targeted and indiscriminate shootings, destruction and leveling of buildings (mostly residential; Kurds at times within said buildings).

*Proxy Group Usage*

Another prime example of institutional violence is using non-state actors, such as al-Nusra Front and ISIS, to attack the Kurds in Syria and Turkey on another front. Evidence of aid given to ISIS by Turkish authorities has been mounting since 2014, with papers and news articles written on the links between the two (Phillips, 2016; Guiton, 2014; Bertrand, 28.07.2015; Solomon, 2014). High-level Turkish government authorities may not have been aware of the actions by Turkish security officials (e.g., MIT) but they certainly did not condemn the actions, rather, they condemned those who reported (i.e., Can Dundar and Erdem Gul) on the transfer of weapons to Islamic militant groups in Syria and sent them to prison (Yeginsu, 6.05.2016; Aljazeera, 27.11.2015; BBC News, 27.01.2016). By not condemning those Turkish security officials who aided Islamist militant groups in Syria, the Turkish government is giving its tacit consent for
Turkish security officials to continue aiding Islamist militants, thus constituting institutional violence as the security officials are doing what the institution deems acceptable. An example of the effects of this form of institutional violence can be seen in the reports of attacks on civilians in the Kurdish suburb of Aleppo, Sheikh Maqsoud (Amnesty International, 13.05.2016; ARA News, 13.05.2016). Many civilian Kurds have been hurt in the indiscriminate shelling and attacks on areas with no YPG installations or checkpoints; over 700 civilians injured and at least 83 killed between February and April 2016 alone (Amnesty International, 13.05.2016). The Islamist militant groups attacking Sheikh Maqsoud, the Fatah Halab coalition, are funded and supported by Gulf states along with Turkey, which has been found to be supplying weapons and aiding transfers of supplies over their southern border (Amnesty International, 13.05.2016; BBC News, 27.01.2016; Aljazeera, 27.11.2015). The institutional violence perpetrated by Islamist militants in Syria can also be constituted as political violence as it is the aim of the Turkish AKP government, specifically President Erdogan, to fight the Kurds in Turkey and Syria in order to suppress Kurdish demands for autonomy (BBC News, 14.02.2016; ARA News, 13.05.2016; Associated Press, 2.03.2016).

The actors are state security personnel (e.g., MIT). The motivation is to support (with weapons and other supplies) militant groups which target Kurds while feeling immune from responsibility. The forms of violence include: aiding militant groups that kills and injures Kurds indiscriminately with weapons and supplies.

3. Structural Violence:

The actors for structural violence include: the state and society. The motivation is the oppression of other groups by the dominant group. The general form of violence is by limiting avenues of living life by way of inequalities in the structures of society.
Curfews

Within the curfews many types and forms of violence have been committed, including structural violence. The purpose of the curfews are to lock down areas, restricting movement of people and barring entry or exit of people from the area, so Turkish security forces can comb through the areas house by house, street by street, grid by grid until they locate and neutralize Kurdish militants in the area (Bowen, 23.05.2016; Deutsche Welle, 22.12.2015). Kurdish residents who remain in the areas under curfew are subject to deprivation of basic needs such as food, water, sunlight (as many hide in basements so as to be somewhat shielded from heavy shelling), medical supplies, medical services, and even using a toilet (Bowen, 23.05.2016; Geerdink, 31.01.2016). All of this constitutes structural violence in both restricting life and thus harming persons as well as in the ultimate result of structural violence, death (Farmer, 2004: 308). In the restriction of life, because the Turkish security forces “behave as if [Kurds] are not…human,” they are thus not worthy of having the same rights or access to basic human items to survive such as food, water, electricity, and medical aid or supplies (Bowen, 23.05.2016; Geerdink, 31.01.2016; Yeginsu, 30.12.2015). An example of such structural violence can be seen in the action and inaction taken by Turkish security forces in the curfew of Cizre. As of the 31st of January 2016, 10 civilians who had been injured by clashes in the city had died in a basement from their treatable injuries due to Turkish security forces not allowing medical teams or ambulances into the area under curfew (Geerdink, 31.01.2016; Amnesty International, 2016). Any appeals by lawyers in support of the 20 wounded civilians left in the basement were blocked or rejected by Turkey’s constitutional court in quick decisions (Geerdink, 31.01.2016). One may argue this may not constitute structural violence but a different form of violence as it does not seem to be a structure occurring from historical processes. However, to treat civilian Kurds as less than human and not allow the injured to provide them with medical care (let alone seek medical attention on their own) demonstrates
the invisible structures of racism and prejudice towards the Kurds by Turkish security forces and the government. Furthermore, this indirect form of violence (blocking medical aid) is also constitutive of structural violence because the injuries were treatable and the victims not only suffered to the degree of misery as Galtung outlines, but they also died from their injuries (Galtung, 1994: 8). The deaths and prolonged misery of those in the basements in Cizre from their injuries is the severest effect of structural violence, but the misery continued on for those under the curfews (ARA News, 31.03.2016; VICE News, 10.08.2016; Amnesty International, 2016). Those who have tried to defy the curfew and attain food, water or medical supplies have been shot at with tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition by Turkish security forces (Deutsche Welle, 22.12.2015).

The actors are the state and security personnel. The motivation is provided by the prejudicial structures in Turkish society that compels the dominant group to oppress the Kurds by limiting the ability to live their lives. The forms of violence include: denying Kurds in need of medical aid, food, water, sanitation, and heat from attaining them during curfews (which are basically war zones).

**Blocking Aid Arbitrarily**

Another example of structural violence that also crosses over into institutional violence is the blocking of post-curfew aid, provided to the Kurds in the southeast from solidarity networks, by Turkish state officials (Hurriyet Daily News, 15.06.2016). State officials have “removed…tents that were built to distribute food for fast-breaking during Ramadan,” and in other cases banned the erecting of tents in and around the destroyed homes of Kurds (Hurriyet Daily News, 15.06.2016). This example threads the line between institutional and structural violence since the perpetrators are clearly identified (Turkish state officials such as district governors), act with impunity, but the violence creates misery, suffering and limits the ability of people to live their lives by restricting
access to food or shelter (Hurriyet Daily News, 15.06.2016). However, the example does not clearly fall into the category of structural violence as it is not structures of society that are perpetrating the violence, as far as one can tell without understanding the motivations of Turkish state officials (Taylor, 2016). State officials could be following a law or structure that imposes these limitations on aid being transferred to the Kurds, but most likely it is due to the curfews being put in place that tents were banned, which is a combination of institutional and structural violence (Hurriyet Daily News, 15.06.2016; Taylor, 2016). However, the tents were set up post-curfew, thus it is highly probable the Turkish state officials are acting on prejudicial structures in Turkish society so as to prolong the misery of the Kurds post-curfew, thus not allowing basic necessities as Turks are afforded.

The actors are the state and provincial governors. The motivation is provided by the prejudicial structures in Turkish society that compels the dominant group to oppress the Kurds by limiting the ability to live their lives. The forms of violence include: denying basic shelter and aid after curfews and military operations have ended.

**Social Relations that Perpetuate Structural Violence against Kurds**

Another case of structural violence is when habits and social relations perpetuate structural violence against Kurds in non-conflict situations. An example of such a case is when Pinar Cetinkaya, a 20 year-old “student at Adnan Menderes University in…Aydin, was speaking on the phone in Kurdish with her parents” and then subsequently was “kicked out of her hostel, lost her scholarship, and was questioned by the police [over] terrorism charges” (Rudaw, 15.05.2016). Three roommates reported Cetinkaya when they heard her speaking Kurdish on the phone to her parents who do not speak Turkish (Rudaw, 15.05.2016). Incidentally, the events that transpired for Cetinkaya occurred the same week as President Erdogan declared universities “hotbeds of
[separatist, Kurdish] terrorism” (Rudaw, 15.05.2016). What occurred to Cetinkaya happened because of the structures of modern Turkish society having a distrust for Kurds wherever they reside, even among the newer generations of Turks who view them as terrorists or sympathizers of terrorists and thus not humans (Taylor, 2016). Just by being known to be a Kurd who spoke Kurdish, Cetinkaya was subject to discrimination by her peers who saw her as dangerous and not among their social class or their identity (Rudaw, 15.05.2016). The effect of the structural violence in this case includes stigmatization, imposed ‘conditions of physical and emotional distress,’ and ultimately limiting Cetinkaya’s ability to live her life by furthering her studies and possibly exiting the lower social class that comes with being a Kurd in Turkey. Furthermore, from this point on she will have a record in national databases for being questioned on terrorism charges, which will most likely bar her from gaining employment requiring a background check and make it more difficult for her to integrate into Turkish society (if she so wishes), thus stigmatizing her further (Rudaw, 15.05.2016).

The actors are Cetinkaya’s roommates. The motivation was perpetuating the prejudicial structures embedded in Turkish society about Kurds being dangerous or violent and should be treated as less than a Turk. The forms of violence include: arbitrary detention and questioning based on hearing Cetinkaya speak Kurdish, loss of education opportunity, loss of shelter, and permanent black mark on her record that will further limit avenues she may take in her life.

Prejudicial Treatment of Kurds in Justice System

The final example is of the Turkish Judiciary and law enforcement having prejudice towards the Kurds with arbitrary detentions, a lack of due process, and physical abuse at the hands of law enforcement agents. Since hostilities resumed between the PKK and the Turkish state, the number of arbitrary detention of Kurds, Kurdish allies, and those who just want to see peace return
to the southeast has skyrocketed (Jones, 21.06.2016; Işıkara, Kayserilioğlu, & Zirngast, 2015; Aljazeera, 16.01.2016). The Turkish state may not be aware of some of the actions taken by their subordinates, but they are certainly aware of the Judiciary’s treatment of ISIS suspects better than Kurdish suspects of terrorist offences (Jones, 21.06.2016). For example, “an Istanbul court released…94 ISIS suspects” in March who were held in pre-trial detention, while “thousands of pro-Kurdish activists…are being held in pre-trial detention on charges not linked to violence” (Jones, 21.06.2016; Bulut, 28.01.2016; Lowen, 25.07.2015; Işıkara, Kayserilioğlu, & Zirngast, 2015). Furthermore, Kurdish detainees when ‘picked-up’ are usually beaten and/or snatched in broad day light from their homes, work, or from the street (Bulut, 28.01.2016). For example, cameraman Baran Ok was kidnapped in broad day light in front of his colleague by masked men (most likely from the Gendarmerie or Special Team) in a van, being subdued forcibly by the masked men as they dragged him into the van (Bulut, 28.01.2016). The rough treatment of Kurdish detainees constitutes both institutional and structural violence as it is the power of the state that allows those security personnel to abuse Kurdish detainees while the structures of society make the security personnel perceive Kurds as less than human, as terrorists, and thus subject to harsher treatment than Turkish suspects (Taylor, 2016). As for the Turkish judiciary’s treatment of Kurdish detainees, this constitutes structural violence as the judiciary is part of the (semi-invisible) ‘Guardian State’, which has been violently opposed to Kurdish aspirations for autonomy or secession since the founding of the Turkish state and has created many of the structures oppressing the Kurds (e.g., ban on Kurdish language, rejection of Kurdish identity, etc.) (Oktem, 2011: 63, 65, 66, 92).

The actors are the judiciary and state security personnel. The motivation is to oppress the Kurds due to prejudicial structures compelling those in Turkish society to do so. The forms of
violence include: violent treatment of Kurdish detainees, abductions by security personnel with no rights read or declaration they are security personnel, and prolonged arbitrary detention with no court dates.

4. Symbolic Violence:
   The actors for symbolic violence include: the state, groups, or individuals. The motivation is to dominate a class or group of persons with the collusion of the oppressed as they judge their oppression to be the way the world works. The general forms of violence include: invisible power structures, laws, articles and news reporting.

*Opinion Columns and Presidential Speeches*

Two ways of implementing symbolic violence is through opinion columns in newspapers and on news websites, and Presidential speeches. The purpose of both is to further instill and perpetuate symbolic violence by propagating the state as the sole defender and representative of the Kurds while vilifying Kurds who fight against the state violently and non-violently. Both are used to disperse this propaganda into the wider Turkish public so the oppression felt by the Kurds is all encompassing (i.e., oppressive action coming from all segments of society) and is ingrained in the habitus of all Turkey’s residents. This then has the Kurds either consciously or subconsciously believe in their own subjugation by the Turkish state as self-evident. An example of an opinion piece can be found on Aljazeera’s website, written by AKP MP Mehmet Metiner (Metiner, 2.04.2016). Metiner writes how the Turkish government is trying to reveal the true face of the PKK, that of an oppressive Kurdish minority claiming to be protectors and representatives of all Kurds, while the government is nobly meeting Kurdish demands for identity recognition (Metiner, 2.04.2016).

In President Erdogan’s speeches he at one moment depicts (implicitly) any Kurds still residing under the curfews as terrorists or sympathizers, then depicts the PKK (who are attempting
to defend Kurdish values and peoples through violence) and the HDP (which many Kurds view as their representatives in Turkish democracy) as the only terrorists (YeniSafak, 21.05.2016). For example, the speech on the 21st of May was far more blatant as he labeled the HDP as terrorist supporters, who along with the PKK, are impeding the development of the southeast by the Turkish state (YeniSafak, 21.05.2016).

The actors are state and government officials. The motivation is to have the Kurds perpetuate and/or accept their own oppression. The attempted forms of violence include: portraying the actions of the government to be benefiting the Kurds and if any Kurds rejects this statement then they are a terrorist.

Taped Confessions
Another attempt at perpetuating symbolic violence is a news report by the Daily Sabah (a AKP mouthpiece news company) which describes a video released by Turkish security forces of Zehra K who claims she was forced into the PKK but now understands that Kurds “should take refuge in the state” (Daily Sabah, 26.05.2016). Zehra goes on to describe how even during the curfews and military operations in the southeast, “the state opened its arms to us even in a process like this….The state gave me every chance and never forced me to do anything. They treated me as best as they can” (Daily Sabah, 26.05.2016). If what Zehra is saying is her own words and not being read from a script then this would not just be perpetuating symbolic violence but actual symbolic violence. The reason why it is symbolic violence is because Zehra may believe the Turkish state is an accepting state for Kurds, even for those who have actively fought against it. When one focuses on how Zehra denounces the PKK as a force that is “burning both the Republic of Turkey and the Kurdish nation” and declares that the Turkish state has “treated me as best as they can,” this is textbook symbolic violence (Daily Sabah, 26.05.2016). Zehra is not just
implicitly accepting the violent treatment by the state, but explicitly acknowledges this when she says they “treated me as best as they can,” implying that she, along with other Kurds, must accept their treatment at the hands of the Turkish state (Daily Sabah, 26.05.2016). If Zehra is being genuine, she may be a prime example of how many felt leading up to the November 2015 election where some Kurds (conservatives) changed their vote from the HDP to the AKP, thus succumbing to symbolic violence and misrecognizing the AKP government as the only entity that can bring about stability and peace (The Economist, 2.11.2015).

The actors are the Turkish security forces, Daily Sabah, and Zehra. The motivation is to have the Kurds perpetuate and/or accept their own oppression. The (possible) form of violence in this example is Zehra believing the actions taken by the Turkish state are just and that their current treatment of Kurds is the best they can do; Zehra accepts, and thus also perpetuates, her own oppression.

*Turkish National Anthem used as Humiliation*

One other attempt at symbolic violence, which may have succeeded, is the use of the Turkish national anthem played through loudspeakers at a volume so loud an entire city hears it, as was the case in Nusaybin (Hurriyet Daily News, 2.06.2016). The timing of the Turkish national anthem being played is what helps clarify why this is symbolic violence. On the 26th of May the YPS left Nusaybin, thus the playing of the Turkish national anthem immediately after the withdrawals of the YPS is a form of humiliation directed at the Kurds by Turkish security forces implying that Nusaybin has been Turkified (Rudaw, 26.05.2016). The symbolic violence being perpetrated here is a form of domination and humiliation where the Kurds (at the very least the YPS and its supporters) unwittingly supporting it by not speaking out against it and no longer fighting Turkish security forces.
The actors are the security forces. The motivation is to have the Kurds perpetuate and/or accept their own oppression. The form of violence in this example is the use of the Turkish national anthem to humiliate the Kurds residing in the city.

5. Developmental Violence:
The actors for developmental violence include: the state and private corporations. The motivation is economic development. The general forms of violence include: displacing persons, destroying traditional sources of employment, creating competition over scarce resources.

GAP
The development plan of “GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, the Southeastern Anatolia Project)” is a prime example of developmental violence directed towards the Kurds (Galip & Özkahraman, 2016). GAP’s main goal is the construction of dams in nine Kurdish provinces in the southeast, restricting the flow of water from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (Galip & Özkahraman, 2016). Since GAP is a large development project for the southeast, GAP also includes development of “irrigation, power production, urban and rural infrastructure, education and health, housing, transportation, communication, agricultural and industrial development, and employment” (Galip & Özkahraman, 2016). However, the priority of the Turkish state has been to construct the dams so as to satisfy energy needs in the west of Turkey while using the dams as security outposts (Galip & Özkahraman, 2016). The dams have forced Kurds from their homes for those who relied on the rivers for food or income, while others have been displaced due to the flooding caused by the dams, of which at least 11 have been completed on the Tigris River in the “Hakkari and Sırnak provinces” (Galip & Özkahraman, 2016). The reason why the GAP constitutes developmental violence is two-fold: first, Kurds were displaced due to these dams flooding living areas and that they are being used as security posts, which discourages Kurds from living near them as they are possible targets of PKK attacks and contain a heavy military presence.
(Galip & Özkahraman, 2016). Second, resources were diverted from other projects outlined in GAP to build these dams that do not provide power to possible new industrial ventures in the southeast, but only to the western Anatolian industrial heartland (Galip & Özkahraman, 2016). In other words, the GAP is using natural resources (the rivers) in Kurdish regions to further develop the western part of Turkey, thus increasing the socio-economic disparities between the Kurdish southeast and western Turkey. This example of developmental violence somewhat merges with political violence as the motives for the dam constructions are to provide power to the growing industrial heartland in the AKP’s political base (western Anatolia) (Galip & Özkahraman, 2016; The Economist, 2.11.2015; Oktem, 2011: 128-129, 131).

The actor is the state. The motivation is to provide economic development for the southeast. The forms of violence include: displacement of Kurds, and increasing socio-economic disparities between Kurds and Turks whereby the development is overwhelmingly aiding the Anatolian industrial areas.

**Destruction, Resettlement, and Increased Competition**

The other blatant example of developmental violence is the planned rebuilding of Kurdish cities after being heavily damaged by Turkish security forces. This shall be done by the Turkish state confiscating and purchasing the Kurds’ damaged, destroyed, and bulldozed homes and building new buildings that are out of the price range for those previous Kurdish tenants (Ceylan Yeginsu, 23.04.2016). The new tenants would be anyone who could afford it, including Turks, but it seems the AKP government had been planning for some time to bring in healthy, well-educated Syrian refugees (Ensor & Huggler, 23.05.2016). With the EU migrant deal with Turkey, it was made clear that those refugees who had been waiting the longest (regardless of education or health) in Turkey would be sent to the EU in exchange for “each Syrian deported from Greece” (Ensor &
However, the Turkish government has been excluding from the UN refugee agency “Syrian doctors, engineers and academics from the scheme” (Ensor & Huggler, 23.05.2016). When President Erdogan offered Syrian refugees citizenship in early July 2016, this rose speculation the Syrian refugees will be settled in the Kurdish southeast as the 2.7 million Syrian refugees could be a huge voting block for Erdogan, according to “Turkish journalist Fehim Tastekin for Al Monitor” (ARA News, 19.07.2016). This speculation was confirmed when the Turkish government proposed a “plan to permanently resettle Syrian refugees in the Kurdish southeast” (Rudaw, 19.07.2016). Furthermore, this would mean the weakening of the Kurdish demography in the southeast, according to Robert Olson, since the displacement of 345,000 Kurds aids this policy of demographic manipulation and amounts to “ethnic cleansing in [his] view” (ARA News, 19.07.2016). According to Judit Neurink, an expert and reporter on the Middle East, what will occur next is that Syrian refugees will compete with those Kurds who stayed during the curfews in the southeast over scarce resources and jobs, thus leading to lower wages for not only Kurds but others as well (Neurink, 19.07.2016). Thus, while the Kurds are competing with Syrian refugees for necessities to live, they will no longer focus as much attention on advocating for autonomy or their rights (Neurink, 19.07.2016). The developmental violence within this example is when re-development of the land destroyed and occupied by the Turkish state occurs, the Kurds will be pushed out of their homes and made to compete with a new national bloc (Syrian refugees) over scarce jobs and resources. Furthermore, the influx of Syrian refugees will most likely lead to Turkification (or an amalgamation of cultures) in Kurdish areas as the refugees begin to acclimatize to their new citizenship and new state that they owe their new lives to. Thus, the forms of developmental violence in this example include: displacement, amalgamation (or in this case Turkification) of Kurdish culture, and creating competition over jobs and resources. This example
also overlaps into political violence as one of the possible motives for settling new Turkish-Syrian refugee citizens in the southeast is to bolster the AKP’s voting bloc in the southeast where it has been weak previously. Another motive is having Kurds and Syrians compete over scarce resources, Kurds may have less time and effort to put into seeking autonomy or their rights (Neurink, 19.07.2016).

The actor is the state and its security personnel. The motivation is to redevelop the southeast after the destruction caused by the curfews. The forms of violence include: destruction of Kurdish homes causing displacement, amalgamation of culture by way of Syrian influx, and increased competition over resources and employment with influx of Syrians.

6. Everyday Violence:
The actors for everyday violence include: state, groups, and individuals. The motivation is the normalization of violence towards a group or persons. The general forms of violence include all forms of physical and psychological violence.

The Return of Forced Disappearances
The first example of everyday violence in Turkey are the forced disappearances, which are a common occurrence for those who are Kurdish or supporting the Kurds, especially in the southeast (Bulut, 28.01.2016; Oktem, 2011: 87-88). For example, the case of Hursit Kulter, a Kurdish politician from the DBP who was taken by “Special Operations teams” (i.e., Ozel Tim) on the 27th of May, 2016 (Winter, 16.09.2016). Seven days after his abduction a twitter account linked to the “Special Operations teams” posted he had been taken for interrogation, but soon after the “tweet was…deleted and the account closed….Turkish officials deny Kulter was ever arrested and claim to not know his whereabouts” (Winter, 16.09.2016). All efforts to illicit an investigation into Kulter’s disappearance have fallen on deaf ears within the State apparatus (Winter, 16.09.2016). This constitutes everyday violence since it has been occurring non-stop for decades
with little to no backlash on the government or outcry (for decades) as the rest of Turkey perceives any Kurd taken by security forces as a terrorist (Bowen, 23.05.2016; Celebi, et al., 2014: 66, 73-74). Forced disappearances have become so normalized in the Kurdish community people forget about those disappeared or do not bother worrying about them because an organization, The Saturday Mothers, has been created for the explicit purpose of shining a light on those forcibly disappeared (Winter, 16.09.2016). When a group such as The Saturday Mothers (who are made up of families of the disappeared and human-rights campaigners) is formed and has been “protesting on Istanbul’s main pedestrian thoroughfare every week for nearly two decades” without much action by the government to investigate these disappearances or widespread public outrage, everyday violence is being perpetrated (Winter, 16.09.2016).

The actors are the state and their security forces. The motivation is to normalize violence towards the Kurds. The form of violence in this example is the use of forced disappearances.

**Police Perpetuating Everyday Violence**

An example of the acknowledgement of everyday violence and support for it towards Kurds by security forces is the shooting of Refik Tekin (Letsch, 3.05.2016). When Refik Tekin was being dragged on the ground (after being shot and wounded by Turkish security forces) to an ambulance by a police officer in Cizre, the officer told Tekin (as he was dragging him) “You are all terrorists, you will see the strengths of the Turks!” (Police officer qtd. in Letsch, 3.05.2016). Just moments earlier, Tekin had been part of a group of civilians who were waving a white sheet to signify they were peaceful and had only come to collect bodies that lay in the street when they were then shot at by security forces at the other end of the street; two were killed, nine wounded (Letsch, 3.05.2016). Some may point to what the police officer said as just someone believing in propaganda produced by the state, but even when this is true it does not mean the police officer
does not accept everyday violence directed towards the Kurds. The police officer is clearly implying that all Kurds are terrorists, including journalists and civilians, and violence directed toward them in any form is normal and justified. Why the police officer perceives this everyday violence to be acceptable is another matter, which could be due to propaganda produced by the state or come from a personal grudge upon seeing fellow security personnel killed by Kurdish militants (Dearden, 18.03.2016; Aljazeera, 1.04.2016). Now one acknowledgement by a police officer of everyday violence is not proof of everyday violence being perpetrated by security forces, however, the large quantity of reports of security forces (extrajudicial) killing civilians, harassing them, and arbitrarily detaining them does present a picture that this is not a one-off occurrence (Amnesty International, 2016).

The actors are the state and their security forces. The motivation is to normalize violence towards the Kurds. The forms of violence include: shooting at Kurds indiscriminately and normalizing the violence committed by labeling all Kurds as terrorists.

**Discussion**

The categorization of the typology of violence worked well for this study. However, it should be noted the definition of symbolic violence made it more difficult in categorizing and identifying forms of symbolic violence as surveys or interviews could not be conducted. Another difficulty was that propaganda could not count as symbolic violence and yet it can be construed as an attempt at initiating symbolic violence, thus complicating the analysis and categorization of examples.

One problem that may be interpreted from the categorization is that some definitions may have been too broad. For example, political violence overlapped into almost every single type of violence due to its motivation factor. This may confuse readers as to whether a form of violence
is one type, two types, or a mix, and may lead future researchers to deem a form of violence multiple types when it is actually only one type and vice versa. However, as mentioned early on in this paper, forms of violence can constitute more than one type of violence and can be a mix of types. Furthermore, the analysis mentioned when forms of violence were more than one type or mixed, thus alleviating some confusion brought on by the broad categorizations of violence.

One thing that was missing from this analysis, due to the word count limitation, is an analysis of the violence perpetrated by groups not associated with the Turkish state, e.g., PKK, YPG, TAK, etc. Thus, this paper was limited to violence perpetrated by the Turkish state and their affiliates. Hopefully in the future a more complete analysis can be completed where all sides of the conflict may be examined and analyzed.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this paper the research questions were outlined as: What are the types of violence the Turkish state utilizes against the Kurds? What forms or modes do these types of violence take? In what ways does a violence typology explain more than SRT? These questions have been answered thusly: all types of violence with varying forms have been utilized by the Turkish state and a typology of violence explains more since it encompasses more in its analysis than SRT. Curfews and the violence surrounding them was by far the most overlapping form throughout the types of violence.

We understand the violence against Kurds better now with the practical application garnered from this case study is that if we understand the different types of violence (and their overlaps) then we can understand the developments in conflicts better. However, in other cases there may be types of violence not found to be present, but a comprehensive typology should always be utilized otherwise researchers will miss out on types and forms of violence that
complicate conflict solutions. To understand the types of violence helps one understand the motivations for conflict. Furthermore, this analysis is generalizable as this broader analysis of violence aids in understanding conflicts more comprehensively due to the complexity of violence. Whether solutions to conflicts relate to types of violence one cannot say from the results of this paper, however, knowing the complexity of violence allows for greater problem solving (i.e. tailoring solutions)

Future research is required utilizing a typology of violence to better refine the definitions and categorization of the types of violence. Future cases need not require all types of violence to be present but should utilize a full typology of violence in order to determine what types of violence are and are not present.
Works Cited


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Appendix A1: Table of Acronyms

AKP: Justice and Development Party (Conservative, Islamist)

BPD: Democratic Regions Party

CHP: Republican People’s Party (Kemal)

DTP: Democratic Society Party (Kurdish)

HDP: Peoples’ Democratic Party (Kurdish)

HEP: Labour Party of the People

MHP: Nationalist Movement Party

PKK: Kurdistan Workers’ Party

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ISIS: Islamic State, Islamic State of Iraq and the Sabah, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

PYD: Democratic Union Party

RPP: Republican People’s Party

SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces

SGDF: The Federation of Socialist Youth Associations (in Turkey)

SOHR: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights

SRT: State Repression Theory

TIB: Turkish Telecommunications Authority
TAK: Kurdistan Freedom Hawks

JITEM: Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism Centre (Turkish Army)

Ozel Tim: Special Team (Police)

YPS: Kurdish Civil Protection Units (Turkey)
## Appendix 2: Types of Violence

### Full Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Violence</th>
<th>Types of Actors (using violence)</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Action/ Form of Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Violence</strong></td>
<td>State, Quasi-State Group, Sponsored Group, Individual (e.g., Turkish State Security Forces, Village Guards, al-Nusra Front and other Syrian militant groups, Suicide Bomber)</td>
<td>Political (e.g., suppressing dissent, suppressing attempts at political autonomy by the PYD, crushing the HDP as political rivals)</td>
<td>Physical: Bombings, Airstrikes, Suicide Bombings, Shelling, supporting militant groups that opposed the Kurds in Turkey and Syria Non-Physical: Using institutional authority to restrict HDP from campaigning, Stripping immunity from HDP MPs so as to prosecute them under vague laws used overwhelmingly to target Kurds, Use of terror or fear of bodily harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Violence</strong></td>
<td>State (Turkish state agencies and personnel e.g., MIT), Group (Syrian Militant Groups) or Individuals working for the State</td>
<td>Commits violence because of the power they wield that is given to them by the group or institution (Attack Kurds and support/fund those groups who attack Kurds with impunity due to the power vested in them by the Turkish state who willingly turns a blind eye)</td>
<td>Overt: Turkish security forces indiscriminately (and discriminately) killing and injuring civilians due to the power vested in them by the State, but is not held accountable (completely) as they did what was deemed acceptable by the State (e.g., Memo Sent out on July 31). Supporting Syrian militant groups with weapons and supplies to kill and injure Kurds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Violence</strong></td>
<td>State, Turkish Security Personnel, Society</td>
<td>Oppression of other groups (e.g., Kurds) by the dominant group (e.g., Turks/Turkish State).</td>
<td>Limiting avenues of living life by way of inequalities in the structures of society (economic and social); The Turkish state denying Kurds medical aid, food, water, sanitation, and heat during curfews; Governors of provinces denying basic shelter and aid to Kurds after curfews have ended; Arbitrary detention, loss of education opportunity, loss of shelter, and an arrest record due to speaking Kurdish; Unequal and violent treatment of Kurdish detainees, abductions of Kurds by Turkish security personnel, and prolonged arbitrary detention with no court dates</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic Violence</strong></td>
<td>State, Group, or individual (and then self-perpetuated by the individual affected by it) (e.g., Turkish State, Turkish Security Forces, President Erdogan)</td>
<td>To dominate a class or group of persons with the collusion of the oppressed as they judge their oppression to be the way the world works</td>
<td>Invisible Power Structures, laws, articles or news stories (NOT STATE PROPAGANDA); Kurds succumbing to believing (or at least unknowingly consenting to) they are less than Turks, that their aims for autonomy are wrong, that the use of their language is wrong, that they should accept how the Turkish state treats them as second-class citizens and hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developmental Violence</strong></td>
<td><strong>State (State Agencies and Companies) and private corporations given permission by State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Development concerning economic development for the Southeast</strong></td>
<td><strong>Displacing Kurds by destroying their homes during curfews, destroying traditional sources of employment and food and water, destruction of cultures and amalgamating Kurds by way of Syrian refugee influx in southeast, violent competition over natural resources in Kurdish regions due to Syrian refugee influx, creating wealth inequality between Kurdish regions and western Turkey by exploiting Kurdish region natural resources for western Turkey electricity needs</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Everyday Violence</strong></td>
<td><strong>State, Groups, Individuals (e.g., Turkish state and security forces)</strong></td>
<td><strong>The normalization of violence towards a group or persons</strong></td>
<td><strong>All forms of Physical and Psychological Violence; Normalized use of forced disappearances of Kurds; Normalized indiscriminate violent actions by Turkish security forces towards Kurds; Labeling all Kurds as terrorists so as to normalize violence towards them</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Comprehensive Timeline

June 2015

-June 5th: Days before the election, two bombs ripped through a crowded rally for the HDP in Diyarbakir (predominantly Kurdish city), killing four and injuring over 400 other civilians (BBC News, 6.6.2015).

-June 7th: The first General Election of the year led to seats gained for the first time by the new secular, pro-Kurdish party, the HDP (Beck, 2016). The AKP was still the largest party at this point but it left the AKP “unable to form a government alone,” and thus they sought to acquire a coalition partner from the secular CHP and “far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)” (Beck, 2016).

July 2015

-July 20th: Bombing of “the Amara Culture Centre in Suruc,” where a gathering of 300 members of the SGDF was occurring (BBC News, 20.7.2015). Many of those killed (32) and injured (over 100) in the Suruc bombing were young Kurds wanting to help rebuild the neighboring Syrian city of Kobane (BBC News, 20.7.2015). The Turkish state’s findings after investigating the bombing site concludes that it was carried out by a Turkish born ISIS bomber (Marszal & Akkoc, 22.7.2015). Claims that the Turkish state was somehow involved in the attack circulated, with the leader (Figen Yuksekdağ) of the HDP at the time stating that “No force can act in the Suruc area without the knowledge of the state or the MIT” (Girit, 21.7.2015).
-July 22\textsuperscript{nd}: A retaliatory execution of two state security personnel by the PKK; the state security personnel were deemed to have colluded with ISIS, according to the PKK (Marszal & Akkoc, 22.7.2015; Beck, 2016).

-July 22\textsuperscript{nd}-25\textsuperscript{th}: Following the Suruc bombing and subsequent revenge killing by the PKK, the government took action by launching a counter-terrorism operation over the next few days, targeting both the PKK and ISIS inside and outside Turkey (Lowen, 25.7.2015). However, the arrests and attacks against the PKK outnumbered and were more severe than those conducted against ISIS by the Turkish state; “2544 people were detained…of those, only 136 were associated with ISIS — the rest were mainly from the organized left and the Kurdish movement” (Lowen, 25.7.2015; Işıkara, Kayserilioğlu, & Zirngast, 2015). Following the initial strikes against the PKK in Iraq and arrests of Kurds and those supporting the Kurds, the Turkish government began conducting ‘curfews’ for cities with large Kurdish populations in the Southeast (Lowen, 25.7.2015; ARA News, 31.3.2016).

-July 30\textsuperscript{th}: The “Cizre/Şırnak 3rd Tank Battalion Command affiliated to 172nd Armored Brigade Deputy Command of Land Forces Command” received a memo instructing soldiers not to feel restrained in using their weapons, even towards civilians, which is implied when the memo mentions that they should not fear being prosecuted and implies that soldiers will have impunity from the law (ANF News, 4.1.2016; Bulut, 28.1.2016).

\textbf{August 2015}

-August 27\textsuperscript{th}: Three VICE News journalists were detained by Turkish security forces on the 27\textsuperscript{th} of August in the city of Diyarbakir (BBC News, 5.1.2016). Unlike the other two journalists who were “released after 11 days and deported,” the Iraqi Kurdish journalist/translator was kept “in a
high-security prison” until the 5th of January 2016, and could not “leave turkey and…must report to a police station twice a week” (BBC News, 5.1.2016).

**September 2015**

-September 13th. Curfews were re-imposed on Cizre (predominately Kurdish populated city) “just a few days after it was lifted” (BBC News, 13.9.2015). The reversal by state security forces was due to three police officers being killed a few days before “in two separate attacks in the south-east[;]….A car bomb near the city of Sirmak....[And] a rocket attack in the city of Silvan” (BBC News, 13.9.2015). The last curfew lasted eight days while the Turkish military conducted “a counter-terrorism operation against the PKK” (BBC News, 13.9.2015).

**October 2015**

-October 10th: Two suicide bombers detonated their bombs in the middle of a crowded rally (organized in part by the HDP) in the centre of Ankara (Işıkara, Kayserilioğlu, & Zirngast, 2015; BBC News, 14.10.2015). 102 people were killed in the attack, many Kurds and secularists among the dead and wounded (of which there were hundreds) (BBC News, 14.10.2015; Beck, 2016). Soon after the bombing, President Erdogan accused the PKK and Syrian affiliates (YPG, PYD) “of blowing up their own people;” it was found later that an ISIS bomber was behind the attack (Tisdall, 18.2.2016). The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire the same day (10th of October) so as to ensure a stable, calm, peaceful environment for the upcoming elections in November (Beck, 2016). Soon after the bombing, the HDP declared that it would be canceling all future “election campaigning for safety reasons,” while the AKP continued on with their campaigning (Beck, 2016).
-October 26th: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced that Turkish forces “had struck Kurdish militia fighters twice after they defied Ankara’s warning not to cross west of the Euphrates river;” PM Davutoglu did not disclose when Turkish forces struck the Democratic Union Party (PYD) or the YPG, but according to the YPG the strikes were “near the border towns of Tel Abyad and Kobani” (Pamuk, 27.10.2016).

-October 31st: A day before the November General Election, the Economist reported that “in the first 25 days of October, Mr Erdogan appeared on the state-run TV channel for 29 hours, while coverage of his party ran for 30 hours” (The Economist, 31.10.2015). As for the other opposition parties, the CHP and MHP had 6 hours and 10 minutes on television, and the HDP only received 18 minutes (The Economist, 31.10.2015).

November 2015

-November 1st: Polls closed on the second General Election of the year with the AKP winning just over 49 percent of the vote (The Economist, 2.11.2015). According to the Economist, the majority the AKP gained from the election came from far-right nationalists who support Erdogan’s tough stance on the Kurdish conflict, and from conservative Kurds who switched back to the AKP (from the HDP in June) after the peace process with the PKK ended (The Economist, 2.11.2015). All of the aforementioned factors hurt the HDP (and produced gains for the AKP) electorally as they went from 80 to 59 seats in parliament and dropped from 13.1 percent to 10.8 percent of the vote (The Economist, 2.11.2015).

-November 26th: “Pro-Kurdish lawyer and human rights activist,” Tahir Elci was shot and killed by state police or unidentified gunmen in Diyarbakir (BBC News, 28.11.2015). Just after Elci ended his statements condemning the violence between the Turkish security forces and the PKK,
“the crowd was sprayed with bullets,’ a local official from the pro-Kurdish HDP party, Omer Tastan, told Reuters” (BBC News, 29.11.2015). The Kurdish population and those in opposition to the government believe Elci was assassinated by the Turkish nationalists in conjunction with the Turkish state (BBC News, 28.11.2015; BBC News, 29.11.2015). Following Elci’s death, the Turkish state put in place a curfew in the district of Diyarbakir where he was shot (BBC News, 29.11.2015).

November 27th: “Two prominent Turkish journalists were arrested on charges of ‘spying’ and ‘revealing state secrets’ after they published a story alleging that members of the state intelligence agency were sending weapons into Syria;” the journalists are Can Dundar and Erdem Gul from the Cumhuriyet newspaper (Al Jazeera, 27.11.2015). The weapons were destined for Islamist militants in Syria, but the Turkish government states that trucks were not filled with weapons but aid destined for Turkmen (BBC News, 27.1.2016).

December 2015

-December 17th: Turkish security forces killed 23 suspected members of the PKK in the cities of Cizre and Silopi, which were both put under curfew at the beginning of the week (BBC News, 17.12.2015). It was reported that 10,000 police and army personnel, along with tanks, were deployed to the two cities to search every home for militants; deserted schools were turned into army barracks and civilians hid in basements as they feared they would be killed by state security forces if they went outside (BBC News, 17.12.2015).

-December 18th: The Turkish state declared that 63 PKK members had been killed in fighting, but news agencies or human rights organizations could not independently confirm this statement made by the military as the areas (Cizre and Silopi) were under curfew (Aljazeera, 18.12.2015).
On the same day (18th), Selahattin Demirtas, co-leader of the HDP “urged local residents [of Cizre and Silopi] to ‘expand the struggle’ and embrace ‘honorable resistance’” (Beck, 18.12.2015).

-December 22nd: Deutsche Welle reported on the ongoing curfews in the southeast of Turkey noting that reports of civilians protesting the curfews or simply trying to retrieve food or water were shot at by security forces; Human Rights Watch added that the Turkish security forces “have failed ‘to distinguish between people who were armed and those who weren’t, making no assessment of the threat an individual posed or the necessity of using lethal force’” (Deutsche Welle, 22.12.2015). The same news report by Deutsche Welle found that dead bodies littered basements and streets as the curfews were in effect (with some lasting more than a month), and that civilian death tolls were under reported according to Human Rights Watch (September to December: 15 reported, HRW estimates at least 100) (Deutsche Welle, 22.12.2015).

-December 25th: A “3-month-old baby and her grandfather were killed in crossfire between security forces and militants, according to local medics, who said the family was unable to reach help after its house had been shelled” in the city of Cizre, under curfew once again (Yeginsu, 30.12.2015).

-December 26th and 27th: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (a union of rebel groups fighting in northern Syria with the main force being the YPG) took away the “Tishrin Dam from ISIS,” thereby violating Turkey’s ‘red line’ for the Kurds not to cross the Euphrates river; the Turkish government fears the two cantons of Rojava (the self declared Kurdish state) linking up into one, thus providing a Kurdish state or launching pad on its southern border (Bertrand, 29.12.2015).
-December 29th: President Erdogan accused the co-leader of the HDP, Demirtas, “of treachery for comments that called for self-rule for Kurds in the southeast,” which has led to an investigation being opened against Demirtas by the “Ankara Public Prosecutor’s Office” (Yeginsu, 30.12.2015).

January 2016

-January 1st: The snatch and grab of camera-man Baran Ok by masked men (later found to be Turkish security forces) in front of his reporter co-worker (Bulut, 28.1.2016).

-January 2nd: ARA News reports that “at least 16 civilians were killed and dozens wounded since the start of the Turkish army operations in [Cizre],” with those wounded being treated inside basements of houses as the curfew (and subsequent shelling by Turkish tanks and artillery) “prevents the medical teams from transferring people to the town’s hospital” (ARA News, 2.1.2016).

-January 5th: Three female Kurdish activists (Seve Demir, Pakize Nayir, Fatma Uyar) “were found dead subsequent to a security raid in Silopi;” the HDP along with the Democratic Regions Party (BPD) issued a joint statement declaring these assassinations of Kurdish civil rights activists “‘confirms the brutality of the authorities against the Kurdish people and the peaceful activists’” (qtd in ARA News, 6.1.2016). Also on the 5th, Mohammed Rasool, an Iraqi Kurdish journalist had been released from prison under conditions that he not leave Turkey and “must report to a police state twice a week”; Rasool was held for 131 days on terror charges for reporting in the southeast of Turkey (BBC News, 5.1.2016).

-January 8th: Turkish special forces alongside local police in Istanbul raided the offices of the HDP and “detained six people including local officials from the…[HDP];” the raid comes two
days after President Erdogan declared that “some HDP lawmakers and local mayors were behaving like members of a terrorist organization and that their positions should not shield them from prosecution” (Pamuk & Cakan, 8.1.2016).

-January 12th: The beating of photographer and journalist Mursel Coban by Turkish security forces (Bulut, 28.1.2016).

-January 16th: “Tens of academics detained for signing a petition calling for an end to the army campaign against Kurdish rebels in the southeast of the country” were released after an investigation by state prosecutors; the charges that were going to be levied against the academics included: “insulting the state and engaging in ‘terrorist propaganda’ on behalf of the…[PKK]” (Aljazeera, 16.1.2016). President Erdogan along with other government officials are critical of the petition and claim it is PKK propaganda since it is only critical of the government’s actions and not the PKK’s (Aljazeera, 16.1.2016).

-January 20th: Turkish security forces fired upon “a group of civilians who were holding up white flags as they tried to remove the dead and wounded from the street in Cizre;” two civilians were killed in the incident and 12 others were wounded (Bulut, 28.1.2016). Among the wounded was Refik Tekin, a cameraman for IMC TV, who was wounded while filming the entire incident (Bulut, 28.1.2016).

-January 26th: the Israeli defence minister joined his Russian counterpart in accusing that Turkey is purchasing oil from ISIS, whether knowingly with Turkish state official approval or by middle men (as a US state department official stated a month) and tacitly allowing the oil to flow in and be sold (BBC News, 26.1.2016).
-January 27th: Turkish security forces expanded the curfew from the Sur district in Diyarbakir “to include five more neighbourhoods....So that security forces could remove barricades and explosive devices and fill in ditches set up by the militants,” according to the Diyarbakir governor office (Sim, 27.1.2016).

-January 31st: It was reported that “at least 10 civilians injured in clashes have died in southeastern Turkey over the past two weeks because ambulances could not reach them;” this includes six of the 20 civilians trapped in a basement in Cizre as the Turkish security personnel will not allow ambulances into areas “where operations are ongoing” (Geerdink, 31.1.2016). Lawyers sympathetic to those wounded civilians trapped in the curfew zones had been utilizing appeals for “urgent procedure at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),” which had been accepted by the ECHR, however, the ECHR switched their stance and advocated for “domestic judicial options...[being] exhausted before the ECHR may be asked to intervene” (Geerdink, 31.1.2016). The highest court in Turkey, the Constitutional Court, ruled against the appeals for immediate medical aid, including the appeal for the aforementioned remaining wounded civilians (14) in the basement in Cizre (Geerdink, 31.1.2016).

February 2016

-February 3rd: Hundreds of civilians left Diyarbakir after the newest curfew, which had lasted over one month since the last temporary reprieve, was temporarily lifted; the night before the curfew being lifted “in the city’s western [districts],” the curfew was further broadened to include all 15 of the city’s districts instead of only 11 (VICE News, 3.2.2016).
-February 5th: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced there would be no future talks with Kurdish militants, including the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan, stating that “first they will abandon arms, only then there may be an opportunity to talk to them” (Cakan, 5.2.2016).

-February 6th: Another Turkey-Syria cross border shooting occurred near the Kurdish secured town of Tal Abyad; activists reporting to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) claim that Turkish border guards killed an unidentified male (SOHR, 6.2.2016).

-February 7th: The Wall Street Journal reported on talks between US Vice President Joe Biden and top Turkish officials, that occurred a month earlier, where the Turkish delegation focused most of their attention accusations of illicit smuggling of US supplied weapons across the Turkish-Syria border by the YPG for the PKK, (Nissenbaum & Lee, 7.2.2016).

-February 11th: The military operations in Cizre have ended, however, the Turkish state declared that the curfew will not be lifted for an undisclosed amount of time as there were still trenches to be filled and other operations (e.g., de-mining) (Rudaw, 11.2.2016).

-February 14th: The Turkish military shelled YPG positions in Syria and killed two SDF fighters an injured seven others; this is the second day of shelling coming from the Turkish side of the border (Daily Mail, 14.2.2016). Turkey also targeted the “Menagh airbase [near Azaz], which was seized by the YPG…from Syrian Islamists rebels [recently],” including Al-Nusra Front (BBC News, 14.2.2016). On the 14th, five Syrian Kurdish parties have joined under the banner of the Kurdish National Alliance in Syria and have called for a federal state in Syria that allows for an autonomous, Kurdish state of Rojava (ARA News, 14.2.2016).

-February 15th: The Washington Post published findings from an analysis of the Turkish 2015 elections using The Election Forensics Toolkit website that revealed that electoral fraud was
committed in the November 2015 election in Turkey (Mebane, Hicken, & Kollman, 2016). According to the researchers from the University of Michigan and the Washington Post, fraud was committed with “high probabilities of AKP-favoring frauds occur[ing] not merely in eastern Turkey but in areas where the party that supports Kurdish interests (HDP, Peoples’ Democratic Party) is the dominant party” (Mebane, Hicken, & Kollman, 2016). On the 15th, Yasin Aktay, an AKP deputy chairman for foreign affairs, accused the PYD (and subsequently the YPG) of ethnically cleansing areas of northern Syria “where there is nor or a small Kurdish population, and works to deport non-Kurdish ethnic population out of these areas” (Uras, 15.2.2016).

-February 17th: A bomb exploded in Ankara, killing 28 people (26 of which were soldiers); the AKP government quickly claimed the YPG were behind the bombing, naming Salih Necar as the bomber (BBC News, 18.2.2016). The YPG denied attacking Turkish military personnel in Ankara while clarifying in a statement: “despite all the provocations and attacks by the Turkish army on the border of Rojava…we have not responded and acted in a historic responsible manner” (YPG qtd in Aljazeera, 18.2.2016).

February 19th: The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) claimed the bombing of the 17th in Ankara, which contradicted the claim by the Turkish government that the YPG were behind the attack that targeted military personnel (Letsch, 19.2.2016). On the 19th, Member of Parliament (MP) Feleknas Uca claimed that the Turkish security forces allowed 150 Kurds to be burned to death in basements in ongoing curfews in the southeast where “burned bodies were found…without heads in the district of Cizre” (Charlton, 19.2.2016).

-February 20th: Rami Jarrah, a Syrian journalist who set up ARA News, was released after being detained by Turkish security forces in southeastern Turkey earlier in the week (BBC News, 20.2.2016). Jarrah explains upon his release that he was detained alongside other prisoners who
“...were all held under the same suspicion of being terrorist elements, all have not been charged and some have been there for up to nine months after having being declared innocent by a court of law” (BBC News, 20.2.2016).

-February 23rd: DNA reports show that the Ankara bomber is not from Syria, but from the Turkish city of Van; Abdulbaki Somer carried out the bombing for TAK as was proclaimed by TAK in a statement on the 19th (Coskun, 23.2.2016).

-February 26th: The two journalists from Cumhuriyet (Can Dundar and Erdem Gul) who reported on the Turkish government sending aid and weapons to Islamist militants in Syria were released after a Supreme Court ruling declared that their personal rights and freedom of speech were violated (Fraser, 26.2.2016).

-February 27th: The Turkish state takes IMC TV, a pro-Kurdish channel according to the government off the airwaves as it is accused of broadcasting terrorist propaganda for the PKK or in support of the PKK (Business-Standard, 27.2.2016). On the 27th, the Turkish armed forces began observing and participating in the ceasefire in Syria by ceasing their shelling of PYD and YPG positions in northern Syria a few days before the ceasefire (Demirtas, 27.2.2016).

-February 28th: Russia accused the Turkish government of breaking the ceasefire by implicitly allowing 100 Syrian militia fighters cross into Syria from Turkey to attack the Kurdish held town of Tal Abyad and explicitly aiding said rebels by shelling the Tal Abyad area (Smolchenko, 28.2.2016).

March 2016

-March 2nd: The curfew in Cizre was eased from being a 24-hour curfew to only “from 7:30pm to 5am”, three weeks after security operations were officially concluded on the 11th of February
(which began on the 14th of December 2015) (Associated Press, 2.3.2016). According to human rights organizations, 92 civilians were killed in Cizre during the security operations (that ended February 11th) and “another 171 bodies have been found since hostilities [have] ended” when the curfew ended (Associated Press, 2.3.2016).

-March 13th: A car bomb exploded in Ankara killing 36 and injuring over 125 others, mostly civilians (BBC News, 14.3.2016; Peker, 15.3.2016). The Turkish government immediately accused the PKK of orchestrating the bombing, citing a female PKK member as the perpetrator, and commenced new curfews in the southeast (Yuksekova and Nusaybin) while bombers struck PKK camps in northern Iraq (Qandil and Gara) (BBC News, 14.3.2016).

-March 16th: A report from Middle East Eye claims the Turkish state is trying to stoke a civil war between Kurdish factions in Syria by supporting a small Kurdish rebel group called the Grandsons of Salahadin, which is opposed to the PYD and YPG as they see them as defending Bashar al-Assad's regime (Wilgenburg, 16.3.2016). The support from the Turkish state for the Grandsons of Salahadin includes logistical support (by launching from Turkey into Afrin, Syria), financial support, and support from Turkish artillery on the border (Wilgenburg, 16.3.2016).

-March 17th: TAK claimed responsibility for the March 13th bombing as a form of revenge for the ongoing military operations in the southeast; the Turkish government blamed both the YPG and PKK for training her before she became a TAK member (BBC News, 17.3.2016; Peker, 15.3.2016). On the 17th, the PYD declared that they would go ahead with the creation of “an autonomous federation in the northern part of Syria” which they control; the autonomous federation of Rojava consists of three cantons: Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin (Aljazeera, 17.3.2016).
March 18th: President Erdogan stated in a speech “[that] democracy and freedom have ‘absolutely no value’ in the country after calling for journalists, lawyers and politicians to be prosecuted as terrorists;” the speech occurred the same day as close to 50 activists and academics were detained in raids by security forces (Dearden, 18.3.2016).

March 19th: A suicide bomber from ISIS (originally born in southern Turkey, according to Turkish authorities) attacked Istanbul’s main shopping avenue, killing 4 and injuring 36 other civilians; many international tourists were among those injured; initially the Turkish state blamed the PKK (BBC News, 20.3.2016; Reuters, 19.3.2016).

March 21st: The Turkish state restricted Kurdish Newroz celebrations to only “18 of the country’s 81 provinces due to the security problems” (Cakan & Butler, 21.3.2016).

March 28th: Asbarez reported that land and buildings in Diyarbakir, specifically the Sur district, “have been expropriated by the Turkish government;” included in 6300 lands and buildings are the “Surp Sarkis Chaldean Church, Virgin Mary Ancient Assyrian Church, and the city’s Protestant church” (Asbarez, 28.3.2016).

March 31st: A car bomb detonated at a bus terminal killing 7 “special forces policemen and wounded 27 [others]” in the Diyarbakir; the PKK claimed responsibility almost immediately for the attack (Aljazeera, 1.4.2016).

April 2016

April 1st: Amnesty International reported that Turkish state officials had been sending back groups of about 100 Syrian refugees almost daily since mid-January; a BBC investigation corroborates this report with refugees stating that before being forced across the border they were forced to sign a document stating their intention of returning to Syria (BBC News, 1.4.2016).
-April 2nd: President Erdogan made clear during a speech to a gathering of lawyers that “Turkey should consider stripping citizenship form supporters of terrorism…adding that the government had ‘nothing to discuss with terrorists’” (Reuters, 2.4.2016).

-April 3rd: President Erdogan declared that he would support the Manbij operation of the SDF and US-coalition if Syrian Arab tribes that are part of the SDF split from the group and that the US increase support for Turkish supported groups in Syria, specifically in Marea (Tanis, 3.4.2016).

-April 4th: President Erdogan declared that “the time for peace talks with the…[PKK] is over and vowed to stamp out the three-decade insurgency;” Erdogan clarified that the militants fighting the state could either surrender or be “‘neutralized’” (Erdogan qtd in Reuters, 4.4.2016).

-April 5th: After a rocket attack against security forces, which killed one and wounded four other security personnel, Turkish bombers “bombed Kurdish militant targets in northern Iraq…and declared a curfew [in Silopi]” (Cakan, 5.4.2016).

-April 6th: Turkey’s Justice Minister made a statement saying that “the country would begin to work on new rules that would allow supporters of terrorism to have their citizenships taken away” after Erdogan’s speech on the 2nd (Wood, 6.4.2016).

-April 20th: It was reported that several months ago the PKK made clear to the Turkish government it wanted to end hostilities and begin the peace process once more, but the Turkish government declined the invitation to begin talks, even through an intermediary (Yackley, 20.4.2016).
-April 21st: ARA News reports that the 35,000 civilians still residing in the curfewed city of Nusaybin were “suffering from severe shortage of water, food and medicines as well as complete electricity outage” (ARA News, 21.4.2016).

May 2016

-May 1st: Reports coming from activists in Nusaybin say that Turkish shelling has destroyed 28 residential buildings recently and with the aid of bulldozers have wiped away trace of other buildings (ARA News, 1.5.2016).

-May 5th: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stepped down from his post after a rift was seen growing between him and President Erdogan after last week when AKP “party officials stripped Mr. Davutoglu of his power to choose provincial party leaders” (Yeginsu, 5.5.2016).

-May 6th: Can Dundar and Erdem Gul were convicted of releasing state secrets and were sentenced to five years in prison; after being sentenced they were almost killed by a gunman waiting outside the courthouse (Yeginsu, 6.5.2016).

-May 13th: Amnesty International “called on Turkey, Gulf state and others to stop the transfer of arms to the Aleppo Conquest operations room—an umbrella for Syrian Islamist rebels” due to Islamists militants killing 83 civilians in the Kurdish Sheikh Maqsood neighborhood of Aleppo, between February and May 13th (ARA News, 13.5.2016).

-May 19th: Erdogan nominated a loyalist and favourite of his, Binali Yildirim to the post of Prime Minister; Yildirim is subsequently elected PM and AKP leader on the 22nd and urges for a Presidential republic (BBC News, 19.5.2016; BBC News, 22.5.2016).
May 20th: A bill that proposed stripping MPs of their immunity to legal prosecution by the state passed in the Grand National Assembly; pro-Kurdish politicians (specifically the HDP) see this as a way to target their members after being labeled as supporters of terrorists by Erdogan, even as the political wing of the PKK (Aljazeera, 20.5.2016).

May 21st: Turkish state prosecutors have opened over 405 investigations against HDP MPs and over 100 against CHP MPs (Morning Star, 21.5.2016). A total of 50 of the 59 MPs the HDP have in Parliament face terrorism related charges (The Economist, 4.6.2016).

May 26th: The Kurdish Civil Protection Unit (YPS) in Nusaybin withdrew from the city so as to protect the civilians still residing in the city from experiencing a similar fate as that of Cizre (e.g., massive destruction of city, civilian deaths and suffering from collective punishment) (Rudaw, 26.5.2016).

June 2016

June 3rd: Anti-terror operations ceased in Nusaybin but the 24-hour curfew was still in place (Reuters, 3.6.2016).

June 4th: Turkish security forces declare 24-hour curfews “in rural areas near the city of Diyarbakir” (Reuters, 4.6.2016).

June 5th: Turkish security forces (specifically the Army) “shifted the direction of anti-terror operations from urban centers to rural areas;” a Kurdish village guard was killed fighting the PKK militants in Sirnak the same day (Hurriyet Daily News, 5.6.2016). On the 5th, Turkish authorities resettled “300 Turkish families from Ukrain and settled them in…Kurdish areas in the [southeast]” (Rudaw, 5.6.2016).
-June 7th: A car bomb exploded next to a police bus killing “seven officers and four civilians in central Istanbul,” with 36 others being injured; President Erdogan blamed the PKK for the attack almost immediately (BBC News, 7.6.2016).

-June 10th: TAK claimed responsibility for the June 7th car bomb attack of a police bus in Istanbul (Reuters, 10.6.2016).

-June 16th: The PKK denied that they have contacted the Turkish government to engage in talks on the peace process, as the Turkish government has claimed in the past week (NRT, 16.6.2016).

-June 23rd: The Turkish Parliament passed a law making “prosecutors investigating complaints of abuse in counterterrorism operations…[are] required to seek the prime minister’s approval before filing charges against any top general…[and] the defense or interior ministries…[for] charges against lower-ranking military personnel” (Peker, 24.6.2016).

-June 25th and 27th: Turkish armed forces shelled YPG positions around Kobane and neighbouring towns in Syria; the shelling coincided with attacks by ISIS forces in Shuyukh near Kobane (ARA News, 27.6.2016).

-June 29th: ISIS used automatic weapons and bombs against civilians and police in Istanbul’s central airport, “killing 41 people and wounding 239” (Yackley & Pamuk, 29.6.2016).

**July 2016**

-July 1st: President Erdogan reshuffles those two highest courts of the Judiciary and passes a law that allows him to appoint a “quarter of the judges at the Council of State” (Reuters, 1.7.2016).
-July 14th: “Round-the-clock curfews” were put into place in 16 villages in Diyarbakir province and two “co-mayors of the town of Mizidagi in Mardin province” were removed from their posts due to being investigated for having alleged ties with the PKK (Reuters, 14.7.2016).

-July 15th: A group within the Turkish Military attempted to seize power from President Erdogan and the AKP in a coup; over 232 people were killed and 1491 were wounded, of which many were civilians (Arango & Yeginsu, 16.7.2016). Immediately following the coup attempt, President Erdogan initiated purges of the ‘Guardian state’; by the 18th post-coup purges included 8000 police officers and 8777 Interior Ministry officials, detention of 103 generals and admirals, 2389 soldiers, 2745 judges and prosecutors (BBC News, 18.7.2016). Also on the 15th, 23 villages and neighborhoods in the province of Mardin were put back under curfew by Turkish security forces (Rudaw, 15.7.2016).
Appendix 4: Direction of Bias from Biased Sources

The following paragraph explains the direction of bias of the aforementioned sources that have news reports that were important or uncovered new information. It should be noted that even though some of these news agencies, services or sources are not intentionally biased they are inadvertently biased when they are either run by or owned by Kurds, Turks, the Turkish State, Rojava, or the Kurdistan Regional government. The Anadolu Agency is a state-run broadcaster and is a media outlet biased towards the current political party in power, the AKP (Anadolu Agency, 2016). The ARA News is an independent press agency that focuses “on local developments across Rojava, Kurdistan Region, Syria, Iraq and Turkey,” was set up during the Syrian Civil War and largely covers Kurdish events or stories with a Kurdish bias (ARA News, 2016). Daily Sabah is a mouthpiece for the AKP, in particular President Erdogan who’s “son-in-law [owned it] until he sold it to an equally loyal company last year” (Armstrong, 9.12.2014). NRT TV is an Iraqi Kurdish news outlet that focuses primarily on Kurdish related events and stories with a Iraqi Kurdish bias (as can be seen in its reporting style elevating Iraqi Kurdish news reports above all others) (NRT TV, 2016). Today’s Zaman was formerly an opposition paper for the AKP but came under government control following a raid by Turkish security forces (BBC News, 4.03.2016). Press TV is an Iranian based paper that has an obvious Iranian bias towards both the Kurds and the Turkish State (oppositional to both) (PressTV, 2016). Rudaw is an Iraqi Kurdish media network that spans radio, print, TV, and online news reporting that is takes news reporting in “Kurdistan and the Middle East in a professional manner” but is openly biased towards the Kurds (Rudaw, 2016). Yeni Safak is another press media outlet that is a mouthpiece for the AKP (Armstrong, 9.12.2014). The Assyrian International News Agency was set up in 1995 and is biased towards Assyrian issues and events, and can be seen to be unintentionally biased against the
Turkish state in their news reporting and headlines for stories (AINA, 2016). Kurdistan24 is a news website and TV channel that is based in Iraqi Kurdistan and is unintentionally biased towards the Kurds, especially Iraqi Kurdish news, which they elevate above other stories (Kurdistan24, 2016). Gulf-Times is a state owned news outlet by Qatar and may be inadvertently biased due to Qatar supporting (loosely) and allowing for open fund raising of Islamist militant and terrorist groups (e.g., Al Nusra Front) that are actively combatting the Kurds in Syria (Kirkpatrick, 2014; Gulf-Times, 2016; ARA News, 9.03.2016).